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Abstract 
A detailed examination of theoretical approaches to contemporary Russian elites at 
the national and regional levels leads to an initial hypothesis according to which 
Russian regional elites embody a combination of continuity in terms of membership 
and change as regards the structures through which they implement policy ("the 
regime"). The historical background of Russian centre-region relations is surveyed 
with reference to the dominant tradition of centralism and to the centrifugal 
developments of the late Soviet period. The contemporary devolution of power is 
periodised into an initial phase of spontaneous decentralisation and a succeeding one 
in which issues of decentralisation remain unresolved. This leads to a development of 
the hypothesis in which regime change, while not dislodging the traditional elites, has 
nevertheless disrupted relations between them. Hence elite fragmentation goes beyond 
the general division between the centre and the regions, important thought this is, and 
occurs within the regions themselves. The case studies of Tiumen and Omsk regions 
confirm this view. Continuity is clearly marked in the composition of the elites. At the 
same time, significant changes have taken place. In Tiumen, the elites of the northern 
territories have supplanted the traditionally dominant elite based in the south of the 
region. In Omsk, the regional elite has had a constant struggle to establish its control 
over its own capital city. In both cases, central political elites have played a rather 
ineffectual role, especially when compared with corporate elites. The key issue at 
stake in elite conflict has been control over revenue from profitable assets. The thesis 
concludes with an evaluation of these results, and raises the question of their wider 
applicability in the Russian Federation. 
Introduction 
The research project on which this thesis is based spanned a large portion of post- 
Soviet Russia's brief history. It began when Boris Yeltsin, the regime's first president, 
was busy arranging the suppression of its first parliament. At the time, it seemed that 
this presaged a decisive assertion of central authority over the unruly republics, whose 
"parade of sovereignties" had been joined by the key region of Sverdlovsk. It ended 
as the centralisation policy of Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin's successor, was running into 
difficulties inside his own administration, let alone in the regions themselves. These 
problems appeared all the more daunting when set against the grandiose terms in 
which Putin's aim of re-creating a "strongly centralised state power" in the tradition 
of Peter the Great and Stalin had been announced. ' Regionalism, in short, is a 
leitmotif of contemporary Russian politics. 
Much of the first part of Yeltsin's presidency was dominated by the question of 
whether he was going to be able to keep Russia together, or whether it was going to 
fall apart like the Soviet Union. There were long negotiations with republican leaders 
and rival offers to them from parliament and president. Once the outcome of the 
struggle in Moscow was settled, the rewards for the regional elites included the 
Federation Council, the upper house of the new parliament, and special deals in the 
shape of bilateral treaties between individual regions and the centre. Gubernatorial 
elections, most of which were held in the autumn of 1996, consolidated the 
governors' position. In the following year, they succeeded in preventing Yeltsin from 
effectively supplanting Evgenii Nazdratenko, the governor of the Primorskii region, 
despite their evident lack of enthusiasm for the man himself. Not surprisingly, 
federalism, or centralisation, depending on your point of view, became something of 
an issue. But it was not until the lacklustre 2000 presidential election campaign that it 
moved into the foreground of the political stage. Once out in the open, it proved to be 
as knotty a problem for Putin as for his predecessor. At the time of writing, the 
impression of unalloyed decisiveness so highly prized by the presidential apparatus 
has been streaked with floundering, and there are signs that conciliation is once more 
on the order of the day. By the beginning of March 2001, Igor' Bunin, the head of the 
1 V. V. Kistanov, Federal 'nye okruga Rossii: vazhnyi shag v ukreplenii gosudarstva (Moscow: 
Ekonomika, 2000), p. 3. 
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Centre of Political Technology, was justifying the president's "search for a 
compromise with significant social forces, above all with the governors and the 
business elite". He described Putin's first year as "a first attempt at writing" (proba 
pera). He referred to the need to take account of elite interests and to the president's 
role as "a mediator between the authorities and elite groups". Interestingly, he also 
referred (without being specific) to "recent mistakes of the executive power", which 
he blamed on the narrow, segmented outlook produced by a prolonged period of 
adaptation to a bureaucratic environment. 2 
This is a period, then, in which regional elites, the subject of this thesis, have emerged 
as major players in Russian politics. 
The present-day prominence of regional elites in Russia is not something that can 
easily be explained in terms of tradition or past history. As recently as the late Soviet 
period, there was little sign of the extent of the changes which were to come. In 1989, 
for example, Aleksandr Minzhurenko, who was to become the Russian presidential 
representative in his home region of Omsk, was elected to the Congress of People's 
Deputies in the teeth of the opposition of the entire local Communist Party 
establishment. In 1990, he joined the "Democratic Platform" inside the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with the intention of creating a sizeable social- 
democratic party out of this pillar of Soviet power. Asked if there was any inkling 
among those who had adopted this perspective that the USSR was likely to 
disintegrate, he replied: 
We did not have a properly worked-out policy.... Academician Sakharov had 
already raised this issue in the group of deputies. But he raised this issue at 
the time in terms of concluding a new federative treaty, so that the unity of the 
republics would be really voluntary, no more than that. We did not then 
believe that the Soviet Union, the empire, was going to collapse -I don 't 
ctl remember exay. 3 
2 Pavel Fadeev, "Igor' Bunin: Putinu nuzhen `vtoroi shag"', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 March 2001. 
3 Interview with Aleksandr Minzhurenko, Regional Administration building, Omsk city, 10 December 
1996; Neil Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite; The Case of Omsk 1987-1995", 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4,1998, p. 621; John F. Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local 
Politics in Russia: The Case of Omsk", Theodore H. Friedgut, Jeffrey W. Hahn, (eds. ), Local Power 
and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 141. 
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One can certainly see the rise in Russia of regionalism, in the wider sense, as a result 
of centrifugal forces similar to those which broke up the Soviet Union, forces 
independent of the will of individuals like Minzhurenko. But then one has to specify 
what forces they were and why they should affect Russia in this particular way. 
This raises a further question. The Soviet Union disintegrated into individual nations. 
This naturally concentrated attention on Russia's 21 republics with their "titular 
nationalities", the Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Chuvash, etc., who supplied the ethnic 
name-tags on their territories. These republics were considered to be the main threat 
to - or promise of - the integrity of the new federal state. As time has gone on, 
however, the leaderships of the 55 regions have increasingly moved into the limelight. 
It is a sign of the times that Igor Bunin, in the interview quoted above, refers to the 
regional governors but not to the republican "heads of state". Non-Russian 
nationalism clearly played an important role in the disintegration of the USSR. By and 
large, this has not been the case even in the republics, let alone in the regions, where 
ethnic Russians are in the overwhelming majority. Chechnia has therefore been the 
exception which proves the rule. The renewal of the conflict in Chechnia, and the 
television coverage devoted to it, clearly were important factors in the unexpectedly 
strong showing of Edinstvo, the pro-Putin electoral bloc, in the December 1999 State 
Duma elections. Interestingly, however, election leaflets collected in two Russian 
regions (Novosibirsk and Nizhnii Novgorod) do not give particular prominence to the 
issue, compared with, say, centre-region relations, unemployment, or the importance 
of a peaceful transfer of power to a new president. Indeed, the Novosibirsk version 
does not mention Chechnia at all. 4 
If Soviet centrifugalism is the explanation for Russian regionalism, then one might 
expect there to have been a much greater degree of non-Russian nationalism in post- 
Soviet Russia as well as in the Soviet Union. Mass separatist movements featured 
heavily in the break-up of the USSR, while Russian regionalism has been associated 
with elite activity. There is a contrast here not only between Russia and the other 
former Soviet republics, but also between it and other states which emerged from 
elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc. "Compared with other communist federal states", 
'I am indebted to Dr. Christine Thomas, the head of the Slavonic and East European Collection of the 
British Library, for access to these and other election materials. 
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James Hughes has pointed out, "where democratic transition led to disintegration 
(Czechoslovakia by a negotiated disassociation, Yugoslavia ruptured by civil war), 
the survival of the Russian Federation is an exceptional case. "5 
This is not an argument for some general kind of Russian exceptionalism. Russia is 
clearly not the only post-communist country to have experienced a growth of 
regionalism in some form. But it is the only one in which this growth has not led to 
separation and the formation of new states. This suggests that there is a specifically 
Russian variant to a wider trend. It emphasises that the specific explanation for the 
rise of regionalism in Russia, and for its persistence within a single state, must to a 
great extent be sought within Russia itself. 
This thesis is therefore primarily concerned with the origins and nature of 
contemporary Russian regionalism as exemplified in the major activities and relations 
of the regional elites, especially where these have an economic dimension. The key 
question it asks is: what was it about the nature of transition in Russia which 
prompted and and then prolonged a shift of power to the regional elites? To this can 
be added a series of secondary questions. Is there a Russian regional tradition? What 
are the origins of contemporary Russian regionalism? To what extent does is it 
represent a break with the tsarist and Soviet past? In what way does it signify 
continuity? Why and how has it persisted? How has this affected relations between 
central and regional elites? What is the actual balance of power between the two, so 
far as it can be determined? 
Here is an example of the kind of general observation on Russian regionalism which 
has been made fairly frequently in recent years: 
The regional elites... really are assuming a lot of power, and maybe even they 
are the most powerful bodies in Russia - not bodies but forces - because 
central government in fact has really very limited possibilities to influence 
developments on the regional level. All power in particular regions is 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of political and economic leaders, 
political administrators - not even political but bureaucratic administrators - 
and the managers of the most important plants. -Most of them are the same 
5 James Hughes, "Institutional Design and Political Stability: Asymmetric Federalism in Russia's State 
of Transition", Paper, ESRC Research Seminar on Regional Transformations in the Russian 
Federation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 21 October 1998, p. 2. 
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people as they were before the coming of the political and economic 
revolution, of the changes, of the crash of communism - it's most of all the 
same people. 6 
The "before-and-after" contrast on the ground, as it were, at the level of individual 
business deals between individual companies, for example, can be particularly 
striking. A British company seeking to finalise a contract involving an enterprise in 
the then Soviet Ukraine had to pursue two sets of negotiations in parallel: one with the 
regional economic organisation to which the enterprise was subordinate, one with the 
relevant minister. When it came to a similar contract with Omskii bekon, a major 
agro-industrial enterprise, in the post-Soviet period, the main British negotiator was 
struck by the fact that he only dealt with the director, Aleksandr Podgurskii, an 
important figure throughout the transition period in Omsk, one of the case study 
regions in this project. No direct role in the contract was played by any other 
individual or organisation either from the regional or federal levels. 7 
These are illuminating observations of their kind, indicating to whom power has 
devolved and what kind of people they are. But on their own, they are either too 
specific or too general to do more than raise key questions for the purposes of this 
kind of research. They beg at least two of the questions already raised here: Why 
should regional elites left over from the centralised Soviet regime take on this new, 
unfamiliar role? What is the resulting balance of power between central and regional 
elites? There is also a practical reason for wanting an answer to this second question. 
It has been claimed more than once - most recently after the election of Vladimir 
Putin as Russian president in March 2000 - that Russia was being re-centralised. In 
other words, the regional elites were being shorn of their power and the balance was 
decisively tilting back towards the centre. If one had no more than a vague idea as to 
what the balance of power was before the claims about re-centralisation were made, it 
would be very difficult to establish how justified such claims were. 
Interest in the issue of regions and decentralisation goes quite far back in Soviet 
history. A 1927 analysis - and balanced defence - by I. Murugov of the progress of the 
6 Interview with Iurii Fedorov, Associate Professor of Political Science, Moscow State Institute for 
International Relations, King's College, University of London, 2 March 1995. 
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regionalisation policy of the time (raionirovanie), began with a quote from Aleksei 
Rykov, Lenin's successor as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, to the 
effect that the Soviet Republic was too big to be governed in a bureaucratic way from 
a single centre. 8 The article appeared with an ominous disavowal from the editor. 
Eight months later, Stalin took control of the CPSU. Such articles ceased to appear, as 
did the journal which had published Murugov. Stalinist centralisation meant that the 
regions lost any independent political significance. As a field of study, they largely 
became, with the exception of Khrushchev's sovnarkhoz (regional economic council) 
experiment, an interest of geographers. Not that this diminishes the importance of 
their work, a case in point being a paper by J. C. Dewdney on the development of 
Soviet regional policy, which appeared 40 years after Murugov's now obscure 
article. 9 
The prime point of reference in the specialist literature as far as the late Soviet period 
is concerned is Jerry Hough's seminal work on the "Soviet Prefects", which focused 
attention on the local party leaders. 1° Hough's concern with the economic role of this 
layer of leadership was shared and his conclusions updated by Peter Rutland some 20 
years later. " Although Rutland's book was published after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the research on which it was based related to the "mature Brezhnevite system" 
of 1975 to 1990. One of the book's main aims was to contest the significance ascribed 
by Hough to his finding that regional party leaders were becoming more competent 
and professional in dealing with economic affairs. Rutland's extensive re-evaluation 
of Hough is thus a key text for anyone concerned with the further evolution of 
Russian regional elites into the post-Soviet era. The significance of the Soviet break- 
up has, of course, been a major issue. Of particular relevance here is a study of 
institutional collapse by Steven Solnick. Solnick argues that Gorbachev's limited 
decentralisation of institutions like the Komsomol (the official communist youth 
Interview with John Gibson, Overseas Project Manager, Pig Improvement Company (PIC) UK, 
Abingdon, 17 February 1995. 
8 I. Murugov, "Detsentralizatsiia sovetskogo upravleniia primenitel'no k raionirovannym oblastiam", 
Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, No. 4 (9), April 1927, pp. 103-119. 
9 J. C. Dewdney, "Patterns and Problems of Regionalisation in the U. S. S. R. ", Research Papers Series 
No. 8 (1967), Department of Geography, University of Durham. 
10 Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
11 Peter Rutland, The politics of economic stagnation: The role of local party organs in economic 
management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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movement) triggered a fatal "bank run" on their internal organisation. The agents of 
dismemberment were the officials at all levels who appropriated the assets over which 
they had been granted authority. This example was then followed throughout the 
economic and political hierarchies, with only the Russian KGB as a possible 
exception. 12 
Other researchers, both in Russia and elsewhere, were turning their attention to 
regional affairs as the Soviet crisis rose to its climax in the early 1990s. 13 Publication, 
however, tended to wait until after the collapse of the USSR, and, in many cases, after 
the suppression of the Russian parliament in October 1993. Thus, the study by Helf 
and Hahn of the 1990 regional elections cited above and Mary McAuley's influential 
study of three regions (one of which was St. Petersburg) in the transitional period both 
appeared in 1992.14 Some work was published in 1993.15 But a later survey of St. 
Petersburg politics between 1990 and 1992, which McAuley co-authored with 
Vladimir Gel'man, appeared in a path-breaking regional anthology edited by Friedgut 
and Hahn in 1994.16 Quite apart from the ten regional and "systemic" studies which 
appeared in this volume, 1994 was a vintage year for both the number and the 
importance of Russian regional studies which saw the light of day in one form or 
another. '7 One article which deserves special mention here is a comparison by Julia 
12 Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), pp. 5-8,60-124,228-232. 
13 See, for example: O. V. Gritsai, G. V. Ioffe, A. I. Treivish, Tsentr i periferiia v regional 'nom razvitii 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1991); Gavin Helf, and Jeffrey Hahn, "Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the 
Russian Regional Elections of 1990", Slavic Review, 51,3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530. 
14 Mary McAuley, `Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', 
Soviet Economy, 1992,8,1, pp. 46-88. 
15 See, for example: Philip Hanson, Local Power and Market Reform in the Former Soviet Union 
(Munich: RFE/RL Research Institute, 1993); Sergei Manezhev, The Russian Far East (London: RIIA, 
1993). 
16 Vladimir Gel'man and Mary McAuley, `The Politics of City Government: Leningrad/St. Petersburg, 
1990-1992', Theodore H. Friedgut and Jeffrey W. Hahn (eds), Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics 
(Armonk, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 37. 
17 See, for example: I. Busygina, "Regional'noe izmerenie politicheskogo krizisa v Rossii", Mirovaia 
ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (MEMO), 1994, No. 4, pp. 5-17; Vladimir Gel'man, 
"Novaia mestnaia politika", Vladimir Gel'man (ed. ), Ocherki rossiiskoipolitiki (Moscow: Institut 
gumanitarno-politicheskikh issledovanii, 1994), pp. 67-96; Vladimir Gel'man, Ol'ga Senatova, 
"Politicheskie partii v regionakh Rossii", ibid., pp. 16-30; Ol'ga Senatova, Aleksandr Kasimov, "Krizis 
politicheskoi sistemy i porazhenie idei rossiiskogo federalizma", ibid., pp. 34-4 1; O1'ga Senatova, 
Aleksandr Kasimov, "Federatsiia ili novyi unitarizm? Povtorenie proidennogo", ibid., pp. 42-52; Hail' 
Mukhariamov, "Dogovor Tatarstana s Rossiel: suzhdeniia, otsenki, posledstviia", ibid., pp. 112-116; 
Sergei Ryzhenkov, "Volgogradskaia oblast'. Kazaki", ibid., pp. 117-121; Philip Hanson, "The Centre 
versus the Periphery in Russian Economic Policy", RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 17,29 April 
1994, pp. 22-27; Philip Hanson, Regions, Local Power and Economic Change in Russia (London: 
RIIA, 1994); Gavin Helf, "All the Russias: Centre, Core and Periphery in Soviet and post-Soviet 
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Wishnevsky of trends in the regional and central leaderships. 18 Wishnevsky argued 
that the centre's tendency towards authoritarian solutions was encouraging a similar 
trend among the regional elites and therefore posed "a profound threat to democratic 
values in today's Russia". 
Although other work appeared the following year, 19 the next major event affecting the 
field of regional elite studies was the publication, first in Russian and then in English, 
of the results of a five-year project, headed by Olga Kryshtanovskaia, investigating 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russian elites. 20 This provoked a direct response from James 
Hughes, who, on the basis of research into Siberian regional elites, argued that 
Kryshtanovskaia had underestimated the degree of elite integration. 21 Another kind of 
response, less direct but no less significant, came in 1999 from David Lane and 
Cameron Ross. Kryshtanovskaia's results had given a major boost to the argument 
that Russian elites, including those at the regional level, "were most of all the same 
kind of people". Lane and Ross found to the contrary on the basis of a major research 
project of their own, i. e., that the level of continuity between Soviet and Russian elites 
was negligible. 22 
Russia", University of California at Berkeley, Doctoral Dissertation, 1994; James Hughes, 
"Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement", Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 
7,1994, pp. 1133-1161; Peter Kirkow, "Regional Politics and Market Reform in Russia: The Case of 
the Altai", Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, No. 7,1994, pp. 1163-1187; Arbakhan Magomedov, 
"Politicheskie elity rossiiskoi provintsii", MEMO, 1994, No. 4, pp. 72-79 (see also, Andrei Sizov, 
"Kommentarii ekonomista: elity raznye, rezul'taty deiatel'nosti vo mnogom skhodnye", ibid., pp. 80- 
82); Darrell Slider, Vladimir Gimpel'son, Sergei Chugrov, "Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: 
Evidence from the 1993 Parliamentary Elections", Slavic Review, 53, no. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 711-732. 
18 Julia Wishnevsky, "Problems of Russian Regional Leadership", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, 
No. 19,13 May 1994, pp. 6-13. 
19 See, for example: Josephine Andrews, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Regionalism and Reform in 
Provincial Russia", Post-Soviet Affairs, 11,4,1995, pp. 384-406; Peter Glatter, "Regional and Local 
Power in Russia", Slovo, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 1995, pp. 56-79; Peter Kirkow, "Regional Warlordism in 
Russia: The Case of Primorskii Krai", Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, no. 6,1995, pp. 923-947; Nikolai 
Petrov, "Vybory organov predstavitel'noi vlasti", MEMO, 1995, No. 3, pp. 25-46. 
20 O1'ga Kryshtanovskaia, "Transformatsiia staroi nomenklatury v novuiu rossiiskuiu elitu", 
Obshchestvennie nauki i sovremennost', 1,1995, pp. 51-65; Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White, 
"From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5,1996, pp. 711-733; 
see also: Eberhard Schneider, Die Formierung der neuen russländischen politischen Elite (Cologne: 
Bundesinstitut fi)r ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1997); Jonathan Steele, "Keeping it 
in the family", The Guardian, 13 August 1999. 
21 James Hughes, `Sub-national Elites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to 
Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 6,1997, pp. 1017-1036. 
22 David Lane, Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from 
Gorbachev to Yeltsin (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). 
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Although Kryshtanovskaia's work seems to be more widely cited, attention within the 
field of regional elites seems to have shifted from these debates to other issues. Thus, 
the major development in the year following the publication of her results in English 
was a comparative analysis by Kathryn Stoner-Weiss of performance in four regional 
authorities. She concluded that there was a tension between governmental 
performance and democratic accountability. 23 Other publications at the time included 
summaries of the main post-Soviet developments in centre-region relations and within 
the regions themselves, and a study of local political movements in Russia from 1989 
to 1993.24 
Thereafter, the academic literature seems to have been largely of two kinds. One is the 
study of particular regions, still a comparative novelty less than ten years away from 
Soviet restrictions. An unusual example of this was Rob Ferguson's study of the 
Kuzbass, in that it looked beyond the regional elite itself to its relationship with the 
miners who formed a key element in the local population. A more conventional but no 
less significant example was Neil Melvin's account of how the Omsk elite evolved 
through the transition and its aftermath. The importance of Russia's prime natural 
resource region was given particular recognition by the inclusion in a volume on 
Russian oil of no less than two chapters on the Tiumen regional elite. 25 
The other type of literature is more concerned with developing an overview of 
Russian regional politics. Kimitaka Matsuzato of the Slavic Research Centre, 
Hokkaido University, is the editor, or joint editor, of a great deal of published 
research (mostly in Russian) on the Russian regions, to which he himself has regularly 
23 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
24 Ruth Brown, "Russia before the 1993 elections: did local political parties have a part in politics? ", 
British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES) conference 1997; Darrell Slider, 
"Regional and Local Politics", Stephen White, Alex Pravda, Zvi Gitelman (eds. ), Developments in 
Russian Politics 4 (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 251-265; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Federalism and 
Regionalism", ibid., pp. 229-250. 
25 Rob Ferguson, "Will Democracy Strike Back? Workers and Politics in the Kuzbass", Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3,1998, pp. 445-468; Peter Glatter, "Federalization, Fragmentation, and the 
Russian Oil and Gas Province", David Lane (ed. ), The Political Economy of Russian Oil (Lanham MA: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 143-160; Bruce Kellison, "Tiumen, Decentralization, and Center- 
Periphery Tension", ibid., pp. 127-142; Neil Melvin "The Consolidation of A New Regional Elite: The 
Case of Omsk 1987-1995", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4,1998, pp. 619-650. 
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contributed. 26 Matsuzato has argued that "sub-regional politics has been a driving 
force for the transition of Russia's political regime from communist boss politics to 
post-communist caciquismo". 27 He has also advocated the application of the concept 
of the "administrative party" both to the Yeltsin regime as a whole as well as to 
regional electoral behaviour. 28 Vladimir Gel'man of the European University in St. 
Petersburg (and formerly of the Institute of Humanities and Political Studies in 
Moscow, where he headed a research programme based on regional monitoring) and 
Michael Brie of the Society for Social Science Research and Publication in Berlin 
have helped to pioneer the analysis of regional politics in terms of different types of 
regional regimes. 29 At least two important works in Russian share this approach. The 
first, by Lapina and Chirikova, seeks to identify the main characteristics - 
problematic, for the most part - which have been developed by the regional elites as a 
result of their acquisition of power from the centre. 30 The second, by Arbakhan 
Magomedov, traces the path by which regional elites in two Volga republics 
(Tatarstan and Kalmykiia) and two regions (Nizhnii Novgorod and Saratov) have 
developed as discrete entities with their own interests, regimes and political 
ideologies. 31 Developing an overview in relation to a group of case study regions has 
also been a central concern in a research project on regional patterns of economic 
change headed by Philip Hanson and Michael Bradshaw. 32 
26 See, for example: K. Matsuzato, A. B. Shatilov, (eds. ), Regiony Rossii: khronika i rukovoditeli 
(Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, 1997 [Vols. 1-4], 1998 [Vol. 5], 1999 [Vol. 
6]); K. Matsuzato, (ed. ), Trete zveno gosudarstvennogo stroitel 'stva Rossii (ibid.: 1998); K. Matsuzato 
(ed. ), Vzryvnoipoias-96 (ibid.: 1999); Kimitaka Matsuzato (ed. ), Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic- 
Eurasian World. Towards a Discipline of "Regionology" (ibid.: 2000). 
27 Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Local Elites Under Transition: County and City Politics in Russia 1985-1996", 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 8,1999, p. 1367. 
28 Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Progressive North, Conservative South? - Reading the Regional Elite as a Key 
to Russian Electoral Puzzles", Matsuzato (ed. ), Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World, 
pp. 143-176. 
9 See, for example: Vladimir Gel'man, "Regime Transition, Uncertainty and Prospects for 
Democratisation: The Politics of Russia's Regions in a Comparative Perspective", Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6,1999, pp. 939-956; Vladimir Gel'man, "Transformatsii i rezhimy. 
Neopredelennost' i ee posledstviia", V. Gel'man, S. Ryzhenkov, M. Brie (eds. ), Rossiia regionov: 
transformatsiia politicheskikh rezhimov (Moscow: Ves' Mir/Berlin: Berliner Debatte 
Wissenschaftverlag, 2000), pp. 16-60; Vladimir Gel'man, "Sravnitel'naia perspektiva: regional'naia 
politicheskaia dinamika", ibid., pp. 331-375; Brie, Michael, "Regional'nye politicheskie rezhimy i 
sistemy upravleniia", ibid., pp. 61-108. 
30 N. Lapina, A. Chirikova, Regional'nye elity v RF: modeli povedeniia i politicheskie orientatsii 
(Moscow: Institut nauchnoi informatsii po obshchestvennym naukam, 1999). 
31Arbakhan Magomedov, Misteriia regionalizma. Regional'nye praviashchie elity i regional'nye 
ideologii v sovremennoi Rossii: modeli politicheskogo vossozdaniia "snizu" (sravnitel'nyi analiz na 
primere respublik i oblastei Povolzh'ia) (Moscow: Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 2000). 
32 Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, Special Issue on Russian Regions , 
Vol. 10, 
No. 3, September 1998. 
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On a less theoretical level, there has been a continuing attempt to grasp developments 
in centre-region relations. Thus, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss surveyed the background to 
the economic and political crisis of August 1998, concluding that "the process of 
devolution of authority may now be largely self-sustaining". Gail Lapidus 
complemented this with a summary which indicated that while there was, with the 
possible exception of the northern Caucasus, "little evidence of serious political 
separatism", the crisis had given fresh impetus to "growing economic and political 
autarchy in regions and republics alike". 33 
Regional elite studies is, to all intents and purposes, part of a new field of regional 
studies. Only works which clearly belong to it, and those of particular relevance to it, 
have been cited here. Opinions among its practitioners as to the status and prospects 
of this new field vary considerably, partly, at least, according to their circumstances. 
Two views from opposite ends of the spectrum illustrate the point. Kimitaka 
Matsuzato has argued that "regionology" is a response by Slavists to the challenge of 
change in the Slavic world. He emphasises its interdisciplinary nature, to which the 
Japanese academic structure and the traditions of Japanese Slavists are, he writes, well 
suited. 34 Arbakhan Magomedov, on the other hand, finds that this exciting new 
development in its native politics "remains for Russian political science a patently 
marginal phenomenon". 35 No doubt such contrasting points of view arise from 
differences between research environments as much as from disinterested evaluations 
of the field. 
A thesis about evolution and change, the persistence of the old as well as the 
appearance of the new, lends itself to an approach appropriate to what Moshe Lewin 
33 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the 
Devolution Process in Russia", Post-Soviet Affairs, 1999,15,1, p. 103; Gail W. Lapidus, 
"Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia", Post-Soviet Affairs, 1999,15,1, p. 81; see 
also: Nikolai Petrov, "Rossiia regionov: s Tsentrom ill bez? ", ESRC Research Seminar on Regional 
Transformations in the Russian Federation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 21 
October 1998; Peter Rutland, "The Regional Agenda in Alternative Plans for Russia's Economic 
Development", Takashi Murakami and Shinichiro Tabata (eds), Russian Regions: Economic Growth 
and Environment (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000), pp. 66-71. 
34 Kimitaka Matsuzato (ed. ), Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World, pp. ix-x. 
35 Arbakhan Magomedov, Misteriia regionalizma, p. 15. 
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has called "the history of the present". 36 In other words, an attempt will be made not 
simply to fix the characteristics of regional elites at one or more moments, but to chart 
their development out of the USSR's final decline and into the new age. Since the key 
issue is one of change, and very recent change at that, it is vital to conceive of the 
results as indicating trends rather than immobile verities. One of the lessons of the 
passing of the Soviet Union is the extent to which subordinate political institutions 
changed once their traditional context disappeared. Fictional republics became real 
states, fictional trade unions began to display a sensitivity to their members' wishes, 
fictional regions demonstrated their distinctiveness from the central power. 37 One of 
the implications is that the historical background against which such dramatic changes 
could take place needs to be investigated with these changes in mind. Another is that 
the entire project should be undertaken in more than one dimension: both on the large 
scale, the contextual level, one could say, in terms of centre-region relations, and on 
the small scale, in terms of developments in particular regions. A third is that the 
extent of change needs in some sense to be gauged, quantified, compared with the 
past, and that elements embodying change need to be identified as against those 
embodying continuity. If the apparently monolithic Soviet order of the 1980s was on 
the brink of transformation, then there is every reason to approach its unsettled 
Russian successor with a wary eye on the future. 
The study of Russia's regions is part of a continuing attempt to go beyond 
"Kremlinology", which began to take shape in the late Soviet period. 38 Since that 
time, there have, of course, been important changes, and whether the political 
landscape has really settled down yet remains to be seen. Basic operational concepts 
which represented an attempt to understand the Soviet Union have been rendered 
obsolete with its passing. The Soviet legacy may be a significant factor in Russian 
politics today, but this does not mean that totalitarianism theory has any direct 
application in contemporary analysis. Much the same is true of the terminology which 
denoted the various attempts at conceptualisation and backed them up with a 
common, if limited, shorthand language, a professional jargon. 
36 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (London: Hutchinson 
Radius, 1989), p. vii. 
31 See, for example, Walter D. Connor, Tattered Banners: Labor, Conflict, and Corporatism in 
Postcommunist Russia (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
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Those terms which survived have altered their meaning and need to be handled with a 
degree of care. One example of this is nomenklatura, the list of names from which 
Soviet officials at each level were appointed by a body at a higher level. The word 
came to mean the Soviet equivalent of "the powers-that-be", the "them" in the "them 
and us" of popular consciousness. Unqualified, it can mean the privileged elites which 
survived more or less intact from the old regime, their successful adaptation giving 
rise to expressions like nomenklatura privatisation, nomenklatura democracy, 
nomenklatura capitalism. Then there is the new nomenklatura, a term which seems to 
have at least three meanings. It can mean members of the old nomenklatura who have 
changed their careers (from the KGB, say, into PR or advertising). It can also denote 
those who have acquired wealth and power with the rise of the new Russian state, like 
Boris Berezovskii, the financial "oligarch" - and former Soviet scientist and 
mathematician. Finally, it can signify a mixed elite group composed of both old and 
new elements. 39 With all these differing definitions comes a variety of different views. 
Thus, a democrat in 1990 could denounce perestroika as a "policy of the 
nomenklatura, whose aim is to bring society out of the crisis at the same time as 
preserving its ruling position in it", while a present-day communist can accuse the 
very highest ranks in the nomenklatura of having sabotaged the Soviet Union. 40 
Change has also brought a host of imports of all kinds, including conceptions of 
politics. So although the nomenklatura is still in use, it has had to make room for a 
relative newcomer - the western term "elite", greatly used in this thesis. As we have 
seen, elites in Russia have been the focus of a fair amount of scholarly attention. As 
we shall see in Chapter 1, there has also been some debate about the relationship 
between the two terms "elite" and "nomenklatura". 
Russian specialists have related to the western tradition of elite sociology with 
apparent ease, albeit with some reservations. 41 The term itself appears to have come 
38 See, for example, Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet 
Government (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988). 
39 See, for example, Marat Cheshkov, " `Vechno zhivaia' nomenklatura? ", MEMO, 1995, No. 6, pp. 
32-43. 
40 M. Zil'bert, "Nomenklatura i perestroika", Svobodnoe slovo, No. 39 (69), 30 October 1990; 
Aleksandr Zinov'ev, "Nomenklaturnaia kontrrevolutsiia", Pravda Rossii, December 1999. 
41 See, for example, N. Lapina, A. Chirikova, Regional'nye elity v RF, p. 14. 
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into use quite early on in the decline of official Soviet ideology, in the "informal" 
movement of the late 1980s, for example, and has been an important item of 
discussion ever since. 42 "Elite" is a foreign word which even Russian nationalists are 
not averse to using. 43 This is part of a much broader, international trend, which is 
partly due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, as John Higley and Jan Pakulski have 
noted. But they also noted that while discussion about elites has come back into 
fashion, this has not led to any real renewal of elite theory. This poses serious 
problems, as far as Higley and Pakulski and other practitioners of elite theory are 
concerned. The divorce of the body of theory from its key term means that there is no 
consensus about key issues such as definitions, methodology, terminology, and so 
on. 44 But that, broadly speaking, is how the term is used in this thesis. It discusses and 
investigates Russian elites at some length - whether they are continuous, what 
changes there have been in their relations with each other, the extent to which each 
regional elites is an integrated social group, the relationship between elite identity and 
structure, and so on. It does not do so in the context of any particular theory about 
elites - Pareto's theory of elite circulation, Mosca's division of society into rulers and 
ruled, Michels' "iron law of oligarchy", C. Wright Mills' concept of the power elite, 
and so on - unless this is for some particular reason which is explicitly stated. 
There are a number of reasons for adopting this "untheoretical" or non-doctrinaire 
approach. The first is the sheer usefulness of the term elites, understood, as it was by 
Mosca and Pareto, "in the sense of groups of people who either exercised directly, or 
were in a position to influence very strongly the exercise of, political power, '. 45 As a 
working definition, this is neither too narrow, restricting the elite group exclusively to 
those who are in formal, explicit positions of power, nor too broad to be meaningful. 
It allows for the fact that the line between the powerful and the powerless, like the 
line between night and day, another important and clearly perceptible division, may 
42 See, for example (in chronological order): A. Razorenov, "Vsia vlast' elite? ", Gaudeamus No. 2, 
October 1989; Viktor Mokhov, "Politicheskaia elita v SSSR", Perspektivy, No. 8,1991, pp. 14-22; 
Vladimir Berezovskii, Vladimir Cherviakov, "Sovremennaia politicheskaia elita Rossii", Svobodnaia 
mysl', No. 1,1993, pp. 56-65, No. 2,1993, pp. 93-105; Mikhail Afanas'ev, "Praviashchie elity Rossii: 
obraz deiatel'nosti", MEMO, 1996, No. 3, pp. 46-56,4,1996, pp. 28-38. 
43 V. V. Selivanov, "Natsional'naia elita", Desnitsa, No. 2 (4), 1997, pp. 17-24. 
John Higley and Jan Pakulski, "Elite Theory versus Marxism: The Twentieth Century's Verdict", 
John Higley and, György Lengyel (eds. ), Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis (Lanham 
MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 236-238. 
' Tom Bottomore, Elites and Society (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 3. 
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not be absolutely precise. One of the great advantages of looking at power relations in 
terms of elites is that it focuses attention on the doings of groups of powerful people, 
rather than simply on the ideological, institutional or constitutional aspect of politics. 
Important though these may be, their real significance is established by and through 
human activity. This concern is evident, for example, in James Hughes' judgement 
that Russian centre-region friction had less to do with Muscovite democratisers 
coming up against conservative provincials than with "the territorialisation of 
cleavages within a fragmented elite", leading to conflict "between the two key strata 
of the old communist nomenklatura, the top layer based in Moscow and the main 
sublayers at the regional level, each battling to preserve and protect their status and 
extend their control over the country's wealth". 46 Finally, this way of looking at elites 
does not preclude other conceptions of power relations or social structure. Shorn of 
extraneous conceptual baggage, there is no reason why a particular elite should not be 
considered as a sub-group within a class, for example, or even to be in a 
"contradictory class location". 47 
There are dangers, of course. The definition quoted above suggests an exclusively 
political focus. This in turn implies a division between economic and political elites, 
perhaps a fundamental division, which may not correspond to the reality, or at least to 
the results of research. Thus, the political section of an anthology on elites in the 
former Soviet bloc contains a chapter on "a broad `social elite' that encompasses not 
only political but also economic and cultural (or intellectual) segments". 48 There is 
also a temptation, partly, perhaps, for the sake of convenience, to assume that elites 
derive their identity and attributes solely from the structures they inhabit, usually the 
political ones unless their economic or business career obviously takes first place. The 
problem here is that elites, or sections of them, can inhabit more than one 
organisational or institutional structure either consecutively, possibly in short order 
(in the course of a rising career, for instance), or simultaneously. This is one of the 
reasons why Sergei Sobianin, the recently-elected governor of Tiumen, one of the 
case study regions in this project, was variously described as being the candidate of 
the centre, the candidate of one of the factions in the presidential team, the candidate 
a6 James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia", p. 1154. 
47 Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 61-96. 
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of other local governors, and the favoured candidate of Lukoil, a major oil company. 
A related issue is that drawing a structural distinction between one elite and another 
can be problematic. 49 On the other hand, it is possible, as we shall see in the case of 
"transitology", to put such an emphasis on the role of elites that structures become 
insignificant. Efforts will be made to take account of such problems in this thesis. 
Apart from "elite", two other terms are exhaustively employed throughout the thesis: 
"region", and "regime". 
The definition of regions, has largely been the province of geographers and 
economists. It is, as Stuart Holland has remarked, "a game which can be played with 
almost infinite variations". 50 Broadly, speaking, there seem to be three main starting- 
points. One is to say that there are `natural' or `objective' regions, with which official 
human boundaries may or may not coincide. David J. M. Hooson, for example, 
divided the Soviet Union into, on the one hand, two contiguous zones stretching from 
the western border of Ukraine to a point about 500 miles east of Lake Baikal, which 
accounted for most of the population, output, energy and raw materials, and, on the 
other, a series of non-Slav zones which were marginal in all the same ways. 51 A 
second position is accept the existing administrative boundaries on the grounds that a 
rational definition is either impossible or impractical. According to Harry Richardson, 
for instance, "defining regions is such a nightmare that most regional economists 
prefer to shy away from the task, and are relieved when they are forced to work with 
administrative regions on the grounds that policy considerations require it or that data 
are not available for any other spatial units". To be fair, Richardson also stresses the 
fact that "regional economists are frequently forced to work with administrative 
regions regardless of whether they satisfy economic criteria or not", and that it is 
52 better to be realistic about this, especially in the area of applied research. Other 
48 Pavel Machonin and Milan Tucek, "Czech Republic: New Elites and Social Change", Higley and, 
Lengyel, Elites after State Socialism, p. 25. 
49 See, for example, Neil Melvin "The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite", pp. 649-650 (fn. 89). 
so Stuart Holland, The Regional Problem (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979), p. 4; for a 
complementary work, see Stuart Holland, Capital versus the Regions (London: Macmillan, 1976). 
51 David J. M. Hooson, The Soviet Union (London: University of London Press, 1966), pp. 123-124. 
52 Harry W. Richardson, Regional and Urban Economics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp. 17,24; 
examples of geographical works which avoid this issue include: James H. Bater, The Soviet Scene: A 
Geographical Perspective (London: Edward Arnold, 1989); Roy E. H. Mellor, The Soviet Union and 
its Geographical Problems (London: Macmillan, 1988); David M. Smith, Where the Grass is Greener: 
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regional economists have argued more positively in favour of analysis based on 
administrative divisions because the determining characteristics of regions tend to be 
social or political rather than economic, and because these are the regions `for which 
we have economic data'. 53 
A third position is to abandon the issue of definition as such in favour of typology. 
One influential example of this includes `homogenous' or statistically uniform 
regions, nodal or polarised regions cohering around dominant centres, and planning 
regions. 54 In a discussion of changing patterns of polarisation, Holland points out the 
disadvantages of a simple division between developed regions, which may include 
major depressed areas, and less developed regions, which may include significant 
pockets of high income. He outlines a `sample range' of five more complex categories 
used by governments in Western Europe and the USA: regions which are over- 
developed by comparison with the economy as a whole and congest infrastructure, 
neutral regions, which are developed but not congestive and often gravitate around 
overdeveloped regions, intermediate regions with a mix of more and less developed 
features, depressed regions, which lag behind the rest of the national economy, and 
under-developed regions which have failed to modernise. 55 
There is an extent to which such debates may simply be noted here as being of 
tangential interest before passing on. "There is no unique definition, " as Richardson 
says, "and the choice must depend to a large degree upon the objectives of the 
inquiry". 56 Given that regional administration in Russia, is a major factor in the 
composition of regional elites, a regional "problem" in this sense hardly seems to 
exist. However, it is worth emphasising two other aspects of regional theory. The first 
is that it is not all a matter of debate and uncertainty and that there is a simple, general 
definition of regions as the major divisions of a country. This distinguishes them both 
from the nation as a whole and from a multitude - possibly even an infinite number - 
of smaller divisions. In this sense, regions are simply the first sub-national layer of 
Living in an Unequal World (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981); Peter J. Taylor, Political 
Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality (London: Longman, 1985). 
53 A. J. Brown and E. M. Burrows, Regional Economic Problems: Comparative experiences of some 
market economies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 16. 
sa Holland, The Regional Problem, pp. 6-7; Richardson, Regional and Urban Economics, p. 19. 
ss Holland, The Regional Problem, pp. 7-9. 
56 Richardson, Regional and Urban Economics, p. 17. 
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spatial divisions with which any central government has to contend. 57 They are 
adjacent, they do not overlap, and between them they encompass the entire national 
space. 58 
On the other hand, issues of definition and delimitation in post-Soviet Russia may be 
posing theoretical questions about regions in new ways. 
The simple definition of regions implies that anything regional is essentially a 
subdivision of something national. Thus, regional economies are a subdivision of 
national economies, regional politics is a subdivision of national politics and regional 
elites are a subdivision of national elites. Richardson, for example, marshals a series 
of arguments against the kind of spatial analysis which includes regions as one level 
among many "from the world economy down to the village.. . with the 
implication that 
the economic performance of a region can be understood in terms of traditional 
macroeconomics while interregional systems are comprehensible as analogues to 
international systems". A crucial economic distinction for him between the region and 
the nation "is that crossing national boundaries involves overcoming barriers not 
found at regional borders". The absence of tariffs, quotas, immigration controls, 
exchange control, import and export licences, and direct controls on capital movement 
means easier inter-regional interaction. A region therefore cannot be treated as a 
closed system for the purposes of analysis, "for 'openness' is its essence". The closed 
economy assumption, which may be built into macro-economic models of the national 
economy, has no place at the regional level. "To treat the region as a 'mini-nation"', 
Richardson concludes, "is to ignore the substantial contributions made by regional 
59 economists over several decades". 
Yet this is precisely what Vladimir Gel'man, among others, is now arguing for as 
regards political regimes in the Russian regions: 
Since the late 1980s the degree of political independence of Russia 's regions 
has increased in various forms and degrees. After the 1995-97 wave 
gubernatorial [sic] elections, the federal influence in regional politics became 
even more insignificant. Therefore, it seems useful in analysis of regional 
57 Brown and Burrows, Regional Economic Problems, pp. 7,13-14. 
58 Richardson, Regional and Urban Economics, p. 17. 
59 Richardson, ibid., pp. 25-27,29; see also: Holland, The Regional Problem, pp. 4-6. 
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political regimes in Russia to treat regional entities as if they were nation- 
states. Within this framework, federal authorities (as well as other actors 
outside a particular region) may be regarded as "external" actors. That is, 
one may consider their impact on regional politics as if one were analysing 
the impact of international influence on national politics. 60 
Putting the detail of the argument to one side for the moment, the very fact of its 
emergence among regional specialists could be symptomatic of the extent and 
importance of the fragmentation of the Russian polity - "the territorialisation of 
cleavages within a fragmented elite", in Hughes' pregnant phrase. It may also mean 
that we are witnessing the beginning of a translation of debates about regional 
definition into specifically Russian terms. The complex regional structure of the 
present-day Russian Federation is best left to Chapter 2, which deals with its 
formation and development. However, it is worth keeping in mind that regions are 
always in some sense forms of human organisation, and therefore subject to alteration 
from the same source. 
"Regime" seems to be one of those words in such common use that its meaning often 
has to be inferred. An obvious example is the naming of regimes after their leaders - 
the Brezhnev regime, the Andropov regime, the Gorbachev regime, and so on. 
61 
Equally obviously, this does not preclude the drawing of more fundamental 
distinctions between the tsarist regime and the Bolshevik regime, or between the 
Soviet regime and the political regime of post-Soviet Russia. But there is another, less 
obvious reason for drawing attention to this term: the question of the relationship 
between regime and society. In part, this is to do with the lingering influence of 
totalitarianism theory. 62 "One of the weaknesses of the totalitarian model, " wrote 
Rasma Karklins (who was himself responsive to its appeal), "was its focus on regime 
structures and intent and the way it seemingly ignored society". 
63 
60 Gel'man, `Regime Transition, Uncertainty and Prospects for Democratisation", p. 942. 
61 See, for example, John P. Willerton, Jr., "The Political Leadership", Stephen White, Alex Pravda, 
Zvi Gitelman, Developments in Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 52-54. 
62 See, for example, Peter Rutland, "Sovietology: Who got It Right and Who Got It Wrong? And 
Why? ", Michael Cox (ed. ), Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and 
the New Russia (London: Pinter, 1998), p. 35. 
63 Rasma Karklins, "Explaining Regime Change in the Soviet Union", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, 
No. 1,1994, p. 39. 
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A more influential tendency nowadays is evident in one of the basic texts of 
"transitology". This offers a scenario in which, once the elites have sorted out their 
own arrangements, a democratising regime can, if it keeps a cool head and a firm grip, 
expect a huge boost from society as it feels the chains of authoritarianism slacken. Or 
rather, a boost from particular social groups, such as artists and intellectuals, 
"privileged sectors", "middle sectors", and, most dangerous of all, the working class - 
"the greatest challenge to the transitional regime". 64 The elites clearly have pride of 
place in this conception, to such an extent, in fact, that not only is the rest of society 
alloted roles to help them out of the authoritarian dead-end, but also, more relevant to 
our purpose, structures hardly make an appearance. Indeed, the indeterminacy of the 
regime resulting from such a transition is a major feature of this project. 
The question of definition is relegated to a footnote, although its own key term, 
"transition", is defined as "the interval between one political regime and another", a 
definition which, as the foonote points out, "obviously depends on how one defines 
`regime"'. The lengthy definition of regime which follows revolves around the issue 
of "access to principal governmental positions" - "the ensemble of patterns" which 
determine such access, the characteristics of those who are "admitted and excluded 
from such access", and the means by which access may be gained. All this must be 
institutionalised, i. e., it must be a matter of custom and practice, at least to those who 
participate in it. This definition, if it can be described as such, leaves too many loose 
ends, and seems too broad and vague to be useful in analysis. Perhaps it also seems 
lacking to its authors, as, at another point, they issue a different, and rather more 
succinct definition: "Normality, in other words, becomes a major characteristic of 
political life when those active in politics come to expect each other to play according 
to the rules - and the ensemble of these rules is what we mean by a regime". 
65 Once 
again, however, this is redolent of a reductive approach in which structures are not 
illuminated but replaced by unmediated relations between elites. 
Raymond Aron has traced the term "regime" back to Aristotle, whose Politics, he 
argues, does not distinguish between political science and sociology: "the city is the 
64 Guillermo O'Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore MA: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), p. 52. 
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collectivity through which man's nature is realized and the regime (politeia), being 
the mechanism for the organization of Power, defines the specific character of every 
city". 66 It is true that Aristotle does not make a distinction between state and society. 
What he does do, however, is to argue that the different ways in which power - or, to 
use Aristotle's terminology, the different forms in which the distribution of offices - is 
organised depends largely on inequalities of wealth, rank and merit. The fact that such 
inequalities have developed differently in each city state means that the offices are 
arranged differently in each case too. The shape of the society, in other words, to a 
great extent explains the form of government, the way the exercise of power is 
organised, the structure of the regime. 
Aristotle certainly describes a close relationship between what we would call society 
and the form of government. At the same time, he makes a clear distinction between 
them. However, the way he does this could be interpreted as as deterministic, as a 
conception in which the regime must remain fixed so long as the society does not 
change. But there are two parts to Aristotle's argument. This, the first part, is 
primarily concerned with etiology, that is, with the origins of regimes in the societies 
in which they are rooted. He goes on to assert that there can be as many different 
regimes as there are ways of "arranging the offices". Although he notes that this is 
ultimately limited by the nature of society, the implication is that there may be all 
kinds of variations in the regime without there necessarily being a fundamental social 
change. When one adds to this the range of possible regime changes which may 
correspond to relatively minor social shifts and re-arrangements, the whole 
conception seems much more flexible. A thoroughgoing transformation of society 
would certainly necessitate a corresponding change of regime, all appearances to the 
contrary notwithstanding. On the other hand, a change of regime, however dramatic it 
might appear to be, would not of itself prove that society as a whole was undergoing a 
decisive change. 
65 O'Donnell, and Schmitter, ibid., pp. 6,65,73 (fn. 1). 
66 Raymond Aron, "Ruling groups or ruling class? ", Dominique Schnapper (ed. ), Power, Modernity 
and Sociology: Selected Sociological Writings of Raymond Aron (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), p. 
165. Politeia is normally translated by the word "constitution", but Aron seems justified as we tend to 
use the term "regime" to mean something in the nature of a practical, as opposed to written, 
constitution. I am indebted to Melanie Bourne of the British Library's Slavonic and East European 
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Such implications are relevant to at least two key changes which took place in Russia 
in the twentieth century. Looked at in these terms, for example, the drastic socio- 
economic changes concomitant with the rise of Stalin could mean that the political 
regime which developed was really quite new, despite some apparent similarities with 
what had gone before. By contrast, the unmistakable, if somewhat protracted 
transition from the Soviet to a fully post-Soviet Russia regime does not necessarily 
indicate a qualitative change in the structure or composition of Russian society. This 
has consequences for the meaning of terms like "elite". Drawing a distinction between 
the regime, the arrangement of organisational and institutional structures through 
which power is exercised, and society as a whole means that elites are not looked 
upon as purely political or economic groupings. They are, so to speak, actors or 
agents in two different kinds of structure: the general structure of society, and the 
more specialised structures of the political regime together with the economic 
structures which correspond to it. All sorts of political and economic rules observed 
by elites and arrangements between elites may change (or break down). But if, in this 
conception, the case for social continuity is accepted, then such realignments cannot 
be equated with the formation of new elites. 
Unlike the approaches touched on above, this suggests a basic framework for analysis 
which neither disregards nor understates society or structure and does not deflect 
attention from important issues of definition. Aristotle's vision is rather more 
ambivalent than has been - or can be - depicted here. 
67 Despite this, and its antiquity, 
his basic conception of regime and society, as developed in relation to transition in 
Eastern Europe, is fundamental to the argument of this thesis. 68 
This extended discussion of terms has a lot to do with the changes which have taken 
place in Russia since the late 1980s and with the unsettled appearance of the current 
regime. These also have consequences when it comes to methodology. "When an 
Collection - and to her classical background - both for this observation and for an understanding of the 
original ancient Greek text. 
67 Aristotle, The Politics [with an English translation by H. Rackham] (London: William Heinemann, 
1932), pp. 284-299; Aristotle, The Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), pp. 240-247; Aristotle, 
Politics: Books III and IV (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 71-77; Aristotle, The Politics and the 
Consitution of Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 94-97. 
68 Alex Callinicos, The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1992), pp. 50-66; Colin Sparks with Anna Reading, Communism, Capitalism and the 
Mass Media (London: Sage Publications, 1998), pp. 780-106. 
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object of study is changing drastically, its methods should change too, " Kimitaka 
Matsuzato has observed: "Probably this is one of the academic canons which we 
Slavists have been facing during the last decade". 69 The state has changed. So has its 
ideology and the extent of its territory. Key institutions have changed. The 
presidency, the presidential administration, the government and the ministries all 
represent something different from Soviet practice. Even where there is similarity, 
context and function are new. One only has to think of "the sixty-five or so branch 
ministries which ran the bulk of the USSR's enterprises" to appreciate the 
difference. 70 Those institutions which have changed more than once include the 
presidential representatives to the regions, the governors (regional heads of 
administration), the regional representative bodies, the Russian parliament and the 
federal structure. All in all, it is not surprising that the editors of an anthology of post- 
communist elite studies should find developments in Russia particularly difficult to 
interpret. 71 
This suggests that the critical selection, evaluation and comparison of data is at a 
special premium. In what ways, for example, can the composition of Soviet and post- 
Soviet regional representative bodies in the case studies bear comparison with each 
other? For that matter, in what ways should the pre-1994 regional soviets be 
compared with the smaller representative assemblies which replaced them? Again, a 
great deal of biographical data has been used. How reliable is it? What problems have 
previous researchers encountered? Are there any tell-tale signs which point in a 
particular direction? Are any important factors missing? Specific issues like these are 
discussed in detail where they arise in the body of the text. At this point, however, it is 
worth mentioning two guidelines or rules-of-thumb which have been kept in mind 
throughout the project. 
The first is the acquisition of a certain variety of sources, the positive side of not 
placing too much reliance on any one source or on one type of data (quantitative data, 
which tends to look so much "harder" and more objective than qualitative data, can be 
particularly misleading when not correlated in some way). Thus, primary sources 
69 Matsuzato (ed. ), Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World, p. ix. 
70 Rutland, The politics of economic stagnation, p. 93. 
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include newspapers, official publications, unofficial and amateur publications 
("informal" samizdat, for example), leaflets, internet sites, and interviews, while 
secondary sources range from academic works and previous published research to 
regional histories and autobiographies. 
This has made it possible in Tiumen, one of the case study regions, to compare, for 
example, official and unofficial accounts of the same process (the unseating of the old 
Brezhnevite regional leader), and central and local versions of the same event (the 
"dirty" gubernatorial election of 2001). In Omsk, the other case study region, the 
contemporary history of the region has been seen through the eyes of its two main 
leaders, their views checked against other data, such as the statistics on small business 
or the differing views of the presidential representative and the mayor of the regional 
capital. It has also been possible to interview the British and Russian side of a 
business deal involving an important regional enterprise, with illuminating results. 
When it comes to biographies, the "large samples" of the regional assemblies - each 
of which, Hughes argues, amounts in a sense to a whole population 72 _ are 
complemented by in-depth "small samples". These vary according to the nature of 
each of the case study regions: a selected leadership group in Tiumen, the governor 
and some of his longer-term associates in Omsk. The small size of these second 
samples is more than made up for by the importance of the individuals who compose 
them. Kimitaka Matsuzato has drawn attention to the continuing importance of the 
leadership principle in Russia right down to the local level. 73 The significance of 
Aleksandr Podgurskii, the director of Omskii bekon, has already been mentioned. John 
Gibson, the British negotiator, added that there was no sign of any "succession 
management": when Podgurskii went into hospital for a minor operation, the board 
went on meeting round his bed. 74 
Internet sources have been extremely useful, especially with regard to Tiumen. 
Generally, Russian internet sites seem to have improved markedly in recent years in 
quantity, quality, and accessibility. They include regional and local government 
71 Higley and Lengyel, "Elite Configurations after State Socialism", Higley and Lengyel (eds. ), Elites 
after State Socialism, pp. 17-19. 
72 Hughes, `Sub-national Elites", p. 1021. 
73 Matsuzato, "Local Elites Under Transition", pp. 1368-1370. 
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websites, electronic versions of regional and local newspapers, and services which 
provide details of regional elections. It is now possible to connect directly to 
information services which provide a substantial volume of news from correspondents 
and agencies in each of the seven new federal districts. On the other hand, it is not 
always possible to confirm this kind of data. In addition, a number of sites have 
disappeared. Information collected from such sites has not been used unless the 
source was reasonably authoritative, such as the electronic version of the Sverdlovsk 
region paper, Ural 'skiff rabochii. 
The second guideline has been borrowed from medical and paramedical methodology. 
This teaches the practitioner to diagnose a presenting patient in terms of outward or 
objective signs and inward or subjective symptoms. The question then is whether 
these signs and symptoms, together with what is known of the patient's history, can 
be arranged into some kind of meaningful pattern. 75 Difficulty in breathing, an 
observable sign of distress, may mean very different things depending on whether or 
not it is combined with, for example, chest pain, even though this is a purely 
subjective sensation. This does not imply any similarity between the objects of 
medical and political investigation. The point is rather that the political developments 
being investigated need to be approached and examined from more than one direction, 
wherever possible. Thus, a number of different pointers have been used to establish 
the dimensions of continuity and change as regards the elites of the case study 
regions: history, economic development, relations with central elites, homogeneity, 
divisions, the views expressed by leading figures, and the kind of biographical data 
referred to above. This seems an appropriate way to approach what Arbakhan 
Magomedov has called "the mystery of regionalism" in Russia, 76. It follows from this 
and from a number of other points made earlier - about the importance of economic as 
well as political elites, for example, or about the relationship between regime and 
society - that this is part of an interdisciplinary approach, a response to the challenge 
74 Interview with John Gibson, Overseas Project Manager, Pig Improvement Company (PIC) UK, 
Abingdon, 17 February 1995. 
75 See, for example, the classic paramedical text By Nancy L. Caroline, Emergency Aid in the Streets 
(Boston MA: 1983), pp. 11-55. 
76 Arbakhan Magomedov, Misteriia regionalizma. 
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of change, as Matsuzato puts it, which involves breaking down "the barriers between 
traditional academic disciplines by exploiting the key concept of 'space"'. 77 
The choice of two west Siberian regions for the case studies was to some extent 
conditioned by the interdisciplinary nature of the project. Just as the military- 
industrial complex was the heart of the Soviet economy, so the great oil and gas fields 
of western Siberia are the economic heart of today's Russia. The great majority of 
these fields are located inside the boundaries of the Tiumen region. The relationship 
between this huge economic resource and the behaviour of the regional elite was a 
natural focus of interest. Tiumen and Omsk are neighbours, and although Omsk has 
no oil of its own, it has a large, modern refinery which plays a key role in the regional 
economy. On the other, they belong to rather different natural, political and geo- 
political zones. Tiumen is really three regions in one, while Omsk has a much more 
typical uniform structure with one main urban centre which dominates the region 
economically and demographically. Tiumen has a much shorter history and a much 
more recent identity than Omsk. Although Tiumen is such an important region, no 
published research made it a major focus until 1999, with the arguable exception of 
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss' four-centre study of regional governance. 78 Omsk, by contrast, 
has been the subject of two substantial studies since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 79 There are enough common points and enough differences here to make for a 
fruitful comparison. 
A hypothesis combining elite continuity with regime change will be applied to these 
two case study regions. The case will be made that Soviet elites negotiating transition 
succeeded in maintaining their dominance but became fragmented and conflictual as a 
result of regime change. This was partly due to the difficulties of reforming a rigid 
regime and partly to the way in which institutions began to be dismantled before 
adequate replacements had been developed. The contemporary situation will be set 
against a historical survey of centre-region relations. The latter will be divided into an 
initial period in which power decentralised "spontaneously", especially after the 
77 Matsuzato (ed. ), Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World, p. ix. 
78 Glatter, "Federalization, Fragmentation"; Kellison, "Tiumen, Decentralization"; Stoner-Weiss, Local 
Heroes 
79 Melvin "The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite"; Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics 
in Russia" 
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introduction of the elective principle into the CPSU, and a subsequent one in which 
the problematic legacy of this decentralisation remains unresolved. The impact of 
transition on the unbalanced economic structure inherited from the Soviet era will also 
be discussed. This will be related, in terms of the issue of diversification, to the 
division between regions which are net donors to and net recipients from the federal 
budget. 
The case studies indicate that regional elites have more characteristics in common 
than might be apparent from the diversity of regional regimes. Elites in both Omsk 
and Tiumen display strong signs of continuity both explicitly and in terms of a 
political-economic homogeneity which overrides occupational structures. The core of 
the Omsk elite has marginalised a nationalist element in political structures, which 
itself had been instrumental in marginalising the democrats at an earlier stage. At the 
same time, the fragmentation of these elites has taken striking forms. In Tiumen, a 
ten-year struggle, climaxing in a dramatic election battle, has resulted in the victory 
of the two outlying regions over the third, to which they had in Soviet times been 
subordinate. In Omsk, the capital city has lost two successive mayors in the last 
decade through recurrent conflict with the regional leadership. Such protracted 
conflicts have partly been due to the "spontaneous" decentralisation of power which 
tended to fragment elites at all levels, partly to issues left unresolved after its 
conclusion, and partly to the motivation supplied by key profitable assets in a 
regressive, narrowing economy. The key issues in Tiumen relate to the huge oil and 
gas reserves of the outlying regions, while those in Omsk are closely connected with 
the large modern oil refinery. In addition, the 2001 Tiumen gubernatorial elections 
highlighted the divisions inside the presidential apparatus: it was a reminder that elite 
fragmentation is not confined to centre-region or intra-region relations. This and other 
current developments indicate that despite the initiation of a centralisation policy, the 
period of unresolved decentralisation is not over. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis examines national and regional elite studies. It concludes with 
the adoption of a hypothesis about continuity and change, adapted for specifically 
Russian conditions. 
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Chapter 2 takes a historical perspective on centre-region relations. Although the 
dominant theme will be centralism, special attention will be given to regionalist 
initiatives. 
Chapter 3 focuses on contemporary centre-region relations, which are periodised into 
an initial phase of "spontaneous" decentralisation and a succeeding one of 
"unresolved" decentralisation. 
Chapter 4 consists of the case study of Tiumen which establishes comparative criteria 
for the Omsk case study. 
Chapter 5 consists of the case study of Omsk. 
The Conclusion discusses the extent to which the hypothesis has been confirmed and 
the wider applicability of the research results. 
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Chapter 1. Elites in Transition 
1.1 Introduction: regionalism and elite continuity 
There is a recognition in the more general literature on the subject that there has been 
a rise in the importance of Russian regional elites, and that this has, in some sense, 
gone along with an overall trend toward elite continuity 
Thus, while stressing "the enormous heterogeneity of Russian provincial life" and the 
competition for power between different institutions within each locality, Richard 
Sakwa, in the second edition of a standard work on contemporary Russian politics, 
nevertheless observes that all these externally and internally divided regional 
leaderships "have taken advantage of the weakness of the centre to seize powers and a 
degree of sovereignty that in certain cases poses a threat to the continued existence of 
the Russian state itself. "' In 1994, the third edition of a standard anthology mentioned 
in passing that "Considerable political and economic power has shifted to subnational 
actors in the past few years". 2 Three years later, the fourth edition marked the 
increasing importance of the regions by devoting no less than two of its fourteen 
chapters to them, one to centre-region relations, i. e., to struggles for influence 
between regional and central elites, the other to politics within the regions themselves, 
i. e. to struggles for influence inside regional elites. 3 
At the same time, the continuity of elites in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia has been 
widely remarked upon, particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse but also 
later on. 
Juni Burtin described the Russian system as being "like a werewolf - it changes its 
outer hide whenever it pleases, but its essence remains the same. ,4 The historian 
Martin Malia used another striking image: "Although the old regime had been 
t Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 210. 
2 John P. Willerton, "Yeltsin and the Russian Presidency", Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi 
Gitelman (eds), Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (Basingstoke and London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), p. 26. 
3 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Federalism and Regionalism", Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman 
(eds), Developments in Russian Politics 4 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 229-250; Darrell Slider, 
"Regional and Local Politics', ibid., pp. 251-265. 
4 Juni Burtin, "Chuzhaia vlast"', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 December 1992. 
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decapitated with the dissolution of the central Communist Party apparatus and the 
Union in 1991, its detached limbs and sinews were everywhere. "5 Richard Sakwa's 
concluding remarks in the first edition of his standard work on the new Russian 
politics were more emphatic about the limitations of change: 
The impression of dramatic and sudden change in Russian politics therefore 
masks a more profound continuity. The form had changed, but often the 
content remained remarkably similar. 6 
Considering, some years later, the achievements and failures of "Sovietology", 
Stephen White commented: "There had clearly been a change of regime... . But 
it was 
less clear that there had been a change of system, or a more fundamental departure 
from long-standing patterns of centralized and authoritarian rule. "7 Ex-general 
Aleksandr Lebed, governor of Krasnoiarsk krai and a national political figure, 
expressed similar sentiments: 
Everyone just went off to commercial positions, which they'd prepared 
earlier... . In 
1991, there was some sort of hope that everything would 
change.. . But it soon 
became clear that nothing would change, and nothing 
could change, because power had simply changed colours.... Power remained 
the same but just changed its colour in order to conform. 8 
The theme of elite continuity entered the same general literature, almost, it seems, in 
tandem with the rise of regionalism. 9 Indeed, it is in the regions that the issue of elite 
continuity is posed with particular force. Thus, the only discussion of elite continuity 
in the first edition of Sakwa's work on contemporary Russian politics came in a 
section on the Russian regions. 10 This discussion, which focused on the argument that 
such continuity did not necessarily mean conservatism, took up less than a page and a 
half of the 500-odd pages in the book. Three years later, a revised and slightly 
enlarged second edition featured a special section entitled "A Nomenklatura 
Revolution? ", in which Sakwa accepted that: 
5 Martin Malia, "Russia's Democratic Future: Hope against Hope', Problems of Post-Communism (Fall 
1994), p. 34. 
6 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 414. 
Stephen White, "Rethinking the Transition: 1991 and Beyond', in Michael Cox (ed), Rethinking the 
Soviet Collapse (London: Pinter, 1998), p. 136. 
8 Interviewed in Harold Elletson, The General Against the Kremlin. Alexander Lebed: Power and 
Illusion (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998), p. 234. 
9 See, for example, Donald N. Jensen, How Russia is Ruled - 1998, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL), updated 28 August 1998 (information accurate as of 1 June 1998), "III. Continuity of 
Elites', <http: //www. rferl. org/nca/special/ruwhorules/elites-3. html>, accessed 8 September 1998. 
10 Sakwa, Russian Politics... (1994), pp. 197-199. 
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The transformation of the Politburo member into the president, the oblasi 
Party secretary into the mayor, the criminal entrepreneur into a businessman, 
all suggest not so much the formation of a new elite as the reformation of the 
old.... This elite dominates many of Russia "s regions and republics.... Yeltsin 
forged a strategic alliance with the old administrative elites by choice to 
secure a social base to his own rule and at the same time to free himself from 
dependence on any particular constituency, the democrats included. 11 
Sakwa went on to argue, not very optimistically, that the metamorphosed 
nomenklatura was part of an emerging "multiplicity of elite structures", which was, 
however, "still far from representative of society at large, with the old Party-state and 
managerial structures greatly over-represented". Popular mobilisation between 1989 
and 1991, he added, did not amount to "a genuine popular revolution and not even a 
negotiated revolution", as there was no transfer of power from establishment to 
opposition. A gloomy sense of continuity pervades the whole chapter (on "The 
politics of pluralism"), with repeated references to Yeltsin's dependency on the old 
Soviet nomenklatura. 12 Mikhail Afanasev has argued that the Russian regions are 
dominated by highly-integrated oligarchies, most of whose characteristic functions he 
summed up in the words: "In form - this is the same as Soviet power. "13 Robert 
Service also comments briefly on the evidence of continuity and concludes that: "the 
social structure of the new Russia was disclosing itself as a modified version of the 
old USSR. , 14 
Sakwa remarked on evidence that the level of nomenklatura persistence in the regions 
and localities was especially high, and comments that the large proportion of former 
officials from its ranks who had gone into private business "illustrates the political 
flexibility of the old elite, and possibly their ability to use old contacts to new 
purposes, in particular personal enrichment. " Darrell Slider broadly agreed that the 
typical region was one in which "the same officials who comprised the old communist 
nomenklatura remain dominant. " He went on to highlight the resulting "rampant 
corruption by regional political and economic elites" and the likelihood of "a 
stultifying combination of autocratic politics and cartel or monopoly economics. " 
11 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 161. 
12 Ibid., pp. 163,165,171. 
13 Mikhail Afanas'ev, "Praviashchie elity Rossii: obraz deiatel'nosti', Mirovaia Ekonomika i 
Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia MEMO, 1996, No. 3, p. 54. 
14 Robert Service, A History of Twentieth Century Russia (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 542. 
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Where Sakwa was prone to talking about "the struggle between elites", or, in a 
regional context, "the struggle between old and new elites", Slider stated flatly: 
"Often the competition that occurs is not between new and old elites, but rather 
between factions within the old elite. "15 
The important thing about this general literature, which covers the bulk of the post- 
Soviet period, is precisely the fact that it consists of attempts to generalise from more 
specialised research. It gives one a way of mapping discoveries against terra 
incognita. The increased prominence of the regions and their elites is unmistakable. 
But the specifics of the new balance of power between the centre and the regions are 
much more hazy. Evidence of elite continuity is visible but its extent and importance 
are unclear. It is therefore difficult to put together an overall picture which can in 
some sense be put to the test. One reason for this is that published research on elites at 
both national and regional levels tends to polarise between those which lean towards 
an exclusive emphasis on continuity and those which lean towards an exclusive 
emphasis on change. 
1.2 National elite studies: the case for continuity 
If an observer had gone to sleep in Russia at the start of 1990 and then 
woken up to be shown a list of the current Russian government, . as a 
commentator in Nezavisimaia gazeta put it at the end of 1992, he 
would be bound to conclude that the reformist wing of the communist 
party headed by Boris El 'tsin had finally come to power. 
16 
Probably the best-known authority on Russian elites is Olga Kryshtanovskaia. The 
research project led by her on late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian elites has been 
widely cited, both in the more general and the more specialised literature. 
'7 The core 
15 Sakwa, Russian Politics, (1996), pp. 161,163,219; Slider, "Regional and Local Politics", pp. 251, 
252. 
16 Olga Kryshtanovskaya (sic) and Stephen White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5,1996, p. 711. 
17 Citations in the general literature include: Service, A History (1998), p. 542; Sakwa, Russian Politics 
(1996), p. 161; David M. Kotz with Fred Weir, Revolution from Above (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 117-126; John P. Willerton Jr, "Presidential Power", White et al. (eds), 
Developments in Russian Politics 4 (1997), p. 280. Those in the more specialised literature include: 
Stephen White, "Rethinking the Transition: 1991 and Beyond", Michael Cox (ed), Rethinking the 
Soviet Collapse (London and New York: Pinter, 1998), p. 141; M. Afans'ev, "Praviashchie elity Rossii: 
obraz deiatel'nosti", MEMO, 1996, No. 3, p. 49; Eberhard Schneider, 
"Die Formierung der neuen 
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of the project consisted of an examination of 3,610 official biographies, covering 
1996 members of the Brezhnev elite, 789 members of the Gorbachev elite, and 825 
members of the Yeltsin elite (including 100 heads of the largest banks, exchanges and 
industrial-financial groups), which were broken down into six sections, as in Table 
1.1.18 












Brezhnev 0 94 48.7 0 0 n. d 
Gorbachev 91.5 71.2 59.4 n. d. 0 n. d. 
Yeltsin 75.0 57.2 60.2 74.3 82.3 61.0 
Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White described the elite as "the ruling group in a 
society, consisting of the people who take decisions of national significance", and 
defined it for research purposes "in largely positional terms: in other words, on the 
basis of their occupancy of posts that involve the taking of decisions of national 
importance". 20 This definition was made in the context of delineating the components 
of the contemporary Russian elite but was also applied to its Soviet predecessor: 
The highest placed members of the nomenklatura - that is, the holders of 
positions to which appointments required the approval of the Politburo or the 
Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee - were in effect the national elite. 
Equally, in spite of the varied character of the positions that were included in 
the upper nomenklatura, the Soviet elite was monolithic in nature, extending 
across all spheres of party, state and social life. Its monolithic character was 
assured by the fact that all its members were communists, and by the manner 
in which all leading appointments had to be made or at least approved by 
higher-level party bodies. 21 
russländischen politischen Elite", Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und 
internationale Studien, 51-1997, pp. 9-11. Kryshtanovskaia's own publications include: 
"Transformatsiia staroi nomenklatury v novuiu rossiiskuiu elitu", Obshchestvennye nauki i 
sovremennost', 1,1995; "Finansovaia oligarkhiia v Rossii", Izvestiia, 10 January 1996; "Nomenklatura 
nashego vremeni", Obshchaia gazeta, 21 January 
1997, 
<http: //www. relis. ru/MEDIA/news/og/ogcont. html>, accessed 9 July 1999; Olga Kryshtanovskaya and 
Stephen White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5, 
1996, pp. 711-733. See also, Jonathan Steele, "Keeping it in the family", The Guardian, 13 August 
1999. 
18 Kryshtanovskaia and White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", pp. 712-713. 
19 Source: ibid., p. 728 (a summary breakdown of the six main elite groups in the table appears on pp. 
712-713). 
20 Ibid., p. 712. 
21 Ibid., p. 713. 
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The results of the investigations carried out by Kryshtanovskaia's team over a five- 
year period between 1989 and 1994 indicated a high level of elite continuity, above 
all in the regions, then in the presidential administration, closely followed by the 
government. The main tabulated findings are reproduced with minor variations in 
Table I. I. Kryshtanovskaia has argued that the overall results for the Yeltsin cohort 
underestimated the real level of continuity (which she averages out at 65 per cent, as 
opposed to 80.5 per cent for the Brezhnev cohort and 88.6 per cent for the Brezhnev 
cohort, on the basis of the figures cited in Table 1.1). She related this underestimation 
to the apparently spontaneous creation of commercial structures during the initial 
period of privatisation: 
At the head of such structures appeared young people, the study of whose 
biographies did not suggest any links with the nomenklatura. However, their 
breathtaking financial success could only be explained in one way - though 
not themselves "nomenklatura ", they were its trusted representatives, 
"authorised agents "- in other words, plenipotentiaries 
[upolnomochennymi]. 22 
She expanded on this point several years later: 
I analysed the new capitalists and found that 7% had been party secretaries at 
various levels. Another 60% had indirect or secret links with the 
nomenklatura. It was impossible to be a self-made man in Russia. You had to 
have links to officialdom to get started, or at least to get on. 23 
Kryshtanovskaia and White argued that this basic elite continuity coexisted with a 
number of secondary changes: a more youthful profile, less representation of women, 
a decline in the proportion of the elite coming from a rural background, a rise in the 
educational level, and so on. Perhaps the most important of these, as far as the authors 
were concerned, was the age factor, which indicated a certain renewal of the elite 
from within its own ranks: 
A broader continuity coexisted.... with a process of circulation within the elite 
as a younger and less compromised cohort rose to leading positions... it was 
similar, in some ways, to the military coups that took place in Africa under the 
leadership of junior officers, not complete outsiders.... A process of leadership 
renewal that was largely confined to the junior ranks of the communist elite 
was part of this evolutionary process. 24 
22 Olga Kryshtanovskaia, "Finansovaia oligarkhiia v Rossii", Izvestiia, 10 January 1996. 
23 Steele, "Keeping it in the family". 
24 Kryshtanovskaya and White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", pp. 724-727,729. 
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Kryshtanovskaia and White quoted Andrei Grachev"s apt and influential 1994 
observation that the Russian transition was a kind of "revolution of the `second 
secretaries"', though they left out the following phrase: "even less competent than 
their predecessors. , 25 This basic case has since been reinforced by additional research: 
Though a sweeping change of the elite has taken place at government level, 
the new incumbents of the top positions are seldom really new people but in 
most cases former nomenklatura members from the second and third tiers of 
the government apparatus.... In Russia, a far-reaching replacement of the elite 
has formally taken place, but most of the new post-holders are not infrequently 
former members of the second layer of the old nomenklatura. 26 
Kryshtanovskaia and White also attempted to root their evidence about elite 
continuity firmly in its developmental context. They were at some pains to outline 
how privileged "access to the market, in the first instance,... allowed the nomenklatura 
to begin to protect their position as the future of the [Soviet] regime became 
uncertain; afterwards, for many, it was the market and particularly banking that 
allowed them to retain their position of advantage. " Again, the evidence they 
presented, though here not original to them, gave a firmer basis to arguments, for 
example, that the Komsomol had played a crucial role in privileged marketisation, and 
that the crucial phase of privatisation for the elite had been completed before the 
public programme of privatisation had been launched. 27 
Such important changes in nomenklatura economic control during transition could not 
but have profound repercussions on the nomenklatura itself. According to 
Kryshtanovskaia and White, these have been twofold. The first is that the 
"monolithic", "unitary" Soviet elite (the adjectives are the authors' own) 
25 Kryshtanovskaya and White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", p. 729; Andrei Grachev, 
Dal'she bez menia (Moscow: Progress-Kul'tura, 1994), p. 9; the fuller version is, however quoted in 
White, "Rethinking the Transition", p. 141. 
26 Schneider, "Die Formierung", pp. 5,27. 
27 Kryshtanovskaia and White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", pp. 716-717,720-721, 
730 (a summary of the nomenklatura transition from power to property appears on pp. 716-721); for a 
less well-organised account of the marketising role of the Komsomol, see David M. Kotz with Fred 
Weir, Revolution from Above (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 118-119,120-121; for a 
much more impressionistic treatment of nomenklatura privatisation, see Lev Timofeev, "Novaia teoriia 
sotsializma', Moskovskie novosti, 8 December 1996, especially p. 16; see also: Joseph R. Blasi, Maya 
Kroumova, Douglas Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: The Privatization of the Russian Economy (Ithaca 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 33-35,38,46,61,66; Roman Frydman, Andrzej 
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"reconstituted itself as a bifurcated one", i. e., as a political and economic elite, one 
wing based on political status, the other on control of capital. The leadership of the 
political section of the elite strove to impose executive control of the legislative 
branch, and revived nomenklatura traditions of selection, allocation and hierarchy of 
cadre personnel. Following the disintegration of the old "vertical" command 
economy, the economic section of the elite began, in a sense, to re-centralise by 
linking firms and banks horizontally into a number of large and powerful financial (or 
financial-industrial) groups. 28 The second repercussion is that the elite was not just 
bifurcated but "trifurcated": 
The new Russian elite, as it had developed by the mid-1990s, may be 
conceptualised as a three-layered pie. At the top level are politicians and their 
allies, who compete among themselves for power. The middle layer consists of 
entrepreneurs, who finance the politicians" electoral campaigns, lobbying, 
newspapers and television, and at the bottom level are the security services 
which not only maintain order but also act as a means of influence and 
contract enforcement. 29 
Quite apart from the accuracy of these latter observations, it is difficult to envisage 
this simultaneous existence as a duality and a trinity. Nor is it clear what the relations 
between these constituent parts of the elite are, or indeed, if the parts might not be 
greater than the whole, i. e., whether it makes sense in these terms to go on talking 
about a unified elite at all. 
However, on the basic question of continuity Kryshtanovskaia and White remained 
unambiguous. They began their article by quoting Pareto to the effect that revolutions 
were above all a matter of elite change: "The more considerable the changes at 
leadership level, clearly, the more readily we can consider the Russian and East 
European transition a revolution. , 30 Their conclusion made it clear that no such 
revolution had taken place: for the time being, they "largely shared the conclusions of 
those who have argued that "plus ca change" in the composition of post-communist 
Rapaczynski, John S. Earle, et al, The Privatization Process in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1993), p. 75. 
28 Kryshtanovskaya and White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", pp. 713,721-723. 
29 Ibid., p. 723. 
30 Ibid., p. 711. 
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elites. "31 Yet it is precisely on this, their central and apparently strongest point, that 
they were challenged. 
1.3 National elite studies: the case for change 
Defining the political elite is a complex problem in any society... 32 
The challenge came three years later from the sociologist David Lane in collaboration 
with Cameron Ross. 33 As with Kryshtanovskaia and White, this is the definitive 
product of some years of research, which appeared, in this case, in a series of earlier, 
partial forms between 1992 and 1998.34 Lane and Ross investigated 470 members of 
the political elite under Yeltsin. This total breaks down into 176 members of the 
parliamentary elite between December 1993 and December 1995,108 members of the 
government elite in January 1995, and 195 members of the regional (and republican) 
elite in January 1995, giving 479 in all (9 appearing here in more than one category). 
They also examined biographies of 303 members of the economic elite between 1991 
and 1996, consisting of 118 from banking and finance, 55 from oil and gas, 53 from 
"industry and building", 50 "other entrepreneurs" in retail, services and 
communications, and 27 political/economic executives (chairs and presidents of 
associations of industrialists, members of the stock exchange, government 
representatives on company boards). 35 The overall results and analysis have been 
published in a much more complex and detailed form than those of Kryshtanovskaia 
and White. 
Lane and Ross pose two main questions. Firstly, had there been a "reproduction" of 
the old ruling elites, i. e., was it a really a case of "old wine in new bottles"? Or, as 
they put it: 
By "reproduction " of an elite, we mean the continuation of the individuals 
occupying elite positions in the old regime in similar positions in the new 
31 Ibid., p. 729. 
32 David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites ftom 
Gorbachev to Yeltsin (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 91. 
33 Ibid.; see also David Lane, "The Role of Elite and Class in the Transition in Russia', paper presented 
at the Political Studies Association Specialist Group on Communist and Postcommunist Politics 
Annual Conference, 6 February 1999. 
34 For details, see Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. xi-xii. 
15 Ibid., pp. 148-149,169; Lane, "The Role of Elite", p. 10. 
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regime. Hence, the individuals (and the stratum of which they are fart) do not 
change: they adopt new identities, but the bodies remain the same. 
Secondly, to what extent had there been a "circulation" of elites, i. e. a change of 
dominant groups? Here, Lane and Ross differentiate between more and less radical 
types of circulation: 
We distinguish between two types of circulation: substitution circulation, in 
which the incumbents of elite position are replaced by others from within the 
same class or status group; and structural circulation, in which a new political 
leadership from a different stratum displaces an incumbent group. While 
members of the former (substitution) group may join the latter (`jumping 
ship') to ensure a structural circulation, a new political group - the 
expression of another political, economic, or social interest - must replace the 
old elite and its political supports. 37 
Bearing such distinctions in mind, they found the level of continuity between Soviet 
and Russian elites to be more or less negligible. 
As far as political elites are concerned, Lane and Ross draw attention to the results 
shown here in Table 1.2, which indicate that by far the largest single group within the 
Yeltsin political elite had no background in either of the major Soviet apparatuses. 
The largest single component of this group (the cut-off date for which was 1 January 
1990) consisted of students, followed by members of the intelligentsia and industrial 
managers. Of the 255 (54.3 per cent of the sample) who did have an apparatus 
background, few had held leading positions in either institution, the largest groups 
having held middling positions, such as at regional level or in the administration of a 
Soviet ministry. Lane and Ross describe the rise of such elements into the political 
elite of post-Soviet Russia as "a circulation rather than a reproduction"; their 
"unequivocal" conclusion is that the "Soviet political elites were not reconstituted as a 
political elite under the Yeltsin regime": 38 
The political elite that came to power under Yeltsin in the Russian Republic 
was largely a new one... There were relatively few people from the Soviet 
political elite. Those from the Soviet bureaucratic stratum were mainly in 
middle-ranking positions and originated in the government rather than the 
Party executive. The overwhelming majority came from the intelligentsia; 
36 Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. 147-148. 
37 Ibid., p. 148; see also p. 302. 
38 Ibid., pp. 156-157. 
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many were researchers, educators, journalists, and a smaller group were 
managers in industry and agriculture with relatively little, if any, activity in 
politics and could not be said to have been part of the previous ruling elite. 
These conclusions refute the work of those who argue that the Soviet 
"nomenklatura" has been replicated in the current Russian political elite. 39 
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Lane and Ross are not quite so unequivocal about economic elites . 
41 As far as the new 
economic elite as a whole is concerned, they conclude that the significant proportion 
of it which derives from the Soviet system does so in the main at levels well below 
the old elites - "in the political sphere at the middle and lower levels" or in "economic 
executive roles, as managers and others employed at the place of production. " They 
concede that the latter "could well be said to represent a reproduction of the Soviet 
managerial elite". 42 But they go on to emphasise important sectoral differences: 
We conclude that contemporary large-scale industry (production in the 
military-industrial complex, oil production, and large-scale building) contains 
people with values and outlook more similar to the traditional Soviet 
managerial elite, whereas banking, financial services and commerce include 
39 Ibid., p. 160. 
40 Source: Ibid., p. 155 (based on Graph 8.1). 
41 Ibid., pp. 172-175,179 (Table 9.6), 180,182. 
42 Ibid., p. 182. 
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more people with a non-Soviet administrative background and possibly a more 
"market" orientation; here one would find people in the economic elite 
representing a structural circulation. Compared to the new political elite, the 
economic one - particularly in some important industrial sectors - has a 
greater affinity with the previous Soviet system. In the terms of elite 
recruitment, there are more people we could define as having a circulation of 
a "Substitution" type. 43 
Like Kryshtanovskaia and White, Lane and Ross are clear and unambiguous in the 
overall conclusion: 
We unequivocally have shown that under Yeltsin the political elite was not 
"reproduced ": purely political assets were not turned into economic 
capital.... Moreover, the evidence would suggest that a circulation in a 
structural and substitution sense has taken place. In the economy, there is 
more evidence of a reproduction of the previous executive and administrative 
elites. Here, however, rather than `political capital"... we have shown that the 
possessors of "economic organization" (those who had positions of expertise 
and authority in economic institutions) have been able to turn their 
intellectual capital into economic power. 44 
Again, as with Kryshtanovskaia, this conclusion is linked to a particular view of the 
role of elites in the transition from Soviet Union to contemporary Russia. Lane 
disputes the view, as he has done for some thirty years, that the Soviet nomenklatura, 
at least since the end of the rapid industrialisation period, could accurately be 
described as monolithic, monistic, totalitarian, unitary, a ruling class - or even as a 
ruling elite. He considers the nomenklatura to have been too heterogeneous to be 
categorised in this way and prefers the term "political class", "in the sense used by 
Mosca". This term groups together all those who, whatever their other differences, 
exercise or struggle for political power and influence, and implies the existence within 
the political class of a smaller political elite which does the actual governing. Or, as 
Lane and Ross put it: "while rejecting the notion that the "nomenklatura" was a 
unified elite, we suggest that it had the status of a "political class": it constituted the 
group from which the political leadership was recruited. "45 
43 Ibid. 
as Ibid., pp. 202-203. 
as See, for example, David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (London: Martin Robertson, 1978), 
p. 257 (this is the second edition: the first edition was published in 1970); David Lane, The End of 
Social Inequality? Class, Status and Power under State Socialism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1982), p. 150; David Lane, "Ruling class and Political Elites: Paradigms of Socialist Societies', David 
Lane (ed), Elites and Political Power in the USSR (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 3-18. Lane, 
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Accordingly, they identify the late Soviet political elite not with the nomenklatura as a 
whole but as "those people in the USSR who consistently were able to exert political 
power over decisions that were national in scope", i. e., "members of the leading 
political bodies of the Communist Party, the All-Union government ministries, and 
the Supreme Soviet". They go on to argue that the "corporatist, segmented... pluralist 
but closed" consensual elite framework of the Brezhnev era "was destroyed by the 
reformers under Gorbachev and replaced by pluralistic elites lacking ideological and 
political consensus.... The elite structure became confrontational. "46 
One of the issues over which confrontation occurred and spilled out beyond 
traditional elite boundaries was control of assets. The leaders of the abortive coup of 
August 1991 not only stood against a drain of political power from the leadership of 
the Soviet Union as a whole to the leaders of the constituent republics; they also stood 
for the retention of economic power in traditional hands, albeit by such novel methods 
as privatisation, i. e., transferring the ownership of assets to themselves. They 
represented an "administrative class", based in the military-industrial complex and in 
the ministries which controlled the means of production, opposed market reforms, and 
had become independent enough to defy penetration by the Gorbachev party 
leadership. According to Lane and Ross, this class now came up against an emergent 
"acquisition class", a term they use to denote a series of disparate groups which 
identified their material market interests with the liberal-democratic ideology of a free 
enterprise system. This "revolutionary social bloc" essentially consisted of "new 
entrepreneurial classes originating from outside the old elites - from people in middle 
and lower executive positions, the alternative economy, and the professions. " Lane 
and Ross break these down into five groups: disaffected members of the old elites, 
people who had already acquired enough money, partly illegally, to buy privatised 
assets, farmers profiting from private and surplus produce, former middle and lower 
state managers, and professionals from the intelligentsia, such as doctors, lawyers and 
"The Role of Elite", pp. 4,6,7. Tom Bottomore, Elites and Society (London, New York: Routledge, 
1993), p. 7. Lane and Ross, The Transition, p. 16; see also pp. 143-147. 
46Ibid., pp. 6,19. 
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engineers (they make it clear that both these uses of the term "class" are "in a 
Weberian sense of a market relationship that determines a person's life chances"). 47 
It is important to emphasise that, as far as Lane and Ross are concerned, this 
confrontation was rooted in the contradictory nature of the late Soviet period and took 
place within the ranks of the nomenklatura as well as outside it: 
It is important to note that a political class may not be unitary but may include 
groups in conflict with each other, who are vying for power. In the case of the 
USSR/Russia, structural differentiation gave rise to political interests, which 
were expressed within the nomenklatura. The nomenklatura as a political 
group and as a control mechanism fragmented with the development of state 
socialism... 
... 
Under state socialism, we would contend, there were concurrently two 
contrasting organizing principles: the administrative and the market... The 
nomenklatura is associated with the administrative class in the sense that it is 
considered to have been the institution that reproduced the relations to the 
means of production; in terms of Soviet Marxism, it "safeguarded socialism. " 
In reality, however, it contained people with different positions and 
aspirations. 48 
Despite its high educational qualifications and its skills, the acquisition class "lacked 
control of property" and depended on the administrative class for employment. At the 
same time, "Many members of the administrative class were in contradictory class 
positions. " They had important positions in the existing order but stood to gain from, 
for example, turning their control of property into ownership. Unintentionally, the 
Gorbachev leadership gave the acquisition class the chance to break free of traditional 
constraints and hesitations. As it became an ascendant class, it took parts of the 
administrative class with it, in varying degrees of reconstruction (contemporary 
regional leaders, for example, "have greater affinity with the old regime, and are more 
likely to have had a Party and state career"). The numerically dominant group within 
the Yeltsin political elite which has no background in either of the major Soviet 
apparatuses (see Table 2) and which sprang largely from the intelligentsia and from 
Soviet economic management embodies, so Lane and Ross believe, the elite of the 
acquisition class. 49 The replacement of a state socialist elite by an acquisition elite 
47 Ibid., pp. 19-20,68-69,163-165. 
48 Ibid., pp. 146,163. 
a9 Lane, "The Role of Elite", p. 8; Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. 162,165. 
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also helps to explain the persistence from the Gorbachev period of elite dissension 
since this replacement is, of course, not total: 
Elite dissention (sic) is, to a considerable extent, a consequence of a large 
number of incompatible interests - on the one hand, embedded in the structure 
of the old system, and, on the other, those able to benefit from different aspects 
of the new... In order to achieve an elite pact, elites must be structured in such 
a way that they have a commitment to the new socio-economic base of society. so In Russia, this they lack. 
Lane and Ross go on to suggest that the future will probably belong to some kind of 
"authoritarian polyarchy" based on a pact between the new acquisition class, the 
traditional captains of industry, and the political elites. 5' 
1.4 National elite studies: polarisation 
The main elements in the sharp polarisation between Kryshtanovskaia and White and 
Lane and Ross are summarised in Table 1.3. Continuity is the key point at issue. 
Kryshtanovskaia and White believe that the overall transitional picture at the elite 
level is dominated by continuity, with the doubtful exception of the business elite. 
Lane and Ross take up a diametrically opposite position. They insist that the overall 
picture is one of qualitative change, though less in the economic elite than in the 
political elite. 
Table 1.3 - Conceptions of Elite Transition in Russia 
Soviet Elite Transition Continuity Post-Soviet 
Elite 
Prospects 
Kryshtanovskaia Monolithic Privileged market High Bifurcated/three Differen- 
and White access -layered tiation 
Lane and Ross Heterogeneous Acquisition class Low Fragmented and Authoritarian 
conflictual polyarchy 
This polarisation is not primarily due to general issues of definition, such as that of 
the term "elite", or to differences in the samples. Lane and Ross lay great stress on the 
difference between the nomenklatura as a whole and the Soviet political elite. But 
so Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
51 Ibid., p. 205. 
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Kryshtanovskaia and White make a similar differentiation when it comes to setting 
out which groups they include within the scope of their study. The overall sample 
investigated by Kryshtanovskaia and White looks much larger than that studied by 
Lane and Ross, and includes the higher ranks of the Presidential Administration, 
which the latter do not. On the other hand, Lane and Ross studied two samples of 
elites under Yeltsin, consisting of 918 people in all, as against Kryshtanovskaia's 
sample of 825, which, however, is more variegated, though heavily dominated by 543 
members of the Federal Assembly (63 per cent of the sample). 52 Their sample of the 
contemporary Russian economic elite is three times larger than the corresponding 
sample in Kryshtanovskaia and White, though it seems weighted towards banking and 
finance and entrepreneurs, whose relative importance compared, say, with oil and gas 
is questionable. 
Lane and Ross point to an underlying conceptual difference when they identify as a 
primary fault the assumption that the "nomenklatura elite" was "the political 
leadership of a unitary class having a common interest and consciousness opposed to 
others outside it. " Kryshtanovskaia and White highlight the concentration of power in 
Soviet society and its subsequent relative diffusion. For Lane and Ross, the 
nomenklatura and its elites were already heterogeneous, and this derived from the 
level of development of late Soviet society. Through the agency of the acquisition 
class, this heterogeneity accounts for the "dynamics of the political movement from 
state socialism", which, in their eyes, otherwise remain undefined. However, 
Kryshtanovskaia and White argue that the Gorbachev reforms made possible a 
"process of circulation within the elite", in which "a younger generation of the 
nomenklatura" took advantage of the changes, both in terms of political power and 
private property ownership, and "ousted its older rivals. "53 
Both sides draw on ideas and analyses developed in relation to Russia and the Soviet 
Union for over half a century. The categorical statement by Kryshtanovskaia and 
White about the monolithic nature of the Soviet elite derives from the overall 
52 For details of the earlier sample, which, for the sake of simplicity, has not been considered here, see 
Lane and Ross, The Transition, p. 135. 
53 Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. 145-146; Kryshtanovskaya and White, "From Soviet", pp. 724, 
727. 
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emphasis in totalitarianism theory on singleness, monopoly and monolithism. 54 Their 
stress on the role of the Communist Party, and of its internal regime, resembles those 
variants of the theory which highlighted the system's ideological and political aspects 
-a stress which is even more pronounced in at least one of Kryshtanovskaia's own 
writings. 55 It is appropriate that her work should begin with a reference to Pareto, 
since his particularly emphatic distinction between the governing elite and the masses 
evokes resonances both in totalitarianism theory itself and in Kryshtanovskaia's other 
writings about the contemporary Russian elite. 56 
David Lane represents a major current in the development of "Sovietology" in his 
own right. He has explicitly acknowledged the biggest single influence on him to be 
Talcott Parsons, the creator of "structural functionalism" and an adherent of the 
notion of "industrial society" or "convergence theory". 57 Lane"s rejection of what he 
called "a ruling class analysis of the USSR", which, he argued, misconceived political 
power as a "zero-sum equation", owes much to Parsons' earlier refutation of the C. 
Wright Mills thesis that society in the United States was dominated by an integrated 
"power elite". By the time of this debate, Parsons had come to the view, like 
Durkheim and Spencer before him, that "Socio-cultural evolution, like organic 
evolution, has proceeded by variation and differentiation from simple to progressively 
more complex". 58 
Lane also subscribes to this view. He has no objection to other approaches, such as 
interest group analysis or "transitology", as long as they are compatible with a 
conception of "advanced industrial society" as being necessarily both un-egalitarian 
and pluralist. He sees the dynamic of change as arising out of the incompatibility 
sa See, for example, C. Friedrich, Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954; 
A. K. Brzezinski and C. Friedrich (eds. ), Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1956). 
ss See, for example, S. Finer, Comparative Government (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1985), pp. 
353-438; Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaia, "Transformatsiia staroi nomenklatury v novuiu rossiiskuiu elitu', 
Obshchestvenniye nauki i sovremennost', 1,1995, p. 52. 
56 Tom Bottomore, Elites and Society (London, New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 4; Kryshtanovskaia, 
"Finansovaia oligarkhiia"; "Nomenklatura nashego vremeni". 
57 David Lane, "Social Theory, the Collapse of State Socialism and After: Convergence or 
Divergence', Cox (ed. ), Rethinking the Soviet Collapse, pp. 152-154,155-159. 
58 David Lane, "Ruling Class and Political Elites: Paradigms of Socialist Societies', David Lane (ed. ), 
Elites and Political Power in the USSR (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988) pp. 3-18; Talcott Parsons, 
Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), pp. 2,199-200, 
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between the essential heterogeneity of an advanced industrial society and the stifling 
grip of a centralised political and economic system - or as he succinctly summarises 
it: "inside state socialism was a pluralistic social system trying to get out". 59 In this 
view, the elites which, in a sense, represented the centralised Soviet system could not 
be the same as those at the head of an incompatible social formation. A fundamental 
discontinuity of Soviet and post-Soviet elites is thus a theoretical requirement. No 
similar requirement can be discerned in the case of Kryshtanovskaia. Indeed, she, like 
other Russian specialists, shares much of Lane's orientation, though in broader terms. 
The theme of change through differentiation, for example, retains a powerful 
influence among those who do not necessarily subscribe to Lane's highly 
systematised viewpoint or to the Lane/Ross thesis of elite discontinuity. 
Kryshtanovskaia and White describe an elite which unfolds, as it were, from 
monolithic oneness into two or three distinctive wings or sections. Mikhail Afanas'ev, 
who accepts Kryshtanovskaia's evidence of continuity, rejects the idea of a ruling 
class in favour of a multiplicity of elites, who may form alliances and coalitions, but 
who are too divided by differing interests to form a single coherent group. 60 
This may help to explain the narrowness with which Lane and Ross interpret the 
results of their research, as an examination of Appendix 1 in their work helps to bring 
out. Appendix 1 consists of the biographies of members of the Soviet political elites 
and of contemporary Russian political and economic elites mentioned in the text. 61 it 
is, of course, impossible to say how far these 52 biographies, and, more to the point, 
the 36 biographies of people classed as belonging to contemporary Russian elites, are 
representative of the total sample. 
Two considerations should be borne in mind in taking a critical view of these 
biographies. The first is that they contain no indication as to family background and 
connections. Lane and Ross are, in fact, rather dismissive about the importance of 
such factors in the late Soviet period. 62 However, a significant proportion of the 
quoted in Alex Callinicos, Social Theory: A Historical Introduction (Cambridge, Britain: Polity Press, 
1999), pp. 242-243. 
s9 David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (London: Martin Robertson, 1978), pp. 233-243; Lane 
and Ross, The Transition, p. 89; Lane, "Social Theory", pp. 152,153-154. 
6o Mikhail Afanas'ev, "Pravyashchie elity Rossii: obraz deiatel'nosti', MEMO, 1996, No. 3, pp. 46-56. 
61 Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. 206-222. 
62 Ibid., p. 108. 
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biographies (at least 15 out the 52, i. e., 28.8 per cent), particularly in the post-war 
period, outline rapid promotion from humble beginnings. Taken together with other 
characteristics, such as high levels of education, this indicates the possibility that such 
people had the advantage, if not of an elite background, then at least of what 
Arbakhan Magomedov has described as "a pretty solid social status"63 Thus, two of 
the five typical examples given by Lane and Ross of new political elite members from 
the intelligentsia with no background in Soviet elite structures are Anatolii Chubais, 
whose father served in the political administration of the USSR Supreme Soviet and 
Egor Gaidar, whose father was a Rear Admiral in the Soviet Navy. 64 One is reminded 
of Peter Rutland's warnings about dealing with biographical data, in particular his 
reference to the official biography of Gorbachev, which had him as an assistant on a 
combine harvester for four years, when this was, in fact, just his regular summer work 
while at school. Lane and Ross also note the need for caution in interpreting 
biographies but not in this connection. 65 Gennady Burbulis, another of the five, is 
given by Kryshtanovskaia as an example of how the new elite supplements itself with 
transfusions from the intelligentsia, in contrast to the Soviet nomenklatura, which did 
this from the ranks of workers and peasants: 
The role of the intelligentsia in society has changed in a fundamental way. The 
intelligentsia has, so to speak; been "absorbed" into the body of the elite. 
Former dominant influences (writers, poets, artists), having failed to get to the 
top, lost their significance. On the other hand, the role of that part of the 
intelligentsia which founded a "service sector "for the elite - sociologists and 
journalists - grew sharply. Previously unknown varieties of intellectuals 
sprang up: analysts, political consultants, "piarshchiki " (from the English PR 
-public relations), image makers - also engaged in services 
for the elite. 66 
Secondly, no allowance seems to have been made for "coming people", who were 
rising into or up through an elite before the Soviet Union was replaced by the Russian 
Federation. Indeed, Lane and Ross appear to be concerned to remove this element 
from their data. We have already seen that they restrict their definition of elite 
continuity to the same or similar positions in the two regimes, and that members of 
63 Arbakhan. Magomedov, "Politicheskie elity rossiiskoi provintsii', MEMO, 1994, No. 4, p. 76. 
64 "Personalii", National News Service/Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/restricted/persons/chubalsO. html>, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/restricted/persons/gaidarO. htm1>, both accessed 6 July 1999. 
65 Peter Rutland, The politics of economic stagnation in the Soviet Union: The role of local party 
organs in economic management (Cambridge, New York, 
Oakleigh: CUP, 1993), p. 90; Lane and 
Ross, The Transition, pp. 149-150. 
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the Yeltsin political elite had to have been in such a position by 1 January 1990 in 
order to qualify (1 January 1989, for those with leading positions in the Soviets, 1 
July 1990 for those with leading positions in the Soviet government administration). 67 
In examining the occupational background of the Yeltsin political elite, for example, 
they state: 
As some of the political elite owed their promotion to Gorbachev himself 
(notably Yeltsin), they could not be considered to have been part of the 
"traditional " soviet administration.... We also excluded periods of employment 
of less than three continuous years on the grounds that their occupational 
status would be determined by fairly long periods of service. 68 
Yet this part of Yeltsin's Soviet career had followed a fairly traditional path, as had 
Gorbachev himself. It was part of a pattern of which, as we have seen, suggested to 
Sakwa "not so much the formation of a new elite as the reformation of the old". 69 
Such tight criteria clearly favour a discontinuity thesis. Understandably, perhaps, 
Lane and Ross are not always so strict when it comes to the interpretation of their own 
results. Do the data presented here in Table 1.2, for example, really "refute the work 
of those who argue that the Soviet `nomenklatura' has been replicated in the current 
Russian political elite"? 70 True, the biggest single grouping - 45.7 per cent - are 
shown to have had no previous Soviet government or CPSU service. But that appears 
to leave 54.3 per cent who had up to 40 years' service. Also, the figures on their own 
do not indicate the balance of power within the elite between newer and older 
elements. Just to take one example, what if Kryshtanovskaia is right about a 
significant proportion of the new business elite acting in some sense as agents for or 
protegees of the old nomenklatura elite ? 71 Lane and Ross appear to judge the question 
of continuity on a purely quantitative basis, instead of seeing such evidence as one 
among a number of signs and symptoms, although it is at the elite level, if anywhere, 
that "some are more equal than others". 
Taking these considerations into account, and subtracting those elite members who 
did not survive beyond the Soviet period, the biographies listed in Appendix 1 can 
66 Kryshtanovskaia, "Nomenklatura nashego vremeni". 
67 Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. 147-148,152,154. 
68 Lane and Ross, The Transition, p. 138; see also p. 152. 
69 Sakwa, Russian Politics (1996), p. 161. 
70 Lane and Ross, The Transition, p. 160. 
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easily be interpreted to give a high level of continuity, with nearly 80 per cent of 
political elite members maintaining or improving their elite positions, while nearly 16 
per cent completed their upward promotion (see Interpretation A, below). A narrower 
interpretation, closer to Lane and Ross, gives a dramatically different result, with 
something over 50 per cent coming from an existing elite and something under 50 per 
cent coming from outside (see Interpretation B, below). The difference is less 
pronounced for members of the Russian business elite. The broader definition gives 
an overall level of continuity which is over 16 per cent higher than the narrower one. 
71 Kryshtanovskaia, "Finansovaia oligarkhiia v Rossii'; Steele, "Keeping it in the family". 
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Interpretations of Change 
Table 1.4 - Members of the Political Elite 
Interpretation A: broad definition Interpretation B: narrow definition 
1 Aleksandrov: YES 1 Aleksandrov: YES 
2 Anisimov: YES 2 Anisimov: YES 
3 Baklanov: DOESN'T COUNT 3 Baklanov: DOESN'T COUNT 
4 Balakshin: YES 4 Balakshin: YES 
5 Chernomyrdin: YES 5 Chernomyrdin: YES 
6 Demichev: DOESN'T COUNT* 6 Demichev: DOESN'T COUNT* 
7 Dobrynin: DOESN'T COUNT 7 Dobrynin: DOESN'T COUNT 
8 Gaidar: YES 8 Gaidar: NO 
9 Glaz'ev: COMING MAN 9 Glaz'ev: NO 
10 Gorbachev: DOESN'T COUNT 10 Gorbachev: DOESN'T COUNT 
11 Gromyko: DOESN'T COUNT 11 Gromyko: DOESN'T COUNT 
12 Karlov: DOESN'T COUNT 12 Karlov: DOESN'T COUNT 
13 Khizha: YES 13 Khizha: NO 
14 Lazutova: YES 14 Lazutova: YES 
15 Ligachev: DOESN'T COUNT 15 Ligachev: DOESN'T COUNT 
16 Listov: YES 16 Listov: YES 
17 Lobov: YES 17 Lobov: YES 
18 Pastukhov: YES 18 Pastukhov: YES 
19 Polevanov: COMING MAN 19 Polevanov: NO 
20 Poliakov: DOESN'T COUNT 20 Poliakov: DOESN'T COUNT 
21 Ponomarev: DOESN'T COUNT 21 Ponomarev: DOESN'T COUNT 
22 Ryzhkov: DOESN'T COUNT 22 Ryzhkov: DOESN'T COUNT 
23 Shumeiko: COMING MAN 23 Shumeiko: NO 
24 Silaev: YES 24 Silaev: YES 
25 Sillari: DOESN'T COUNT 25 Sillari: DOESN'T COUNT 
26 Skokov: YES 26 Skokov: NO 
27 Slavskii: DOESN'T COUNT 27 Slavskii: DOESN'T COUNT 
28 Strom YES 28 Strom YES 
29 Surkov: DOESN'T COUNT 29 Surkov: DOESN'T COUNT 
30 Vlasov: DOESN'T COUNT* 30 Vlasov: DOESN'T COUNT* 
31 Voronov: DOESN'T COUNT 31 Voronov: DOESN'T COUNT 
32 Yeltsin: YES 32 Yeltsin: NO 
33 Zyuganov: MAYBE 33 Zyuganov: NO 
34 Zolotukhin: DOESN'T COUNT 34 Zolotukhin: DOESN'T COUNT 
35 Zorkal'tsev: YES 35 Zorkal'tsev: NO 
DOESN'T COUNT: 16 DOESN'T COUNT: 16 
NET TOTAL: 19 NET TOTAL: 19 
MAYBE: 1 (5.3%) 
YES: 15 (78.9%) YES: 10 (52.6%) 
COMING MAN: 4 15.8% NO: 9 47.4%) 
*Reference to biography m text not tounci 
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Table 1.5 - Members of the Russian Business Elite 
Interpretation A: broad definition Interpretation B: narrow definition 
1 Alekperov: YES 1 Alekperov: YES 
2 Anisimov: YES 2 Anisimov: YES 
3 Aven: YES 3 Aven: YES 
4 Bekh: YES 4 Bekh: YES 
5 Berezovskii: COMING MAN 5 Berezovskii: NO 
6 Bukato: YES 6 Bukato: YES 
7 Dubenetskii: YES 7 Dubenetskii: YES 
8 Egorov: YES 8 Egorov: YES 
9 Fidelman: YES 9 Fidelman: NO 
10 Generalov: COMING MAN 10 Generalov: NO 
11 Kadannikov: YES 11 Kadannikov: YES 
12 Khait: COMING MAN 12 Khait: NO 
13 Potanin: COMING MAN 13 Potanin: NO 
14 Shafranik: COMING MAN 14 Shafranik: NO 
15 Shcherbakov: YES 15 Shcherbakov: YES 
16 Sorokin: YES 16 Sorokin: YES 
17 Viakhirev: YES 17 Viakhirev: YES 
YES: 12 (70.6%) YES: 11 (64.7%) 
COMING MAN: 5 (29.4%) NO: 6 (35.3%) 
Table 1.6 - Totals for Both Elites 
Interpretation A: broad definition Interpretation B: narrow definition 
GROSS: 52 GROSS: 52 
DOESN'T COUNT: 16 DOESN'T COUNT: 16 
NET: 36 NET: 36 
MAYBE: 1 (2.8%) 
COMING MAN 8(22.2%) NO: 15(41.7%) 
YES: 27(75.0%) YES: 21(58.3%) 
All this suggests that the approach adopted by Lane and Ross to the interpretation of 
their research results is flawed. By the same token, it reinforces the case for elite 
continuity put forward by Kryshtanovskaia and White. But all that has really been 
done here is to raise questions. Admittedly, more questions have been raised about 
Lane and Ross than about Kryshtanovskaia and White, but this is partly because Lane 
and Ross have published more details of their work. In any case, it would not be the 
first time that research results were capable of more than one interpretation. The one 
clear result of the exercise has been to confirm that there is a definite polarisation on 
the issue of continuity and change among Russian elites in general. The question that 
arises is whether such a polarisation is also evident in the more specialised research 
on regional elites. 
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1.5 Regional elite studies 
Despite their differences, both Kryshtanovskaia and White and Lane and Ross see the 
contemporary Russian regional leadership as embodying a comparatively high level 
of continuity with the Soviet regime. Kryshtanovskaia and White found that 57.4 per 
cent of the 68 governors they studied began their nomenklatura careers under 
Brezhnev, compared with over a third 37.1 per cent for the sample as a whole. All of 
these regional leaders "had inherited rather than acquired their elite status. " They also 
cite a regional example of the typical elite path from Gorbachev to Yeltsin: "Regional 
first secretaries, for instance, became chairmen of local soviets and then heads of 
administration. " Lane and Ross note: "The regional leaders have greater affinity with 
the old regime, and are more likely to have had a Party and state career". 72 One line of 
development in research on regional elites has been to investigate the issue of 
continuity and to begin exploring its implications. Another has been to concentrate 
instead on the differences between regions in terms of the variety of elite political 
arrangements or regional regimes which developed out of the decline of the Soviet 
Union. 
There has been a wary acceptance of the importance of elite continuity in the 
literature on regional elites since an early stage in the transition from the Soviet 
regime. In her influential study of three regions (one of which was St. Petersburg) in 
the transitional period, Mary McAuley drew attention to the weaknesses of the new 
political order and the continuing economic grip of parts of the nomenklatura, though 
she would not commit herself at that stage to a conclusion which said more than that 
the former was stronger in some regions and the latter in others. 
73 A later survey of St. 
Petersburg politics between 1990 and 1992, which she co-authored with Vladimir 
Gel'man, was more definite: 
72 Kryshtanovskaya and White, "From Soviet", p. 728; Lane and Ross, The Transition, p. 162. 
73 Mary McAuley, Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective", 
Soviet Economy, 1992,8,1, pp. 47,72-78,84-85,87. 
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The changes that took place.... did not transform society in any real sense. 
They represented little more than an unhealthy adaptation on the part of the 
existing socioeconomic and political structures to a changing situation. 74 
Gel'man and McAuley observed that "developments in St. Petersburg are 
subsequently reproduced, albeit in softer contours, in other regions of the country and, 
for this reason, we should pay particular attention to the process and consequences of 
economic reform in the city". 75 Studies of Saratov and Omsk in the same anthology 
appeared to bear this out. 76 
The case for continuity as a key feature of regional elites in Russia was put with 
particular force by James Hughes, who came to the Siberian regions of the present 
with a strong historical background. 77 In his study of the inter-regional association 
Siberian Agreement, which was formed in 1990, Hughes argued that "while there has 
been a considerable turnover in the personnel occupying top regional positions there 
has been only a marginal change in the nature of the elite". He did so largely on the 
basis of an examination of the backgrounds of 27 of the top legislative and executive 
leaders of the Siberian regions, who formed about three-quarters of the leadership of 
Siberian Agreement. This showed that the "typical path" later cited by 
Kryshtanovskaia and White had indeed been well-trodden in Siberia, with former 
nomenklatura bosses abandoning the party for positions in the new Soviet structures 
enhanced by a democratic mandate. Probably no more than six (all of whom had been 
academics) out the 27 constituted a "meaningful new democratic intake". Hughes also 
found some evidence of the entry into the elite of a younger generation. 78 
74 Vladimir Gel'man and Mary McAuley, "The Politics of City Government: Leningrad/St. Petersburg, 
1990-1992", Theodore H. Friedgut and Jeffrey W. Hahn (eds), Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics 
(Armonk, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 37. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Joel C. Moses, "Saratov and Volgograd, 1990-1992: A Tale of Two Provinces", ibid., pp. 106-119, 
131-132; John F. Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics in Russia: The Case of Omsk", ibid., 
pp. 143,146-147,155-156. 
77 James Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the crisis of the New Economic Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 1991); 
James Hughes, Stalinism in a Russian Province: A Study of Collectivization and Dekulakization in 
Siberia (London: Macmillan, 1996); James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of 
Siberian Agreement", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 7,1994, pp. 1133-1161; James Hughes, "Sub- 
national Elites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaia and 
White", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 6,1997, pp. 1017-1036. 
78 Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia", pp. 1017-1136,1160-1161. 
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Like Gel'man and McAuley, Hughes claimed that his findings were "representative of 
a pattern repeated in other regions". At the same time, he emphasised the solidity of 
the Siberian elite, despite its new democratic alloy, especially vis-a-vis Moscow. 
Hughes' study focused on the danger posed to the power of the president by the 
Siberian elite's assertion of its interests, particularly in terms of control over 
economic resources. At the same time, he highlighted the vulnerability of the 
association due to the regional differentiation within its ranks and the attachment of 
the various regional leaders to different economic ministries and networks. The 
crushing by Yeltsin of the old Russian parliament in the autumn of 1993 seemed to go 
hand-in-hand with a downgrading of regional and inter-regional institutions. 
However, there was, as Hughes pointed out, "no large-scale purge of regional leaders, 
suggesting that the president was concerned to ensure a large measure of continuity in 
Siberian government. , 79 
Hughes therefore contested the picture, painted at that time by Sakwa, Helf and Hahn, 
and others, of a democratising centre, supported by Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
battling it out with a regional anti-reform coalition deriving from the old Soviet elites. 
Apart from the fact that the Moscow and St. Petersburg also had their soviets had 
closed down for opposing Yeltsin's coup, centre-region conflict, as demonstrated by 
the case of Siberian Agreement, had less to do with ideology than with "fracture and 
interplay over economic distributive and redistributive issues between the two key 
strata of the old communist nomenklatura, the top layer based in Moscow and the 
main sublayers at the regional level, each battling to preserve and protect their status 
and extend their control over the country's wealth. " This "territorialisation of 
cleavages within a fragmented elite" had hindered the transition to democracy, 
according to Hughes, by overlaying the kind of class and ideological issues on which 
established party systems are based. Yeltsin had struck out at organisations like 
Siberian Agreement, which were institutionalising such cleavages within the 
framework of democratisation. But the fact that he had done so without elaborating 
alternative policy strategies, suggested that he too in his way was likely to perpetuate 
the conditions which produced the tendency to regional fragmentation in Russia. 80 
79 Ibid., pp. 1136,1148,1153. 
so Ibid., p. 1154. 
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Hughes complemented this study of centre-region relations by examining the 
composition of regional representative institutions between 1985 and 1994 in seven 
Siberian regions, including Omsk and Tiumen. What he found was that the elections 
of 1990 initiated - and the 1994 elections reinforced -a process in which the existing 
regional elites adapted to the transition by colonising first the soviets and then the 
assemblies which replaced them. The impact of this colonisation is summarised in 
Table 1.7 below. By 1994, the assemblies were "saturated by the old dominant sub- 
national elites from political-administrative and economic managerial hierarchies" (or 
"directorates") which were "interlocking" and avoided overt identification with a 
political party. 81 Representation by professionals had been eroded, representation by 
women, young people and workers had been marginalised. Interestingly, Hughes 
remarked on the phenomenon referred to above as "new entrants": 
A trend of massive turnover of individual deputies is apparent. In the 1994 
elections there was a re-election rate of just 15.9% for the deputy corps of 
1990.... This radical turnover of individuals was accompanied by the 
consolidation in the social composition of the corps of deputies... as the 
regional directorate strengthened its representation, but it did so on the basis 
of a whole influx of new deputies. 82 
Table 1.7 - Regional Representation (%)83 




officials, middle 45.9 72.4 
managers No data 
of whom: 
political leaders 12.8 25.2 
economic leaders 22.9 38.8 
Professional 
leaders/professionals No data 29.5 14.9 
Employees/workers 60.7 15.2 0.0 
AGE 
18-30 35.7 
36-56 81.2 87.4 
WOMEN 47.7 6.4 9.8 
* Regional averages for the whole of the USSR 
81 Hughes, `Sub-national Elites, pp. 1024,1025-1026. 
82 Ibid., pp. 1028-1029. 
83 Source: ibid., pp. 1023-1025,1026-1027. 
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In order to give an overall impression of these trends as portrayed by Hughes, the 
figures in Table 1.7 are necessarily selective. The 1985 figures emphasise the 
comparatively high proportions of employees/workers, women, and members of the 
young 18-30 age group. The 1990 and 1994 figures highlight the displacement of 
other groups - including the professionals who scored significantly in 1990 - by the 
political/administrative and economic elites and by groupings closely connected with 
them. 
Unlike the later figures, those for 1985 derive from a work by Jeffrey Hahn, not from 
Hughes' own research, and are not included by the latter in any of his tables. They 
serve as a kind of benchmark and bring out the contrasting trend in the later figures. 
Hughes himself made it clear that the breadth of representation in the old soviets was 
more apparent than real. He cited previous studies which showed that the high 
proportions of workers, women, and members of the 18-30 age group were the 
outcome of CPSU policy and control. This control extended to the entire electoral 
process from nomination to getting out the vote. The function of the soviets was to 
give the semblance of social approval to decisions which had already been made by 
party bodies. Hughes here reproduces the essential points of a broad consensus, 
although, as Hahn points out, gender was probably the only characteristic of the wider 
society which was reflected in the soviets with any accuracy. 84 Hughes also makes the 
point that since the party was where the real power was, there was in any case no need 
85 for the sub-national elite to saturate the soviets during this period. 
84 See, for example: Adrian Campbell, "Regional Power in the Russian Federation", Andrew Coulson 
(ed. ), Local Government in Eastern Europe: Establishing Democracy at the Grassroots (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 149-150; V. Gel'man, A. Kuz'min, S. Ryzhenkov (eds. ), Organy 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub "ektov Rossiiskoifederatsii (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi institut 
gumanitarno-politicheskikh issledovanii, 1998), pp. 16-20; Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots: Citizen 
Participation in Local Soviet Government (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 80-132 (the point about the 
social representativeness of the soviets is on p. 109); Ronald J. Hill, Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist 
Party (Winchester MA: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 112-124; Mary McAuley, Politics and the Soviet 
Union (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp. 209-210,313; Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics: An 
introduction (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 151-158; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The 
Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
64-67. 
Hughes, "Sub-national Elites", pp. 1022-1023. 
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However, he does not refer to Hahn's discussion of the composition of the executive 
committees (ispolkomy) of the soviets. These small committees did the day-to-day 
governing in between sessions of the much larger soviets, which generally met only 
about four times a year. In terms of size and composition, the ispolkomy look rather 
less like the unwieldy collections of deputies which elected them and rather more like 
the compact regional assemblies of today. In 1985, the average number of deputies in 
the main type of regional soviet was getting on for 250 (the corresponding figure for 
1990 in the seven Siberian regions in Hughes' study was nearly 189). The average 
membership of the 1985 ispolkomy was just over 17 (the corresponding figure in the 
Hughes study for the slimmed-down assemblies in 1994 was 30.6). Hahn gives a 
summary of the differences in composition between the ispolkomy and the soviets: 
Unlike the composition of the soviets, membership in the executive committees 
appears to be determined less by a desire to ensure representation of certain 
social or economic categories than by a need to include people with 
managerial skills. The typical member of the executive committee is far more 
likely to be male, a party member, older, and better educated than the deputies 
who elected him.... The concern for professional competence is also reflected 
in the fact that all presidents and secretaries, and occasionally vice- 
presidents, work full-time as administrators, an apparent repudiation of 86 Lenin's warnings against creating a 'professional class" of politicians. 
It should be kept in mind that only the composition of the old ispolkomy and the post- 
1993 regional assemblies is being compared here, not their role in the political 
system. Nevertheless, the similarities in their composition indicates that the evidence 
for continuity may be even greater than Hughes suggests. 
The function of the soviets under the old regime until 1990 was pretty clear. The same 
does not seem to be the case for regional representation after that date. In Hughes' 
account, Gorbachev transformed the soviets into "new institutions of sub-national 
power" while the party's effectiveness as an instrument of control declined and 
it 
entered a state of collapse. The soviets now became a much more important power 
focus and there was an influx of economic and political-administrative elites into 
them. The grip of the elites was further strengthened by the Yeltsin's victory over the 
parliament inherited from the old regime, which cleared the way for desovietisation at 
86 Hahn, Soviet Grassroots, pp. 86,114-117; Hughes, "Sub-national Elites", pp. 1035,1036. 
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all levels and for the subordination of legislative to executive institutions embodied in 
the 1993 constitution. 
Yet, as Hughes points out, the post-1993 regional assemblies were relatively weak. 
Why should elites consider them important enough to colonise? What was it about 
their function that made them more significant in elite terms than the old soviets? 
Hughes came up with five explanations. The first was that decision-makers need 
institutions (in the Russian context, this naturally tended to exclude workers, women 
and younger people). Secondly, he argued that those who already had an elite position 
outside the assemblies were equipped with numerous advantages when it came to 
winning votes for positions inside them. A third explanation was that the assemblies 
retained enough economic powers to make them a significant factor in a period of 
privatisation. It followed from this that the elites needed to exclude elements which 
were likely to disrupt their control of assets. Finally, the rules discriminated in favour 
of those who could afford to support themselves and against those who could not. 87 
Whatever the exact explanation (and without wanting to pre-empt the case studies in 
Chapters 4 and 5), one thing seems clear. The passing of the vertical CPSU power- 
structure led to a much-increased level of direct elite involvement in regional 
representation. Going by Hughes' evidence, this involvement persisted after the 
downgrading of the legislative branch in 1993. Whatever else the regional assemblies 
may or may not have done, they certainly seem to have gone a fair way to 
representing the regional elites. 
Hughes drew two main conclusions from this study. The first was that the 
nomenklatura in these seven regions had recomposed itself "on the basis of a 
reassertion of power by the hierarchies of the soviet administrative elite 
(apparatchiki) and the economic managerial elite (khoziaistvenniki)". The second - 
and more important one for his line of argument - was that the 
integration of both these segments in the political elite demonstrates that 
occupational boundaries between elites are being eroded.... The sub-national 
political elite has became a broadly uniform elite in terms not only of 
occupational structure and status but also as regards age, gender and lack of 
overt party affiliation. 
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There was, in other words, a relationship between the nature of the elite and the way 
in which it had recomposed itself. Hughes approvingly quoted Dahl's dictum that 
"political homogeneity, then, is a function of socio-economic homogeneity", and 
referred to the idea of a power elite as conceived by C. Wright Mills. He therefore 
rejected the idea that the leaders of privatised business, who constituted almost a 
quarter of the 1994 deputies, represented "a channel for rejuvenating the old... elites 
with new democratic and market values", given the scale of nomenklatura 
privatisation. On the contrary, noting that the data indicated a similar trend throughout 
Russia, he predicted the increasing importance of elite networks and coalitions which, 
like the integrated elites themselves, crossed the boundary between the public and 
private sectors. 88 
Hughes cast his argument in the form of a polemic against the bifurcated or three- 
layered elite posited by Kryshtanovskaia and White. The political and the economic 
were, at the most, poles within what was essentially the same group, a purely internal 
distinction or "marbled cake effect". The fact that elected representative institutions 
were part of the process of elite integration, and displayed strong signs of this, raised 
questions about the nature of democratisation: "Electoral politics at the regional level 
is dominated by strong elites of bureaucrats and corporation men who prefer the 
shadow world of informal cliques and backroom deals to open party competition in 
the public arena. " Similar misgivings were voiced by Kathryn Stoner-Weiss in her 
book-length study of four regions (including Tiumen), though more as a warning of a 
possible future scenario than as the identification of an actual problem in the 
present. 89 
For other specialists, however, the variety of the changes in regional political 
arrangements was a much more pertinent issue. At first sight, Joel Moses' study of 
Saratov, referred to above, appeared to confirm the judgement made by Gel'man and 
McAuley about the "unhealthy adaptation" to change by elements from the old 
order. 90 However, it was only half of a comparative study with the neighbouring - and 
87 Ibid., pp. 1022-1023,1029-1031. 
88 Ibid., pp. 1024,1031-1032. 
89 Ibid.; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 192-203. 
90 Gel'man and McAuley, "The Politics of City Government... ", p. 37. 
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in many ways similar - province of Volgograd (with which Saratov had formed a 
single territory until 1934). The point of the study was the dramatic contrast between 
two regions which "epitomize the diversities of the Russian Federation in 1993". Elite 
continuity in Saratov was overwhelming. Yet in Volgograd "by 1993, a new post- 
communist elite governed, a number of political parties and movements contested 
policies and competed for power, and local entrepreneurs provided the support for the 
rapid privatization of agriculture, commerce, and industry". One of the editors of the 
anthology drew particular attention to the "considerable variation in politics at the 
local and regional level" and contrasted this favourably with the uniformity of the 
Soviet era. 91 Similarly, Arbakhan Magomedov concluded a survey of three Volga 
regions (Nizhnii Novgorod, Saratov and Ul'ianovsk) with the observation that "the 
elites of the Russian regions live as if in different political worlds". It was clear from 
such studies that there was room for a wide range of variations between extremes like 
Moses' Saratov and Magomedov's Ul'ianovsk (a "Brezhnevite paradise"92), where 
the nomenklatura elite had survived intact, and Moses' Volgograd, where it had been 
removed and replaced. In Magomedov's Saratov, for example, the old elite had 
survived at the cost of a disabling legislative-executive split. In his Nizhnii Novgorod, 
Boris Nemtsov, the young and dynamic reformist governor, symbolised a working 
arrangement between old and new elites based on "clear-cut professional criteria", 
which had "relegated ideological prejudices to the background". 93 
For Moses, the difference between conservative Saratov and reformist Volgograd was 
due to "a spontaneous grassroots popular movement" in Volgograd in January 1990, 
which had swept out the existing obkom (oblastnoi komitet - regional party 
committee) leadership, disorganised the nomenklatura elite, and "accounted for both 
the outcome of the Volgograd election in March 1990 and for all of the subsequent 
differences marking Volgograd's anti-establishment political evolution through 
91 Moses, "Saratov and Volgograd", Friedgut and Hahn (eds), Local Power, p. 96; Jeffrey W. Hahn, 
"Conclusions: Common Features of Post-Soviet Local Politics", ibid., pp. 272-273. 
92 Philip Hanson, "The Center versus the Periphery in Rusian Economic Policy', RFE/RL Research 
Report, vol. 3,29 April 1994, p. 25. 
93 Arbakhan Magomedov, "Politicheskie elity rossiiskoi provintsii", MEMO, 1994, No. 4, pp. 74-77,79 
(contrary to a reference by Hughes, this was not, in fact, a study of Tatarstan, see: "Sub-national 
Elites", p. 1033 [fn. 4]); see also: Arbakhan Magomedov, Misteriia regionalizma (Moscow: 
Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 2000), pp. 145-160,183-191; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 
Local Heroes, pp. 184-187. 
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1992". 94 According to Magomedov, however, there had also been popular pressure in 
the large urban industrial centres of Saratov and Nizhnii Novgorod, with their 
influential intelligentsias and widespread politicisation. This had forced out "openly 
offensive" obkom leaderships, though not until after the abortive August 1991 coup. 
He contrasted this with Ul'ianovsk, a much more rural region, which had remained 
largely calm and unchanged. Magomedov also focused on the different abilities of the 
three elites to form a unifying "association" (soobshchestvo). The Nizhnii Novgorod 
and Ul'ianovsk elites seemed to be at opposite ends of the Russian political spectrum 
but they were both pragmatic about forming a workable elite consensus which 
corresponded to their particular regional circumstances - "liberal pragmatism" in the 
one case, "conservative pragmatism" in the other. This distinguished both of them 
from Saratov, where, it was said, members of the regional soviet and of the 
administration only came together when they happened to use the canteen in the 
building they shared at the same time. 95 
As the Soviet Union has receded into the past, the focus of research on Russian 
regional elites appears to have undergone a marked shift towards the notion of 
regional regimes, as has already been noted (in the general introduction to the thesis). 
This notion is a natural development from the work of those who, like Moses and 
Magomedov, had already begun to concentrate on the increasing variety of regional 
politics at an earlier stage. A crucial example for this thesis is Neil Melvin's study of 
Omsk, which will be considered further in the appropriate chapter. 96 Suffice it to say 
that although Melvin locates his work in the theoretical context of democratisation 
and transitology, the account he gives essentially traces the development from a 
political configuration imposed by the centre to one adapted to the specific regional 
environment. Such approaches do not preclude some consideration of continuity. 
Magomedov described how Nemtsov won over the Nizhnii Novgorod regional soviet, 
over 80 per cent of which consisted of representatives of the old administrative 
system", by sacrificing the "excessively radical" part of his own immediate circle, by 
accepting a former gorkom (gorodskoi komitet - town/city party committee) first 
secretary as vice-governor, and by insisting that large numbers of the old raion 
94 Moses, "Saratov and Volgograd", pp. 129-130. 
95 Magomedov, "Politicheskie elity... ", pp. 73,74,76,79. 
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(district) leaders remain at their posts, even in the most "capitalist" districts of the 
oblast. Melvin acknowledged that the powerful core grouping which dominated the 
new political elite in Omsk was grouped around the governor (and former chairman of 
the regional soviet executive committee), Leonid Polezhaev: "Polezhaev's most 
potent asset was his extensive connections among representatives of the former local 
party economic nomenklatura, which continued to hold many administrative and 
managerial posts". 97 This did not stop either of them from presenting these elites as 
new or transformed: the political realignment of a regional elite, irrespective of the 
extent to which that elite may otherwise have maintained its continuity, was, after all, 
quite different from anything that had happened in the Soviet period. 
By the time of his second Siberian study, Hughes had adopted a position which was 
diametrically opposed to this. It was, for him, an "either-or" situation: either 
continuity and homogeneity or change and differentiation. 98 Since his data indicated 
continuity and homogeneity, change and differentiation were automatically excluded. 
Presumably, the changes which had taken place among the regional elites - hence, in 
his view, among Russian elites in general - were merely changes of form, of 
appearance, while continuity remained their real content or essence. This takes us 
back to the kind of observation we noted earlier by Richard Sakwa about continuity 
being "masked" by change. 99 Although Hughes' position is the more overtly 
exclusive, a similar tendency is implicit in its polar opposite. In neither case is there 
much sign of a possible relationship between continuity and change. A conception of 
such a relationship could provide a synthesis in which both of these elements would 
retain their validity, though not necessarily on an equal basis, and make it possible to 
see the regional elites in the round rather than from one restricted angle. 
1.6 Continuity and change: a hypothesis 
As we have seen, research on Russian regional elites has effectively divided along the 
lines of the polarised hypothesis put forward by Hughes in his second study of 
Siberian elites: "elite continuity and homogeneity versus change and 
96 Neil J. Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995", 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 619-650. 
97 Magomedov, "Politicheskie elity", pp. 74,76; Melvin, The Consolidation", pp. 625,642-643. 
98 Hughes, "Sub-national Elites", p. 1022. 
99 Sakwa, Russian Politics, p. 414. 
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differentiation". 100 However, as we have also seen, his previous study suggested a 
rather different pattern, in which continuity and change were more closely interwoven 
with each other. On the one hand, the leaderships of the Siberian regions had two 
characteristics in common: a marked continuity and a willingness to confront "the top 
layer of the old communist nomenklatura in Moscow" on the basis of their joint 
economic interests. On the other, they were divided by different regional economic 
interests of their own, especially when it came to the possession or lack of natural 
resources. 101 In other words, continuity, which crossed the line separating Soviet from 
post-Soviet Russia, was a common feature not only of the regional elites but of the 
central elites as well. At the same time, the divisions and in-fighting between all these 
elites constituted key points of difference between the two regimes. 
The combination of elite continuity and regime change constitutes the conceptual 
starting-point of this thesis. This will take us back to the discussion about the term 
"regime" in the Introduction to the thesis, and forward to its application in the 
changes in Eastern Europe of the late 1980s. However, there is an outstanding issue to 
do with elite continuity which needs attending to first. 
It has been established here that there is both a general and regional case for elite 
continuity in Russia. However, the most recent data on which the regional case is 
based goes back to the mid-1990s - 1994 for Kryshtanovskaia and Hughes, 1995 
for 
Lane and Ross. This is sufficient evidence, it could be argued, since it establishes that 
the old elites had succeeded in bridging a transition which ended once the remnants of 
Soviet institutions had been abolished and largely replaced by early 1994. However, 
even 1995 is now a good half-decade in the past, and the election of governors, now 
an important feature. of the Russian regime, especially for our purposes, only 
began to 
be instituted in that year in a small number of "trial run" regions. Table 1.8, "Siberian 
regional leaderships", which is included as an appendix to this chapter, therefore 
expands Hughes' 1994 table on the leadership of Siberian Agreement to 
include the 
leaders of the five Autonomous Okrugs (AOs), and updates it to the end of July 
1999.102 
loo Hughes, "Sub-national Elites", p. 1022. 
10' Ibid., pp. 1136,1148,1153-1154. 
102 Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia", pp. 1160-1161 (Appendix). 
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Although the data are not complete, 28 out of a total of 38 regional leaders (73.7 per 
cent) are covered, compared with Hughes' 26 plus the director of Siberian Agreement, 
who had no other position. Out of the 28, twelve were former senior office holders in 
the CPSU apparatus prior to democratisation in 1989 (as opposed to six in the Hughes 
study), six of these were regional CPSU leaders (compared with three in the Hughes 
study), and twelve held senior Soviet posts (as against 10 in Hughes). Hughes' 
"meaningful new democratic intake" of six academics (22.2 per cent) compares with a 
corresponding figure in Appendix 1 of three (10.7 per cent). This evidence of an 
increase in elite continuity the best part of a decade after the passing of the Soviet 
Union and over half a decade after the Hughes study suggests that the rise and fall of 
a democratic opposition outlined by Neil Melvin in Omsk may have been a 
phenomenon not confined to one region. 103 It is particularly striking in the light of two 
facts. One is that out of the 26 regional leaders studied by Hughes, 17 (65.4 per cent) 
have since been replaced by "new entrants", who did not previously occupy a post at 
this level (unlike, for example, Amangeldy Tuleev, who was chair of the Kemerovo 
Soviet before becoming governor). The other is that all the post-holders in Appendix 
1 had been subject to election, while, at the time of the Hughes study, the regional 
executive leaders (governors/heads of administration of krais, oblasts and AOs) . 
were 
presidential appointees. 
Hughes remarked on the fact that the post-1989 intake was around a decade younger 
than the old guard; despite the six years which had elapsed since his study, the 
average age of the sample in Appendix 1 is only slightly higher: 51.1 compared with 
49.1. The combination of comparative youthfulness with elite continuity is 
particularly noticeable in some of the youngest leaders in the table. Ravil' Geniatulin, 
for example, the 43 year-old governor of Chita oblast, was active in the Komsomol 
from the time he entered the oblast Pedagogical Institute in 1976 at the age of 21, 
becoming secretary of the committee there and rising to become first secretary of the 
Komsomol committee for the regional capital in 1982 before developing his career in 
the city's party and soviet apparatus. The 41 year-old chairman of the Khanty-Mansi 
AO duma, Sergei Sobianin (now governor of Tiumen'), was a Komsomol department 
103 Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite", pp. 619-650. 
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head by 1982 at the age of 24 before rising through the Soviet hierarchy and into the 
regional party leadership by 1988 at the age of 30. 
Despite the high proportion of "new entrants", Appendix 1 points to a significant 
degree of elite continuity within the post-Soviet period, with at least 16 of the 28 
leaders (57.1 per cent) having begun their second term of office in the same position, 
half of them at the head of the executive, half at the head of the legislature (these 
figures exclude cases such as Sergei Korepanov, who was the chairman of the lamalo- 
Nenets AO duma before becoming the chair of the Tiumen' duma). The 28 leaders 
covered come from 18 out of a total of 19 Siberian regions. Out of those 18 regions, 
12 (66.7 per cent) had at least one leader in their second term of office, and four (22.2 
per cent) had both. The table also indicates something of a "revolving door" between 
top executive and legislative posts. Seven of the leaders covered (25 per cent) in 
seven of the regions covered (38.9 per cent) have switched positions at this level of 
the regional elite - four of them from legislative to executive head, two the other way, 
and one from presidential representative to head of the executive. 
The data presented in the table therefore strengthen the case for elite continuity and 
confirm the importance of including it as a key element in analysis. This returns us to 
the question of the relationship between that continuity and regime change. This 
combination, noted as a possibility in the introduction to the thesis, was used by Alex 
Callinicos in the early 1990s as a basis for understanding the nature of change in the 
former Soviet bloc. Callinicos argued that the upheavals in Eastern Europe were "a 
remarkable instance of unintended consequences in history: the effects of the 
"enlightened minority" of reformers in the Stalinist regimes far outreached their 
intentions". The significance of the changes retained a certain element of ambiguity. 
Callinicos sought to understand this ambiguity in terms of the relationship between 
the political regime - the structure of political power - and the structure of social 
power: 
The social meaning of the East European revolutions was obscured by their 
most visible aspect, the collapse of the Stalinist one party states. But an 
economically dominant class must be distinguished from the specific political 
form through which it both secures its own cohesion and establishes its rule 
over society..:. The relationship between ruling class and political regime had 
been especially intimate under Stalinism - the very name often given that class 
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referred to the nomenklatura system through which the party leadership made 
appointments to key positions. Nevertheless, the one party state provided the 
political framework through which the dominant class of bureaucrats, 
managers, generals, and secret policemen exercised their social power. 
To key elements in this dominant class, Callinicos argued, certain types of change, 
such as the abandonment of autarky in favour of full integration into the world 
economy (along with the extensive restructuring this would involve), had become 
acceptable, even desirable. It was in line with this that the new regimes incorporated 
parliamentary democracy, on the one hand, and, on the other, a "substantial continuity 
both in the core apparatuses of state power and in the personnel of the ruling class". 104 
The basic approach outlined by Callinicos has since been applied in research on small 
business and the media in Eastern Europe. 105 It represents a possibility of overcoming 
the polarisation between continuity and change which has dogged studies of elites in 
Russia. It has appeared in the form of prescient remarks by specialists, such as this 
one about regional elections in the first half of the 1990s from Philip Hanson: "they 
have left the old local elites dominating representative bodies, and therefore having a 
previously unheard-of democratic legitimacy, in circumstances in which the old 
chains of command tying them to a national nomenklatura elite in Moscow have been 
destroyed". 106 This thesis will apply it to Russian regional elites with particular 
reference to western Siberia. 
104 Alex Callinicos, The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions (Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 51,56-58. 
105 J Hardy and A. Rainnie, Restructuring Krakow: Desperately Seeking Capitalism (London: Cassell, 
1996); Colin Sparks with Anna Reading, Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 1998). 
106 Philip Hanson, Regions, Local Power and Economic Change in Russia (London: RIIA, 1994), p. 15; 
J. Hardy and A. Rainnie, Restructuring Krakow: Desperately Seeking Capitalism (London: Cassell, 
1996); Colin Sparks with Anna Reading, Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 1998). 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
Table 1.8 - Siberian regional leaderships July 1999 







Zubakin S. 1. Republic/gvt. head )) 1997 (200 1 State Duma dep. 10 952(47) 
Tabaev D. 1. * Chair leg. Assy. 1998(2001) 1937(62) 
Revublic of Buriatia Obkom sec. 76- 
87,90; s. sov. Party 
Potapov L. V. President/gvt. head 1998(2002) chair 91 apparatus 1935(64) 
Semenov M. 1. Parliament chair 1998(2002) Sov. Of mins. 88; Sov. apparat.; 1938(6011 
parlt. Chair 94 metals 
Republic of Tyya Obkom sec. 87; Pty. apparat.; 
Oorzhak Sh. D. President/gvt. head 1997(2002) President 92 agri. mngt. 1942(57) 
Kara-ool Sh. V. * Chair parliament 1998(2002) Charity director; 1966(33) 
Company director 
Republic of Khakasiia Regimental 
Lebed A. L* Chair of gvt. 1996(2001) Commander 91 Career soldier 1955(44) 
Shtygashev V. N. Chair Supr. Soviet 1997(2001) Chair ispolkom; Party apparatus 1939(59) 
Chair S. soviet 92 
Altai krai Dep. Chair Sov. apparat.; 
Ispolkorn 85-90; Construction 
Surikov A. A. Head of admin. 1996(2000) chair Soviet 91 management 1940(59) 
Nazarchuk A. G. * Chair leg. Assy. 1996(2000) Agriculture Party/Soviet 1939(59) 
Minister RIF 94 apparatus, 
agriculture 
Krasnoyarsk krai Party congress 90; 
10 army 
commander 92; 
Lebed A. L* Governor 1998(2003) national politician Career soldier 1950(49) 
Uss A. V. * Chair leg. Assy. 1998(2001) 1954(4411 
Kemerovo oblast Ind. Manager; 
Tuleev A. M. Governor 1997(2001) Chair soviet 90 Railways 1944(55) 
Diudaev G. T. * Chair Soviet 1999(2003) 1947(52) 
Irkutsk oblast Soviet ispolkomy 
83; Irkutsk city Sov. apparat., 
Govorin B. A. * Governor 1997(2001) admin. head 92 power ind. 1947(52) 
Zelent I. Z. * Chair leg. Assy. 1999(2003) Pty. /Sov. positris. Party/soviet apparatus 1941(58) 
63; oblast 
admin. /chair leg. 
assy. 94 
Novosibirsk oblast Obkorn sec. 89; Party 
Mukha V. P. Governor 1995(1999) Governor 91 apparatus 1936(63) 
Leonov V. V. * Chair Soviet 1998(2001) 1952(46) 
Omsk oblast Chair oblispolkom 
Polezhaev L. K. Governor 1995(1999) 89; governor 91 Soviet posts 1940(59) 
Varnavskii V. A. * Chair leg. Assy. 1998(2002) Gorkom. sec. 88; Party apparatus 1947(52) 
dep. Governor 94; 
leg. Assy. ch. 94 
Tomsk oblast Party apparat. 87; Pty. apparat.; 
Kress V. M. Governor 1995(1999) Governor 91 agriculture 1948(50) 
Maltsev B. A. * Chair Duma 1997(2001) Dep. Chair Construction 1938(61) 
- Oblispolkom 90; management 
chair Duma 94 
Tiumen oblast Sov. Positris. 80s; Soviet 
obkom 90; dep. apparatus, oil 
Roketskii L. lu. Governor 1997(2001) govr. 9 1; govr. 93 & gas 1942(57) 
Korepanov S. E. * Chair Duma 1998(2001) LANAO okkom 84; Party apparatus, 1948(51) 
Gazprom director industrial management 
93; LANAO Duma 
chair 96 
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Chita oblast Party/admin. city 
posts; admin. head Party 
Geniatulin R. F. * Governor 1996 (2000) 91 apparatus 1955 (43) 
Vishniakov V. E. * Chair Duma 1996 (2000) Senior Soviet Academic 1940 (59) 
Geologist; city 
Soviet 75-89; 
Chair Duma 94 
Aga Buriat A. O. 0 kkom. sec.; 
Duma dep. 96; Kom. 
Shamsuev B. B. Governor 1997 (2001) Pres. Rep. 93 apparatus 1959 (40) 
Dugarov D. Chair Duma 1996 (2000) 1946 (53) 
Taimyr AO ispolkom 71; 
hd. Town admin. Kom. /Soviet 
Nedelin G. P. Governor 1996 (2000) 91; Fed. Co. 93 apparatus 1938 (61) 
Zabeivorota A. I. Chair Duma 1995 (1999) 1955 (44) 
Ust Orda Buriat A. O. 
State farm director 
Maleev V. G. Governor 1996 (2000) 91 1964 (35) 
Khutanov L. A. Chair Duma 1996 (2000) Chair ispolkom Party/Soviet apparatus 1947 (52) 
86; chair duma 94 
Khanty-Mansi A. O. Ispolkom 82; ok- Party/Soviet 
kom 88; oblispol- apparatus, 
Filipenko A. V. Governor 1996 (2000) korn 89; govnr. 91 construction 1950 (49) 
Sobianin S. S. Chair Duma 1996 (2000) Kom. /sov. posts Party/Soviet apparatus 1958 (41) 
82-88; okkom 88; 
admin. 1' dep. 93; 
chair duma 94 
Evenk A. O. Agro-ind. mngt. Agro-ind. 
83; chair leg. assy. management 
Bokovikov A. A. Governor 1997 (2001) 94 1956 (42) 
Amosov A. E. Chair leg. assy. 1997 (2001) 1957 (42) 
Iamalo-Nenets A. O. Surgut Soviet 87; 
dep. Tiumen govr. Party/Soviet 
Neelov Yu. V. Governor 1996 (2000) 91; AO gov. 94 apparatus 1952 (47) 
Artiukhov A. V. Chair Duma 1998 (2000) Dean oil & gas Academic 1958 (41) 
uni.; duma dep. 
Key: 
* New entrant since the table detailing the leadership of the Association Council of Siberian 
Agreement published as the appendix to James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia..., pp. 1160-1161 
(excludes switches between executive and legislative leaderships). 
gvt. Government 
leg. assy. Legislative assembly 















IANAO Iamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
kom. Komsomol 
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Fed. Co. Federation Council 
uni. University 
Sources 
James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement", Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 46, No. 7,1994, pp. 1160-1161 (Appendix). 
"Regional"naia vlast" v litsakh" (for biographical information on Sholban Valer'evich Kara-ool, 
Chairman of the Supreme Khural, or Parliament, of the Republic of Tyva), Rossiiskaia Federatsiia 
segodnia, No. 8,1999, p. 47. 
The Russian Government website, pages on the composition of the Federation Council updated 7 
June 1999) at <http: //www. council. gov. ru>, accessed 24 July 1999. 
National News Service biographies at <http: //www. nns. ru> (persons and restricted persons), 
accessed 24,26 July 1999. 
Profile of Head of Administration Sunkov on the official Altai Krai website at < 
http: //www. altai. amic. ru/316/317/355. shtml > accessed 4 August 2001. 
Profile of Tomsk Duma Chairman Mal'tsev at the Tomsk website 
<http: //www. tomsk. net/duma/new/deputy/malcev. htm>, accessed 25 July 1999. 
Biography of Tiumen' Duma Chairman Korepanov (updated June 1999) at the Tiumen' website 
<http: //www. biograph. comstar. ru/bank/korepan. htm>, accessed 23 July 1999. 
Profile of Chita Duma Chairman Vishniakov at the Chita website <http: //www. chita. russia. org/> 
and, together with that of Head of Administration Geniatulin, at 
<http: //www. society. rulbibl/polros/Chita/person-chit. htm>, all accessed 26 July 1999. 
Profile of Aga Buriat A. O. Head of Administration Shamsuev at 
<http: //www. society. ru/bibl/polros/Aginsk. okr/bio. html>, accessed 23 July 1999. 
Biography of Khanty-Mansi Duma Chair Sobianin at the official Khanty-Mansi A. O. website 
<http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/gd. html>, accessed 26 July 1999. 
Profile of Iamalo-Nenets Duma Chair Artiukhov at the official Iamalo-Nenets A. O. website 
<http: //www. yamal. ru/new/rigthO8. htm>, accessed 26 July 1999. 
Much of this material was accessed via the Russian regions website at <http: //www. regions. ru>, 
the Siberian section of the Hokudai University Slavic Research Centre website at < http: //src- 
home. slav. hokudai. ac. jp/eng/Russia/siberia-e2. html>, and the Norwegian Institute of International 
Relations website at <http: //www. nupi. no/cgi-win/Russland>. 
Other sources may be found in Pete Glatter, "Federalization, Fragmentation, and the West 
Siberian Oil and Gas Province", David Lane (ed), The Political Economy of Russian Oil (Lanham 
MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 143-160. 
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Dear <Principal / Head of Partner Institution> 
RE: PROPOSED <INSERT TYPOLOGY TYPE> FOR <INSERT AWARD TITLE> 
I am writing to you with respect to the above proposal for collaboration between the University 
and <PARTNER INSTITUTION>. 
The University of Wolverhampton and the PARTNER INSTITUTION agree to consider for 
academic planning approval and, if successful, subsequent validation, during the academic 
year <INSERT> a proposal for the delivery of the University Award of <INSERT AWARD 
TITLE> to students based at the PARTNER INSTITUTION. 
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" Arrangements to ensure the quality of the student learning experience and maintenance 
of the academic standards of the Award; 
" The allocation of human and physical resources appropriate to the delivery of the 
Award; 
" The roles of the respective parties in the delivery of the Award; 
"A form of programme management which will allow process monitoring of the 
arrangements; 
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Academic Development Panel and then onto a formally constituted Standing Panel for 
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but prior to the commencement of recruitment, admissions and enrolment activity, a 
Memorandum of Co-operation that is consistent with the requirements of the University's 
Typology of Collaborative Academic Provision and accurately reflecting the nature of the 
collaboration as defined at validation must be signed by the University's Vice-Chancellor and 
his/her counterpart in the partner institution. 
In the period prior to the formal approval of the collaboration by the University the following will 
apply to the relationship between the University and the <PARTNER INSTITUTION> with 
respect to the <INSERT TYPOLOGY TYPE> for <INSERT AWARD TITLE> : 
All external advertising and publicity shall be approved by appropriate members of staff at 
the University and the <PARTNER INSTITUTION>. All external advertising during this period 
will state that the Award is `Subject to Validation'. 
Copyright in respect of the learning experiences and any associated learning support 
materials developed by the University under this agreement shall remain solely with the 
University. 
Copyright in respect of the learning experiences and any associated learning support 
materials developed by the College shall remain the property of the College. 
Copyright in respect of learning experiences and any associated learning support 
materials developed jointly by the University and the College under this agreement will 
remain the property of both the University and the College to use in perpetuity. 
The term of ownership of copyright is not limited by the terms of this Memorandum but by the 
relevant statutory provision under English law. 
The University and the College will ensure that conditions of personal data holding conform to 
the Data Protection Act. 
This letter does not commit either party beyond the point of submission of the proposal and in 
particular does not imply the approval or validation by the University of the proposal. 
I would appreciate it if you could give this proposal your formal written endorsement as the 
<Head> of <PARTNER INSTITUTION>. In particular I would appreciate if you endorse the 
financial arrangements for <INSERT TYPOLOGY TYPE> shown on the enclosed pages. 
Chapter 2. The Russian regions in history' 
2.1 Introduction 
An analysis based on continuity and change necessarily raises wider questions of 
background and historical context. Continuity with what? Change from what? An 
element of historical comparison is therefore built into the approach adopted here. 
This comparative element is not restricted to the case study regions, since they 
developed as part of a whole complex of territories. Accordingly, this chapter surveys 
the long though not unbroken history of Russian centralism and the shorter but not 
unimportant periods in which regionalism of one kind or another was on the agenda. 
To the former belong tsarism, Stalinism, and the late Soviet regime; to the latter, the 
revolutionary period, the years following the civil war, and Krushchev's experiment 
with sovnarkhozy (regional economic councils). As these two different kinds of period 
alternate and define themselves to a certain extent against each other, they have been 
taken chronologically. 
A number of other issues which relate to the situation today will be touched on as they 
arise. They include the uneven economic development of the regions, the nature and 
evolution of the regional administrative structure, and the relationship between 
regions and branches of the economy. Reference will be made to the case study 
regions and their environs at appropriate points. 
The focus in this chapter, as elsewhere in the thesis, is on the overall pattern of 
relations between the centre and the regions. Conceptions of federalism, or 
arrangements which might be described as federalist, are dealt with as part of these 
relations. 2 There are a number of reasons for this. The tsarist state had no federalist 
pretensions at all, quite the contrary, and the Provisional Government made no 
1I am indebted to Kiril Novosel'skii, a geographer at the Urals Agricultural Institute, who impressed 
on me the importance of Russian regional history when I interviewed him at the L. S. E. on 27 May 
1994. 
2 For a discussion about the definition of federalism, see, for example: S. E. Finer, Comparative 
Government (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp. 210-211; K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 1-34. 
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commitment to radical change. 3 In the Soviet period, formal constitutional provisions 
about federalism, as about democracy, were quite likely to mean the opposite of what 
they said. 4 This also meant that regionalist - or apparently regionalist - initiatives in 
these times were not necessarily connected with federalist ideas or practice. Indeed, 
there is still some doubt about whether today's Russia, in which centre-region 
relations is an issue of some importance, can accurately be described as a federation. 5 
2.2 Tsarism and the provinces 
Although the tsarist state has to a great extent been presented as ruthlessly centralist, 
there is some disagreement about this. Hans Rogger quotes Prince Trubetskoi's 
opinion that by 1900 the unitary tsarist autocracy had been irrevocably fragmented by 
the autocracies of the officials who ran it. Jonathan Steele refers to the "considerable 
measure of regional autonomy" which was allowed. Katherine Stoner-Weiss has 
described the development of provincial administration by Peter the Great and 
Catherine the Great as "decentralization". The generous view of tsarist provincial 
administration has been reinforced in the past by the Russian nationalist element in 
Soviet ideology and, more recently, by the less guarded nationalism of post-Soviet 
Russia. 6 But there is no shortage of evidence to the contrary. 
The rise of the Russian state and its development into an expanding non-Russian 
empire resulted in the imposition of two main central priorities on the provinces: 
3 See, for example: Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881-1917 
(London and New York: Longman, 1989), p. 182; Nigel Harris, National Liberation (London: Penguin, 
1992), p 77-78. 
4 See, for example, Raymond Pearson, "The historical background to Soviet federalism", Alistair 
McAuley (ed. ), Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1997), p. 30.; Denis J. B. Shaw, Russia in the Modern World: A New Geography 
(Oxford & Malden MA: Blackwell, 1999), p. 65. 
5 See, for example: Aleksandr Bobin, "Federalizm v krizise. Pora razminirovat"', Izvestiia, 4 August 
1998; Sophie Lambroschini, "Russia's governors proving to be unpredictable political force", End 
Note, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 173, Part I, 6 September 1999; Peter C. Ordeshook, "Russia's 
Party System: Is Russian Federalism Viable? ", Post-Soviet Affairs, 1996,12,3, pp. 195-217; Graham 
Smith, "The Ethno-Politics of Federation without Federalism", David Lane (ed. ), Russia in Transition: 
Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 1-5. 
6 Liudmila Makeenko, "Ot lichnosti gubernatora mnogoe zaviselo", Vash vybor, No. 5-6,1994, p. 15; 
M. N. Pokrovskii, History of Russia from the Earliest Times to the Rise of Commercial Capitalism 
(London: Martin Lawrence, 1932), p. 302; Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and 
Revolution 1881-1917 (London and New York: Longman, 1989), p. 22; Jonathan Steele, Eternal 
Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev and the Mirage of Democracy (London: Allen Lane, 1994), p. 339; 
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 58. 
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control and revenue. The large economic regions which resulted from the assimilation 
of territory, particularly during the reign of Peter the Great, formed the basis of the 
administrative division of the state. Greater control over the collection of revenue was 
a major declared aim of Peter's reforms of regional administration. 7 One of Peter's 
reforms has been described as being "tantamount to military rule in the countryside". 8 
Although this particular measure was short-lived, Peter's successor Catherine went on 
to group regions into governor-generalships "in order to safeguard the unitary 
economic-administrative leadership". 9 Jeffrey Hahn sees in these developments the 
destruction of the weak shoots of popular participation: 
The Imperial Age of Russia, which began with the accession of Peter the Great 
in 1689, witnessed the introduction of precedent-shattering changes in many 
aspects of Russian life. Ironically, however, for a ruler committed to 
Westernization, these included a retreat from the tenuous traditions of self- 
government that had preceded him.... The objective of the reforms in local 
government which did take place under Peter I and Catherine II 
was... expansion of the central authority's control over local affairs, especially 
in the collection of taxes. 10 
Central control became so obsessive that in the late nineteenth century Alexander III 
refused to turn over to the Council of Ministers such tasks as the appointment of 
provincial midwives. ' 1 
Tsarism industrialised in order to maintain this centralised grip in the face of other 
powers which were much more advanced, especially in arms. This resulted in an 
extremely uneven form of development. The majority of regions were trapped in 
primitive forms of agriculture in order to generate export revenue to finance industrial 
development from which they did not benefit. There were no less than three rural 
famines between 1891 and 1901. A few islands of highly advanced industry appeared 
but they were surrounded by an ocean of backwardness. The bulk of industrial 
production was concentrated in a few centres such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, 
Vladimir, the iron and steel-producing areas of the south and the mining and 
7 A. Bakunin and V. Salchinskii, "Nam ne zhit' drug bez druga...: Iz opyta territorial'no- 
khozyaistvennogo upravleniya Rossii", Ural'skii rabochii, n. d. (February? ) 1994; Makeenko, "Ot 
lichnosti", p. 15; Steele, Eternal Russia, p. 158. 
8 Lionel Kochan, The Making of Modern Russia (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1970), p. 112. 
9 Bakunin and Salchinskii, "Nam ne zhit"'. 
to Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Government (London: I. B. 
Taucis, 1988), pp. 49-50. 
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metallurgy region in the Urals. 12 The administrative system, unaltered in principle 
since its beginning under Peter the Great, was not adapted to economic change: 
"Administrative centres were often relatively small towns to which were subordinated 
much larger cities of more recent origin, while unified economic areas were often split 
between a number of administrative units". 13 
The highest provincial official was the governor (gubernator), the man charged with 
preserving the province's loyalty to the tsar and maintaining the flow of revenue. He 
was the regional embodiment of the autocratic doctrine according to which 
government depended not on laws or institutions - let alone on some form of popular 
representation - but on key individuals acting as agents for the tsar. This emphasis on 
individuals was, as Rogger puts it, "the logical extension of a highly personal, 
centralized system of rule". Like their master, the governors had immense powers and 
became virtually immune to punishment for abuses of office, of which there was a 
wide variety. They became a byword for arrogance, corruption and arbitrary rule 
(proizvol). From 1881 on, a governor's powers could be drastically increased by the 
declaration of a state of reinforced or extraordinary protection. According to a 
contemporary source, all but five million Russians were living under one or other of 
these by 1912. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the governors became a major focus of 
resentment. 14 
The guberniia (from the French gouvernement), the province over which the governor 
ruled, remained the main form of regional division for 200 years after its creation by 
Peter, despite numerous changes of detail. The rise in the number of guberniias 
reflected the growth of the empire, and possibly also the desire not to allow any of the 
governors to rule over too large a territory. Peter's original reform in 1708 delineated 
eight guberniias; by 1740, there were 20, by 1770, there were 60, and by 1914, there 
" Rogger, Russia, p. 20. 
12 V. I. Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp. 611- 
615; Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 11,16-19; 
Rogger, Russia, pp. 64,79,100. 
13 J C. Dewdney, "Patterns and Problems of Regionalisation in the U. S. S. R. ", Research Papers Series 
No. 8 (1967), Department of Geography, University of Durham, p. 6. 
14 Rogger, Russia, pp. 27,52-54. 
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were 103 - 20 of these, known as oblasts (oblasti), were equivalents of guberniias 
outside the European part of the empire. 15 
Zemstvos (zemstva), local organs of rural self-government, and municipal dumas were 
introduced in 1864 and 1870 respectively as part of the reforms which cleared the way 
for industrial development. Hopes that these - particularly the zemstvo statute - might 
mean a real commitment to public participation in government were soon 
disappointed. As far as the tsarist state was concerned, the role of the zemstvos was to 
perpetuate the dominance of the landed gentry over the peasants once the abolition of 
serfdom ended the individual landowner's authority over the serfs. The governor 
remained a far more important and more widespread institution. Zemstvos were given 
extensive responsibilities but denied the revenue, scope and power to implement their 
decisions. Accordingly, whenever anything goes wrong in Chekhov's story `Peasants' 
(Muzhiki), for example, it is the local zemstvo which gets the blame. 16 Since the town 
dumas were less enterprising, possibly because of business influence, and as their 
spending was often dominated by the military and the police, the burgeoning cities 
lacked basic amenities. When in the 1890s the zemstvos became centres of liberal 
opposition, the role of elections was reduced and state control of them and of the 
dumas was increased via the governor. 17 
The administrative system "completely ignored the distribution of the various ethnic 
groups within the Empire". 18 Abuses of office acquired spectacular dimensions in the 
new territories conquered after 1550 as Russians drove south-east to the Caspian Sea 
and east into Siberia. To begin with, all the governors were expected to support 
themselves by collecting extra taxes and revenues. This system of "feeding" 
(kormlenie) was abolished in Russia proper in 1555, but in Siberia, for example, the 
governors went on extorting gifts from local chiefs and appropriating state revenue as 
of right. The most valuable form of revenue in Siberia at this time derived from the 
iasak or fur tribute. Although the governors were strictly forbidden to take part in the 
fur trade, practically all of them did so, much depleting state income. They bestrode 
15 Dewdney, "Patterns", pp. 6,8-9,37 (note 1); V. Z. Drobizhev, I. D. Koval'chenko, A. V. Muravlev, 
Istoricheskaia geografiia SSSR (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1973), pp. 176,178; Pokrovskii, History of 
Russia, p. 291. 
16 A. P. Chekhov, Izbrannoe, Tom 3 (Moscow: Biblioteka klassicheskoi literatury, 1994), p. 167. 
17 Hans Rogger, Russia, pp. 59-65. 
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an extraordinary pyramid of violent extortion, terror and mutual rivalry. Official 
attempts to limit the persecution and oppression of the indigenous peoples were not 
implemented. Unofficial projects by Siberian regionalist intellectuals went unrealised. 
Like most of the non-Russian territories, Siberia, which had been settled by peasants 
and did not have a landowning gentry, was not allowed to have zemstvos. 19 
According to one historian, the Siberian administration from the 17th to the 19th 
centuries "even compared to that of European Russia, was notorious for its 
embezzlement of State property and for violence". 20 There are signs that it was 
actually worse towards the end than it had been to start with. In 1721, Prince Gagarin, 
the first governor of Siberia, was hanged for crimes such as defrauding the 
government of the profits from the China trade. A hundred years later, when the 
Siberian regime could be described as having reached "the nadir of corrupt 
administration" and vicious cruelty, the absentee governor and his vice-governor were 
merely dismissed for a catalogue of misrule which cost the state around 2.8 million 
rubles. According to M. N. Pokrovskii, the Bolshevik historian, one of the worst of 
the wave of semi-official pogroms in October 1905 took place in the Siberian town of 
Tomsk, "where more than a thousand people were locked up in a theatre and burned 
alive in front of the bishop and the governor". 21 
It is difficult to reconcile this picture with any real measure of regional autonomy or 
decentralisation. True, Catherine the Great experimented with the creation of a 
`Siberian realm', but this was abandoned within twenty years, after which no tsarist 
government "ever gave any encouragement to the federal concept or `regionalism' 
(oblastnichestvo) as it came to be called". 22 The latitude given to governors was done 
so on the understanding that they were to act as trusted agents of the tsar. The more 
the tsar felt threatened, the more latitude was given to these, his main 
18 Dewdney, "Patterns", p. 6. 
19 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia. Russia's North Asian Colony 1581-1990 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 34,42,46-47,60-61,111-113,198; Rogger, 
Russia, p. 59; Nikolai Vakhtin, Native Peoples of the Russian Far North (London: Minority Rights 
Group, 1992), pp. 9-10. 
20 Ibid., p. 9. 
21 Forsyth, A History, pp. 112-113; M. N. Pokrovskii, Russkaia istoriia v samom szhatom ocherke 
(Moscow: Mysl', 1967), p. 418. 
22 Forsyth, A History, p. 199. 
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plenipotentiaries. 23 In any case, giving autonomy to governors was not the same thing 
as giving it to the regions. It could with some justification be seen as the exact 
opposite. 
John Miller sharply contests the view that tsarism had much truck with regionalism: 
Crucial to an understanding of provincial administration in Russia is that no 
Russian regime in history gave more than very limited opportunity for 
representative `local government'... The reasons were that the central 
authorities doubted either the competence of local leaders to harmonise their 
particularistic interests with the wider interests of Russia; or they doubted 
their loyalty, their will to stay within the circumscribed sphere of competence 
that constitutes any system of local government. Russia would not stay 
together unless it was held together. 24 
Miller goes on to acknowledge that the emergence of ministries from 1802 did 
incorporate a level of institutional fragmentation into the "piecemeal but essentially 
viceregal approach" systematised by Catherine II with the creation of the post of 
governor-general. An attempt at a compromise solution by Nicholas I in 1837 only 
produced greater complexity. The governors effectively became responsible both to 
the tsar and to the Interior Ministry, while the War, Finance and Justice Ministries 
continued to maintain their own agents in the provinces. This led to the tension and 
rivalry which account for Prince Trubetskoi's remark about the multiplicity of 
autocracies. However, these were not signs of decentralisation or regional autonomy. 
They were cracks and defects in a system which found it increasingly difficult to 
adapt to change, and, so far as it could, refused to do so. "The Moscow state, " 
according to the judgement of two Swiss specialists, "was from the sixteenth century 
a tightly organised, centralised state with a heavy concentration of power in the 
autocrat and his executive organs and a correspondingly weak development of 
permanent-corporative and regional-territorial independence. , 25 
23 Rogger, Russia, p. 53. 
24 John Miller, "El'tsin's Reconstruction of Provincial Administration: An Old or a New Pattern? ", 
Paper presented at the Fifth World Congress for Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 6-11 
August 1995, pp. 2-3. 
25 Andreas Wenger and Jeronim Perovic, "Russland zwischen Zerfall und Grossmachtanspruch: 
Herausforderungen der Regionalisierung", Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und 
Konfliktforschung, Zurich 1998, p. 12. 
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2.3 Regions and revolution 
As a member of the government of the Soviet Republic, I could 
not but become convinced, day by day, week by week, month by 
month, that to govern a country with over 130 million 
inhabitants, to govern a country which encompasses one-sixth 
of all dry land, to govern it from Moscow on the basis of 
bureaucratic centralism is impossible. 
- A. I. Rykov, from a speech at the 12th congress [1923] 
of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party 
(bolsheviks)]26 
Not only are the ten years from 1917 to 1927 full of complexity, they are also crucial 
for the continuing debate about whether "Lenin led to Stalin" - whether, in other 
words, the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 set off an essentially organic 
process of development which led via the one-party state to the convulsive 
consolidation of Stalinist power. 27 This debate has a bearing on the regional question 
in Russia today. Firstly, it raises the issue of genesis. Do the contemporary regions 
and their elites originate in the changes of the decade following the revolution, in 
Stalinist transformation, or at some other point? Secondly, it poses a question of 
comparison. How do the regional changes in the post-revolutionary period, under 
Stalin, and during the present age of change compare with each other in degree and in 
kind? Keeping such questions in mind helps to put the current situation in a relevant 
historical context. The decade after the revolution is divided here into three periods. 
First comes 1917 and the early part of 1918, a period of regional movements among 
Russians and of national movements among the non-Russian peoples. Next comes the 
26 Murugov, I., "Detsentralizatsiia sovetskogo upravleniia primenitel'no k raionirovannym oblastiam", 
Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, No. 4 (9), April 1927, p. 103. An asterisk on the title of the article referred the 
reader to a note which read: "In including comrade Murugov's article, we emphasise its character as an 
item for debate". See below p. 17 on the 15th congress of the Communist Party, which took place eight 
months later. 
27 Those in favour of this proposition include: Samuel Farber, Before Stalinism (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991); Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (London: 
Pimlico, 1997); Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet 
Union from 1917 to the Present (London: Hutchinson, 1986); Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution 
1899-1919 (London: Harvill Press, 1997); Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics: An Introduction (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1990); Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia (London: 
Penguin, 1998). Those against include: Edward Acton, Rethinking the Russian Revolution (London: 
Arnold, 1998); Chris Harman, `How the revolution was lost', Peter Binns, Tony Cliff, Chris Harman, 
Russia: From Workers' State to State Capitalism (London: Bookmarks, 1987); Mike Haynes, "Social 
history and the Russian Revolution", John Rees (ed. ), Essays on Historical Materialism (London: 
Bookmarks, 1998); Moshe Lewin, Lenin 's Last Struggle (London: Pluto, 1975); Marcel Liebman, 
Leninism under Lenin (London: Merlin, 1980). For a selection of positions on both sides, see John Rees 
with Robert Service, Sam Farber and Robin Blackburn, In Defence of October: A Debate on the 
Russian Revolution (London: Bookmarks, 1997). 
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civil war period, in which such movements are subordinated to the militarised, 
centralised party-state of "War Communism". Finally, there are the years roughly 
corresponding to the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), years typified by an 
ambiguous mixture of centralism and attempted regionalisation. This third period is 
the main focus of the discussion here, the scope of which is restricted to territories in 
present-day Russia. 
The revolutions of 1917 were, in part, a revolt against centralism. Where the tsarist 
state had imposed a centralised structure which took minimal account of national 
differences, the movements of the revolutionary period took both regionalist forms 
among Russians and ethnic - i. e., nationalist or national-religious - forms among the 
non-Russian peoples. Among the latter were reform movements among the Western 
Muslims, such as the Volga Tatars. The Provisional Government declared its 
opposition to discrimination and recognised the right of self-determination in 
principle but clung on to the empire for the time being. By contrast, the first Soviet 
government made the `right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, up to 
secession and formation of an independent state' the touchstone of its equal rights 
policy for the nationalities within the new state. Although the Bolsheviks began to 
abandon this principle during the civil war, the extent to which they lived up to it 
distinguished them from their rivals. 28 
Regionalism among the Russians themselves blossomed later and withered sooner. 
The Provisional Government had abolished the office of governor but had left the 
entire system of gubernatorial institutions untouched. A large part of the revolutionary 
story of 1917 is about the appropriation of the powers of such official institutions by 
the soviets. Following the October Revolution there was a brief oblastnichestvo or 
"period of regionalism" (especially pronounced in Siberia) during which the rapidly 
spreading local soviets enjoyed almost unrestricted autonomy. In December 1917, the 
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (the original NKVD), while granting 
soviets the right to change regional boundaries independently, tried to introduce some 
order into the process by encouraging the stronger soviets in the more industrial towns 
28 Robert V. Daniels (ed. ), A Documentary History of Communism, Volume 1. Communism in Russia 
(Hanover NH: University Press of New England, 1988), p. 85; Nigel Harris, National Liberation 
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to assume the role of regional administrative centres. But the soviets recognised the 
authority of the new Commissariats largely when it suited them to do so. They altered 
local and regional boundaries without reference to any central power. The regional 
soviet of Siberia refused to accept the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the 
Soviet Congress in March 1918 and declared that it was still at war with Germany. It 
was reported in April 1918 that oil from Baku could not get to Moscow without being 
taxed by every regional soviet on the way. The Commissariats complained in vain. 
The Soviet structure, especially at the grassroots, was stronger than that of the 
Bolshevik party, and Lenin appeared to be philosophical about what he described as 
"a disease of growth". For a time, there was a genuine, if rather anarchic, sense of the 
primacy being accorded in the new system to initiative from below. 29 
All this came to an end with the civil war. As real, functioning institutions, the soviets 
did not survive the autumn of 1918. They gave way to White Terror on one side and 
to the Cheka (the Extraordinary All-Russian Commission for Combating Counter- 
Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation) on the other; the working class they had 
represented all but disappeared. In the struggle for survival, the new Soviet state 
adopted "War Communism", a regime of tight central control and militarisation 
combined with forced requisitioning from the peasantry. From November 1918 the 
Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence undertook the task of turning the republic 
into a single military camp. By the second half of 1919, the soviet structure, 
especially at the regional and urban levels, was saturated by members of the 
Bolshevik (now renamed as the Communist) party, while power had been 
concentrated upwards, ultimately in the sub-committees of the party's Central 
Committee, especially the Politburo, and in the Central Committee secretariat. The 
Central Committee formed a special Bureau at the end of 1918 to establish and 
maintain its control over the Party organisation in Siberia, which was a crucial source 
of food and agricultural produce. At the same time, control over changes in 
(London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 78-82,89-90,96; Heller and Nekrich, Utopia, p. 7 1; Victor Serge, Year 
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administrative divisions was progressively removed from the local soviets to the 
NKVD. 30 
The civil war also brought a drastic change in the way the Bolsheviks treated the 
national question. Allowing the right of nations to self-determination now seemed 
tantamount to abandoning the crucial borderlands to the enemy. It risked the survival 
of the new Soviet republic. This strengthened the hand of the right and left of the 
party, neither of which were keen on self-determination anyway. In practice, it 
became an argument for Russian domination. Those Bolsheviks who, like Lenin, took 
the principle of self-determination seriously nevertheless went along with 
incorporating other peoples by force and with then conceding to them, on paper at any 
rate, federal rights and cultural autonomy, which they had previously denounced as 
divisive. 31 
A case in point in Russia itself was the fate of the "Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic". 
Set up in March 1918 by Narkomnats (the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, 
headed by Stalin), the new Volga-Urals republic was swiftly aborted by the civil war, 
in which its territory became a key battleground. But the idea had a tremendous 
appeal for the Muslim, mainly Turkic, peoples of the old empire, who at one stage 
made up nearly half of the Red forces on the eastern front. As the Red annies battled 
their way east, however, the plan for the new state was dropped. Instead, in March 
1919, the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was established 
32 within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) . The new scheme 
had a strong flavour of being an imperial machination: 
Thus, the early Bashkir Soviet Republic excluded all Bashkir participation. By 
means of an appeal to Lenin, Bashkirs were able to secure some positions in 
the government,, only to have their agreement with Moscow cancelled q year 
later when Bashkiria was forcibly incorporated in the RSFSR. The Bashkir 
30 W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory. - A History of the Russian Civil War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
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Membership in the USSR 1917-1967 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 417-418. 
31E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Volume 1 (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1970), p. 273; Nigel 
Harris, National Liberation (London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 87-88,90-94,97. 
32 Marie Bennigsen Broxup, 'Volga Tatars', Graham Smith (ed. ), The Nationalities Question in the 
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Revolutionary Commission resigned in protest at this "Russian chauvinism " 
and the "imperialistic tendencies of the Russians which hinder in every 
manner the development of national minorities ". Zeki Validov, one of the most 
famous Bashkir military leaders, fled to the Urals - to the shock of Moscow - 
and thence to the armed revolt of the Basmachi in eastern Turkestan. Behind 
him, the Russian colonists created vigilante groups to seize Bashkir land. 33 
A separate Tatar ASSR appeared in May 1920. Arbitrary borders meant that 75 per 
cent of Tatars lived outside their nominal republic. This 75 per cent had restrictions 
placed on the expression of their national identity. It included the Tatars who formed 
the majority ethnic group in the Bashkir ASSR. 34 It all had a lot less to do with self- 
determination and equal rights than with divide-and-rule: 
Soviet nationality policy in the Muslim areas aimed above all at forestalling 
any attempt to create either pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic unity. That is why the 
Bashkirs, close relatives of the Tatars and almost assimilated by them, were 
given their own republic, where the Bashkir population was initially only 25 
per cent, and were encouraged to develop their own literary language, distinct 
from that of the Tatars. 35 
A similar approach was employed elsewhere, especially in the Caucasus. Even so, 
despite the extreme circumstances of the civil war, the new state made more 
allowance for non-Russian national identity than tsarism ever had. In Siberia, for 
example, the Soviet government had at an early stage abolished police supervision of 
native communities and the traditional iasak. At the same time, furs were now a major 
Soviet export and generated vital revenue for the acquisition of industrial equipment. 
Unlike the old tsarist administrations, the government demonstrated that it had a 
vested interest in the northern minorities keeping their traditional way of life: it raised 
the price of furs, lowered prices of state-imported goods and released the northern 
minorities from all taxation. 36 Divide-and-rule on the one hand, real progress on the 
other: it was a sign of the ambivalence to come. 
The harsh regime of War Communism was abandoned in 1921 in the face of unrest 
and revolt among workers, in the armed forces and in the countryside. An uprising in 
33 Hams, National, p. 94. 
34 Ibid. ; Hosking, A History, p. 242. 
35 Ibid., p. 241. 
36 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony 1581-1990 
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western Siberia lasted several months and received support from among the 
indigenous peoples of the north. 37 The rebellions were crushed and discipline inside 
the CPSU was tightened up. At the same time, War Communism gave way to the 
New Economic Policy (NEP), which replaced the hated requisitioning with a tax in 
kind, and liberalised trade and some manufacturing. The attempt to increase 
centralism in some areas and relax it in others says a lot about the ambiguities of the 
period, which were to be fully played out in relation to the territories making up the 
RSFSR. 
Figure 2.1 - Soviet Administrative Structure38 
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The civil war period had moulded a rough-and-ready framework for Soviet centre- 
region relations, particularly in the RSFSR: a centralised, hierarchical, one-party state 
administering a dual structure of sub-central units, divided into those which were 
linked with nationality and those which were not. Figure 2.1 is a highly schematic and 
over-simplified representation of this dualism or "asymmetry". On paper, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), formed in December 1922, was a federation of 
seven "union republics". Control was largely vested in "all-union" ministries and 
agencies and, above all, in the corresponding level of the party, now the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In practice, the USSR was dominated by Russians. 
The RSFSR accounted for 90 per cent of the land area, 72 per cent of the population, 
and 72 per cent of the members of the CPSU. It consisted partly of what were called 
"administrative-territorial" regions, like the oblast marked in the table, and partly of 
" V. M. Kruzhinov (ed. ), Ocherki istorii Tiumenskoi oblasti (Tiumen': Administratsiia Tiumenskoi 
oblasti, 1994), pp. 168-170; Victor L. Mote, Siberia. - Worlds Apart (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1998), p. 86; curiously, no account of this revolt appears in Forsyth, A History, or in Vakhtin, 
Native. 
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national territories of various kinds, often referred to as "autonomies", the biggest and 
most important of which was the ASSR. An administrative-territorial region which 
contained a subordinate autonomous oblast was called a krai. Ethnic minorities got 
their own territories and soviets right down to the level of the village or the clan. A 
late addition such territories was the national okrug (NO), two of which (lamalo- 
Nenets and Ostiako-Vogul, later Khanty-Mansi) were formed in the northern part of 
what is now Tiumen oblast. Although such innovations were not always satisfactory, 
the motivation behind them seems to have been sincerely altruistic, and genuine 
improvements were made in the lives of at least some of the non-Russian peoples. 39 
The reorganisation of the administrative-territorial regions also represented a 
considerable change from the tsarist structure. Table 2.1 represents an 
oversimplification which tends to understate the differences: the Soviet boundaries, 
for example, were quite new. Nevertheless, the table does indicate the sharp reduction 
in the total number of sub-central units, and, by implication, the fact that they were a 
good deal larger than their forerunners. 40 The increase in size had to do with the 
economic significance that was now attached to regionalisation. 
Table 2.1 - Russia-RSFSR-USSR: changes in internal structure 1917-193141 
Imperial Volosts Uezds Guberniias NO TOTAL 
1917: 14,000 605 74 EQUIVAL- 
ENT 
14,679 
'Russia' 10,622 567 64 66 11ý253 
1922** 15,064 701 93 66 15,858 
1930: 3,000 228 44 11 39283 





6 On the territory of the former Russian empire, without the western borderlands 
, 42 which have split off and not counting Transcaucasia and the Far Eastern Republic . 
38Adapted from Hosking, A History, p. 13. 
39Dewdney, "Patterns", p. 7; Hosking, A History, pp. 117-118; Forsyth, A History, pp. 244-246,283- 
284; Kruzhinov, Ocherki, pp. 183-4; S. V. Utechin, Everyman's Concise Encyclopedia ofRussia 
(London: J. A Dent, 1961), pp. 122,291; Vakhtin, Native, pp. 11,13-14. 
40 Dewdney, "Patterns", p. 16, 
41 Sources: H. Chambr6, LAmýnagement A Territoire en U. R. S. S. (Paris: Mouton, 1959), p. 245; G. 
M. Krzhizhanovskii, Sochineniia, Tom III (Moscow: Ob"edinennoe nauchno-tekhnicheskoe 
izdatel'stvo, 1936), p. 12. 
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** On exactly the same territory'. 
*** 13 Oblasts and Krais, 16 Autonomous Oblasts, 15 Autonomous Republics. 
Note: There is some variation between sources on the figures for 1917. According to 
an official Soviet publication, on the territory later occupied by the RSFSR, there 
were at that time 56 guberniias, 476 uezds, and 10,606 VoloStS. 43 
This came from three main sources. The first was an administrative commission 
headed by Kalinin, which was set up in late 1919, shortly after central control over 
local boundary changes had been established, and which originated the principle of 
uniting administrative and economic regionalisation. The second was GOELRO, the 
State Commission for the Electrification of Russia, headed by the old Bolshevik 
engineer Krzhizhanovskii. GOELRO's initial plan, which envisaged the provision of 
energy as being bound up with development on a regional, i. e., decentralised, basis, 
was approved in 1920. The division of Russia into economic zones or regions, each of 
which would have centrally situated sources of electric power, was known as 
raionirovanie. Gosplan, the state planning commission, fortned in February 1921 (and 
headed by Krzhizhanovskii until 1930), also became involved. There was some 
friction between these bodies, especially between Kalinin's commission and Gosplan, 
which was partly to do with the complex problems posed by the autonomies. Outright 
opposition to regionalisation came from a number of quarters, including the 
commissariats of transport, agriculture and internal affairs. It also came from 
groupings within the party hierarchy, such as the Siberian leadership, which resisted 
the dismemberment of their power-base. On the other hand, there are signs that Lenin 
saw economic regionalisation as a way of devolving political power from a 
bureaucratised centre. 44 
Despite various difficulties, five new economic-administrative regions were formed 
between 1923 and 1927. They included the Urals industrial oblast, which removed 
Tiumen and Northern Tobolsk guberniias from Siberian control, and the Siberian krai, 
which took in Omsk guberniia. The 15 th Party Congress in December 1927 resolved 
I 
42 Ibid., p. 12. 
43 SSSR: administrativno-territorial'noe delenie soiuznykh respublik na I iiulia 1967 goda (Moscow: 
Prezidiurn verkhovnogo soveta soiuza sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik, 1967), p. IX. 
44 Dewdney, "Patterns", pp. 7,23; Hughes, Stalin, pp. 28-29; V. 1. Lenin, Polnoe sobrannie sochinenii, 
Tom 45 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970), p. 115; Lewin, Lenin's, p. 178; Nove, An 
Economic, pp. 70-71; lu. G. Saushkin, "A History of Soviet Geography", Soviet Geography, Vol. V-H, 
No. 8, October 1996, p. 11; SSSR. - administrativno-territorial'noe delenie soiuznykh respublik na I 
iiulia 1967 goda, P. IX. 
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to speed up the pace of change. Over the following two years, another eight 
economic- administrative regions were formed, making the process of raionirovanie 
officially complete by the end of 1929. However, the 15 th Party Congress in 1927 was 
notable not so much for this as for the definitive defeat of the United Opposition by 
the Stalin-Bukharin alliance. It cleared the way for the purging of oppositionists 
throughout the regional and local organisations of the party. Stalin's next step was to 
turn against his erstwhile allies. By late 1929, he had secured the removal of the 
leading figures from most of their official positions. The acceleration and completion 
of raionirovanie over the same period looks practically identical with the 
consolidation of Stalin's own regional hierarchy. 45 If so, then he had succeeded in 
turning the attempt to regionalise the Soviet Union into its opposite. 
Krzhizhanovskii had posed the issue of raionirovanie in two ways. On the one hand, it 
was a practical response to problems like the size and diversity of the country, the 
legacy of tsarism, and the crises in transport and supply. On the other, it was part of 
the framework for the society of the future. If the national autonomies could in some 
sense be seen as a way of relating developmentally to peoples who stood on an even 
lower level than the Russians, then this kind of decentralisation could be seen as an 
attempt to move forward from the 'minimum programme' of the revolution to the 
`maximum programme' of a classless society. 46 The flaws in the project and the fact 
that it failed should not obscure an important detail: this is one of the few periods in 
Russian history when centralism was not a deafening theme. 
24 Stalin's centralised dictatorship 
The triumph of the Stalin faction over its rivals at the end of the 1920s ushered in a 
regime which initiated changes on a colossal and horrific scale. Industrialisation and 
the "collectivisation" of the peasantry, forced through with terrible brutality, 
destroyed the rural base of Soviet society and raised in its place a modem, industrial 
class structure. Breakneck industrialisation under the stimulus of external threat made 
the centralisation of the regime a categorical imperative. There is wide agreement 
about this, despite the fact that Stalin himself is no longer so universally considered to 
45Bakunin and Salchinskii, "Nam"; Drob1zhev et al., Istoricheskaia, pp. 271-272; Hosking, A History, 
146-147,15 1; Hughes, Stalin, P. 37. p 
Krzhizhanovskii, Sochineniia, p. 11. 
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be quite the undisputed leader as he once was . 
47 The ambiguities of the period 
immediately following the civil war were rapidly dispensed with, and the return to 
centralism had echoes of tsarist policy, amplified by modem technology. One of these 
echoes was the uneveness of economic development. 
Institutionally, the regime was transformed. The state, the power of the state, and the 
rigidly hierarchical state bureaucracy, with its habits of evading responsibility and 
avoiding decisions, all grew by leaps and bounds. But the impact of growth varied 
from institution to institution. 
The CPSU, repeatedly purged, terrorised, and ignored, its major bodies failing to meet 
for years at a time, remained a key institution, but it was no longer the key institution 
of the regime. By contrast, the secret police, thoroughly reconstructed and vastly 
expanded, became a crucial mobilising agency under Stalin's personal command. The 
NKVD, now very much a police ministry, acquired important supervisory functions in 
the general economy, at the same time as running a large economic empire of its own 
based on forced labour. The embryonic planning system of the 1920s was 
overwhelmed by the demands of industrialisation. The old Supreme Council Of the 
National Economy (VSNKh) effectively split into the first group of giant economic 
ministries - the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the People's Commissariat 
of Light Industry, the People's Commissariat of Internal and External Trade, the 
People's Commissariat of Supply - which covered the whole range of manufacturing 
and mining. VSNKh, which had been created, well before NEP, on the assumption 
that the economy would continue to be largely private, was abolished in 1932, as the 
new Commissariats were being formed. These soon began a process of sub-division, 
so that by 1939, there were 21 Commissariats, and by 1946-48, there were 32 in 
industry and construction alone. The proliferation of ministries (they acquired this 
47 Alex Callinicos, The Revenge offfistory: Marxism and the East European Revolutions, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991), p. 38; Geoffrey Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union (London: Fontana, 1990), 
pp. 154,506; David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (London: Martin Robertson, 1978), p. 8 1; 
David Lane, The End ofSocial Inequality? Class, Status and Power under State Socialism (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 150; Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR 
(Harrnondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 389-390; Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics. - An Introduction 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 45-46,47-50,59; Robert Service, A History of 
Twentieth Century Russia (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 187-188,193-194,212-214. 
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title officially in 1946) greatly increased the coordinating tasks of Gosplan, which had 
been retained from the old system. 48 
The lurching progress of extreme centralisation did not take long to affect the regional 
structure of the USSR, as Table 2.2 shows. It did so mainly through the abolition of 
the okrug and the splitting of the existing regional units into much smaller ones. 
48 G. Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198 1), p. 345; 
Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 656; Nove, An 
Economic, pp. 101,214-215,266-267; Alec Nove, The Soviet Economy. - An Introduction (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp. 67-7 1; Sakwa, Soviet Politics, pp. 52-53,5 8. 
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Table 2.2 - Changes in the regional structure of the Soviet state 1917-196749 
Type of unit ype 
i 191750 1922 1927 1930 '0  1937 1 1941 1946 1950 1954 1958 1963 196 
F 
Guberniias 74 84 38 - 
ezd  Uezds ý 6 419 26 
1 
- 59 61 54 




- 1023 1013 553 
Oblasts - - 1 6 42 101 129 126 127 117 104 105 
Krais - - 3 8 51 6 6 6 6 6 9 6 
Okrugs - - 124 228 26 8 14 13 - - - - 
National Okrugs - - 2 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
(Rural) Raions - - 1641 , 
3012 3307 4007 4195 4227 4368 4053 1833 2959 
_Municipalities 
n/a n/a 





n/a 249 II 402 525 455 498 413 384 415 
I 
Note: There is a significant variation across published sources for the 1922 figures. Krzhizhanovskii 
gives 93 guberniias, 701 uezds and 15,064 volosts, i. e., higher figures than in this table, although they 
were only supposed to cover "the territory of the former Russian empire, without the western 
borderlands which have split off and not counting Transcaucasia and the Far Eastern Republic". 52 
According to the text of the official Soviet source, from which this table is derived, and to a later 
version of the same publication, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) by 1922 
consisted of 72 gubernilas, 601 uezds and 12,363 VoloStS. 53 It is not clear whether the variation is due 
to administrative changes during the year or to inaccuracies in the data. However, none of the sources 
contradict Yrzhizhanovskii's contention that the number of units significantly increased in the five 
years after the October revolution. 
The okrug, which had been the first sub-regional division in the oblasts and krais, was 
abolished in July 1930, and its powers were transferred to the raion and the 
municipality. It is clear even from Soviet accounts that the intention was to lock these 
localities into a tightly-knit system of central control, particularly, at this stage, in 
view of the vicissitudes of collectivisation. The raions were soon found to be too large 
for the exercise of effective control over the new industrial enterprises and collective 
farms. They were therefore subdivided into a larger number of smaller raions. This in 
turn made the regions (the oblasts and krais) too large, so they too were reduced in 
size and increased in number. 54 The process of fragmentation went on for the best part 
49 Source: SSSR: Administrativno-Territorial'noe Delenie Soiuznykh Respublik na I iiulia 1967 goda 
(Moscow: Prezidium Verkhovnogo Sovieta Soiuza Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, 1967), p. 
xix. 
50 Within the borders of the USSR until 17 September 1939 (note in original). 
51 According to the data for 1926 in the All-Union census (note in original). 
52 G. M. Krzhizhanovskii, Sochineniia, Tom III (Moscow and Leningrad: Ob"edinennoe nauchno- 
tekhnicheskoe izdatel'stvo glavnaia redaktsiia energeticheskoi literatury, 1936), p. 12. 
53 SSSR. - Administrativno-Territorial'noe (1967), p. IX; SSSR. - Administrativno-Territorial'noe Delenie 
Soiuznykh Respublik na I ianvaria 1987 goda (Moscow: Prezidium Verkhovnogo Soveta Soiuza 
Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, 1987), p. 6. 
54 J. C. Dewdney, 'Patterns and Problems of Regionalisation in the U. S. S. R. ', Research Papers Series 
No. 8 (1967), Department of Geography, University of Durhan-4 p. 16; V. Z. Drobizhev, I. D. 
Koval'chenko, A. V. Murav'ev, Istoricheskaia geografiia SSSR (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1973), p. 
274; SSSR. - Administrativno-Territorial'noe (1967), pp. XIH-XIV. 
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of two decades. Wartime expansion only accounted for II new oblasts, ten in Ukraine 
and one in Belorussia, as the Baltic republics and Moldavia were not divided into 
oblasts. The majority of the new oblasts, even in the post-war period, owed their 
existence either to the policy of subdivision or to particularly rapid economic growth. 
Siberia went from one large region (the Siberian krai) to more than 20. Omsk oblast, for 
example, was one of 13 new regions created in 1934. Ten years later, Tiumen oblast, the 
largest region in the country, occupying more than 8 per cent of the land area of the 
RSFSR and nearly 60 per cent of Western Siberia, was formed from the northern part of 
Omsk oblast. This completed a 10-year process in which the Urals oblast, once a 
political and economic centre rivalling Moscow itself, a thing not to be tolerated under 
55 the Stalin regime, was replaced by 6 new regions. According to two contemporary 
local specialists, this was in any other tenus a chaotic demolition job: 
91hat did such restructuring of economic administration lead to? To the 
destruction of established structures, to the reshuffling of skilled personnel, to 
the violation of economic and cultural life, to the undermining of specialisation 
and cooperation. 56 
Smaller regions may have been more amenable to control, especially in the countryside, 
but they were soon found to be too small and too numerous for the central direction of 
large-scale industry by the economic ministries. The new administrative regions were 
accordingly grouped into a number of large economic regions (makroraiony), 18 to 
begin with in 1940-1941, after the addition of a substantial amount of territory in the 
west. In practical terms, however, the large economic regions existed purely on paper 
and the economic scope of the administrative regions was marginal: real power remained 
in the hands of the economic ministries. 57 
Nationalities policy under Stalin veered sharply against the non-Russian nationalities. 
Korenizatsfia, the promotion of indigenous cultures and personnel, was swamped by 
waves of Russification on the tsarist model, rising to a patriotic climax in the World War 
55 A. Bakunin and V. Salchinsky, "Nam ne zhit' drug bez druga ... : Iz opyta territorial'no- khoziaistvennogo upravleniia Rossii", Ural'skii rabochii, n. d. (February? ) 1994; Dewdney, 
"Patterns... ", p. 17; Drobizhev et al., Istoricheskaia, pp. 274-275; James Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and 
the crisis of the New Economic Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), p. 203; V. M. Kruzhinov (ed. ), 
Ocherki istorii Tiumenskoi oblasti (Tiumen: Administratsila Tiumenskoi oblasti, 1994), p. 198; Victor 
L. Mote, Siberia: Worlds Apart (Boulder CO: Westview, 1998), p. 90; 
56 Bakunin and Salchinsky, "Nam ne zhit"'. 
57 p. M. Alampiev, Economic Areas in the USSR (Mocow: Progress, 1964), p. 25; Dewdney, 
"Patterns", pp. 28,147. 
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Two. Racist persecution rose to dizzying heights, first when opposition to 
collectivisation and industrialisation in the non-Russian areas was barely distinguishable 
from opposition to Russian rule, and then during the war itself, when millions of 
"unreliable" or "pro-Nazi" non-Russians suffered forced deportation. They included the 
entire populations of four ASSRs. Three of these, the Volga German ASSR, the Kahnyk 
ASSR, and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, were dissolved outright, wl-ffle the fourth, the 
Crimean (Tatar) ASSR, was reduced in status. 58 
There is little doubt that Soviet claims about the successes of the First and Second 
Five Year Plans (1927 to 1937) were inflated. There is equally little doubt that they 
laid the basis for the transformation of the Soviet Union into an industrialised world 
power. A massive engineering industry took shape, a series of big metallurgical plants 
were completed, dependence on foreign machinery and equipment - very high during 
the first plan - was overcome in the course of the second, coal production soared and 
so, more importantly, did productivity. However, the emphasis on heavy industry and 
defence grew stronger rather than weaker, as had apparently been the original 
intention, and consumer goods, housing and pay all suffered as a result. Agricultural 
production did not recover from the blows administered to it in the course of 
collectivisation. Livestock numbers remained below the pre-collectivisation level, 
though there was a great increase from 1933 to 1937. While grain yields also 
remained generally lower than before collectivisation, the level of state procurement 
rose dramatically from 18.2 million tons in 1928-1932 to 27.5 million tons in 1933- 
1937.59 
In other words, the economic results of forced development were extremely uneven. 
Gordon B. Smith has gone so far as to describe the Soviet Union as "a classic 
example of uneven economic development". 60 The Siberian regions were a case in 
point. On the one hand, there were projects like the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, two 
integrated iron and steel smelters, one of them in south-westem Siberia, which 
together produced 20 per cent of the entire Soviet steel output by 1938. They 
58 Tony Cliff, Russia. - a marxist analysis (London: International Socialism, 1970), pp. 186-187; Nigel 
Harris, National Liberation (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 137-140; Hosking, A History, pp. 247-259; 
Service, A History, pp. 276-277,281-284,289-290; Graham Smith, "Nationalities", pp. 6-7. 
59 Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 192-196,225- 
232,239-241. 
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stimulated coal production in the Kuzbas (Kemerovo), which led in turn to the growth 
of chemical industries and a huge increase in the production of electricity. Cement 
production soared in response to the demand for building materials. The construction 
of crucial inter-regional railways stimulated the timber and wood-processing 
industries. On the other hand, Siberia was what Victor Mote calls a "resource 
frontier", and what Siberians themselves nowadays refer to as a "raw material 
appendage". Apart from vast reserves of coal and timber, Siberia was a treasure house 
of precious metals and nonmetals, producing by 1940 the vast bulk of the USSR's 
gold, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, fluorspar and mica. Such production took place at 
the behest of the core, as Mote puts it, not because the periphery demanded it. 6 1 It was 
not a recipe for balanced, diversified growth anywhere in the Soviet Union, least of all 
in Siberia itself. 
The German occupation of large parts of the USSR during the Second World War, 
and the eastward dispersion of Soviet industry, which turned Omsk and Novosibirsk 
into boom towns, temporarily obscured this fundamental fact. The Kuzbas became the 
leading Soviet coal producer. The Kuznetsk mill produced a third of Soviet pig iron 
and a quarter of its steel. Compared with 1940, industrial production in the European 
USSR fell by 25 per cent during the war. In Siberia as a whole, it doubled, while in 
Western Siberia, it tripled. However, with the end of the war capital equipment and 
investment drained back across the Urals. Industrialisation had transforined Siberia 
into a raw material appendage, and a raw material appendage it would largely remain. 
6 0 Gordon B. Smith, Soviet Politics, - Struggling with Change (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 178. 
61 Victor L. Mote, Siberia. - Worlds Apart (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), pp. 90-91. 
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2.5. The regions after Stalin 
The main theme of this chapter is the dominance of centralism in Russian history. The 
assertion of this principle under tsarism and its re-assertion under Stalin were 
separated by an ambiguous and unstable interregnum. Even during this interval, 
centralism was a major factor in Soviet policy within 6 to 12 months of the October 
revolution. The pattern of central dominance over the regions established under Stalin 
remained a feature of the Soviet regime until it entered upon its final fragmentation. 
In that case, where did the regionalist impulses in the Russia of the early post-Soviet 
period come from? Did the Soviet regime itself engender a distinct identity in its 
regional leaderships? Or were they impelled along an unfamiliar path by unforeseen 
developments closer to the heart of power? With such questions in mind, this section 
discusses Krushchev's tinkering with economic regionalisation and surveys the 
evolving relationship between central and regional elites in the late Soviet period. 
Although it was partly in the nature of a political manoeuvre, Khrushchev's sovnarkhoz 
(regional economic council, plural: sovnarkhozy) reform of 1957 was a sign that 
something was seriously wrong with the centralised organisation of the economy. There 
had already been something of an upheaval about the sixth five-year plan, adopted at the 
20 th congress of the CPSU in 1956 but abandoned after less than a year as over- 
ambitious and unworkable. Now, the body in charge of current planning 
(gosekonomkomissiia) and the majority of the economic ministries were abolished 
altogether. They were replaced by a regional structure to be co-ordinated by Gosplan. 
What was wrong with the arrangements inherited from the Stalin period? Alec Nove 
identified four major problems: the tendency of each industrial ministry to become a 
self-contained economic empire; the lack of effective regional planning authorities; the 
failure to utilise by-products; bureaucratic delays resulting from the concentration of 
authority in Moscow. The root cause of such problems, Nove argued, was the 
organisational division of the economy into sectors or "branches" (otrasli), each roughly 
corresponding to a vertically-structured ministry whose powers over planning and 
control resided exclusively in its Moscow headquarters. Nove made the point that the 
very success of industrialisation, the increasing size and complexity of the economy, was 
what had turned overhead costs into problematical obstacles. On the other hand, he 
seems to play down the scale of the difficulties, partly, perhaps, in order to emphasise 
92 
that the cure was even worse than the disease, but mainly in order to argue that the root 
cause of the problem was dominance of central planning, and that any reform which 
failed to challenge it was doomed to failure. 62 
The sovnarkhoz reform appeared to signal a step back from the branch principle towards 
the kind of decentralised, regional planning which had been envisaged in the 1920s. 
Peter Rutland, who argues for this interpretation, links it with the increasingly 
counterproductive effect of the traditional Soviet neglect of infrastructure. The USSR 
was divided into 105 sovnarkhoz regions (later 103), 70 of them - i. e., the vast majority - 
being in the RSFSR. Of the other 14 union republics, 11 constituted sovnarkhoz regions 
in themselves, while three - Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - were each divided 
up into a relatively small number of such regions (24 altogether). A geographical 
comparison of the new sovnarkhoz regions with the existing economic-administrative 
regions has shown that their boundaries were in most cases identical. Nove therefore 
argues that "these boundaries did not, save by coincidence, represent economic regions". 
Apart from anything else, they were too small. 63 
Each sovnarkhoz was endowed with a wide range of planning and operational powers 
and responsibilities in its region. However, it was also strictly subordinated to central 
authority and certain strategic industries remained outside its jurisdiction. Its main task 
was to ensure fulfilment of a Plan which had already been decided higher up, ultimately 
by Gosplan at the all-union level. True, the sovriarkhoz submitted its own regional plan 
for consideration and had some room for manoeuvre when it came to implementation. 
But decentralisation does not seem to have been uppennost in the minds of those who 
created and advocated the sovnarkhozy. On the contrary, Khrushchev and Pravda made 
it clear that the leadership intended the changes to bring about an extension of central 
control, once the ministries, with their "departmentalist", empire-building tendencies had 
been cleared out of the way. 64 
62 Alec Nove, The Soviet Economy: An Introduction (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp. 73- 
74; Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 344-345,356- 
361; for an alternative view, see, for example, Tony Cliff, Russia: a marxist analysis (London: 
International Socialisni, 1970), pp. 242-263. 
63 Dewdney, "Patterns", p. 28; Nove, An Economic, p. 346; Nove, The Soviet, p. 74; Alec Nove, Was 
Stalin Really Necessary? Some Problems o Soviet Political Economy (London: George Allen & ýf 
Unwin, 19 ), p. 100; Peter Rutland, The politics of economic stagnation in the Soviet Union: The role of 
localparty organs in economic management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 94. 
64Nove, The Soviet, pp. 74-75; Pravda, 8,17 May, 1957. 
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It might be an exaggeration to say that the sovnarkhozy manifested all the disadvantages 
of decentralisation and none of the advantages. But the reform certainly appeared to graft 
an alien and incompatible growth on to the party-state apparatus. Many enterprises 
seemed to be operating amid mounting confusion. Inputs might come from a number of 
different and not necessarily reliable sources, instead of being the responsibility of one 
ministerial supply organisation. Similarly, output plans for - and demands on - one 
enterprise might now emanate from a whole series of different levels: the oblast, the 
sovnarkhoz, union republic planning and production agencies, all-union planning and 
production agencies, and so on. These plans might not be compatible. No one body was 
necessarily in overall charge of or had overall responsibility for the enterprises in a 
particular industry. As with output plans, such enterprises might be divided between a 
series of different authorities at various points in the hierarchy. Such divisions tended to 
negate the ability of the sovnarkhoz to develop joint planning and allocation of resources 
within its own region. The discrepancy between planned inputs and outputs had been a 
prime cause of ministerial autarky, as the ministries had found it easier and quicker, 
though not cheaper, to produce their own inputs rather than rely on other ministries. The 
sovnarkhozy had been designed to get round this problem, but as the discrepancies 
remained, they simply reproduced it in the form of a tendency to "localism" 
(mestnichestvo) or local autarky. They began to order their enterprises to give priority to 
production destined to remain within the region, thereby provoking a similar response 
from other sovnarkhozy. This gave rise to a vicious circle of autarkic tendencies 
spreading from one region to another. 65 
The centralised ministerial organisation of the Soviet economy had taken shape in 
response to the specific circumstances and demands of industrialisation. It had little of 
the flexibility necessary for long-term development. At the same time, the ministries 
themselves to a certain extent constituted centrifugal forces tending to pull the economic 
regime apart along the lines of the autarkic empires they were impelled to create by the 
demands of the central leadership. The sovnarkhoz reform left the basis of that regime 
untouched, in the sense that fulfilment of the plan remained the overriding priority. "Yet 
the abolition of the ministries, " as Nove commented, "removed a vital element in the 
65 Nove, Was Stalin, pp. 101-107; Nove, An Economic, pp. 360-361; Cliff, Russia, pp. 245-248,266- 
267. 
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chain of command. " With the ministerial link gone, the sovnarkhozy began to orient 
themselves on their own regions and the obkom first secretaries failed to bring them to 
heel as Khrushchev had expected. A retreat back towards the ministerial system began, 
in a rather chaotic way, well before Khrushchev's departure and was rapidly 
consolidated once he had gone: 
Thus, Khrushchev revoked his decentralization reform of 1957 because it ended 
up giving too much power to the regions, and disrupting the functioning of the 
economy. The chaos which resultedftom these hasty reforms contributed greatly 
to Khrushchev'S ouster in 1964, after which some sort of status quo ante was 
restored ... After 1965 there were no more radical efforts to correct the imbalance of branch and territorial planning. 66 
The trouble, in other words, was that the cure was worse than the disease. The 
nomenklatura elite and its client networks gave every sign of heartily subscribing to this 
moral. As long as the economy continued to grow and the USSR was able to sustain its 
position as the alternative superpower, conservatism seemed the safer option. Indeed, 
Robert Service argues that as long as "the aim was to achieve military parity with the 
USAý it was difficult to alter economic policy to any great extenC. 67 But the 
sovnarkhoz experiment had also demonstrated that once a key link in the chain of 
command was removed, the regions tended to go their own way, even in relatively 
favourable economic conditions. A similar tendency was to manifest itself 30 years later 
in much less favourable circumstances. For the moment, however, the ministerial 
system, the traditional form of centralisation, had triumphed. 
The nomenklatura, seemed to acquire a new sense of stability and even a touch of 
dynamism as its leaders - initially Brezhnev and Kosygin, later just Brezhnev - put 
the era of Khrushchev's reforms behind them. The sovnarkhozy were abolished, the 
central ministries were restored. The obkoms, the regional party committees, which 
Krushchev had divided between industry and agriculture, were reunited. Krushchev's 
"rotation of cadres" was replaced by a policy devoted to "the stability of cadres". 
This not only meant the reinstatement of officials purged under Khrushchev; it also 
confirmed in their positions those who had been promoted. The new leadership was so 
hostile to change that it not only scaled down its predecessor's ambitious production 
66 Rutland, Thepolitics, p. 95. 
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targets over the economy as a whole but ensured Brezhnev's victory, on a programme 
of "extensive development", over Kosygin and his more radical perspective of 
"intensive development", based on structural reforms involving a reduction in the role 
of the Party. Brezhnev himself then sought to inject more dynamism into the economy 
through a "push to the east", a series of large-scale projects in the Urals, Siberia and 
the Far East (all in the RSFSR), such as the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the strategic 
development of oil and gas in Tiumen. These were associated with the promotion of a 
younger generation of better-trained first secretaries, first in the project areas, where it 
created a group of regional leaders which had a special relationship with the centre, 
and then more generally. 68 
The "push to the east" was mounted through the reconstituted ministerial system. This 
traditional form of centralism continued to apply not only in these great construction 
projects, and in special campaigns to improve product quality and conserve energy, 
but also in the day-to-day running of the economy - by far the most important area of 
Communist Party activity. Horizontal (i. e., regional) coordination remained weak, if 
not virtually non-existent. Just as the central elites extended themselves, so to speak, 
into the regions via the party and the 60-odd branch economic ministries, so the 
regional elite in a case like Tiumen would expand into its targeted development areas. 
Such vertical integration was accentuated in Tiumen itself by the promotion of Boris 
Shcherbina, the first secretary of the Tiumen obkom, to minister for oil and gas 
construction in 1973, and by the extremely high proportion of oil and gas men in the 
regional leadership. As Gustafson commented: "It is common for an obkom and its 
departments to specialise in the dominant activities of its jurisdiction, but the Tiumen' 
obkom goes further than most". All the regional leaderships were locked into the 
industrial structure, and, given the low priority of consumption and infrastructure, 
they tended to see successful plan fulfilment by local plants as being more important 
than a smoothly functioning regional economy. In any case, their ability to intervene 
69 independently was highly restricted . 
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Although centralism remained the dominant trend in the late Soviet period, centrifugal 
forces were gathering strength and the centre itself displayed a decreasing ability to 
deal with them. The widespread development of informal and usually illegal 
economic arrangements involving blat ("pull") and tolkachi ("expeditors" or "fixers") 
in order to cope with supply problems, was a key feature of the command economy 
from its inception during the industrialisation of the 1930s until its final demise. The 
problem got worse with time. In the 1970s and 1980s, adequate supplies for top 
priority projects could be secured only with difficulty, and only at the expense of low- 
priority sectors. A structure designed to centralise the economy spawned a radical 
decentralisation of economic activity. Ironically, the massive branch ministry 
structure -a key agent of centralisation - contributed to this. By 1988, the central 
management apparatus outnumbered the personnel of the central committee (CC) of 
the CPSU by almost exactly forty to one. Ministries flouted CC directives, especially 
in the more sophisticated industries. 70 
The military priorities with which centralisation was so closely associated remained 
firmly in place, especially as the arms race with the USA became more 
technologically sophisticated and demanding, while Soviet economic growth faltered. 
Indeed, Aslund puts the maintenance of military competitiveness top of his list of 
reasons for Gorbachev's renewal of economic reform. He quotes Gorbachev's first 
programmatic speech in late 1984 to support this, pointing out that Gorbachev himself 
already took the problem so seriously as to be thinking in terms of a 15-year 
perspective for tackling it. Gorbachev seems at an early stage to have come to the 
conclusion that "the USSR was losing out in the arms race with the USA because of 
insufficient economic strength". 7 1 Aslund's basic argument is that the ultimate aim of 
Gorbachevite economic reform - perestroika - was to restore Soviet military and 
economic competitiveness with the USA. Be that as it may, the demands of the arms 
race, the decline in economic growth, and the sense that things were slipping out of 
control go some way to explain the extensive purges which were conducted by the 
69 Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Strugglefor Economic Reform (London: Pinter, 1991), pp. 145-146; 
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two reforming leaders who succeeded Brezhnev, and which marked a ma or change j 
from his leadership. 
Even before coming to power, Brezhnev's immediate successor, lurii Andropov, at 
that time the head of the KGB, had been identified with a well-publicised anti- 
corruption campaign, which had reached inside Brezhnev's family. Once in power, 
Andropov embarked on a purge of corrupt officials, a crackdown on absenteeism, 
alchoholism, shoddy work and the black market, and a re-orientation of economic 
policy. Only eight of the fifteen months Andropov spent in office were free from the 
illness which was to kill him early in 1984. Nevertheless, during this short time he 
replaced no less than one-fifth of all regional party secretaries, according to one 
calculation, not to speak of a high-profile shake-up of several regional party 
organisations, and further exposures of official corruption. Andropov was followed by 
ailing 73 year-old Konstantin Chernenko, whose accession to power marked a partial 
return to the elite stability and stifling conformism associated with Brezhnev. 72 
Chernenko died after thirteen brief months of reassuring calm for those alarmed by 
the activism of his predecessor. He was replaced by the healthy, 54 year-old Mikhail 
Gorbachev. Gorbachev had moved rapidly up the hierarchy in his native Stavropol 
krai, a region which gave him links at the time of his election to the CC in 1971 at the 
age of 40 with Mikhail Suslov, the second secretary of the CC CPSU, Andropov, then 
the head of the KGB, and Konstantin Chernenko, then Brezhnev's "personal 
assistant". He was Andropov's pet protege, possibly his intended successor. He and 
his public commitment to reform had majority support at the heart of the top 
nomenklatura. At Ligachev's initiative, a large number of obkom first secretaries had 
put their weight behind Gorbachev, possibly as a representative of the younger, less 
hidebound, more independent-minded generation in the party elite. 73 
Gorbachev's accession marked a return to the Andropov approach to personnel. 
Within a year, 47 of the 121 CPSU regional secretaries had been removed, as had 
more than half of the Central Committee. As far as the RSFSR was concerned, the 
72 Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-96; Gordon 
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Andropov-Gorbachev purges, taken together, lasted 6 years and replaced 80 regional 
party leaders. Most of the victims had been appointed under Brezhnev before 1971, 
i. e., in the classic "stability of cadres" period prior to the "push to the east". They 
were replaced by a younger generation which now owed its position to the new 
central leadership. In other words, an attempt was under way to establish a 66circular 
flow of power", a phenomenon which dated back to the time when Stalin was first 
getting a grip on the party machine (see below). The aim was not to devolve power 
but, on the contrary, to reinforce the new leadership at the centre. A crucial role in the 
purge was played by CC's Organisation and Party Work Department (OPWD). Egor 
Ligachev, later cast as a conservative opponent of Gorbachev ("grossly overdrawn", 
according to Jerry Hough), was appointed head of the OPWD by Andropov on 
Gorbachev's recommendation, and was promoted by Gorbachev himself to an 
oversight role as CC Secretary. Gorbachev could hardly have been unaware of the 
importance of this responsibility for personnel, as it had been his since 1983, just as it 
had been Chernenko's (and probably Andropov's) prior to accession to the leadership 
before him. It was almost as unlikely that he was unaware of the potential danger the 
postholder could pose to the general secretary. Chemenko's predecessor, Andrei 
Kirilenko, had lost this position after a decade - and despite a 35-year association 
with Brezhnev - after having moved into opposition on economic policy, together 
with the largest single grouping of regional secretaries. 74 
Relative youth was not the only novel feature of the new regional leaders. Their 
Brezhnevite predecessors had overwhelmingly been "local insiders", implying, in 
Peter Rutland's view, that within the RSFSR, at any rate, the obkom was the "key 
political arena where appointment decisions were made" - though all such decisions 
had to be approved by the CC. 75 By contrast, the new regional leaders tended to come 
from the home bases of their patrons. There was Gorbachev's own network of clients, 
which originated like him from southern Russia, and there were the networks around 
his closest allies, who originated largely from the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. 
There is an implicit suggestion in Helf s account that this south-eastern axis in some 
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ways resembled the regional coalitions, such as the "push to the east" group, which 
developed under the Brezhnev leadership, and he emphasises the importance of the 
reformist leaders' roots in the late Brezhnev environment. "By 1988, " Helf concludes, 
"this elaborate and extended patronage network of southemers and eastemers, 
intimately tied to the new leadership in Moscow, had with rare exceptions taken over 
,, 76 the regional leadership in the entire Russian Republic. 
As General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev stood at one pole of the "circular flow 
of power" on which the continued functioning of the entire party-state machine 
ultimately depended: 
Gorbachev held the most strategic position in the system, the one giving him 
great power vis-a-vis the selection of the regionalfirst secretaries ... the 
basic 
structure of power inside the Communist party involved the election of the 
general secretary and members by a Central Committee that in turn was 
selected by a Party congress whose delegates were controlled by the 
provincial secretaries who were supervised by the general secretary. 77 





A Gorbachevite summary of the "inner party" expresses much the same idea, though 
in rather sharper tones: 
As a result, you have an indestructible machine: simple, easy to operate and 
dependable. The First Secretary relies on the department of Party bodies and 
their records to select his committee; then the committee to "elect" its First 
Secretary. The selection of committee members (who are always sent to Party 
conferences) is a secret procedure; one gets elected if one has a good record 
or happens to go fishing with the top man. The "election" of the top man is 
held openly. 
76 Helf, All the Russias, pp. 30,31,35 (see also Map 3-1). 
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The machine's key advantage is that it does not allowfor anyfeedbackfrom 
contact with "rank-and-file" Communists. There are officers, generals and 
marshals. I'm not beingfunny. I'm just quoting Stalin who described the Parti, 
structure precisely in these terms (he dubbed the Party "Order of the Sword'). Understandably, it is not for soldiers to elect officers. It is for 
officers to make soldiers NCOs and so on. 
So this makes it plain that the "power of the Party" is just words. In reality 
when we say the Party, we mean the apparat ... 
At the core of Stalinism is the 
principle ofpower. The anonymous power materialized in the nomenklatura, 
that secret ruling class never before known to history. Therein lies the genesis 
of the command system. This power signified the end of the Party as a socio- 
political organization, its conversion into a universal personnel department (it 
is personnel, not political ideas, that matter most) and into a giant distribution 
centre. 78 
The circular flow of power had been seen as a key feature in the bureaucratisation of 
the Soviet regime at least since 1923, when Trotsky identified it as one of the grounds 
for his increasingly critical attitude to the party leadership: 
In thefiercest moment of War Communism, the system of appointment within 
the party did not have one-tenth of the extent that it has now. Appointment of 
the secretaries ofprovincial committees is now the rule. That creates for the 
secretary a position essentially independent of the local organization.... The 
bureaucratization of the party apparatus has developed to unheard-of 
proportions by means of the method ofsecretarial selection. 79 
Richard Sakwa describes the circular flow of power as a key feature of Stalin's nse 
after April 1922, when he became General Secretary, "a post regarded at the time as a 
key administrative rather than political job ... 
His ability to appoint, dismiss, and 
transfer party officials prefigured the uniquitous nomenklatura personnel placement 
mechanism of later years and gave him a powerful weapon in the inner-party 
debates". 80 
Jerry Hough devotes a special section of his exhaustive account of Soviet collapse to 
the role played by the circular flow of power in the rise of Gorbachev. In the course of 
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this, he quotes Gorbachev's own appreciation of the role of the regional party 
secretary: 
The [obkom] first secretary ... was a 
key figure in the system of power. He 
received his post and huge power notfrom the people, notfrom a competitive 
election, but from the hand of Moscow - the Politburo, the Secretariat, and 
personally the general secretary. This was the basis for the duality and 
vulnerability of the position of the first secretary. Each knew full well that he 
would lose his post the moment he ... 
lost the confidence of the general 
secretary. 81 
By this time, however, the relationship between party leader and regional secretary 
was much more one of mutual dependence. The man at the top could no longer rely 
on the stick of Stalinist terror or the carrot of Brezhnevite security. The general 
secretary was as dependent on the regional secretaries as a group as they were 
individually on him. Any basic change in the terms of their relationship could threaten 
the mechanism of interdependence - and with it, the regime in which it was a core 
element. Democratisation was just such a change. There is some question as to why 
Gorbachev adopted a democratisation agenda: was it, as Gavin Helf argues, in order 
to get round the obstruction posed by the party leaderships in the non-Russian 
republics, or was it, as Jerry Hough speculates, to neutralise potential opposition 
inside the party in the RSFSR, or for some other reason? There is also some question 
about how far his commitment to democratisation went. Be that as it may, the 
September 1988 plenum of the CC of the CPSU introduced competitive elections for 
the position of regional party leader and replaced the CC departments, including the 
crucial OPAID, with much weaker institutions. The importance of these changes were, 
perhaps, not apparent at the time. They have not been a significant focus of scholarly 
attention. But they amounted to a political earthquake: 
From the moment that central control over regional appointments (the first 
and most important link in the chain of the nomenklatura system) was lost..., 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a unified vertical power hierarchy 
ceased to exist. What emerged were somewhere more and somewhere less 
viable unconnected regional Party political machines which occupied a 
variety of positions on economic, political, and social reforms and faced 
varied levels of popular dissatisfaction and organized opposition in regions 
81 Hough, Democratization, p. 82. 
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with very different levels of urbanization and economic we4fare: multiple 
"CPSUs", which is to say no "CPSU" at all. 82 
" Helf, All the Russias, pp. 40,44; Hough, Democratization, pp. 100-102,142,152-153 
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Chapter 3. Decentralisation 
3.1 Introduction 
The subject of this chapter is the shift in the balance of power in Russia frorn the 
centre to the regions. This shift has been traced back to Brezhnev's stability of cadres, 
which "encouraged officials in the localities to ignore uncongenial central demands". ' 
However, it was, as we have seen, the introduction of elections for regional party 
secretaries which ruptured the connection between the Soviet leadership and the elites 
under its command. It was not regionalism which led to decentralisation but 
decentralisation, in the sense of a loss of power from the centre, which prepared the 
way for regionalism. 
There is a clear distinction here between Russian regionalism and the national 
independence movements which pulled the Soviet Union apart. In crucial cases, such 
as Ukraine, these movements had a history, expressed popular feeling, and gave 
existing leaders somewhere to go. These leaders had been allowed much more latitude 
under Brezhnev - Helf even talks in term of republics being "subcontracted" to them - 
than had the leaders of the Russian regions. Unlike the other union republics, the 
RSFSR did not have its own republican party organisation until June 1990, when it 
accounted for 58 per cent of CPSU membership. Until then, regional and city officials 
in Russia had been directly responsible to the central Soviet and party apparatus. A 
regional party boss in the RSFSR might use his control over local appointments to 
extend his power of patronage on his home ground, but he could not defy instructions 
from the CC apparatus, however unpalatable they might be. This direct chain of 
command was what enabled Andropov and Gorbachev to carry out the extensive 
purges of the Russian regional elite noted at the end of the last chapter. By contrast, 
not a single regional leader was replaced by the central Soviet OPWD in Ukraine, 
Belorussia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan between 1985 and 1989.2 
1 Robert Service, A History of Twentieth Century Russia (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 424; see also, 
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The rise of the Russian regional elites was not simply, and certainly not imitially, of 
their own volition. Regionalism is only part of the story, whereas weakness at the 
centre is a constant theme. This is a highly complex development. At the same time, it 
is a key feature of the current Russian regime, vital to an understanding of individual 
regional elites such as those in the case studies which follow. The aim in this chapter 
is therefore to provide a necessarily schematic overview of centre-region relations, to 
situate the regions in their current political context, just as the last chapter situated 
them historically. To facilitate this, decentralisation is divided into two periods: 1988- 
1993, when decentralisation was "spontaneous" in the sense that it did not have an 
institutionalised fon-n; and 1993 to the present, when it remains "unresolved" in the 
sense that institutionalisation does not extend to key outstanding issues. Chechnia has 
not been dealt with as it is such a special case. 
3.2 Spontaneous decentralisation 
Between September 1988 and the end of 1993, three major developments dispersed 
power from the centre, opening, then widening a gulf between central and regional 
elites in Russia. The first, as we have seen, was the decision to introduce competitive 
elections for the regional party leaders. The second was the struggle between Yeltsin 
and Gorbachev. The third was the conflict between Yeltsin and the Russian 
parliament. All three developments originated centrally. For this reason, a 
contemporary Russian social democrat drew attention to the way the central Moscow 
political elite was "successfully consolidating against itself' the regions and the 
people in them who controlled their resources. 3A key feature of the period was the 
absence of institutions which corresponded to the new relationship between the centre 
and the regions. This was a problem for elites all round, as Leonid Polezhaev, the 
governor of Omsk oblast, pointed out: 
So the centre, aspiring as before to the total control of the entire process of 
Russian life, no longer possessed drive belts which would convey the impulses 
of its orders to the provinces. In the provinces, nothing at all remains of the 
Russia", Theodore H. Friedgut, Jeffrey W. Hahn, Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk NY: 
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archaic drive mechanism which existed in communist society. Rupture. Hiatus. 
The centre exists, the territories exist but the effective connection between 
them has been destro ed. The authoritarian desire to command remains, and a Y 
seýflwilled desire not to obey has arisen. 4 
The significance of the 1988 decision to end the system of nomenklatura 
appointments has not been widely discussed. 5 Yet contested elections purged the 
Russian regional leadership far more thoroughly than Andropov and Gorbachev had 
done, and launched a process which Helf describes as "democratisation cum 
localisation". As we have seen, in the six years prior to September 1988,80 RSFSR 
regional leaders, who largely came from the early Brezhnev period, had been replaced 
by members of a younger generation. But between November 1988 and August 1991, 
more or less the last three years of the CPSU's existence, no less than 121 regional 
leaders, including all of Gorbachev's appointees, were voted out. The successful 
candidates owed their positions to the local party organisation, not to the central 
apparatus or the general secretary. As the party's credibility declined, many among 
both victors and vanquished found a place in the democratised regional soviets. The 
dual mechanism on which the implementation of central directives depended - the old 
vertical hierarchy and Gorbachev's own regional patronage network - had gone, and 
no new chain of command was there to take its place. The "Soviet pyramid", as the 
social-democrat quoted above put it, "broke up into a multitude of little regional 
pyramids". The process of change within the regional elites was given extra impetus 
by the unprecedented if transitory independent political movements of the time (the 
"infornals", etc. ). While representatives of the older generation were obvious targets, 
such organisations expressed attitudes about issues like regionalism and elites which 
were acceptable to the rising element in the regional nomenklatura. 
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At the same time, the intensifying struggle between the union republics and the Soviet 
leadership weakened central authority as such and stimulated regional aspirations. In 
April 1990, Gorbachev gave the ASSRs the same status as the union republics in 
order to divide and weaken the latter from within, especially Russia, which had 16 out 
of the 20 ASSRs. Yeltsin, who was now the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 
responded by encouraging the ASSRs to "take as much sovereignty as you can 
swallow" in order to trump Gorbachev and keep the ASSRs on side. In June 1990, the 
RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies (CPD), also chaired by Yeltsin, adopted a 
Declaration of State Sovereignty, which asserted the primacy of Russian law over 
Soviet law and of Russian rights to the natural resources on its territory over Soviet 
rights. It also voted to reduce its 1991 contribution to the Soviet budget by U per 
cent. The main result was a "war of laws" in which the union republics and the Soviet 
leadership both claimed that their laws came first, "leading in most cases. " as Sakwa 
comments, "to the implementation of none". But that was not all. Within five months 
of the Russian declaration of sovereignty, about 16 ASSRs and Autonomous Okrugs 
(AOs) had in some sense declared their sovereignty or raised their status, or both. A 
few regions and city districts joined in this "parade of sovereignties". The key issues 
at stake for all of them in a sinking economy with a splintering economic structure, 
accentuated by what Philip Hanson calls the "war of fiscal attrition", were taxation 
and control over property and resources. By the time of the abortive coup of August 
19919 it was difficult to know, especially in the key case of Tatarstan, whether 
Gorbachev or Yeltsin was more successful in winning over the ASSR leaderships, or 
whether the ASSR leaderships were more successful in playing off the two main 
rivals against each other. 7 
Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3,1992, pp. 479-509; Peter Rutland, The politics of economic stagnation in 
the Soviet Union: The role of localparty organs in economic management (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 194. 
7 Abraham Brumberg, "The Road to Minsk", The New York Review ofBooks, 30 January 1992, p. 22; 
Busygina, "Regional'noe izmerenie", p. 6; Philip Hanson, Local Power and Market Reform in the 
Former Soviet Union (Munich: RFE/RL Research Institute, 1993), pp. 26-27; Izvestiia, 3 May 1990; 
Martin Nicholson, Towards a Russia of the Regions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 13- 
14; Sakwa, Russian Politics, pp. 6,112,115-116,437 (fn. 28); Robert Service, A History of Twentieth 
Century Russia (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 488; Denis J. B. Shaw, Russia in the Modern World: A 
New Geography (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 57; Ann Sheehy, "Commonwealth Emerges from a 
Disintegrating USSR", RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 1,3 January 1992, p. 6; Ann Sheehy, 
"Tatarstan Asserts Its Sovereignty", RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 14,3 April 1992, p. 2; 
Darrell Slider, "Federalism, Discord, and Accommodation: Intergovernmental Relations in Post-Soviet 
Russia", Theodore H. Friedgut, Jeffrey W. Hahn, Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk, NY: 
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No sooner had the Russian leadership established its supremacy over the Soviet centre 
in the August 1991 coup than two contrary tendencies became evident in its relations 
with the regional elites. On the one hand, Yeltsin, now the elected president, strove to 
set up some kind of vertical executive apparatus with himself at its head. On the other, 
splits within the Russian leadership led to a prolonged struggle for power between the 
president and the parliament, in which the attempts by both sides to win over regional 
leaderships strengthened regional autonomy and regionalist aspirations. According to 
one estimate, for example, a third of the signatories to the Federal Treaty in March 
1992 came from regions which had ceased to make contributions to the federal 
budget. 8 
The key figure in the new administrative apparatus was the regional head of 
administration or governor, the chief executive official in each oblast, krai, and AO. 
Whether the governors were to be appointed or elected (and how) quickly became 
part of the complicated in-fighting and trade-off deals between parliament and 
president. The upshot was that neither side - nor the regional electorate - got much of 
a grip on the general run of governors, most of whom came from the upper ranks of 
the regional nomenklatura. While the governors were granted considerable sway over 
city mayors, the powers of the presidential representatives, who tended to come from 
the reform wing of the nomenklatura, amounted to little more than a watching brief 
Throughout 1992 and 1993, there were clashes - many of which were connected with 
the legislative-executive conflict at the national level - between the regional soviets, 
the presidential representatives, and the governors. To a certain extent, these clashes 
obscured the underlying shift in the balance of power from the centre to the regions. 9 
M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 240; Gordon B. Smith, Soviet Politics. - Struggling with Change (London: 
Macmillan, 1992), pp. 170-17 1; Roman Solchanyk, "The Draft Union Treaty and the 'Big Five"', 
Report on the USSR, 3 May 199 1, pp. 16-17; Roman Solchanyk, "The Gorbachev-Yeltsin Pact and the 
New Union Treaty", Report on the USSR, 10 May 199 1, pp. 1-2; V. 1. Ul'ianov, "Vertikal' 
redstavitel'noi vlasti - eto tol'ko zakon", Vash vybor, 3,1993, p. 4. 
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Report on the USSR, Volume 3, Number 43, October 25,199 1, pp. 18-2 1; Darrell Slider, "Federalisrn, 
Discord, and Accommodation: Intergovernmental Relations in Post-Soviet Russia", Theodore H. 
Friedgut, Jeffrey W. Hahn (eds. ), Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1994), pp. 261-263; Vera Tolz, "The Role of the Republics and Regions", RFEIRL Research Report, 
Vol. 2, No. 15,9 April 1993, p. 8. 
9WIlliam A. Clarke, "Presidential Prefects in the Russian Provinces: El'tsin's regional cadres policy", 
The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 22, No. 2 (1995), pp. 221-224,226-227,229-233,23 5-23 6; Slider, 
"Federalism, Discord, and Accommodation ", pp. 251,254-260. 
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Both the republics and the regions sought to play parliament and president off against 
each other in order to extract more powers for themselves. But at this stage, the shift 
still seemed to be more towards the autonomies, especially the republics, than to the 
oblasts and krais (so much so, that in September 1993, the republic of Udmurtia's 
immediate response to the Yeltsin decree which led to the suppression of the 
parliament was to seize new rights for itself and announce that its laws would 
henceforth take precedence over those of the Russian Federation). The government 
felt unable to pressure Tatarstan and Chechnia to sign the Federal Treaty, which they 
refused to do despite the fact that it granted the republics many new powers over their 
territories and resources, as well as over foreign policy, foreign trade, and inter- 
regional relations. There was evidence that the oblasts and krais were less successful 
in obtaining federal funds than the republics (though in this field the AOs and 
autonomous oblasts appeared to come out on top). There is also evidence that the 
earlier a republic had adopted a declaration of sovereignty, the greater the fiscal 
benefits it received from the centre. An alternative case stressed that the centre had 
succeeded in achieving a measure of redistribution in the pattern of transfers, to the 
benefit of the neediest regions, though it conceded that economically strong republics 
had cut preferential deals in the early 1990s. 10 
However, as the trial of strength between the presidency and the parliament rose to its 
climax, the oblast and krai leaderships began to cast not only envious but increasingly 
confident eyes on equality with the republics. In March 1993, the vast majority of 
regions supported the proposal to set up a Federation Council made up of regional 
leaders as the upper house of a new parliament. But over half of the republics opposed 
it as a threat to their special status, though the idea surfaced again in August. Between 
April and July 1993, four regions - Vologda, Chita and Sverdlovsk oblasts, plus 
10 R. G. Abdulatipov et al. (eds. ), Federativnyi dogovor: Dokumenty. Kommentarii (Moscow: 
Respublika, 1992), pp. 10- 16; Leyla Boulton, "Regions divided over Moscow battle", Financial Times, 
23 September 1993, p. 2; John Morrison, "Russia's Black October: The End of the Time of Troubles? " 
RIIA Briefing Paper, November 1993, p. 3; Ann Sheehy, "Tatarstan Asserts Its Sovereignty", pp. 1-4; 
Slider, "Federalism, Discord, and Accommodation", pp. 249-250,252-253; Vera Tolz, "Regionalism 
in Russia: The Case of Siberia", RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 9,26 February 1993, p. 4; 
Daniel S. Treisman, "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia", British 
Journal ofPolitical Science, July 1996; Philip Hanson, Sergei Artobolevskiy, Olga Kouznetsova, 
Douglas Sutherland, "Federal Government Responses to Regional Economic Change", Philip Hanson, 
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Primorskii krai - moved towards declaring themselves republics within the Russian 
Federation. Only Sverdlovsk went the whole way, and the Urals Republic it set up did 
not enjoy much success. The crushing of the parliament, the abolition of the soviets, 
the weakening of the inter-regional associations (already split by regional economic 
interests), the dismissal of Eduard Rossel, the governor of Sverdlovsk, and the 
nu auOlition of the Urals Republic after eight days' existence pointed to a decisive victory 
for the presidency. But in the new constitution drawn up by the presidency and 
adopted in December 1993, the oblast and krai elites got more or less what they 
wanted: equality with the republics and a Federation Council. This was not all there 
was to it, of course. But it showed how far the balance of power had shifted, and who 
to. 11 
Table 3.1 - The RSFSR 1990: administrative-territorial structure 
12 
Region No. Notes 
ASSR 16 
krai 6 5 included subordinate 
autonomous oblasts & AOs* 
oblast 49 7 included subordinate AOs** 
AO 10 all subordinated to the krais/oblasts 
in 
which they were located 
Autonomous oblast 5 all subordinate to the krais in 
which they were located 
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Studies, Vol. 46, No. 7,1994, pp. 1133-1161; Slider, "Federalism, Discord, and Accommodation", pp. 
262-263. 
12 Sources: V. H. Peikhvasser, Geograficheskii atlas SSSR (Moscow: Glavnoe upravleme geodesil 1 
kartografii pri sovete ministrov SSSR, 1990), pp. 23-26; Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics (1993), pp. 
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Krasnoiarskii krai included 3 (1 autonomous oblast, 2 AOs), 4 other krais had I 
autonomous oblast each. 
** Tiumen oblast included 2 AOs, 6 other oblasts had I AO each. 
i11 
Table 3.2 - "A parade of sovereignties": changes in the status of the Russian 
regions 1990-1993 13 








"Republic" Adygea autonomous 
oblast 
05.10.90 republic approved 
03.07.91 
"Republic" Alta; autonomous 
oblast* 
25.10.90 republic approved 
03.07.91 
"Republic" Buriatia ASSR** 10.10.90 republic 
"Republic" Dagestan ASSR** 13.05.91 republic 





ASSR** 30.01.91 republic 
"Republic" Kalmykia ASSR** 18.10.90 republic 
"Republic" Karachaevo- 
Cherkessia 
autonomous oblast 30.11.90 republic approved 03.07.91 
"Republic" Karelia ASSR** 09.08.90 republic 
"Republic" Komi ASSR** 29.08.90 republic 
"Republic" Marii-E] Mari ASSR** 22.10.90 republic 
"Republic" Mordovia ASSR** 07.12.90 republic 
"Republic" North Ossetia ASSR** 20-07.90 republic 
"Republic" Sakha (Yakutia) Yakut 
ASSR** 
27.10.90 republic 
"Republic" Tatarstan ASSR** 30.08.90 republic 
"Republic" Tyva Tuva ASSR** 12.12.90 republic 
"Republic" Udmurtia ASSR** 20.09.90 republic 
"Republic" Khakassia autonomous 
oblast 
15.08.90 republic approved 03.07.91 




"Republic" Chuvashia ASSR** 24.10.90 republic 











AO Koriak AO 08.10.90 AO 
AO Nenets AO 13.11.90 AO 
AO Chukotka AO 07.02.91 AO 
AO Evenk AO 16-17.01.91 AO, 
AO Yamalo- 
Nenets 
AO 16.10.90 AO 
* Gorny-Altai 
13 Sources: Gerald M. Easter, "Redefining Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation: 
Sverdlovsk Oblast"', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4,1997, pp. 622-624; MaikI Makfol [Michael 
McFaul] and Nikolai Petrov, Politicheskii al'manakh Rossii 1997, Tom 1 (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr 
Karnegi, 1998), pp. 639-641; Peikhvasser, Geograficheskii atlas SSSR, pp. 23-26; Richard Sakwa, 
Russian Politics and Society (1993), pp. 422-424; S. M. Shakhrai (ed. ), Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi 
federatsii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar'(Moscow: Nauchnoe izdatelqstvo "Bol'shaia Rossiiskaia 
entsiklopediia", 1995), p. 278. 
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** As a result of a 15 December 1990 amendment to the the constitution of the RSFSR, the ASSRs in it became 
"republics fon-ning part of the Russian Federation". 





city of federal significance 2 
autonomous oblast I 
AO 10 
Total equal subjects of thefederation 89 
under articles 5 and 65 of the constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted 12 
December 1993 by referendum. 
3.3 Unresolved decentralisation 
Yeltsin had to make substantial concessions to the regional elites in order to keep 
them together under his leadership. To a certain extent, the 1993 constitution 
registered the new balance of forces and institutionalised it. Decentralisation was no 
longer spontaneous because what governor Polezhaev called an "effective connection" 
between the centre and the regions once more existed. But the tension between the 
centre's "authoritarian desire to command" and the regions' "self-willed desire not to 
obey", as he put it, was not resolved so easily. 15 The period in which decentralisation 
remained an unresolved issue can itself be subdivided into two parts. In the first, from 
the beginning of 1994 until April 2000, the regional elites had the initiative and 
continued to consolidate their position. In the second, from April 2000 to the present, 
Vladimir Putin, the new president, has presided over an attempt to shift the balance of 
forces back in the centre's favour. The results so far have been mixed, and do- not 
indicate a decisive resolution. 
14 S. M. Shakhrai (ed. ), Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoifederatsii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar'(Moscow: 
Bol'shaia Rossliskaia entsiklopediia, 1995), pp. 266,278. 
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Constitutions are not a strong point in Russian political history. The spirit of Count 
Witte's remark, "I have a constitution in my head but in my heart I spit oii it", 
survived much longer than the tsarist regime he served. The importance of the 1993 
constitution, which in many ways continues a tradition of power politics, unwritten 
rules, and convention, should not be overestimated. On the other hand, out of the five 
constitutions in Russian history, it may be only the second to mark some kind of 
settlement rather than a simple imposition (the first having been in 1906). 16 
The Federal Treaty had described the republics as states within the Russian Federation 
which possessed full state powers other than those they had agreed to give up to the 
federal authorities. The other types of region had simply been defined as being 
subordinate to the federal authorities. However, article 5 of the 1993 constit ption 
declared that the republics and the five other types of region making up the Federation 
- oblasts, krais, okrugs, the two cities of federal significance and the one autonomous 
oblast - were all equal "subjects of the federation". The regions, no less than the 
republics, were entitled to draw up their own constitutions, known in their case as 
charters, and to pass their own legislation. 17 
Two representatives from each federation subject, one from the legislature, one from 
the executive, made up the Federation Council, the upper house of the new 
parliament, or Federal Assembly. In constitutional ten-ns (under articles 102 and 106), 
the Federation Council was more powerful than the lower house, the State Duma. The 
State Duma had no independent financial control, as any laws adopted by it on the 
budget had to be considered by the Federation Council. This also applied to laws on 
other financial matters, war and peace, external borders and international treaties. It 
was the Federation Council, not the State Duma, which had within its jurisdiction the 
confirmation of presidential edicts declaring a state of emergency or martial law. It 
was also in the Federation Council's jurisdiction to decide "on the possibility of using 
15 Leonid Polezhaev, Vpered na medlennykh tormozakh... (Moscow: Novosti, 1994), pp. 61-62. 
16 Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age ofModernisation and Revolution 1881-1917 (London & New York: 
Longman, 1983), p. 34; Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics. - An Introduction (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1990), pp. 104-106; Julia Wishnevsky, "Problems of Russian Regional Leadership", 
RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 19,13 May 1994, p. 10; A. Zhilin, "Strashchaiut generalov", 
Moskovskie novosti, 3 (766), 15-22 January 1995. 
17 Abdulatipov, Federativnyi dogovor, pp. 13,50,70 -71; the text of the constitution referred to here is 
in S. M. Shakhral (ed. ), konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar'(Moscow: 
Bol'shaia Rossiiskaia entsiklopedlia, 1995). 
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the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian 
Federation". 18 The Federation Council appointed the procurator general and the senior 
judges, including those of the constitutional court, from presidential nominees. It also 
had the final say in the difficult and complicated business of impeaching the 
president. The Federation Council was also a legislative body with particularly strong 
executive connections, as can be seen from Table 3.4. even when, as initially, it was 
directly elected (the governor and the chairman of the regional assembly later took the 
seats on it as of right). This was partly because of the general shift towards executive 
power after 1993, and partly because its members, many of whom already had 
executive positions, were, unlike the State Duma deputies, not subject to the 
constitutional ban under article 97 on double post-holding. 19 
Table 3.4 - Federation Subject Officials in the Federation Council 1993 20 
Position No. Per cent 
Regional heads of 
administration (governors) 40 22.9 
Republican leaders (presidents, 
chairs of republican soviets, etc. ) 16 9.1 
Republican prime ministers 
(chairs of councils of ministers) 9 5.1 
Regional legislative leaders (regional 
soviet chairs/deputy chairs) 13 7.4 
City chief executives (mayors/city 
heads of administration) 7 4.0 
All regional, republican and city 
Officials 85 48.6 
Other Federation Council members 90 51.4 
Total Federation Council 175 100.0 
members 
However, the shift to the executive did not mean that the executive elites at different 
levels had achieved a clear consensus, let alone cohesion under presidential 
command, though this was an assumption made at the time. A sign of the lack of 
definition was the list of fourteen items in article 72 of the constitution, including land 
18 Shakhrai, Konstitutsiia, p. 290. 
19 Jane Henderson, "All Power to the President", Russia and the Successor States Briefing Service, vol. 
2, No. 6, December 1994, p. 4; Darrell Slider, "Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies", Post-Soviet 
Affairs, 1996,12,3, pp. 243-248. 
20 Sources: Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 December 1993; Nezavisimaia gazeta, 7 April 1994; Segodnia, 17 
March, 17 May 1994. 
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and natural resource issues, principles of taxation, administrative procedure, legal and 
law enforcement personnel, and foreign economic relations, which came under the 
joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and of the federation subjects. Clarity 
about the terms of the agreement on which a centre-region division of powers is 
based, as well as adherence to that agreement, is, needless to say, essential to the 
smooth functioning of a federal state. Article 72 was one of the signals that, on the 
contrary, the victors and beneficiaries of 1993 were about to dispute the spoils. The 
constitution stated that on matters of joint jurisdiction federal and regional executives 
should constitute "a single system of executive power". But this was far from 
guaranteed, especially in view of the substantial concessions the constitution itself 
made to the regional elites in general and to their executives in particular. Their 
enhanced status and powers both reconciled the regional elites with the centre and 
encouraged them to further consolidate their positions at its expense. 21 
An important sign of this was the spreading of bilateral treaties on the delimitation of 
powers, provided for under article 11 of the constitution. At first, these were only 
concluded with the republics, perhaps to make up for their reverse in the 
constitutional settlement. But the regions soon joined in. By the end of 1997,40 
treaties had been signed and 15 more were in preparation. These treaties went against 
the constitution in at least two different ways. Firstly, some federation subjects got 
better deals than others, which undermined the principle of equality. Secondly, the 
treaties often transferred powers from federal jurisdiction to joint jurisdiction or from 
joint jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of the federal subject where this was expressly 
forbidden by the constitution. In many cases, this provided the justification for 
constitutions, charters and legislation in the federal subjects to ignore the federal 
constitution as well. By 1996, Sergei Filatov, the head of the presidential 
administration, was complaining that legislation in 75 out of the 89 federation 
subjects contravened the constitution. Although it was the republican consititions 
which stood out in placing their laws above those of the Russian Federation, they 
were not the only ones. The Kemerovo charter, for example, passed in September 
1995, violated the constitutional principle of the division of powers by giving the 
21 Henderson, "All Power to the President", p. 4; Shakhrai, Konstitutsiia, p. 283; K. C. Wheare, 
Federal Government (New York: Oxford UniversIty Press, 1947), pp. 55-56. 
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region's legislative assembly the right to appoint the governor. By 2000, some 20 per 
cent of regional legislation was said to be unconstitutional. 22 
One of the few outstanding differences between the regions and the republics in the 
aftermath of the 1993 crisis was the fact that republican heads of state were elected 
while governors were still appointed by the president. William A. Clarke, writing in 
1995, thought that Yeltsin's ability to prevent the election of governors would be an 
important test of his real strength. Such elections, were they to take place, could 
increase the assertiveness of the Federation Council, which the president was 
accustomed to using as a counterweight to the oppositional State Duma. Take place 
they did, the first few in 1995 - one seeing the return of Rossel in Sverdlovsk - and the 
bulk in the latter part of 1996, after the governors had contributed to the president's 
own election victory. Over half the incumbents, nearly all of them Yeltsin appointees, 
were defeated. Within less than a year, there was a major confrontation between the 
Federation Council and the president over Yeltsin's effective replacement of Evgenii 
Nazdratenko, the governor of Primorskii krai, which was in the throes of a severe 
energy crisis, by the presidential representative (who was also the head of the regional 
FSB). Despite their lack of enthusiasm about Nazdratenko himself, the regional 
leaders stood firm against the exercise of presidential power over an elected governor 
and Yeltsin was forced to back down. 23 
More power accrued willy-nilly to the regional elites as a result of the economic crisis 
of 1998, and of the speed with which Yeltsin worked his way through his last four 
prime ministers. There is also evidence that the governors played an more active role 
in the 1999 State Duma elections than they had in the 1996 presidential election, 
especially in boosting Edinstvo, the Kremlin's new party. Unlike the 1995-1997 
22 Gordon M. Hahn, "Putin's 'Federal Reform': The Administrative and Judicial Reform of Russian 
Federalism", East European Constitutional Review, Winter 200 1, p. 6 1; Monitor, 12 December 1995,2 
January 1996; Vitalii lvanov, Rossiiskiijederalizm i vnutrigosudarstvennaia dogovornaia politika 
(Krasnoiarsk: Krasnoiarskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1997); Open Media Research Institute Daily 
Digest (OMRI), Part 1,14 September 1995; Russian Regional Report (RRR), 10 July 1997,15 January 
1998; Shakhrai, Konstitutsiia, p. 267; Andrei Zhukov, "Gubernatorial Elections", The Jamestown 
Foundation Prism, 10 February 1996. 
23 Philip Hanson, "The Center versus the Periphery in Economic Policy", RFEIRL Research Report, 
vol. 3,29 April 1994, no. 17, p. 24; RRR, 12 June 1997,10 July 1997,17 July 1997,15 January 1998; 
"Russia", East European Constitutional Review, Winter 200 1, p. 34; B. Timofeev, "Posle vyborov: 
Lishnikh prosiat udalit'sia", Ural'skii rabochi, 24 August 1995, p. 1; k7adivostok, 15 July 1997; 
Zhukov, "Gubernatorial Elections". 
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gubernatorial elections, the 2000-2001 round was dominated by the incumbents. They 
won 28 of the 44 elections contested in 2000 itself (63.6 per cent), with designated 
successors winning in at least two other cases. Between the end of October 2000 and 
the end of January 2001 incumbents won 20 out of 34 elections (58.8 per cent). Of the 
46 gubernatorial elections held in 2000 and in 2001 until the end of May, only 11 
incumbents (23.9 per cent) were defeated. Victories by incumbents or designated 
successors were a sign of consolidation by regional elites, especially where this went 
against presidential preference. On the other hand, the defeat of an incumbent was not 
necessarily a sign of weakness on the part of the regional elite, as our examination of 
the January 2001 Tiumen election will show. 24 
But despite its undoubted weaknesses, the centre retained considerable powers. 
Yeltsin ordered the military into Chechnia at the end of 1994 on his own authority as 
president, although the Federation Council was supposed to have the final say on the 
external or internal use of the armed forces. On a more mundane level, the centre, 
despite its own fiscal problems, maintained its grip on the redistribution of tax 
revenue as subsidies to the regions. This gave it an effective stranglehold on their 
budgets, as the vast majority of regions were dependent on these subsidies (an 
examination in 1998 suggested that there were probably eight "donor" regions, 
including both the AOs in Tiumen, and 81 "recipients"; estimates of these numbers 
vary, but not by very much). The same Federation Council which faced Yeltsin down 
over Nazdratenko in July 1997 had passed the federal budget by a large majority four 
months earlier. There had been a storm of complaint and criticism. One or two regions 
24 Yevgenia Borisova, "And the Winner is? " The Moscow Times, 10 September 2000, 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2000/09/09/119-print. htnil>, 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2000/09/09/120-print. htrril>, 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/storles/2000/09/09/12I-print. htrnl>, accessed 10 September 2000; 
Julie A. Corwin (JAC), "Regional Leaders Got the Vote out for Putin", RFEIRL Russian Federation 
Report, 13 September 2000; Sarah Karush, "Governors Hold Key to Durna", The Moscow Times, 18 
December 1999, <http: //www. moscowtimes. ru/18-Dec-1999/stories/storyl7. htnil>, accessed 20 
December 1999; Gail W. Lapidus, "Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia", Post- 
Soviet Affairs, 1999,15,1, p. 8; Sergei Porshakov, "Orientatsiia v politicheskom durniane", Izvestiia, 
26 January 200 l.; "Russia", East European Constitutional Review; Peter Rutland, "The Regional 
Agenda in Alternative Plans for Russia's Economic Development", Takashi Murakami and Shinichiro 
Tabata (eds), Russian Regions: Economic Growth and Environment (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 
Hokkaido University, 2000), pp. 66-71; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and Provincial 
Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia", Post-Soviet Affairs, 1999,15,1, p. 
103; Rostislav Turovskii, "Sil'nyi tsentr - sil'nie regiony? Itogi i uroki gubernatroskikh vyborov", 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 March 2001, <http: //www. scenario. ng. ru/expertiZe/2001-03- 
14/2_strong. html>, accessed 14 March 2001; Marc Weinstein, "The Regional Elite: Who Are Russia's 
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had even witheld tax revenue for a time. But so long as the budget had not been 
approved, regional officials could not even begin to go about the long and difficult 
business of beginning to secure actual money transfers. There was evidence that the 
government was using its control of these transfers to pressure regional leaders to 
implement unpopular policies such as housing reform, though an elaborate system of 
bribery at the Finance Ministry seemed to offer a way round this. One of 
Nazdratenko's weak points was that Primorskii krai was allocated a bigger 
proportionate subsidy than any other region, amounting to 70 per cent of its budget. 25 
As well as the strengths of the centre, there were important divisions between the 
regions themselves. Putting the interests of one's own region - or of one's own 
regional elite - first was a natural consequence of decentralisation. At the same tinie5 
there were the divisions or "asymmetries" between the regions and the republics, and 
between the "donor" and recipient regions. Regional leaders went on accusing the 
republics of profiting at the regions' expense, despite the levelling-up embodied in the 
constitution, and have chimed in with the nationalist argument in favour of 
incorporating the titular "ethnic" territories into "non-ethnic" Russian regions. Most of 
the donor regions produce and export raw materials or semi-processed raw materials, 
a fact which reflects Russia's drastically shrunken economy. Such is the pressure to 
produce that there is no room for diversification in these regions. On the other hand, 
their export earnings can only provide partial relief from the production slump in the 
recipient regions. Real development, as opposed to some limited recovery after a 
crisis like that of 1998, seems to be out of the question. The result is that both donor 
and recipient regions are tied into a vicious circle of decline. In this situation, the 
relatively advantageous (and therefore threatened) position of the donor regions and 
the republics, whether real or imaginary, is a ready-made source of inter-regional 
friction. This was an open invitation to divide-and-rule policies for a weakened 
centre. 26 
25 Peter Glatter, "Federalization, Fragmentation, and the West Siberian Oil and Gas ProvMCe", David 
Lane (ed. ), The Political Economy ofRussian Oil (Lanham MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 
151-152,159-160 (fn. 35); Moskovskie novosti, 15-22 January 1995; RRR, 20 February, 13 March, 24, 
30 April, 8,22 May, 12 June, 17 July 1997; Segodnya, 5 March 1997; Daniel Treisman, "Deciphering 
Russia's Federal Finance: Fiscal Appeasement in 1995 and 1996", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5, 
1998, pp. 893-906; Daniel Treisman, "Russia's Taxing Problem", Foreign Policy, Fall 1998, pp. 55-66. 
26 Eduard Rossel, quoted i Adrian Campbell, "Regional Power I in I in the Russ'an Federation", Andrew 
Coulson (ed. ), Local Government in Eastern Europe. - Establishing Democracy at the Grassroots 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), p. 157; Vladimir Zhir'novskii, quoted in Pete Glatter, "Regional and 
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The shift in the balance of power away from the centre and towards the regions was 
therefore limited. One of the striking things about this limited shift was its lack of 
resolution. The centre's control over budgetary funds has been emphasised here, for 
example. In reality, this was only one part of the picture, for the federal government's 
own lack of funds meant that it was not in a strong position to enforce regional 
compliance. There was a certain mutual impotence in the relationship between the 
centre and the regions. The relative weakness of both sides engendered a kind of 
dynamic stalemate in which the two sets of elites sometimes seemed to circle round 
each other in an endless series of moves and counter-moves. 
Thus, the constitution did not even mention governors, let alone give the regions the 
right to elect them. Once elections were conceded, the governors became more 
assertive. Their assertiveness prompted, or speeded up, counter-measures by the 
centre. The powers of the presidential representatives were increased in order to draw 
the 90-odd federal departments in each region away from local influence. At the same 
time, a more systematic policy was initiated of supporting the mayors of regional 
capitals in their rivalries with the governors. The Federation Council then lined up 
behind the Primorskii governor in a test case over presidential representatives. It also 
obstructed local government legislation, while two key governors - Iakovlev in St. 
Petersburg, Rossel in Sverdlovsk - reformed local government structures in such a 
way as to strengthen their own domination. At the same time, the fact that the shift 
from centre to region was a limited one meant that there was attraction as well as 
repulsion in the relationship between them. So while the conflicts outlined above were 
going on, they were sounding each other out as potential allies against other players: 
the State Duma, in Yeltsin's case, unruly local governments in the case of the 
governors. 27 
Local Power in Russia", Slovo, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 1995, p. 70; Glatter, "FederaliZation", pp. 151-153; 
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27 Arkadii Chernetskii, "Biudzhet oblasti osnovan na dvoinykh standartakh", Ural'skii rabochii, 16 
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However, it was not until the Yeltsin presidency had been severely damaged by the 
crisis and unrest of 1998 that some sort of serious elite consensus seemed to be 
forming around the need for centralisation, or at least for greater cohesion between 
central and regional authorities. This was also the period in which Putin was promoted 
through the presidential administration to head the FSB. Aleksandr Bovin argued that 
Russia was degenerating into a confederation, and that this was due not simply to the 
self-seeking of the regional leaders, or to the power the Federation Council gave them 
as a group on matters of common interest, but also to government policy favouring 
bilateral treaties. Like Bovin, Viacheslav Igrunov, one of the leaders of the liberal 
labloko, described Russia as a set of lawless baronial fiefs which needed greater 
central control, the gradual amalgamation of regions into larger units, and a refo rmed 
Federation Council. According to Leonid Smirniagin, the presidential administration 
had for some years been working on various schemes to improve the coordination of 
federal structures, including grouping regions into several large districts headed by a 
new kind of presidential representative comparable in some ways to the old governor- 
generals. 28 
Gubernatorial interventions in the otherwise uneventful 2000 presidential election 
campaign indicated that a consensus on centralisation existed among the regional 
elites themselves. This was particularly true of an open letter to Putin from three 
governors, who suggested that the president should have the right to appoint the 
governors, while the governors should have the right to appoint the chief executives 
within their regions, including, of course, the mayors of the regional capitals. The 
three governors also proposed that the Federation Council should no longer consist of 
the executive and legislative heads of the federation subjects, a change which would 
certainly diminish its importance and possibly make it less amenable to gubernatorial 
control. Their basic thesis was that "a strong state power is the essential attribute of 
the market economy in Russia", and that without a revived economy it would not be 
28 Aleksandr Bovin, "Federalizm v krizise. Pora razminirovat"', Izvesdia, 4 August 1998; the eXile, 21 
May-4 June 1998; Viacheslav Igrunov interviewed by Boris Kornotskii, "Nash federalizm - eto 
feodalizm", Sovetskaia Kalmykia segodnia, 17 February 1999; Moskovskie novosti, 24-31 May 1998, 
pp. 2-3,6,31 May-7 June 1998, p. 8,12-19 July 1998, pp. 6-7,26 July-2 August 1998, p. 7,2-9 August 
1998, pp. 10-11; V. A. Serdiukov, "Boris, ty bol'she ne prav! " Leiborist, 6, July 1998, p. 2; Leon1d 
Smirniagin, "Putin Brains Trust Seeks to Improve Federal Agencies in Regions", RRR, 26 January 
2000. 
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possible to defend her national interests against "economically and militarily stronger 
powers". The governors who took part in this debate were variously accused of 
making panic-stricken attempts to curry favour with Putin rather than putting forward 
realistic proposals, and of wanting to restore a Soviet-style hierarchy. Smimiagin, 
who agreed with both of these charges, argued that the governors were still 
intimidated by the prospect of having to face an election. He quoted a member of the 
Federation Council as saying that "it is much easier to lick one boot clean than 
29 400,000". 
However, such points of view were associated with central elites and tended to 
underestimate the power-shift towards the regions. They seemed to miss the degree to 
which the open letter constituted an invitation to negotiate, to bargain. They also 
missed the novel idea in the open letter. This was not the argument about the 
importance of a strong state to economic reform, which was then having one of its 
periodic airings. It -was the connection between such "market Stalinism" and a 
perspective of maintaining the power of the regional elites. The basis of that power 
lay in the regions themselves, not at the centre. It was therefore possible for the 
regional elites to go along with most of the changes introduced under Putin. Those 
which reduced their standing at the centre most of them were not willing to oppose. 
Those which threatened their dominance on their home ground they either resisted or 
found a way round. The Federation Council voted itself out of existence in its original 
form, thus shearing itself of much of its real remaining power, and the governors 
began to take their turn on a consultative State Council. The regions were grouped 
into seven federal districts, each with its own presidential representative. A new law 
even gave the president the limited right to dismiss governors. None of this provoked 
much opposition, certainly not when Nazdratenko finally resigned under intense 
29 Petr Apokov, "Zhivaia sobaka luchshe mert-vogo I'va", Izvestiia, 28 February 2000, 
<http: //www. izvestia. ni/izvestia/article/210622? printable=yes>, accessed 29 February 2000; "Intriga 
sokhraniaetsia lish' v bor'be za 'bronzu"', Izvestiia, 22 March 2000, 
<http: //www. izvestia. ni/izvestia/article/212383? printable=yes>, accessed 22 March 2000; Alan 
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newfederals. html>, accessed 18 March 2000; Sergei 
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2000, <http: //www. ng. ru/politics/2000-02-18/3 - 
tuleev. htn-il>, accessed 18 February 2000; Mikhail 
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pressure. On the other hand, Putin met with very little success when it came to 
influencing gubernatorial elections. By and large, the incumbents won the day. Even 
in Kursk, where the centre played a role in preventing incumbent Aleksandr Rutskoi 
from standing, the victor was not the centre's favoured candidate. The centre's attempt 
to intervene in the Tiumen election was a disaster, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. 30 
The period following the main round of gubernatorial elections gave the impression 
that the governors might be getting tougher while the presidency was becoming more 
conciliatory. Governors likely to oppose the restructuring plans of chief executive 
Anatolii Chubais went on the board of the electricity monopoly Unified Energy 
Systems. Putin approved a new law which effectively allowed the majority of regional 
leaders a third term, and some of them a fourth. It was doubtful whether the new 
federal policy had been successful during its first year, as Putin claimed, in 
harmonising most regional legislation with the constitution and with federal law. In 
sum, the presidency has had some success with its easiest task, reducing the formal 
influence of the regional elites at the centre of Russian politics. But its ability to bend 
the regional elites to its will remains very much in doubt. The drain of power from the 
centre to the regions which took place in the early 1990s has not really been begun to 
be reversed. The governors are not beholden to Putin, Marc Weinstein has argued, 
"and therefore will be happy to work with him when it serves their interests and go 
their own way when that seems more profitable". The relationship between the central 
Alexander Uss, "Rossii - impersckuiu federatsliu", Nezavisimaia gazeta, 6 April 2000, 
<http: //www. ng. ru/ideas/2000-04-06/8 
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elites and the regional elites remains institutionalised, if in a weaker and more 
complicated form than previously -a development which may well have increased the 
scope for informal arrangements. All the basic issues of unresolved decentralisation 
remained outstanding. 31 
As the Putin administration got into its stride, an apparent contrast developed between 
the effectiveness of its fiscal policy towards the regions and its federal policy. The 
main agents of the latter policy, the seven presidential representatives, seemed no 
more successful during the second year of their existence than they had been in the 
first. At most, they had, as Robert Orttung put it, "weakened the governors without 
establishing an equally powerful replacement". Orttung concluded that "many of the 
presidential representatives' supposed accomplishments are in fact overstatements". 
By contrast, tax refori-ris promised to shift a substantial proportion of revenue fTom the 
regions to the federal centre. The government circumvented a clause in the Budget 
Code, which guaranteed the regions at least 50 per cent of overall tax revenue, in 
order to reduce the regions' share from 64 per cent in 1998 to under 50 per cent in 
2001. This suggests that the centre is succeeding in arm-wrestling the regions back 
into line, and that the period of unresolved decentralisation is finally coming to an 
end. 
However, there are several reasons for being wary about such a conclusion. As a 
general point, the claim that the centre Is taming the regions has been made before 
and, like the even more frequent claim that Russia is turning the comer economically 
(a claim made, according to one source, by no less than 9,437 journalists between the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and mid-November 2001), needs to be treated with a 
Guardian, 31 March 2000; Marina Volkova, "Gossovet vse-taki budet", Nezavismaia gazeta, 28 July 
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degree of scepticism. The Putin leadership may have been trying to come to grips 
with the problem in a more consistent and persistent way than its predecessor, but the 
fact that it has spent much of its first two years grappling with it does not necessarily 
indicate success. Secondly, as has already been indicated, the centre has always held 
the whip hand not only over the federal budget but also over actual transfers to the 
regions. There have been considerable differences of opinion between central and 
regional elites about the latter amounts, especially at times of crisis. Thirdly, as we 
will see in the Omsk case study, loss of revenue, though problematic, is not 
necessarily as unwelcome to the regional elite as to other sectors of the population. As 
we shall see, this is connected in Omsk with what Hughes referred to as the 
interlocking of political-administrative and economic elites. Such interlocking is 
noticeable, in a concentrated form, at all levels of government, including the reformed 
Federation Council. It may herald the formation of a new "oligopolistic" vertical or 
possibly, as is in the nature of oligopoly, more than one. Finally, the strong economic 
growth recorded in 2000 and 2001 has masked problems such as the reduction in the 
regions' share of public revenue, as absolute amounts have increased. It may only be 
as growth falters that the real state of centre-region relations will become apparent. 32 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter, like the two previous ones, has attempted to summarise some of the 
salient points in a large and complex field. Its most important function is to provide 
something in the way of a political context for the two case studies which follow, just 
as the previous chapters sketched in historical and theoretical contexts. Three aspects 
of this most immediate context have a particular bearing on the studies: the nature of 
the origins of present-day regional elites in the late Soviet period, the fragmenting 
effect of political change, and bargaining as a major way in which elites at different 
levels relate to each other. 
32 The differential progress of federal policy can be charted in the following issues of RRR: 29 August, 
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Chapters I and 2 put the case for elite continuity. Chapter 3 has outlined the particular 
consequences of regime change in Russia, which, while not dislodging the traditional 
elites, nevertheless fragmented them and disrupted or "de- structured" relations 
between them. This fragmentation has occurred largely between different levels in 
what used to be a vertical hierarchy, crucially, though not exclusively, between the 
centre and in the regions. When it comes to the case studies, we should therefore 
expect to find some signs of change in even the most stagnant and otherwise 
unchanging regional elite. In particular, we would expect to see signs of a speeded-up 
generational change within late Soviet elites as traditional political structures began to 
give way. In other words, continuity in this context does not preclude conflict within 
and between elites nor related activity in the wider population. It does, however, 
imply that such conflicts and such non-elite activity remained within certain limits. In 
other words, they fell somewhere short of removing the elites as a whole (as opposed 
to particular figures and leadership teams) from their privileged position. We should 
also expect certain characteristics of late Soviet regional elites, despite all the 
changes, to have been carried over into the new age. Indeed, if the level of elite 
continuity is as high as has been argued, then it would be surprising were this not to 
be so. One such characteristic was the close relationship in predominantly industrial 
regions between the obkom and the directors of major regional industrial enterprises 
on which the region's fortunes depended. These directors wielded substantial power 
over their regions, and embodied, in Michael Brie's words, the point at which "the 
departmental and the regional were interwoven". 33 The extent to which such 
relationships have persisted through changes in politics and property is therefore a 
partial test of the basic argument put forward in this thesis. 
Change as fragmentation has occurred at a number of levels. The crucial area of 
concern in this and the previous chapter has been the relationship between central and 
regional elites. However, we should expect to find some degree of fragmentation 
between regions which used to be subordinate to each other, and between regional and 
city elites, particularly where the city or fon-ner sub-region has special weight in terms 
of population or economic importance. Regionalism is in part an expression by each 
33 Michael Brie, "Regional'me politicheskie rezhirny i sisterny upravleriiia", V. Gel'man, S. 
Ryzhenkov, A Brie, Rossiia regionov: transformatsda politicheskikh rezhimov (Moscow: Ves' 
mir/Berlin: Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag, 2000), p. 72. 
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region of its separateness and distinctiveness not only from the centre but also from 
other regions. This implies the possibility of disjuncture between regions in the same 
part of the country. The fact that the case study regions are adjoining territories in 
western Siberia, this does not mean an automatic commitment to some kind of all- 
Siberian unity as against the federal authorities, let alone for more ambitious ends. 
Russian regionalism remains a relative, limited phenomenon, which is why the term 
"fragmentation" has been chosen here as opposed to "integration" on the one side and 
"disintegration" on the other. Finally, if our understanding of the relationship between 
regime and social structure is broadly correct, then we should expect to find a 
distinction at all these levels between the elite and particular individuals or groups 
within the elite who happen to hold leading positions at any particular moment in 
time. 
It fits with this analysis of elite fragmentation that relations between the elites 
themselves should be marked by ambivalence, bargaining and jockeying for position. 
The nature of this fragmentation and the economic conditions under which it has 
occurred impel the regional elites to seek the best possible "deal" from the centre, and 
city elites to get the best possible deal from the region. This has stimulated central 
elites to dictate where they are in a strong economic or fiscal position, and to resort to 
divide-and-rule manoeuvres where they are not. Either way, short-termism on the one 
side and NIMBYism (Not-In-My-Back-Yard-ism) on the other tend to reinforce each 
other at the expense of the common national interest to which all the elites subscribe 
in words. 
34 
At the same time, this kind of bargaining implies common ground. If elite 
fragmentation in general and regionalism in particular are limited, relative 
phenomena, then it would not be surprising to find regional elites linking in to 
vertical, extra-territorial structures, especially on the economic side where the 
regional element is likely to form no more than one link in a chain. Fragmentation 
does not exclude a certain impulse towards integration, limited by NIMBYism though 
it may be. The three governors' open letter to Putin was one of a number of statements 
indicating a preparedness by the regional leaderships to give some of their power up 
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to the centre in return for more power over their own regions, a trade-off which might 
help to fashion a more coherent chain of command. There seems therefore to be some 
basis in principle in the regional elites themselves for the kind of centralisation policy 
proclaimed by the Putin leadership. It is tempting to see that leadership as a 
reassertion of the military and security elites standing for national unity which had 
lost so much ground to the "oligarchs", i. e., to economic and financial elites, whose 
rise was linked with post-Soviet fragmentation. An oversimplification, no doubt. But, 
given the military's continuing weakness, it suggests how much hangs on the Putin 
centralisation project, and how much of the project must depend on the voluntary 
cooperation of the regional elites and of particular factions within them. 
Generalisation is one thing, specifics are another. The argument here is not that 
Russian regional elites are all basically the same. It is that, seen in the historical and 
political context of centre-region relations, it is possible to make generalisations about 
them in terms of in terms of origins, fragmentation and ambivalence. There are, as we 
shall see, important differences between Tiumen and Omsk, the two case study 
regions, neighbours though they are - differences, that is to say, in the immediate 
"administrative-territorial" context of their respective elites. Their economic 
structures differ considerably. Tiumen is the major source of Russia's oil and gas. 
Omsk has an important refinery and petrochemicals complex. Tiumen is the most 
fragmented region in the country, economically, politically, demographically. Omsk 
is the scene of more typical kinds of elite friction between, for example, the governor 
and the mayor of Omsk city. Tiumen' has an inclination towards the Urals regions 
while Omsk is unequivocally Siberian. And so on. Looked at in this way, difference 
rules (apart from a common tendency towards economic monoculture). Following 
such an approach, one would be likely to conclude that the distinctiveness of regional 
regimes is the most important thing about them. The most one could do in terms of 
generalisation would be to construct some sort of typology to which they 
approximate. This kind of approach, which was touched on in the Introduction to the 
thesis, has its validity and its uses. But it is rather like studying fonns of manne life 
without taking into account the ecosystem of the sea. Every actor has a context. The 
conclusions which can be drawn from an approach which puts the issue of context to 
" For an earlier summary of Russian regional NIMBY-ism in terms of stabilisation, see, Philip 
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one side must be limited if they are not to be misleading. What follows is an attempt 
to conceptualise two specific actors in relation to the three contextual generalisations 
mentioned earlier, to look at them in a sense (and without depriving them of their own 
volition) as variants, each unique in its own way, but not as island universes. 
Hanson, Regions, Local Power and Economic Change in Russia, (London: RIIA, 1994), p. 22. 
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Chapter 4. The Tiumen elite turns upside down 
4.1 Introduction 
The conclusion to the last chapter framed the preceding discussion in terms of 
contexts, the first chapter providing a theoretical context, the second a historical 
context, the third a political context for the approach to contemporary Russian 
regional elites. That is one way of looking at it. Another way is to divide this 
discussion up according to whether its main emphasis is on elite composition or on 
the nature of the political regime. Chapter 1 concentrated on the question of elite 
composition, and concluded that its main feature was continuity. Yet this made it 
difficult to account for the changes which had clearly taken place. The problem was 
especially sharp in the case of the regional elites, where both continuity of 
composition and an increase in political importance were particularly pronounced. 
The chapter ended with a hypothesis in which continuity and change were 
simultaneous but differentially located, the former in elite composition, the latter in 
the organisation of power, the political regime. If the first chapter was largely taken 
up with the question of elite composition, the two following chapters concentrated on 
regimes and regime change in terms of Russian centre-region relations. A historical 
survey explored the dominant centralist tradition as well as episodes of regionalism. 
The recent rise of the regional elites was related to the draining of central power 
which marked the transition from Soviet to Russian governmental forms. The loss of 
the CPSU as a unifying hierarchy and the successive conflicts which broke out in the 
top leaderships were identified as crucial episodes in the spontaneous decentralisation 
of the time. There is undoubtedly a sense in which the 1993 constitution recognised 
and institutionalised the new relationship between the centre and the regions. But the 
further concessions to the regions which followed - bilateral treaties, the election of 
governors, etc. - and the uncertain attempt since the spring of 2000 to turn the tide 
back in the centre's favour indicate that this issue is far from being resolved. 
Chapters 1,2, and 3 provide a number of points which can be tested in the case study 
regions. The discussion in Chapter 1 should lead us to expect more or less 
simultaneous signs of elite continuity and regime change. We would not expect to 
find evidence of direct or near-direct continuity, as laid down by Lane and Ross, but 
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we would certainly expect to find evidence of two other kinds. One is of trends - of, 
for example, the continuing rise of individuals up the elite career ladder (likely to be 
speeded up in the case of the younger element), or, as was indicated in Chapter 3, of a 
close connection between the political- administrative elite and a major regional 
industry. The other is evidence of elite homogeneity as an indicator of continuity, or 
of a overt link between elite continuity and elite homogeneity. However, given the 
results of the survey in Chapter 3 of the effects of regime change, we should not 
expect such continuity and homogeneity to preclude elite fragmentation and a 
significantly altered relationship between the fragmented elites. On the contrary, we 
should expect to find evidence of a link between such fragmentation and regime 
change. This applies not only to elites within a particular region, but also to relations 
between them and elites at the centre. In sum, we should expect to find continuity and 
homogeneity within the elites, change and differentiation between them. In view of 
the discussion in Chapter 2, we might also expect to find signs of the historically 
dominant tradition of centralist, "pyramidal" organisation, possibly of domination 
within a particular elite of a single leading figure. 
The specifics of Tiumen are particularly complex. In fact, it is really three regions in 
one, though, as we shall see, there is a possibility that this could now be changing. Be 
that as it may, some local historical and economic background helps to clarify the 
context of the contemporary regional elites. 
Tiumen has quite a long and colourful history. The regional capital is the oldest 
Russian town in Siberia and was once the capital of the Siberian Khanate (referred to 
in the official regional history as "the Tiumen Khanate"). The region's natural 
resources have been a focus of conflict and rivalry as far back as the Mongol-Tatar 
iasak, the tribute of furs and forest products extorted from the local peoples which 
was taken over by the victorious Russian invaders. Like other parts of Siberia, it 
began under the tsars to be a destination for successive waves of exiles. It also began 
to be settled by Russians and by other European peoples of the empire, though less so 
than other parts of western Siberia. In contrast with the rapacious rule of the tsars, the 
Soviet regime of the 1920s made some attempt to encourage the northern minorities 
to develop without destroying their traditional way of life. A late example of this was 
the natsional'nyi okrug or National District (NO), two of which - the Iamalo-Nenets 
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NO and the Ostiako-Vogul (later the Khanty-Mansi) NO - were formed in 1930 in the 
north-east of what was then the large Urals region. Stalinism, however, brought 
extreme subjection to the centre. Even in this sparsely-populated territory, some tens 
of thousands of peasants were driven into collective and state fan-ns. A minor incident 
of resistance in 1932 was distorted beyond recognition to create the legend of Pavlik 
Morozov, the local Russian boy who heroically denounced his erring father to the 
authorities. The most serious resistance to collectivisation seems to have come not 
from Russians but from the indigenous Khants and Mansis. They were also the main 
victims of repression and their traditional way of life was all but wiped out. 
Meanwhile, the large regions were broken up into more easily controllable units. The 
town of Tiumen and its hinterland passed in stages from the economically and 
politically important Urals region into Omsk in 1935. New towns were created by the 
forced labour of hundreds of thousands of deported peasants, which boosted local 
industrial production by 200 per cent in the course of the decade. On the other hand, 
productivity remained low and the industries themselves were largely restricted to 
timber and river transport. But the new state enterprises, the Great Terror, the Gulag, 
Russification, and the creation of a virtual apartheid system all subordinated the 
Siberian north-west to the Kremlin more tightly than ever before. ' 
Tiumen finally became a region in its own right in 1944, as part of the continuing 
move towards smaller regions more easily dominated by Moscow. It remained, 
however, relatively large, as big as Britain, France and Germany put together, notable 
for its forests and waterlands, with a sparse population and harsh natural conditions. 
Two-thirds of it was forested, most of it was subject to some degree of permafrost, 
and 40 per cent of it was marshland. In the three or four summer months, it was like a 
1 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia. - Russia's North Asian colony 1581-1990 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 242,244-246,283-284,286,290,302,348,35 1- 
352; K. S. Karol, Solik Life in the Soviet Union 1989-1946 (London: Pluto Press, 1986), pp. 37-40; V. 
M. Kruzhinov et al (eds. ), Ocherki istorii Tiumenskoi oblasti (Tiumen': Administratsiia Tiumenkol 
oblasti, 1994), pp. 37,114-118,176-181,183-185; Victor L. Mote, Siberia. - Worlds Apart (Boulder 
CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 39,101; N. Trotskii (sic), Tuda i obratno (St. Petersburg: Shipovnik, 
1907), pp. 19-46; Lembit Vaba and Riri Viikberg, The Endangered Uralic Peoples 
<http: //russianculture-miningco. com/culture/cultureeurope/russianculture/gi/dynamic/offsite. htm? site= 
http: //www. suri. ee/eup/>, accessed II October 1999; Nikolai Vakhtin, Native Peoples of the Far North 
(London: Minority Rights Group, 1992), pp. 11,13-23. 
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water-drenched sponge - water which during the long, harsh winters, turned to ice at 
least 2 metres thick. 2 
The discovery of the region's oil and gas resources eventually brought profound 
changes to Tiumen. But the Moscow geological establishment and the Soviet leaders 
were slow to come round to the views of local experts. It was not until the 1950s that 
they realised what a treasure trove they had, and not until the 1960s that the focus of 
the petroleum industry moved from the Volga to western Siberia. But then things 
proceeded apace. Between 1966 and 1985, according to the region's official history, 
Tiumen received one quarter of all capital investment in the Siberian economy. This 
was at a time when Siberia had been made an investment priority for strategic 
reasons. The "basic funds" available to the region soared from 74 million rubles in the 
8th Five Year Plan (1965-1970) to 9.7 billion rubles in the I Ith Five Year Plan (1981- 
1985), and the proportion of these funds going to oil and gas rose from 5.8 per cent in 
1966 to 78 per cent in 1985. By 1983, Tiumen was producing about half a million 
cubic metres of natural gas per day, and its daily output of oil had overtaken that of 
Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the obkoin was usually powerless to ensure the 
provision of basic infrastructural items such as roads and power lines in time. The 
provision of housing and urban services was even worse and contributed greatly to the 
transience of the workforce. 3 
Such problems became clearer, and even more entrenched, in the gas campaign of 
1979-1982, a major development of the Tiumen gasfields and of export pipelines to 
Europe. Gas production rose by well over ten times between 1975 and 1985 and 
Tiumen became an important factor in international politics. But the emergency 
nature of the campaign, the lack of forward planning, the dominance of central control 
and the dependence on a massive transfusion of resources led to waste, confusion, 
dislocation, lack of coordination, and shoddy workmanship. Above all, the 
development of social and industrial infrastructure lagged far behind the growth in 
2 Kruzhinov, Ocherki istorii Tiumenskoi oblasti, p. 5; Zeev Wolfson (Boris Komarov), "The 
Environmental Risk of the Developing Oil and Gas Industry in Western Siberia", The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, Research Paper No. 52, October 1983, pp. 2-5. 
3 Douglas Evans, The Politics ofEnergy. - The Emergence of the Superstate (London: Macmillan, 1976), 
p. 92; Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics ofSoviet Energy under Brezhnev and 
Gorbachev (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 32,171-174,306; Kruzhinov, 
Ocherki istorii Tiumenskoi oblasti, pp. 5,219-220; Wolfson, "The Environmental Risk", p. 1. 
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production. Unusually for such campaigns, some attempt was made at integrated 
regional ("horizontal") planning. Nevertheless, entire towns were built by individual 
ministries for separate departmental purposes. Despite its complaints, the obkom did 
not differ significantly from the central authorities in practice. It, too, sacrificed 
horizontal to vertical coordination, infrastructure to production. Its goal of achieving 
a settled, permanent population in the region fell far short of the balanced approach 
favoured by Siberian reformers like Abel Aganbegian and Tatiana Zaslavskaia, hence 
Thane Gustafson's comment that "seen from Novosibirsk, the Tiumen' obkom is a 
threat to the real interests of the region". 4 
The environment and the indigenous peoples were major, long-term victims. Crude 
transport methods eroded the permafrost environment, speeded up the expansion of 
swampland and the depletion of forests. Frequent oil leaks polluted the entire region, 
thanks to the ubiquitous presence of water. Burning torches incinerated tens of 
thousands of birds. As early as 1983, between 13 per cent and 16.5 per cent of the 
tundra and taiga zones had been turned into "cold desert", i. e., irrversibly destroyed. 
Zeev Wolfson concluded that western Siberia had been assigned the role of a 
"disposable" territory - "to be used once only". By 1997, such environmental damage 
was estimated at a cost of $3.2 billion a year. This helped to complete the destruction 
of the indigenous peoples' traditional way of life by laying waste their land while 
preventing them from sharing the benefits of the natural resources in it. They were 
effectively excluded from decision-making by a law of 1980 which turned the NOs 
into autonomous districts (AOs). Despite an increase in absolute numbers, the 
Northern Minorities as a proportion of the population of the Khanty-Mansi AO 
(KhMAO) fell from 7.3 per cent in 1970 to 1.6 per cent in 1989. In the lamalo-Nenets 
AO (IANAO), the corresponding figure fell from 32.4 per cent to 6.1 per cent. 
Nevertheless, the rise of an indigenous rights movement has met with a murderous 
response. 5 
4 Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty, pp. 306-308; Peter Rutland, The politics of economic stagnation in the 
Soviet Union: The role of local party organs in economic management (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 97,129-134. 
5 Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia, pp. 390-392,395-396,413; Ohtuleht, 7 April 1993; G. F. 
Shafranov-Kutsev, Universitet i region (Tiumen': Tiumenskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1997), p. 
46; V. L. Sokolin (ed. ), Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Goskornstat, 1998), pp. 112, 
120; Vakhtin, Native Peoples of the Far North, pp. 23-25; Wolfson, "The Environmental Risk", pp. 2- 
19. 
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Tiumen has been so dominated and so deeply marked by the development of oil and 
gas that its main territorial divisions now have more to do with its economic structure 
than with the indigenous minorities for which they were originally designed. The 
development of oil and gas at the expense of socio-economic infrastructure has also 
resulted in an extremely lopsided regional economy. As of 1993 (i. e., early in the 
post-Soviet period), Tiumen held over 60 per cent of the known oil reserves in Russia 
and produced 93 per cent of its gas. The distribution of these vast reserves 
corresponds rather neatly to the region's three main administrative divisions: 
1. The IANAO lies in the far north. It occupies more than half the land area of 
Tiumen, has a population of over half a million, which in the mid- I 990s stayed for 
an average of only five to eight years, owing to the severe climate. It produced 93 
per cent of all Russia's gas in 1993 and accounted for over 25 per cent of the entire 
region's oil production. Oil and gas together accounted for 92.3 per cent of all 
industrial production in the UNAO in 1998. 
2. The KhMAO, immediately to the south, occupies well over a third of Tiumen, has 
a population of nearly 1.4 million, 90 per cent of which in the mid-1990s had come 
from other parts of Russia and of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. It is the 
main centre of the Russian oil industry, accounting for more than half of all 
Russian oil production in the mid-1990s. Oil and gas together accounted for 84.3 
per cent of all industrial production in the KhMAO in 1998. It has a slightly more 
diversified economy than the IANAO, especially in terms of electricity generation, 
which accounted for nearly 12 per cent of all industrial production in the KhMAO 
in 1998. The AOs dominate the region economically, accounting in 1993 for more 
than 90 per cent of its gross output and over 95 per cent of its profits. 
3. The remaining sixth of the oblast in the extreme south, commonly referred to as 
"Tiumen proper" (sobstvenno Tiumen), essentially consists of the town of Tiumen 
and its adjacent districts. It has a population of over 1.3 million and has a role in 
the onward transmission of oil and gas. It provides 50 per cent of the entire oblast's 
food consumption and has some mechanical engineering and electrical equipment 
enterprises concentrated mainly in the town of Tiumen, which has a population of 
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over 550,000. The town is the traditional location of the main higher education 
institutions and medical facilities, the oil and gas administration offices, and the 
regional administration. 
Russia is littered with the remains of Soviet one-industry ministerial empires and their 
"company" towns. Even in these terms, the Tiumen region has an extremely narrow 
industrial base. In 1990, manufacturing accounted for over 90 per cent of all industrial 
production across Russia as a whole. In Tiumen, it accounted for less than 30 per cent. 
Extractive industries other than oil and gas accounted for about 6 per cent of industrial 
production in Russia as a whole but only around 2 per cent in Tiumen. Gas, which 
only accounted for about I per cent of industrial production nationally, made up 25 
per cent of output in Tiumen, and oil only figured at about 3 per cent nationally but at 
well over 40 per cent in Tiumen. 6 This, then, was the economic base on which the 
local elites faced the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
6 Sources: V. I. Galitskii (ed. ), Regiony Rossii: Tom I (Moscow: Goskornstat Rossii, 1999), pp. 397, 
399,405; Pete Glatter, Tyumen: The West Siberian Oil and Gas Province (London: RIIA, 1997), pp. I- 
2; V. Kriukov, pp. 98-112; "Administrativnoe ustroistvo"; Sokohn, Rossiiskii statisticheskii 
ezhegodnik, p. 396; Jonathan Stem, Oil and Gas in the Former Soviet Union: the Changing 
Foreign 
Investment Agenda (London: R11A, 1993), pp. 
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Table 4.1. Industrial Structure of Tiumen Oblast 1994 (%)7 
Industry Whole 
Oblast 
KhMAO L4, NAO South  l 
Electricity generation 10.5 1 2.9 0.1 2 7. 2 
Oil 60.2 78.3 33.8 0.1 
Gas 21.5 5.7 64.8 - 
Oil and gas 81.7 84.0 98.6 0.1 
Chemicals and 
petrochemicals 
1.1 - - 14.2 
Machine building and metals 1.4 0.1 - 17.7 
Timber and woodworking 1.2 1.1 0.1 6.1 
Building materials 1.3 1.1 0.7 5.0 
Light industry 0.2 - - 3.1 
Food 2.1 0.8 0.5 20.0 
Table 4.2. Industrial Structure of Tiumen Oblast 1998 (%)8 
Industry I Whole 
Oblast 
Kh. MAO 1 4 IANAO 
lectricity generation 10.9 1 1.9 5.4 
Oil and Gas 81.8 84.3 92.3 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 0.7 - - 
Machine building and metals 2.2 1.7 0.2 
Timber, woodworking, paper 
and cellulose 
0.7 0.6 0.1 
Building materials 1.0 0.6 1.0 
Light industry 0.2 - 0.1 
Food 1.8 0.6 0.9 
Note: The figures in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 have been selected to show the main forms of 
production and so do not quite add up to the full 100 per cent. 
7 Source: "Adrriinistrativnoe ustroistvo i razmeshchenie proizvodstva", Natsional'naia sluzhba 
novostei, <http: //www. nns. ru/regiony/tyumen2. html>, accessed 9 August 1998. 
' Source: V. 1. Galitskii (ed. ), Regiony Rossik Tom I (Moscow: Goskornstat Rossli, 1999), pp. 393, 
399,405. 
137 
4.2 Elite continuity 
Elite continuity in Tiumen will be examined in two ways. First, the profiles of four 
key regional figures will be compared: lurii Shafranik, the first oblast governor and 
former Minister of Fuel and Energy, Leonid Roketskii, his successor as oblast 
governor, Aleksandr Filipenko, the governor of the KhMAO, and luni Neelov, the 
governor of the LkNAO. 9 These leaders have played vital roles in the development of 
executive power in the region during the transition period. The nature of their origins 
as members of the regional elite and the extent to which they continue to display 
Soviet elite characteristics are therefore of crucial importance to the case argued here. 
Second, the composition of the three dumas in the region will be investigated in order 
to establish whether they continue to provide evidence of continuity and homogeneity 
along the lines argued by Hughes in relation to the regional elections of 1990 and 
1994.10 As with the careers of the governors, special attention will be given to the 
place of the oil and gas industries in the composition of the three regional dumas. 
9 Sources for the four biographies: "Khanty Mansi Governor on Relations with Tyumen, Kremlin, Oil 
Firms", RRR, 23 October 1997; V. M. Kruzhinov et al (eds. ), Ocherki istorii Tiumenskoi oblasti 
(Administratsiia Tiumenskoi oblasti: Tiumen' 1994), p. 232; Martin McCauley (ed. ), Longman 
Biographical Directory of Decision Makers in Russia and the Successor States (Harlow: Longman, 
1993), pp. 171,516-517; Damian Marhefka, Who's no in the CIS Oil and Gas Industty (Los Angeles: 
Russian Petroleum Investor, June 1996), p. 30; Petr Netreba "'Neft', podniataia naverkh, prinadlezhit 
tornu, kto podnial ee naverkh... (interview with Aleksandr Filipenko), Kommersant vlast'. 23 May 2000, 
p. 55; Lev Sigal, "Net mesta teplee Sibirl", (interview with Roketskii) Obshchaia gazeta, September 25 
- October 1,1997, p. 6; FBIS-SOV-96-015,23 January 1996, p. 48; "Neelov Removed from Gazprorn 
Board", RRR, 16 September 1999; "Ves' Khanty-Manslisk", Kommersant vlast', 23 May 2000, p. 63; 
Russian Joint Stock Company Gazprom (Market Intelligence Group, 1995), pp. 17,19; "Filipenko 
Aleksandr Vasil'evich", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei. - Personalii: staryl arkhiv, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/persons/filipen. html>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Gubernator: Biografiia (kratkala)", 
Khanty-Mansiiskii avtonomnyi okrug, <http: //www. hmao. wsnet. nL/govemer/Guber 
- 
v/blogr. htm>, 
accessed 17 November 2000; "Gubernator Tiumenskoi oblasti", Tiumenskaia oblastnaia 
administratsiia, <http: //www. sibtel. ni/Admin/gubem. html>, accessed 5 August 1998; "Gubernator 
Tiumenskoi oblasti", Ofitsial'nyi sait administratsii Tiumenskoi oblasti, 
<http: //adm. tyumen. ru/adniin/gub/gub_l. htn-fl>, accesssed 15 January 2001; "Krupnye politiki i 
biznesmeny oblasti", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, <http: //www. nns. ru/regiony/tyumen6. html>, 
accessed 24 June 1999; "Neelov lurii Vasil'evich", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/restricted/persons/neelovO. htn-A>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Shafranik lur-ii 
Konstantinovich", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/restricted/persons/shafranO. html>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Shafranik luni 
Konstantinovich: Politicheskie vzgliady, pozitsii", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/restricted/persons/shafran6. html>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Shafiranik luni 
Konstantinovich: Postoiannye kontakty, otnosheniia, sviazi", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/restricted/persons/shafran8. html>, accessed 7 June 2001. 
10 James Hughes, "Sub-national tlites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to 
Kryshtanovskaya & White", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 6,1997, pp. 10 17-103 6. 
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Leonid lulianovich Roketskii was the governor of Tiumen for seven years until 2001. 
Born in 1942 in Ukraine, he worked in 1966 in one of the first student construction 
brigades in Surgut, one of the main towns in the KhMAO. He returned to Surgut after 
graduating in 1970 to work in the Soviet Ministry for Construction of Oil and Gas 
Enterprises (Minneftegazstroi), rising, by the early 1980s, to the position of chief 
engineer in Surgutgazstroi. Roketskii left the industry in the early 1980s to work his 
way up the Soviet ladder, becoming chairman of the Surgut executive committee and 
of the Tiumen town executive committee in June 1988. In March 1990, he was elected 
to the Surgut Soviet. On 22 April 1990, he was elected to the Tiumen oblast Soviet, 
the executive committee of which he became chairman, and joined the Tiumen 
obkom. Roketskii remained a member of the Communist Party until the abortive coup 
of August 1991, which he opposed. He was appointed first deputy governor in 
November 1991, shortly before the final collapse of the USSR, and governor early in 
1993. Roketskii's wife, whom he describes as "a powerful woman", had a senior 
managerial position in Surgut and headed the Tiumen branch of Neftekhimbank - 
something which, he said, had brought him "a host of troubles" in the shape of gossip 
and rumour. 
The governor of the KhMAO is Aleksandr Vasil'evich Filipenko. Born in 1950, he 
followed a career as a bridge building engineer in Surgut in the mid-1970s before 
heading the construction department of the KhMAO Communist Party committee 
from 1977 to 1982. A brief promotion to first deputy chairman of the KhMAO Soviet 
executive committee was followed in 1983 by five years as secretary of a Communist 
Party district committee (raikom). Filipenko's upward progress resumed in 1988, 
when he became secretary of the KhMAO Communist Party committee. In 1989, he 
became chairman of the KhMAO Soviet executive committee, a post which he 
continued to hold after having been elected deputy to the Tiumen oblast Soviet for the 
town of Khanty-Mansiisk (the AO capital) in March 1990. He remained a member of 
the Communist Party until the abortive coup of August 1991, which he opposed. He 
was appointed to his present position shortly before the final collapse of the USSR at 
the end of 1991 and declared that he would attempt to create a favourable climate for 
the useful activities of businessmen. 
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lurii Vasil'evich Neelov, born in 1952, is the governor of the LANAO. He qualified as 
an engineer at the Tiumen Industrial Institute in 1974 before going from mechanic to 
director in a motor transportation unit within a couple of years, by which time he was 
also a member of the Soviet executive committee in Salekhard (the main town of the 
IANAO) and chairman of the Surgut Soviet in the KhMAO. This rapid rise seems to 
have lost momentum in 1976, when Neelov shifted his focus into unspecified 
Komsomol and Party activity for some eleven years. Between 1987 and 1990, 
however, he chaired the Surgut Soviet, the Surgut Soviet executive committee and the 
USSR Supreme Soviet committee on transportation, communication and informatics. 
In March 1989, he was elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) as 
one of the eleven deputies from the Tiumen region. Neelov then became deputy head 
of the Tiumen oblast administration until February 1994, when he was appointed 
governor of the LkNAO. As governor, Neelov was initially a member by right of the 
board of directors of the gas monopoly Gazprom. In August 1999, however, he was 
not re-elected, reportedly as a result of pressure from the federal government, which 
felt that he was too independent. He has been known to blame central government for 
lack of investment in the AO resulting in idle oil and gas wells and unfinished 
industrial construction programmes. At a 1997 roundtable discussion organised by the 
Institute for EastWest Studies (now the EastWest Institute), which produces the 
Russian Regional Report, Filipenko did not deny sitting on the board of the major oil 
companies in the KhMAO, including Surgutneftegaz, which, he said, provided 27 per 
cent of the AO's overall budget. 
Another important regional figure to have spent a period in office in Moscow is lurii 
Konstantinovich Shafranik, who was Russian Minister of Fuel and Energy for three 
and a half years. Like Roketskii, Shafranik has a Ukrainian background, and like 
Neelov he was bom in 1952 and graduated from the Tiumen Industrial Institute as an 
engineer in 1974 (he later acquired an external qualification in oil and gas 
technology). He appears to have started working for Nizhnevartovskneftegaz, an oil 
company based in the KhMAO, as early as 1972, and rose through a variety of posts 
in the enterprise until 1983. From 1983 to 1985, Shafranik was secretary of the 
Langepas district committee of the Communist Party in the KhMAO but for the 
following two years he was second secretary of the Party's Langepas town committee, 
a possible demotion. In 1987, however, he became one of the youngest general 
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directors in the Soviet oil and gas industry as head of Langepasneftegaz, a position 
which he held for the next three years. Langepasneftegaz now accounts for over a 
quarter of the oil reserves of LUKoil, into which it has been incorporated. In 1990, He 
was elected chairman of the Tiumen oblast Soviet by an overwhelming majority, 
despite being one of the least known of the six candidates. Although he joined the 
Communist Party obkom, he refused to enter its top leadership. Shafranik became 
governor in October 1991, in the first wave of appointments to the new Russian 
regional administrations, and devoted strenuous efforts to keeping the oblast fuel and 
energy complex - and the oblast itself - together. He accompanied President Yeltsin to 
Britain in 1992 and agreed a memorandum on cooperation between Tiumen oblast 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Yeltsin appointed him 
as Minister of Fuel and Energy on January 12,1993, thus enabling Roketskii_ and 
others to move one step up the political ladder. In December 1993, Shafranik won the 
election in a KhMAO constituency for a seat in the Federation Council (the upper 
house of the parliament) with 49.5 percent of the vote, beating Filipenko (with 37.1 
percent) into second place (the Council ceased to be an elected chamber in 1995). 
Shafranik lost his ministerial position in the clear-out which followed the 1996 
Presidential election and has since returned to the oil industry, though there have also 
been reports that he has been involved in electoral manoeuvres against Roketskii. 
Evidence like this suggests that a significant elite grouping in the oblast shares a great 
deal of common ground. In the first place, our four leading regional figures share 
career profiles which are typical of Russian regional elite leaders (the obkom first 
secretaries) in the immediate post-Brezhnev period: they are all successful local 
insiders, for example, and their Soviet and Communist Party careers were inextricably 
intertwined. The main differences are that this post-Soviet leadership group is 
younger and has not had any higher education in Moscow. Secondly, these career 
profiles exhibit two important characteristics for which the Tiumen elite was noted in 
the late Soviet period. One is the high level of integration between oil and gas and the 
regional politico-administrative system. The other is the likelihood of promotion from 
the region to a region-related ministry in Moscow. Thirdly, the steady progress of this 
leadership group up the promotion ladder in the 1980s is a remarkable common 
feature, given the purges which rocked the Tiumen regional elite until late in the 
decade. Shafranik, for example, made a fortuitous move from Nizhnevartovskneftegaz 
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to Langepas just before the former was revealed to be the diseased heart of a 
production crisis which provoked the initial wave of purges. The second wave 
followed the arrival in power of Gorbachev, who visited Tiumen in the autumn of 
1985 and accused top officials of lying about oil output. The first casualty was the oil 
minister himself, who was followed by most of the top management of the industry in 
Tiumen and several hundred on the level below. The four leading regional figures 
profiled here not only survived this prolonged crisis (albeit at some temporary cost to 
their prospects), they all came out of it in better positions than when they had gone 
in. " 
A number of figures at other levels share some of these characteristics, especially an 
interrelated career in oil and politics launched in the late Soviet period. Vladimir Il'ich 
Ul'ianov, who has played an advisory role to Roketskii, previously switched between 
a legal career in the KhMAO and Nizhnevartovskneftegaz, where he became head of 
personnel, before entering the Tiumen regional soviet in 1990 and becoming its last 
chairman in 1992. Gennadii Raikov, now a prominent deputy in the State Duma, spent 
18 years switching between enterprise directorships and leading positions in local 
government. Two other KhMAO State Duma deputies with strong oil connections are 
Aleksandr Lotorev, the deputy mayor of Nefteiugansk, a KhMAO company town 
dominated by luganskneftegaz, a subsidiary of lukos, one of Russia's oil majors, and 
Vladimir Medvedev, the president of the Union of Oil Industrialists. According to one 
source, this organisation helped at least five (20 per cent) of the 1994-1997 oblast 
duma deputies to get elected. 12 
11 Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 105-107; Peter Rutland, The Politics of Economic 
Stagnation in the Soviet Union. - The role of local party organs in economic management (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 188-205. 
12 it Lotorev Aleksandr Nikolaevich", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei: Personalii: staryi arkhiv, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/persons/lotorev. html>, accessed 7 June 2001; N. Petrov, A. Titkov, A. Mukhin, 
"Tiumenskaia oblast"', Maikl Makfol [Michael McFaul], Nikolai Petrov (eds. ), Politicheskii almanakh 
Rossii 1997, Tom 2, Kniga 2, Sotsial'no-politicheskieportrety regionov (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr 
Karnegi, 1998), pp. 944,95 1; Andrei Maximov, Kto pravit v Rossiiskoifederatsii, Leto 1996 g., Tom 
2, No. 1, pp. 193,201,202; "Medvedev Vladimir Sergeevich", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei: 
Personalii: staryi arkhiv, <http: //www. nns. ru/persons/medved. html>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Raikov 
Gennadii Ivanovich", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei. -Personalii, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/Person/raykov/>, accessed 7 June 2001 ; V. 1. Ul'ianov, "Vertikal'predstavitel'noi 
vlasti - eto tol'ko zakon", 
Vash vybor, No. 3, July 1993, p. 6; Georgmia Wroe, "The Wild East Frontier", 
Gentleman's Quarterly (GQ), No. 8 1, March 1996, pp. 90,92. 
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Viewed in quantitative terms, this "sample" of eight prominent figures may not look 
very impressive. The legislatures of the three federation subjects in Tiumen, even in 
their shrunken, post-1993 form, total 69, and the pre-1993 oblast soviet numbered 
167. But this would be to underestimate the importance of the eight, and especially of 
the first four, in qualitative terms. They are key figures in groups to which power has 
accrued since the late Soviet period, as we have seen in the foregoing chapters, i. e., in 
economic and political- administrative, especially executive, elites at the regional 
level, through which they developed a national presence. At the same time, the 
significance of such individual leaders needs to be set against a wider elite 
background. The investigation of the composition of the Siberian regional legislatures 
carried out by James Hughes for 1990 and 1994 has therefore been extended in some 
depth to the Tiumen legislatures for the period 1990-2001. If there is a link in this 
context between continuity and homogeneity, then the level of continuity among the 
eight individuals discussed above suggests a high level of homogeneity in the 
legislatures. A high level of homogeneity in the legislatures, in its turn, would confirm 
the importance of the continuity embodied in individual leaders. The significance of 
this investigation is therefore not limited by the question of whether one sees these 
assemblies as samples or, as Hughes did, as whole populations. ' 3 
Table 4.3 presents a breakdown of the three successive legislatures which were 
elected for the whole of Tiumen between 1990 and 2001. Apart from national ballots, 
which have a rather different significance, these were, in fact, the only elections 
covering the entire region until January 2001, since the first gubernatorial elections of 
1996 and 1997 were, as we shall see, held separately in the three territories. Of the 25 
deputies elected in 1997, four came from constituencies in the LkNAO, ten from the 
KhMAO, and eleven from Tiumen proper. The variables are categorised as they were 
by Hughes, with modifications to the occupational ones. Thus, political leaders now 
include AO duma chairs, municipal heads of administration or mayors, municipal 
duma chairs, raion heads of administration and settlement (poselok) heads of 
administration as well as obkom, kraikom, raikom secretaries and oblispolkom, 
kraiispolkom, raiispolkom chainnen. Similarly, administrative officials now include 
senior officials in the oblast, AO, town and raion administrations as well as senior 
13 James Hughes, "Sub-National tlites and Post-conunun-st 1 1 Transformation in russia: A Reply to 
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obkom, kraikom, raikom officials and oblispol-kom, kraiispolkom, raiispolkom 
officials, and interest group professionals now include the presidents of officers' 
organisations as well as trade union officials and political party functionaries. The 
other variables are broadly unchanged: economic leaders continue to be directors of 
state and private industrial and agricultural enterprises, middle managers continue to 
range from deputy enterprise directors down to section heads, professional leaders 
continue to include the directors of schools, higher education institutes, universities, 
research institutes, and chief hospital doctors, and marginals continue to include 
pensioners, students and the unemployed. 14 
Table 4.3 - The Tiumen oblast soviet/dumas 1990-2001 15 







<36 15.0 0.0 4.0 
36-45 53.3 23.5 40.0 
46-55 28.7 64.7 40.0 
>55 3.0 11.8 16.0 
SEX 
Male 89.8 88.2 100.0 
Female 10.2 11.8 0.0 
OCCUPATION 
Political leaders 6.6 23.5 24.0 
Admin. officials 10.2 5.9 20.0 
Int. grp. profs. 1.8 0.0 8.0 
Econ. leaders 16.2 35.3 32.0 
Middle mangrs. 12.6 11.8 8.0 
Emplyees/wkrs. 22.8 0.0 0.0 
Prof ieaders 7.2 17.6 8.0 
Professionals 22.8 5.9 0.0 
Marginals 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AFFILIATION 
Vol. assn. - - 4.0 
Vol. assn. nom. - - 0.0 
Party cand. 70.7 - 4.0 
No affiliation 29.3 - 92.0 
Note: The regional soviet elections took place on 4 March 1990, the first regional duma elections took 
place in late February and early March 1994, the second regional durna elections took place on 14 
December 1997 for a four-year period of office. 
Kryshtanovskaya & White", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 6,1997, pp. 1021-1022. 
14 Hughes, "Sub-national tlites", p. 1022. 
" Sources: for the 1990 and 1994 elections, Hughes, "Sub-national Elites", pp. 1035-1036; for the 1997 
elections, Vybory v zakonodatel'nye (predstavitel'nye) organy gosudarst-vennoi vlasti sub "ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1995-1997. Elektoral'naia statistika (Moscow: Ves' Mir/Tsentral'naia 
izbiratel'naia komissiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1998), pp. 487-488. 
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The overall trend noted by Hughes towards domination by political-administrative 
and economic elites and towards the marginalisation of other groups has broadly been 
confirmed in these region-wide legislatures. At one extreme, political and economic 
leaders accounted for 22.8 per cent of the Tiumen regional soviet in 1990,58.8 per 
cent of the Tiumen regional duma in 1994, and 56 per cent of it in 1997. At the other, 
employees/workers and professionals declined from 45.6 per cent in 1990 to zero 
from 1994 on. Other trends, such as those against party affiliation and women, were 
confirmed. There is a hint in the reduction of the figure for the under 36 age group 
that the generation which came in to the soviet in 1990 may have succeeded in 
holding on thereafter. 












<36 1 4.0 4.3 2 9.5 
36-45 10 40.0 47.8 5 23.8 
46-55 10 40.0 10 43.6 12 57.2 
>55 4 16.0 1 4.3 2 9.5 
SEX 
Male 25 100.0 20 87.0 18 85.7 
Female 0 0.0 3 13.0 3 14.3 
_OCCUPATION Political leaders 6 24.0 2 8.7 1 4.8 
Admin. officials 5 20.0 7 30.4 5 23.8 
Int. grp. profs. 2 8.0 2 8.7 0 0.0 
Econ. leaders 8 32.0 8 34.8 7 33.3 
Middle mangrs. 2 8.0 3 13.0 4 19.0 
Employees/wkrs. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Prof leaders 2 - 8.0 1 4.4 1 4.8 
Professionals 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 9.6 
Marginals 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.8 
_AFFILIATION Vol. assn. 1 4.0 2 8.7 0 0.0 
Vol. assn. nom. 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.8 
Party cand. 1 4.0 0 0.0 0 000 
No affiliation 23 92.0 21 91.3 20 95.2 
Note: Ages were calculated as of the last date on which deputies were elected. In the case of all three 
dumas, this was 14 December 1997. 
Table 4.4 for all three dumas reinforces the trend confinned in Table 4.3, though there 
are some important differences of detail. The very highest level of the political- 
administrative and economic groupings - the political and economic leaders - do not 
16 Source: Vybory v zakonodatel'nye (predstavitel, nye) organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub "ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1995-1997. Elektoral'naia statistika (moscow: Ves' Mir/Tsentral'nala 
izblratel'naia komissiia Rossiiskoi Federatsli, 1998), pp. 487-488,566-567,582-583. 
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have quite such a commanding position in tenns of sheer numbers in the AO dumas 
as they do in the duma for the whole of Tiumen - 43.5 per cent in the KhMAO duma 
and 38.4 per cent in the IANAO duma as against 56 per cent in the Tiumen duma. The 
further one goes north, in fact, the less commanding their numerical position 
becomes. However, this is made up for by the increase in the proportion of the rest of 
the political and economic groupings, i. e., the administrative officials and the middle 
managers, amounting to 43.4 per cent in the KhMAO duma and 42.8 per cent in the 
IANAO durna as opposed to only 28 per cent in the Tiumen durna. It is worth noting 
that the big northward decline in numerical weight is limited to political leaders: the 
proportion of economic leaders actually rises a little. A much higher proportion of the 
far northern LkNAO durna deputies than of their colleagues in the KhMAO double as 
deputies in the Tiumen regional duma: three out of four as against three out of ten. 
One might speculate that the top layer of the political elites is in some way repelled by 
the more northerly latitudes and attracted by the more southerly ones, though there 
may simply be a greater shortage of elite manpower. Be that as it may, the full 
complement of the two elite groupings - political leaders and administrative officials 
plus economic leaders and middle manager - have a position of overwhelming 
dominance in all three dumas: 84 per cent in the Tiumen duma, 86.9 per cent in the 
KhMAO durna, 81.9 per cent in the LANAO duma. 
Table 4.5 - Duma deputies in the Tiumen region 1997-2001 by occupation in oil 















oil 1 4.0 1 4.4 - - 
Gas 5 20.0 3 13.1 2 9.5 
Both 3 12.0 6 26.0 1 4.8 
Total 9 36.0 10 43.5 8 38.1 
COMPANY 
Gazprom 1 (2? ) 4.0 (8.0? ) 2 8.7 2 9.5 
LUKoil 0 0.0 2 8.7 - - 
Surgut 1 4.0 2 8.7 - 
Sidanko 0 0.0 1 4.3 1 4.8 
Slavneft 0 0.0 1 4.3 - - 
Sibneft** 1(2? ) 4.0 (8.0? ý_ (1? ) (4.3? ) - 
TNK 1 4.0 1 4.3 - 
*Insufficient evidence to be specific about five deputies in IANAO. 
" Source: Vybory v zakonodatel'nye (predstavitel'nye) organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub "ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1995-1997. Elektoral'naia statistika (moscow: Ves' Mir/Tsentral'nala 
izbiratel'nala komissna Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1998), pp. 487-488,566-567,582-583. 
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"Includes one double post-holder (i. e., deputy in both Tiumen' and KhMAO dumas). 
Table 4.5 confirms the dominant position in all three 1997-2001 dumas of deputies 
with occupations in the oil and gas industries. The particularly high proportion of such 
deputies in the KhMAO duma may be compared with the particularly high proportion 
of economic leaders in that duma in Table 4.4. However, Table 4.5 does not give any 
impression of elite trends in the AOs over an entire period in the way that Table 4.3 
did for the Tiumen region as a whole. The biographies of the eight individual leaders 
discussed earlier in this section, and especially of the four main ones, suggest that the 
KhMAO may occupy a special position for the elites of the entire Tiumen region. 
Roketskii and Shafranik both spent roughly the first 20 years of their career there, 
Filipenko has followed his career there for the best part of 30 years, even Neelov had 
three years there, and the current governor of the whole Tiumen region, Sergei 
Sobianin, who was elected in January 2001, is a KhMAO man born and bred. The 
composition of the first (1994-1997) and second 1997-2001) KhMAO dumas has 
therefore been examined in some detail. The only element for comparison not 
included is political affiliation, which has already been shown to be of marginal 
importance. 




1" duma (no. ) 1" duma (%: 
17 = 100) 
2 nd duma (no. ) 2 nd duma (%: 
23 = 100' ) 
Political leaders 7 41.2 2 8.7 
Admin. Officials 5 29.4 7 30.4 
Int. grp. Profs. - - 2 8.7 
Econ. Leaders 2 11.8 8 34.8 
Middle mngrs. 3 17.6 3 13.0 
Employees/wkrs. - - - - 
Prof Leaders 1 4.4 
Professionals 
- - - Marginals 
T 
18 Sources: "Deputaty Durny I sozyva", Khanty-Mansiiskii avtonomnyi okrug, 
<http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/depsu. htm>, accessed 17 November 2000; "Spisok deputatov 
Durny Khanty-Mansiiskogo avtonomnogo okruga", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/regiony/hantyml2. html>, accessed 11 June 2001; Vyboryvzakonodatel'nye - 
(predstavitel'nye) organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub "ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1995-1997. 
Elektoral'naia statistika (Moscow: Ves' Mir/Tsentral'nala izbiratel'nala komissiia Rossiiskol 
Federatsii, 1998), pp. 566-567. 
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Again, the figures indicate a persistent domination by the political-administrative and 
economic elites. True, this domination does lessen from the first to the second dumas. 
The political leaders and the economic leaders taken together fall from 53.0 per cent 
to 43.5 per cent, while the administrative officials and the middle managers taken 
together fall from 47.0 per cent to 43.4 per cent. This change is partly due to the entry 
of interest group professionals and of professional leaders, but mainly to a decline in 
the proportion of political leaders and middle managers. At the same time the 
proportion of economic leaders rises dramatically by nearly three times, while that of 
administrative officials increases marginally. It should be borne in mind that the full 
complement of political-administrative and economic elites together accounted for a 
full 100 per cent of the deputies in the first duma. In this light, a decline to 86.9 per 
cent in the second duma looks more like a concession to democratic appearances than 
a setback for the elites. If so, it is not a very substantial one: two of the higher 
groupings excluded from the first duma - interest group professionals and professional 
leaders - got some representation in the second, as did women, up from none to three 
(13.0 per cent). But the others - employees/workers, professionals, and marginals - 
remained excluded. 
Table 4.7 - Survivors from the first to the second KhMAO duma'9 






Aseev 22.07.44 Political leader Political leader Political leader 
Bogdanov 28.05.51 Economic leader Economic leader Economic leader 
Grabovskii 14.0739 Economic leader Admin. official Admin. official 
Krupinin 27.10.51 Economic leader Admin. official Admin. official 
Reziapov 15.12.52 Middle manager Middle manager Middle manager 
Sobianin 21.06.58 Admin. official Admin. official Political leader 
Volostrigov 12.08.55 Admin. official Political leader Admin. official 
'9 Source: Khan ty-Mansiiskii avtonomnyi okrug: "Deputaty Durny I sozyva", 
<http: //www. hrnao. wsnet. ru/power/durna/depsu. htrn>; "Deputaty Durny 11 sozyva", 
<http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/deps2u. htrn>, both accessed 17 November 2000; "Aseev 
Leonid Aleksandrovich", <http: Hwww. hrnao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/deps2/aseev. htrn>; "Bogdanov 
Vladimir Leonidovich", <http: //www. lunao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/deps2/bogdanov. htm>; "Grabovskii 
Vladimir Solomonovich", <http: Hwww. hmao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/deps2/grabovsk. htm>; "Krupinin 
Nikolai Iakovlevich", <h4: Hwww. hmao. wsnet-i-u/power/durm/deps2/krupinin. htm>; "Reziapov 
Aleksandr Filippovich", <http: Hwww. hmao. wsnet-ru/power/duma/deps2/rezyapov. htm>; "Sobianin 
Sergei Semenovich", <http: Hwww. hmao. wsnet. nL/power/dunia/deps2/sobyan. htm>; "Volostrigov Petr 
Stanislavovich", <http: Hwww. hmao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/deps2/volostr. htm>, all accessed 19 
November 2000. 
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Table 4.7 provides some background on the seven KhMAO deputies who survived 
from the first to the second duma. These seven represent 34.4 per cent of the first 
duma and 41.1 per cent of the smaller second duma. They are all male, they all come 
from the political-administrative and economic groupings, and they include Sergei 
Sobianin, the chairman of both dumas and the future governor of Tiumen. Six of them 
(85.9 per cent) were in the 36-55 age groups at the time of the two elections. Most 
strikingly, perhaps, given their relatively low ages, four of them (57.1 per cent) had 
attained leading political and economic positions before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Of the three Soviet economic leaders, two - Vladimir Bogdanov and Vladimir 
Grabovskii - were in oil and gas. It should be borne in mind that these categories were 
not designed for quite this purpose and could be slightly misleading. We cannot see 
from Table 4.7 that Vladimir Grabovskii had effectively acquired his senior 
administrative position in the important oil town of Nizhnevartovsk before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, or that in 1999 he became a presidential advisor on the 
regional oil company TNK (Tiumen Oil Company). Nor can we see that Petr 
Volostrigov went from being a technical officer in the Soviet and then the Russian air 
force to the chairmanship of a district soviet (raisovet) in 1993 before becoming 
Sobianin's deputy in 1994. Or that two of the seven - Aleksandr Reziapov and Nikolai 
Krupinin - were on the duma's important budgetary committee and that Reziapov was 
its chairman. 
Other problems have to do with the data itself, rather than with presentation. No data 
was available as to family background and little was available on educational levels 
(all seven of the KhMAO duma survivors did have higher educational qualifications, 
however). Despite this, Table 4.7 is an effective means of perceiving the crucial 
political weight of this elite group and the continuity of its grip on power in both the 
late Soviet period and throughout the existence of post-Soviet Russia. Like the 
biographies discussed earlier, it provides direct evidence of both continuity and 
homogeneity in the Tiumen elites. At the same time, it establishes a link between the 
continuity and homogeneity of key groupings and the homogeneity of the wider elite 
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as represented in the corps of regional duma deputies. Together with the data in Table 
4.5 setting out the high level of occupational background in oil and gas, the evidence 
for a high level of elite continuity in the whole of the Tiumen region up to a decade 
after the passing of the Soviet Union looks very strong indeed. Table 4.5 also 
indicates that the Tiumen regional elites are linked into corporate as well as state 
extra-territorial elite networks. Given that the economy of the entire region is so 
heavily dependent on oil and gas, and that the federation subjects are roughly 
structured around the deposits, the importance of these networks should not be 
underestimated when we come to examine the contemporary conflict-ridden politics 
of the regionally-based elites in Tiumen itself. 
4.3 The strugglefor supremacy 
Relations between elites in the Tiumen region are just as much charactensed by 
division and conflict as their internal composition is by continuity and homogeneity. 
A feature common to both dimensions is the importance of oil and gas. Power accrued 
to the resource-rich AOs from at least 1990 to 1993, though the oblast authorities still 
maintained some semblance of control. The oblast executive spent much of the six 
years from late 1993 to late 2000 in a vain attempt to regain something of its former 
dominance. Finally, in January 2001, Sergei Sobianin, the candidate backed by the 
AO leaders, defeated the incumbent governor, Leonid Roketskii in a hard-fought 
election. The protracted struggle between the Roketskii leadership and those of the 
AOs is discussed here in two main terms. The first is the nature of the power acquired 
by the AOs between 1990 and 1993, i. e., during the period of spontaneous 
decentralisation. The second is the two elections for oblast governor held since 1994, 
i. e., during the period of unresolved decentralisation. Each of them featured as a 
climax to a particular stage of the struggle between the oblast and the AO leaderships. 
These elections were not the only points of conflict: other major ones included formal 
cooperation, charters, and the regulation of relations between the three federation 
subjects in Tiumen. But the elections for oblast governor, which raised the issue of 
power over the region as a whole, were by far the most important. This is a question 
of power, rather than of elections. All the issues which caused friction did so because 
of the contending jurisdictions of the oblast and AO authorities. The elections for the 
Federation Council, State Duma, and AO governorships did not bring these 
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contending jurisdictions into playý were not a cause of friction, and therefore have 
been given little attention here. 
Gennadii Bogomiakov, the Tiumen obkom first secretary appointed by Brezhnev in 
1973, was forced out in January 1990 after a year or so of popular discontent, pressure 
from Moscow, and unprecedented opposition from inside the regional leadership. By 
October 1990 at the latest, the leaders of Tiumen's three territories were responding to 
the decomposition of Soviet power in different ways. In that month, the LkNAO 
soviet joined the parade of sovereignties and declared that the AO was a republic. In 
the same month, the Tiumen oblast soviet drafted a plan for keeping the oblast 
together by turning the entire oblast into a republic (it used this the following year to 
fend off pressure from Sverdlovsk to join a Urals super-region). The KhMAO, under 
the influence, as it apparently still is, of Valery Churilov, the AO leader from 1985 to 
1990, embarked on a long-ten'n strategy of securing real sovereignty rather than 
demanding it. Tiumen's natural wealth was a vital asset in the struggle between the 
Russian and Soviet leaderships, and Yeltsin made no bones about using it, or about 
demanding more control and rewards for the region, as he did on his visit there on 5 
August 1991, a bare fortnight before the abortive coup. The key question here, 
however, was: "Which region? " A presidential decree the following month on the 
region's development concentrated funds in the hands of the oblast authorities. But in 
February 1992, the law "On the subsurface" set direct payments for use at 
advantageous rates for the AOs. The oblast and federal authorities got 20 per cent, 
while the urban, raion and AO authorities got 30 per cent. The increased importance 
of the AOs was beginning to fragment the region and its elites. A month later, the 
Federal Treaty, which Shafranik, the oblast governor, and Ulianov, the chairman of 
the oblast soviet, signed without consulting the soviet itself, recognised the AOs and 
the oblast as being equal federation subjects. By the summer of 1993, the IANAO was 
flaunting its economic independence in the oblast authorities' faces. 20 
20 Vladimir Bogodelov, "An offer to resign", Rabochaia tribuna, Alexei Serov, The Party on the Road 
to Renewal (Moscow: Novosti, 1990), pp. 47-53; "BP Amoco rocked as Sidanco producers mutiny", 
Energy Compass, 21 May 1999; Pete Glatter, "Russian Informals, Russian Elites", paper presented at 
the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies conference, 9 April 2001, pp. 5-6, 
<http: //www. gla. ac. uk/extemal/basees/baseesOl/glatter. pdf>, accessed 13 June 2001; Jerry Hough, 
Democratization and Revolution in the USSR 1985-1991 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
1997), pp. 405,427; V. M. Kruzhinov et al (eds. ), Ocherki istorii Tiumenskoi oblasti (Administratsiia 
Tiumenskoi oblasti: Tiumen' 1994), pp. 230-23 1; N. Petrov, A. Titkov, A. Mukhin, "Tiumenskaia 
oblast"', MaikI Makfol [Michael McFaul], Nikolai Petrov (eds. ), Politicheskii almanakh Rossii 1997, 
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In the meantime, however, things had apparently begun to swing back in the oblast 
leadership's favour, with Shafranik's promotion to oil minister in January 1993, and 
the KhMAO and Tiumen authorities jointly cutting short an attempt to declare the 
western part of the KhMAO a Mansi republic and incorporate it into Sverdlovsk. 
Roketskii, the new oblast governor, was sufficiently emboldened to try and restore 
Bogomiakov to a formal position of power in a short-lived scheme to re-introduce a 
measure of oblast control over the oil and gas fields in the AOs. But a second - and 
more serious - move to set up a Tiumen republic in October 1993 was forestalled by 
the suppression of parliament in Moscow. This set the pendulum off in the opposite 
direction once more. The leadership (malyi sovet) of the oblast soviet declared that the 
presidential decree dissolving the parliament was null and void on its territory, i. e., 
throughout the oblast. As had become usual, the okrug authorities criticised this 
declaration on the grounds that it could only apply on their territories with their 
agreement. Roketskii supported the president and suspended the oblast soviet, which 
was swiftly reconciled to its fate. The new constitution fully equalised the AOs with 
other federation subjects. In this way, the effective independence of the AOs, gained 
through spontaneous decentralisation, received the formal sanction characteristic of 
unresolved decentralisation. It was equally characteristic of the new era that the major 
issue remaining between the three territorial authorities in Tiumen - the question of 
how their relations with each other were to be regulated - should be left open .21 Thus, 
the weakening of the central power turned the AO's natural resources into a lever with 
which their leaders could prise them out of the clutches of the oblast elite. 
The increased power of the AOs was not complemented by a re-definition of their 
relations with the oblast. Given that the oblast leadership still aspired to some control 
of the AOs, while the AO leaderships were in fact becoming more and more 
independent of the oblast, this meant that the constitutional settlement of 1993 was a 
recipe for stalemate and renewed conflict in Tiumen. The oblast leadership accused 
the AOs of separatism and alleged that their failure to stick together meant a loss of 
Tom 2, Kniga 2, Sotsial'no-politicheskieportrety regionov (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 
1998), pp. 943-944; V. Safronov, "Narodnyi Front Tobol'ska", Severnyi telegraf, 4, July 1989, pp. 19- 
20; Petr Zverev, "Strasti po Iugre", Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 February 2000, 
<http: //www. ng. ru/pnnted/regions/2000-02-23/4 - 
ugTa. html>, accessed 17 November 2000. 
21 Petrov, "Tiumenskaia oblast"', pp. 943-945. 
152 
oil and gas revenue to the region as a whole. Meanwhile, the AO leaders were 
accusing the Tiumen authorities of continuing to treat them as raw material 
appendages, just as in Soviet times. The stalemate was exemplified by the halting 
progress of fonnal cooperation between the three authorities. A tortuous first attempt 
to get this off the ground had lasted from 1991 to 1993, only to founder on the rock of 
the LkNAO's intransigence. A second try went on for about 18 months before a 
framework treaty finally went into effect in November 1995. However, the 
arrangement soon began to founder in terms of immediate, practical decision-making, 
while the delimitation of powers between the three federation subjects got stuck in a 
mass of procedural complications. Not surprisingly, the AO leaders were much 
happier about this than were the oblast authorities. 
By this time, however, the friction was such that both sides were appealing to 
Moscow, though without much result. In June 1995, the oblast authorities adopted a 
charter which seriously curtailed the rights and powers of the AOs. The AO leaders 
took the issue to the Constitutional Court. Thirteen months later, in July 1996, the 
court effectively referred it back to the three federation subjects to settle between 
them. Perhaps there was a hope that the upcoming gubernatorial election for the entire 
oblast would sort out the basis for a solution to this kind of problem. Meanwhile, the 
oblast authorities had submitted a draft law to the Federal Assembly (i. e., to the 
federal parliament) "On the fundamentals of the relations of krais and oblasts to 
autonomous okrugs located on their territory (v ikh sostave)". This put energy supply, 
means of communication, transport, pipelines, law and order and "the defence of the 
economic interests of oblasts and autonomous okrugs in federal organs" within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the oblast authorities. It placed the use of natural resources 
under joint jurisdiction, which would have ended the AOs' special access to oil and 
gas and introduced a measure of oblast control. Like the oblast charter, the draft law 
resulted in another long march round the central institutions, only to end up 
for a 
second time in the Constitutional Court, which again returned the problem politely 
but 
firmly to its point of origin in July 1997. The elections for oblast governor had now 
taken place without, as we shall see, providing a settlement to the hostilities between 
the three federation subjects. The court's ruling confin-ned the stalemate in Tiumen, 
with the advantage firmly on the side of the AOs and no real easing of the 
basic 
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tension between them and the oblast leadership. Clearly, none of the central elites was 
going to take a decisive hand. The issue could only be resolved in the region itself . 
22 
If the gubernatorial elections of 1996-1997 did not bring resolution, they at least 
established the vulnerability of the oblast leadership (or, more accurately, of the 
southern elite), the impotence of the central authorities and the relative stability and 
strength of the AOs. 
First, there was a series of manoeuvres about dates. The election for oblast governor 
had originally been planned for December 1996. But then the gubernatorial elections 
in the AOs were set for October. So the oblast duma brought the oblast election 
forward to the same date, in the hope that this would increase the chances of 
successfully carrying off an oblast-wide operation. But the AOs effectively banned 
this from taking place on their territories. On 13 September, Yeltsin ordered the three 
federation subjects to agree and implement an election date. But the oblast duma 
jumped the gun on 19 September by unilaterally setting the election for October 27. 
The AOs protested that this contravened Yeltsin's decree on the question of 
agreement and did not allow enough time for a proper campaign. On top of these 
troubles, Roketskii found himself challenged by the previously little-known Sergei 
Atroshenko, a businessman with a shady background in vodka and show business, 
who had a reported connection with Shafranik and plenty of money to throw around 
to drum up votes. Atroshenko's main public associates, Bagin, a former regional 
procuracy official, and Gennadii Raikov, the former mayor of Tiumen, the deputy 
director of Tiumenneftegazstroi, and a local State Duma deputy, had a falling-out with 
Roketskii in 1994 over a scandal about illegal oil export and land acquisition. 
Roketskii himself had come under intense pressure at the time because of revelations 
about the business activities conducted under the cover of the oblast administration by 
22 Dmitrii Kamyshev, Vladimir Shpak, "'Pravovol razboi'bez zanesemia v protokol", Segodnia, 26 June 
1997; Veronika Naumova, "Vladimir Kolunin: 'lamal - samostoiatel'naia territoriia unikal'noi 
oblasti"', Tiumenskie izvestiia, 23 December 1995; Petrov, "Tiumenskaia oblast"', pp. 944-946; 
Valentin Samollik, "Administrativnyi sovet prinimaet sotsial'nye programmy. I ne tol'ko", Sibirskii 
posad, 29 February 1996; Sergei Sobianin, "Kto snimaet slivki s tiumenskoi nefti? " Russkaia Aziia, 
January 17,1996; Ul'ianov, Vladimir, "Dialog: oblast'-avtononmyl okrug vchera, segodnia, zavtra", 
Vozrozhdenie, prilozhenie k tiumenskoi oblastnoi gazete Nashe vremia, 27 January 1996; Vladimir 
Il'ich Ul'ianov, "Vertikal'predstavitel'noi vlasti - eto tol'ko zakon", Vash vybor, No. 3,1993, p. 4; Ustav 
Tiumenskoi oblasti; the text of the draft law was published 'in Tiumenskie izvestiia, 21 December 1995; 
the text of the framework treaty was published in: Sibirskiiposad, 29 September 1995. 
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his wife and his deputy, Sergei Martiniushkin, who was murdered in 1996 in 
mysterious circumstances. Atroshenko's candidacy brought these skeletons out of the 
cupboard. By contrast, the gubernatorial elections in the AOs passed off without 
incident in October and confirmed the dominance of the incumbents, especially in the 
KhMAO. 23 
In the face of the opposition of the AOs, the oblast duma postponed the election for 
oblast governor from 27 October to 22 December. But there was still no guarantee 
that the AOs would take part. Viktor Chemomyrdin, the prime minister, and 
Aleksandr Kazakov, the head of regional affairs in the presidential administration, 
swooped down on the AO governors and persuaded them to cooperate. The agreement 
only held for a few days. On 23 October, the IANAO reinstated its ban. At the 
beginning of November, the KhMAO duma added two conditions to its participation: 
a minimum turnout of 25 per cent in the KhMAO and a minimum of 50 per cent of 
the KhMAO vote for the victor. A week before the election was due, Kazakov flew 
back to the IANAO and won over governor Neelov for the second time. Under their 
joint blandishments, the IANAO duma agreed on 16 December to open the polling 
stations, though only to inhabitants of the KhMAO and Tiumen, not to locals. But the 
very next day, the IANAO duma reversed this decision and stood fast on outright 
abstention. 24 Thus the election did not take place at all in the IANAO, despite the 
combined efforts of the president, the presidential administration, the government and 
and the prime minister who had created Gazprom - pressure to which one might have 
thought the IANAO authorities would have been highly vulnerable. 
The first round of the election for what was supposed to be the governorship of the 
entire oblast only went ahead in two of its three federation subjects, and the turnout in 
the KhMAO was disastrously low, as Table 4.8 shows. Nearly four-fifths of the voters 
were in the south. Roketskii and Atroshenko were the only two candidates to go 
23 Pete Glatter, "Elections deepen split in Tyumen oblast", RRR, 24 April 1997; Sergel Leskov, 
"Ostorozhno: vo vlast' idet Atroshenko", Izvestiia, 10 January 1997; Sergei Mulin, 'Leonid Roketskii 
protiv popytki razdelit' oblast', ' Nezavisimaia gazeta, 28 September 1996; Petrov, "Tiumenskaia 
oblast"', pp. 946,949-95 1; RRR, 18 December 1996; Petr Zverev, "Strasti po lugre", Nezavisimaia 
gazeta, 23 February 2000, <http: //www. ng. ru/printed/regions/2000-02-23/4_ugra. html>, accessed 17 
November 2000. 
24 Petrov, "Tiumenskaia oblast"', pp. 946,950; Andrei Maximov (ed. ), Maximov's Companion to no 
Governs the Russian Federation, Summer 96, Vol. 2, No. I (London/Moscow: Maximov Publications, 
1996), p. 4. 
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forward into the second round run-off. Although Roketskii seemed to pull past 
Atroshenko by a comfortable margin, this was crucially dependent on his vote in the 
south, as in the KhMAO Atroshenko just succeeded in reversing the order (see Table 
4.9). 
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Table 4.8 - First round turnout, Tiumen oblast gubernatorial election 22 
December 1996 25 
Federation subject % Turnout 
Tiumen proper 53.3 
KhMAO 15.8 
IANAO - 
Tiumen oblast 30.2 
Table 4.9 - First round results for the top two candidates in the Tiumen 
oblast gubernatorial election 22 December 1996 (%)26 
Candidate Overall Tiumen KhMAO 
Roketskii 42.0 44.1 34.2 
Atroshenko 23.9 21.0 34.8 
The KhMAO authorities declared the first round results null and void as the turnout 
there had failed to reach the stipulated 25 per cent. They banned the second round 
from taking place in the KhMAO. Roketskii's victory in the second round, and his 
authority as oblast governor, was thus confined to Tiumen proper. At the end of the 
whole tortuous process, the authority of the oblast administration was restricted to the 
extreme south of the region. The AO leaderships had shown that they were the 
masters in their own houses and could not be subordinated to an outside agency. 
Roketskii's writ now ran no further than the border with the KhMAO. The first stage 
of the change in relations between the three elites had been accomplished. Within nine 
months of the election, Filipenko was saying that the proportion of natural resource 
revenue going to the AO had risen to 60 per cent, and he seemed to be casting a 
quizzical eye at the 20 per cent still accruing to the oblast authorities. 
27 
25 Source: Petrov, "Tiumenskaia oblast"', p. 95 1. 
26 Source: ibid. 
27 to Governor's Roundtable", RRR, 23 October 1997. 
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Table 4.10 - Second round turnout, Tiumen oblast gubernatorial election 12 
January 1997 (%)28 




0 VERALL 25.2 
Table 4.11 - Second round results of the Tiumen oblast gubernatorial 





The second election to choose the governor of Tiumen oblast was very different 
from the first. Whether the vote was going to take place throughout the oblast 
was no longer the issue. The question was simply who was going to win. As a 
result, the electoral battle between the two main candidates was much fiercer. 
Elites at all levels played a role in the campaign, and there was a good deal of 
media comment, which was in at least one crucial respect contradictory. For the 
sake of simplicity, only three aspects of the campaign will be discussed here. 
The first is the biography of Sergei Sobianin, Roketskii's main challenger. The 
second is the intensity of the contest. The third is the question of which forces 
the two main candidates represented. 
Sergei Semenovich Sobianin was born in the KhMAO on 21 June 1958.30 There 
is some dispute as to whether he belongs to one of the indigenous peoples or is a 
28 Source: ibid. 
29 Source: ibid. 
30 Biographical sources for Sobianin: Kruzhinov, Ocherki istord Tiumenskoi oblasti, pp. 232- 
233; "Ves' Khanty-Mansusk", Kommersant vlast'. 23 March 2000, p. 63; Vybory v 
zakonodatel'nye (predstavitel'nye) organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. 1995-1997. Elektoral'naia statistika (Moscow: Ves' Mir/Tsentral'naia izbiratel'naia 
kormssiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1998), p. 565; Zverev, "Strasti po Iugre"; "Pervyi zarnpolpreda 
nameren uchastvovat' v vyborakh na Urale", Nezavisimaia gazeta, 
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descendant of Cossacks. After qualifying from the Kostroma technical institute 
at the age of 22, he underwent the rapid promotion from shop-floor to 
management common to a number of leading figures in the Tiumen region. 
Within two years, he was a Komsomol official in Cheliabinsk, and soon went on 
to become the secretary of the soviet executive committee in the important 
KhMAO oil town of Kogalym. His time in Kogalym overlapped with that of 
Vagit Alekperov, the future founder and head of Lukoll, one of the two biggest 
oil companies in Russia. Alekperov arrived in 1983 and became a key figure in 
the development of Kogalym into the best-paying oilfield in the Soviet Union. 
He left in 1990 to become a deputy minister of fuel and energy. 31 Two years 
earlier, around the same time that Filipenko became party leader in the KhMAO, 
Sobianin was promoted to a senior position in the organisation department of the 
regional party committee. After a short period in tax inspection, Sobianin spent 
the years from 1991 (when Filipenko was appointed KhMAO governor) to 1993 
as mayor of Kogalym, at a time when this post was in the gift of the first oblast 
governor, lurii Shafranik. Until 1990, Shafranik had headed Kogalym's main 
enterprise, Kogalymneftegaz, a key oil production association which was to 
become the main producing arm of Lukoil, one of the two largest oil companies 
in Russia. Now that Sobianin was the head man in what was to become known 
as the capital city of Lukoil, he used his position to develop a network of 
connections with the future top management of the company. 
In 1993, possibly in the round of promotions which followed Shafranik's 
elevation to oil minister, Sobianin became first deputy governor to Filipenko. In 
1994, however, he was voted on to the new KhMAO duma and elected 
<http: //www. ng. ru/polities/2000-11-11/3 
- 
news. html; "Sobianin Sergei Semenovich", Khanty- 
Mansiiskii avtonomnyi okrug, <http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/deps2/sobyan. htm>, 
accessed 17 November 2000; "Sobianin Sergei Semenovich: Gubemator Tiumenskoi oblasti", 
Arkhiv Zhurnalista, Dos'e: biografii, <http: //www. grankin. ru/dosye/ru - 
bio2l6. htm>, accessed 16 
June 2001; "Sobianin Sergei Semenovich: Kratkaia biograficheskaia spravka", Natsional'naia 
sluzhba novostei, <http: //www. nns. ru/Person/sobyan>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Soblanin Sergei 
Semenovich: Proiskhozhdenie", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/Person/sobyanJI. html>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Sobianin Sergel 
Semenovich: StororUUe otsenki, kharakteristiki", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. r-u/Person/sobyanJ2. html>, accessed 7 June 2001; "Sobianin Sergei 
Semenovich: Dopolnitel'naia informatslia", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/Person/sobyan/3. html>, accessed 7 June 2001. 
9 Pavel Khlebnikov, Krestnyi otets Kremlia Boris Berezovskii i1i Istoriia razgrableniia Rossii 
(Moscow: Detektiv-Press, 2001), p. 189. 
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chairman. He held this post, together with the Federation Council seat that went 
with it, for six years. In 1998, he became chairman of the Council's 
constitutional and judicial committee. This national exposure made him better 
known than Filipenko. In July 2000, when the Council was being downgraded, 
he accepted an appointment as first deputy to the new Urals federal district 
(UFD) presidential representative, Petr Latyshev. But on 10 November, after 
only four months with Latyshev, Sobianin announced his candidacy for the 
Tiumen governorship. He had been a fully-fledged member of the regional elite 
for at least ten years (i. e., since becoming mayor of Kogalym), and possibly for 
more than twelve years (i. e., since becoming secretary of the Kogalym soviet 
executive committee). Despite being only 42 years old, he was a living link with 
the Soviet past. From the start, Sobianin was a much more serious challenger for 
Roketskii than Atroshenko had ever been. 
"Vicious mud-slinging on both sides", and "gutter-level attacks, some of which 
played on regional ethnic stereotypes" began well before the official start of the 
campaign. 32 In March 2000, the month in which Neelov and Filipenko were both 
re-elected with votes of around 90 per cent and nine months before the Tiumen 
gubernatorial election, a sensational special issue - indeed the final issue - of the 
paper of Sergei Atroshenko's organisation "Tiumen-2000" appeared in an 
edition of 400,000. A lead article claimed that accusations about Atroshenko's 
criminal connections in the 1997 election had actually been true of Roketskii, 
and even more so of Roketskii's wife, Galina ("Mama Rokki"). The three 
articles which followed were reprints from central newspapers, two of them 
from Novaia gazeta. They detailed the relationship between the Roketskii "clan" 
and a gang called "The Little Ten" (malaia desiatka), a title resulting from the 
slaughter of the older generation which dominated what had then just been the 
"Ten" by the younger. Most sensationally, one of the Novaia gazeta articles 
alleged that in 1998 and 1999, the Roketskii clan had used the "The Little Ten" 
in an attempt to force a takeover of the West Siberian Commercial Bank 
32 Ana Uzelac, "Sobyanin Sweeps Tyumen", The Moscow Times, 16 January 200 1, 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes-com/stories/2001/01/16/013-print. htrnl>, accessed 16 January 2001. 
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(Zapsibkombank), one of the biggest banks in Russia and a power throughout the 
region. 33 
During the campaign proper, there were scandals about the non-registration of 
candidates, revelations about a "Roketskii memorandum" - disavowed by 
Roketskii himself - proposing the abolition of the AOs, allegations that a leaflet 
entitled "Youth for Sobianin" (in which the names of northern towns were 
printed with atrocious spelling mistakes) was a trick to discredit the challenger, 
and claims that a pensioner collecting signatures in support of the KPRF 
candidate in the UNAO town of Novyi Urengoi had been brutally beaten up, 
with other party activists being threatened with similar retribution. Leonid 
Roketskii, the sitting governor, appeared to be the main target of what the media 
commonly referred to as "dirty technology", though Nezavisimaia gazeta argued 
that the mud was pretty evenly distributed. Towards the end of December, the 
regional election commission decided to introduce holographic stamps in an 
effort to prevent the forging of ballot papers. 34 
On 9 January 2001, five days before the election, Roketskii's campaign 
coordinator, S. M. Sarychev, alleged that there had been a "Bacchanalia" of dirty 
tricks against the incumbent. Roketskii had been prevented from using any of the 
printed or electronic media in the AOs, even where this was specified by law. 
Roketskil's representatives and associates in the AOs had been terronsed, beaten 
up, and forced to leave the territories. Roketskii's visits to the towns of Surgut and 
Khanty-Mansiisk in the KhMAO, and to Novyi Urengoi and Noiabrsk in the 
IANAO had been disrupted by armed men looking like police auxiliaries, who 
melted into the welcoming crowds and then destroyed equipment, removed 
33 Oleg Lur'e, "Dve istorii iz zhizni Mamy Rokki", Novaia gazeta, 21-27 February 2000; "Kak eto bylo 
v 1996-tif', Tiumen'-2000, spetsial'nyi vypusk (no date); "Governors Win Landslide Victories in 
Siberian Okrugs", RRR, 29 March 2000; Lenta. URA. R U, 20 June 2000, 
<http: //www. lenta. ura. ru/index. asp? date=20.06.2000&art--8120>, accessed 15 February 2001. 
34 Andrei Borodianskii, "'Tri v odnom'- politicheskii kokteil so stoikirn aromatorn nefti", 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 19 December 2000, <http: //www. ng. ru/printed/club-89/2000-12- 
19/4 
- 
kokteil. html>, accessed 14 January 2001; Sergel Sergievskii, "Leonid Roketskii: My ne mozhem 
bez severa, sever ne mozhet bez nas" [interview with Roketskii], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 19 December 
2000, <http: //www. ng. ru/printed/club-89/2000-12-19/4 
- 
rokecky. html>, accessed 14 January 2001; 
"Samye 'griaznye' vybory", Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 January 200 1, reproduced in Natsional'naia 
sluzhba novostei, <http: //www. nns-ru/Elect-99/chron99/2001/01/12. html>, accessed 13 January 2001; 
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documents and gave the candidate and his team 24 hours to clear out. Aleksandr 
Veshniakov, the chairman of the Central Election Commission, later stood by his 
decision to let the election go ahead though two of his colleagues challenged the 
results. Veshniakov conceded that the local election commissions did not have the 
resources, expertise or powers to investigate the multitude of defamatory materials 
circulating anonymously. He himself pointed out that this was also a major way in 
which candidates could overstep the limits on election expenditure. 35 
The crucial aim on both sides, as Sarychev's allegations had suggested, was to 
"get behind the enemy lines" and detach part of his support, while vigorously 
protecting one's own from contact with the opponent. Roketskii appeared 
certain to get a majority in the south, just as Sobianin looked to do in the north. 
But the 1997 vote for Atroshenko had shown that Roketskii was vulnerable. The 
key issue, therefore, was who would get the bigger minority vote in the other's 
territory. Hence offensive operations like the "Roketskii memorandum" by one 
side, and "Youth for Sobianin" by the other. On a more defensive note, a special 
issue of the KhMAO paper Jugorskoe vremia (the paper of the "inter-regional 
socio-political movement" lugra, a name also used by KhMAO "godfather" 
Churilov for his business enterprises) countered the appearance in the territory of 
a pro-Roketskii publication entitled Security Council Special Issue, which was 
apparently circulating in an edition of 150,000.1ugorskoe vremia also featured 
expressions of confidence in Sobianin by a series of local notables, including 
Vladimir lakovlev, the mayor of Khanty-Mansiisk, Aleksandr Lotorev, the 
KhMAO State Duma deputy, Aleksandr Gavrin, the then minister of fuel and 
"Na biulleteni nakleiat marki", Vslukh. RU, 27 December 2000, 
<http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtnil? nunl7-6182&showsection=15_>, accessed 28 December 2000. 
35 Sergei Mulin, "Tiumen'-2001: Lobbi na lobbi, resurs na resurs", Segodnia, 12 January 2001; Anna 
Vladinurova, (interview with Aleksandr Veshniakov), "Bespomoshchnost' vlasti na mestakh 
diskreditiruet vybory", Vek, 12 January 200 1; "V Tiumeni 'gubernator goda' ostalsia bez gubernil", 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 January 2001; Elena Strel'tsova, "Veshniakov uzhe v Tiumem", Vslukh-RU, 28 
December 2000, <http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtml? num--6220&showsection=15_>, accessed 28 
December 2000; Uzelac, "Sobyanin Sweeps Tyumen"; "Samye 'griaznye' vybory"; "Zaiavlenie 
koordinatora vybornoi karnpanii kandidata na. dolzhnost' gubernatora tiumenskoi oblasti L. lu. 
Roketskogo", Vslukh-RU, 9 January 2001, 
<http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtml? num--6405&showsection=15_>, accessed 12 January 2001. 
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energy (and, like Sobianin, a former mayor of Kogalym), and Aleksandr 
Sidorov, the mayor of Surgut. 36 
Roketskil had his main base in the south, the region's second most populous area 
where nearly 42 per cent of the oblast' inhabitants lived, (nearly 43 per cent 
lived in the KhMAO, while just over 15.5 per cent lived in the IANAO). By 
contrast, the core of Sobianin's support was in the less populated parts of the 
region. Roketskii could be pretty sure of the vote in the rural areas of the south, 
where he appointed the heads of administration. At the same time, over half the 
southern population lived in urban areas where the heads of administration were 
elected and were not beholden to Roketskii for their positions. But Sobianin was 
not only faced with the task of undercutting some of Roketskii's support in 
Tiumen proper. The problem was bigger than that, for Roketskii had significant 
support both among the general population and in business circles in such major 
KhMAO towns as Nefteiugansk, NizhInevartovsk, and especially Surgut, where 
he had been a leading figure for over 20 years. 37 Such centres were likely to be 
the decisive battlegrounds. 
The course of the campaign indicates that the AOs pursued such tactics more 
effectively. They certainly seem to have been better organised and funded, 
especially when it came to the media: 
The IANAO leadership does not encourage the distribution in the okrug of 
newspapers from the south of the oblast', to put it mildly. The oldest 
newspaper in the south of the oblast', "Tiumenskaia Pravda ". dating back 
to 1918 and traditionally popular, especially among the older generation, 
has practically come under the complete control of the Jamal authorities, 
which have gained a serious lever of influence over southern readers. 
Leonid Roketskii's administration has had to provide itseýf with a new 
36 Iugorskoe vremia, 11 January 2001, see web pages at Khan ty-Mansiiskii avtonomnyi okrug, 
<http: //www. lunao. wsnet. ru/politics/Opdugra/Gazeta/ind. htm>, e. g., Polkova, Nina, "Opasnye sovety 
Soveta Besopasnosti", <http: //www. lunao. wsnet. ru/politics/Opdugra/Gazeta/2_str/3_st. htm>, accessed 
15 January 2001; Iugra Financial and Investment Corporation website, 
<http: //w-ww. yugra. yucom. ru/index. html>, accessed 17 June 1999. 
37 V. 1. Galitskii, (ed. ), Regiony Ross& statisticheskii sbornik, Tom I (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 
1999), pp. 394,400,406; Anatolli Khodorovskii, "Tiumenskii gambit", Vedomosti, 28 November 
2000, <http: //www. vedomosti. ni/stories/2000/11/28-02-Ol. html>, accessed 6 December 2000; Sergei 
Mikheev, "Na vyborakh gubernatora Tiumenskoi oblasti stolknulis' interesy mestnykh politicheskikh 
elit 1 krupnykh neftianykh kompanil", Strana. Ru, II January 2001, 
<http: //www. strana-ru/politics/2001/01/11/979215736. html>, accessed 18 January 2001. 
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paper, "Tiumenskaia Pravda Today ". but its influence in the northern 
territories is insignificant 
. 
38 
A survey of press freedom in Russia found that the LkNAO had allocated nearly 
400,000,000 rubles, i. e., 1.6 per cent of its total budget spending (three-and-a-half 
times the national average) to supporting the media in 2000. At the same time, the 
survey rated the AO 80th out of the 87 regions covered for press freedom. The 
KhMAO allocated less than half of this sum (158,475,000 rubles), still nearly 
twice the national average in percentage terms. Although the south's contribution 
to the media - 60,000,000 rubles - was in absolute terms less than half that of the 
KhMAO and getting on for seven times less than that of the IANAO, it nearly 
rivalled the latter as a proportion of the budget at 1.14 per cent, almost three times 
the national average. The south rated 27h in terms of press freedom, 60 places 
above the IANAO, while the KhMAO rated 3 Oth. 39 When it came to the media 
war, then, the budgets of the AO authorities dwarfed that of the south while the 
extent of their control appeared far greater. 
The intensity of the contest in Tiumen fitted the general pattern of gubernatorial 
elections taking place at the time: "All of them had one common feature: despite 
the formal lowering of the status of governor in the federal 'table of ranks', there 
was everywhere a sharp struggle for power in which the capital's oligarchic 
groupings and the local clans took an active part" . 
40 At the same time, Tiumen 
was one of the most hotly contested elections, particularly notable for the use of 
"black PR" (chernyi piar). This was largely due to the long history of friction 
between the AOs and Tiumen proper. It was also due to the fact that both sides 
appeared to be regarding this election as a decisive encounter. 
It was not unusual in 2000-2001 for more than one candidate in a gubernatorial 
election to claim Putin's backing. What was unusual about the Tiumen election 
was that, to start with at any rate, central political elites actually did support both 
main candidates. 
38 Borodianskii, "'Tri v odnom"'. 
39 Yuha Antonovskaya, Natalya Mytova (eds. ), Anatomy ofFreedom ofSpeech. - A Public Examination 
(Moscow: Obshestvennaya Ekspertiza, 2000), pp. 16-17,212,228,231. 
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Hardly had Sobianin announced that he was standing for governor than he was 
labelled in the central media as the Kremlin candidate, largely by virtue of his 
brief tenure as deputy presidential representative in the UFD. His candidacy was 
supposed to fit into a new strategy for developing the authority of the new federal 
district presidential representatives in response to the poor results of central 
intervention in the Kursk gubernatorial election. But Putin made a point of 
announcing his support for Roketskii to the media at a meeting with a number of 
the key interested parties: Roketskii himself, Sobianin, Neelov, Filipenko and 
Latyshev. The president was markedly cool about Sobianin's candidature, which 
he apparently did not know about, although it had been an item of discussion in 
the media for nearly a fortnight (Neelov was reported as remarking, "He probably 
didn't know that Roketskii was standing either"). Putin went on to give Roketskii 
another sign of his favour by inviting the governor and his wife to see in the new 
millenium at the Kremlin. Sobianin was also described as "a presidential 
representative's man". However, Latyshev's administration let it be known that 
Sobianin's candidature had come as a surprise, and Latyshev's attitude to the two 
main contenders remained ambivalent. 41 
The explanation for the uncertainty about who had the centre's support lay in a 
conflict within the central apparatus itself Friction between the seven new federal 
district presidential representatives and the Main Territorial Department (MTD) of 
the presidential administration led by Sergei Samoilov, the departmental head, and 
Aleksandr Abramov, the curator of the seven districts, had come to a head over 
40 Sergei Porshakov, "Orientatsiia v politicheskom durmane", Izvestiia, 26 January 2001. 
41 Petr Akopov, "Polpredy posylaiut svoikh zarnestitelei na vybory", Izvestiia, 11 November 2000; 
Borodianskii, "'Tri v odnom"'; Sergei Mikheev, "Na vyborakh gubernatora Tiumenskoi oblasti 
stolknulis' interesy mestnykh politicheskikh elit i krupnykh neftianykh kornpardi", Strana. Ru, 11 
January 2001, <http: //www. strana. ru/politics/2001/01/11/979215736. htnil>, accessed 18 January 2001; 
Vladimir Petrov, "V Tiumeni vlast' peremenilas "', Vesti. Ru, 15 January 200 1, 
<http: //www. vesti. ru/printed/979558141. html>, accessed 16 January 2001; " Novosti", Iamalo- 
Nenetskii Avtonomnyi Okrug, 27 November 2000, <http: //www. yamal. ru/new/news/001 127. htm>, 
accessed 2 December 2000; "Vladimir Putin zaiavil o podderzhke na vyborakh kandidatury 
deistvuiushchego gubernatora tiUMenskol oblasti Leonida Roketskogo", Vslukh. Ru, 25 November 
2000, <http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtml? num7-5400&showsection-- 15 - 
>, accessed 2 December 2000; "V. 
Putin odobril reshenie L. Roketskogo ballotirovat'sia na post gubernatora tiumenskoi oblasti", 
Vslukh. Ru, 25 November 2000, <http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtrril? num--5409&showsection=15 >, - 
accessed 2 December 2000; "luni Neelov ne budet ballotirovat'sia na dolzhnost' gubernatora 
tiumenskoi oblasti", Vslukh-Ru, 27 November 2000, 
<http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtml? num---5463&showsection--l 5->, accessed 2 December 2000; "Putin 
priglasil Roketskogo na vstrechu tret'ego tysiacheletiia", Vslukh. Ru, 29 December 2000, 
<http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtml? num--6244&showsection--15_>, accessed 14 January 2001. 
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the Tiumen election. Putin had supported Roketskii and advanced him to the 
presidium of the new State Council because he saw him as representing the best 
chance of "stabilising" the region, which presumably meant re-integrating it under 
a single authority. Not for the first time, though never before in such an important 
region, Samoilov and Abramov resolved to act independently of Putin and put 
their weight behind Sobianin. Why they did so was not clear. Perhaps they were 
influenced by the sentiment of the pro-Sobianin slogan to the effect that Tiumen 
could only be re-united "from the north". The eventual result at the centre was that 
Putin downgraded the MTD (and especially Abramov), though without a 
corresponding increase in the powers of the presidential representatives. The 
result in Tiumen was that both main candidates went on claiming the Kremlin 
mandate, while Putin avoided any further signals or pronouncements on the 
issue. 42 
The position as regards corporate backing was much clearer than the muddle 
about central support. It was widely agreed that Sobianin had Lukoil on his side. 
He was also said to be supported by the giant gas monopoly Gazprom, largely 
through Neelov's good offices, and by Transneft, the state company which 
controls the pipeline network, though its influence locally was thought to be low. 
Although Vladimir Bogdanov, the general director of Surgutneftegaz, remained 
neutral, it was known that he was close to Sobianin, as was Iurii Vazhenin, the 
head of Surgutgazprom. According to Nezavisimaia gazeta, Sobianin had also 
made inroads among financial interests (which tend to be closely related to oil) 
even in the south, where the Tobolsk bank had nominated him because of the 
prospect he represented of consolidating the oblast. The political interests of many 
of the oil "generals" who supported Sobianin were directly bound up with his: 
they benefited from the same swing which brought him victory, as a whole swathe 
of them were voted on to the KhMAO duma on the day he was elected governor 
(see Table 4.12). On the other hand, Roketskii was backed and possibly partly 
financed by the Tiumen Oil Company (TNK), not surprisingly, perhaps, since he 
42 Sergei Berezin, "Perstanovki za zakrytymi dveriarm", Izvestiia, 10 January 2001; Borodianskii, "'Tri 
v odnom, 11; Khodorovskii, "Tiumenskii gambit"; Mikheev, "Na vyborakh gubernatora"; Mulin, 
"Tiumen 1 -2001 "; "Putin clarifies powers of presidential representatives", RRR, 10 
January 200 1; 
Robert Orttung, "Battle intensifies over presidential representatives", RRR, 17 January 2001. 
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was the chairman of the board of directors. This gave him considerable influence 
in the KhMAO town of Nizhnevartovsk, TNK's main base of operations. 43 
Table 4.12 - The KhMAO duma 2001-2005 
44 
Variable Deputies (no. ) Deputies 
AGE 
<36 1 4.8 
36-45 7 33.3 
46-55 11 53.4 
>55 2 9.5 
SEX 
Male 20 95.2 
Female 1 4.8 
OCCUPATION 
Political leaders 1 4.8 
Administrative officials 6 28.6 
Interest group professionals - - 
Economic leaders 10 47.6 
Middle management 4 . 
19.0 
Employees/workers - - 
Professional eaders 
Marginals 
Notes: 1. Thirteen (61.9 per cent) of the deputies worked in oil and gas (the official KhMAO 
website puts this figure even higher at fourteen, i. e., 67 per cent). 
2. Ten (47.6 per cent) of the deputies worked for one of the oil and gas majors. 
3. Six (28.6 per cent) of the deputies had sat in a previous KhMAO duma or soviet. 
43 Khodorovskii, "Tiumenskii gambit"; Anatolii Khodorovskii, Aleksandr Tutushkin, "Odnorazovoe 
golosovanie", Vedomosti, 16 January 200 1, <http: //www. vedomosti. ru/stories/2001/01/16-02-0 l. 
html>, 
accessed 16 January 2001; Mikheev, "Na vyborakh gubernatora"; Mulin, "Tiumen'-2001"; Nina 
Polkova (besedovala), "Vladimir Bogdanov: 'U nas v okruge progressivnaia Duma, zhal', chto tak ne 
rabotaet federal'nyi zakonodatel"", Iugorskoe vremia, 11 January 2001, < 
http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/politics/Opdugra/Gazeta/2-str/2_st. htm>, accessed 15 January 2001; 
"Cherez sudebnye ternii -k gubernatorskirn kreslam", Utro. ru, <http: //www. utro. ru/cgi- 
bin/showart. cgi? mode=print&KEY=200101150332142953>, accessed 16 January 2001; "Samye 
6griaznye' vybory". 
"Source: Biographies of the members of the third KhMAO duma are listed on the official KhMAO 
website at <http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru>, accessed II June 2001; the site has its own comparative 
breakdown of the deputies of the three dumas, < 
http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/power/duma/deput_pr/srav-an. htm>, accessed 11 June 2001. 
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The position of the AO elites, with their comparatively large financial, media and 
other resources, was, as we have already seen, unambiguous. Sobianin was their man, 
as Neelov explicitly stated. The Tiumen gubernatorial election of 1997 had boxed 
Roketskii up in the south of the oblast. But the Putin presidency had made 
centralisation a major issue. There was a distinct possibility that something along the 
lines of the old oblast-AO hierarchy might be reinstated, as Putin's support for 
Roketskii appeared to confirm. Consequently, it made sense for the AO leaders to put 
up their own man for what might become the key position in the entire region. 45 They 
could only be sure of retaining their power by enhancing it, particularly in view of the 
prospect of enlargement: 
Various projects exist, but practically all of them agree on one point: the 
necessity of reducing the number offederation subjects and, naturally, their 
amalgamation into larger units (ukrupnenie). It is completely logical to 
suppose that if such plans begin to be realised, one of these amalgamated 
subjects could be a "greater" Tiumen oblast - from the border with 
Kazakhstan to the Arctic Ocean. If so, then the most vital question for the 
politicians is: who is going to rule this subject? 46 
It may be that Sobianin was the candidate favoured by some elements in the executive 
apparatus in Moscow. It is much less likely, though not quite impossible, that he was 
in some sense a front-man for Latyshev. There is no indication that he was at any 
stage favoured by Putin. The most obvious conclusion was that he was the candidate 
of the political- administrative and business (overwhelmingly oil and gas) elites in the 
AOs, whose urge to remain independent of the southern elites combined with the 
centralising policy of the new presidency to produce a new ambition: to dominate an 
integrated oblast from the north. Whether Sobianin is their creature or one of their 
leaders, either way it seems clear that he is one of them. 
A number of regional and local organisations split during the campaign period. 
Vladimir Ulianov, now a leader of the regional organisation of Edinstvo, the pro-Putin 
party, confirmed its support for Roketskii in late November 2000. But the IANAO 
45 to lurii Neelov ne budet ballotirovat'sia"; Pete Glatter, "Has Putin Got the Regional Elites on the 
Run? " 
RFEIRL Russian Federation Report, 5 December 2000 
46 Borodianskii, "'Tri v odnom"'. 
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conference of Edinstvo unanimously voted to support Sobianin. The Nizhnevartovsk 
town branch of Edinstvo in the KhMAO also supported Sobianin. Despite - or perhaps 
because of - Bogdanov's neutrality, local subsidiaries of Surgutneftegaz divided 
between the two main candidates. 47 Such splits seem to have reflected a growing 
disenchantment with the Roketskii regime. Aleksandr Sidorov, the mayor of Surgut, 
was reported as going over to Sobianin only three days before the election: 
I won't hide the fact that I have for a long time supported the incumbent 
governor Leonid Roketskii. But his policies are unacceptable. The oblast 
needs fresh forces and renewal. I tried to persuade Leonid Julianovich of 
this, but no dialogue was possible. 48 
The loss of such crucial support must, at the very least, been an important sign of the 
way things were going against Roketskii and in favour of Sobianin. Rather 
unexpectedly, the challenger won on the first ballot. 49 
Table 4.13 - 2001 Tiumen oblast gubernatorial election reSUltS50 
KhMAO 
Candidate Vote 
Sobianin 348,230 (74.49%) 
Roketskii 55,759 (11.93%) 
Others 55ý954 (13.58%) 
Turnout: 459,943 (52.09%) 
47 "' Edinstvo' podderzhivaet Roketskogo", V7suh. Ru, 24 November 2000, 
<http: //www. vsluh. ru/art. shtn-A? nunr--5383&showsection--l 5->, accessed 2 December 2000; 
"Novosti". Iamal-Inform on line, 30 November 2000, <http: //www. yamalinfo. ru/on - 
line/news. htm>, 
accessed 6 December 2000; "Sergei Sobianin - dostoinaia kandidatura", "Vybor Nizhnevartovskogo 
'Edinstva'- Sergei Sobianin", Iugra-Inform [on the official website of the KhMAO], 30 November 
2000, <http: //www. hniao. wsnet. ru/news/news - 
dis/novem/30-1 l. htm>, accessed 2 December 2000. 
48 "Samye 'griaznye' vybory"; see also: Mikheev, "Na vyborakh gubernatora"; Nina Polkova 
(besedovala), "Aleksandr Sidorov: 'Edinstvo oblasti ne dolzhno byt'osnovano na. starykh printsipakh. 
Poetamu dlia menia vazhna kandidatura Sobianina"', Iugorskoi vremia, 11 January 2001, 
<Http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/politics/Opdugra/Gazeta/l str/3_st. htm>, accessed 15 January 2001. 
49 Mikheev, "Na vyborakh gubernatora"; Petrov, W Tiumeni vlast'peremenilas ... ; Uzelac, "Sobyanin 
Sweeps Tyumen"; "Voskresnye vybory zakonchatsia vtoryin turom", Izvestiia, 12 January 2001, 
reproduced in Natsional'nai sluzhba novostei, <http: //www. nns. ru/Elect-99/chron99/2001/01/12. html>, 
accessed 13 January 200 1. 
" Sources: "Novosti", Khanty-Mansiiskii Avtonomnyi Okrug, 
<http: //www. hmao. wsnet. ru/news/news - 
dis/2001/J*an/15_01. htm>, accessed 15 January 2001; Wybory 
gubernatoraTiumenskoi oblasti - 2001 ", Arkhiv zhurnalista, 




Sobianin 148,876 (77.80%) 
Roketskii 145276 (7.46%) 
Others 25,706 (14.74%) 
Turnout: 188,858 (54.16%) 
Tiumen proper 
Candidate Vote 
Sobianin 125,202 (23.87%) 
Roketskii 273,674 (52.18%) 
Others 116,975 (23.95%) 
Turnout: 515,851 (55.56%) 
Tiumen oblast as a whole 
Candidate Vote 
Sobianin 622ý308 (52.59%) 
Roketskii 343,709 (29.05%) 
Others 198,635 (18.36%) 
Turnout: 1,164,652 (53.91%) 
The intensity of the contest was partly due to the value of the prize on offer. It was 
also due to the way in which the decentralisation of power had fragmented elites 
at every level and predisposed them to turn against each other. The presidential 
apparatus split and the president himself was rendered impotent so far as his 
intervention in the election was concerned. Not that he had been able to do much 
more than make appeals and token gestures at an earlier stage. The office o. LF' 
plenipotentiary presidential representative and its jurisdiction, the seven regional 
groupings into which Russia was divided, was the major innovation of the Putin's 
centralisation policy. But in the crucial test of the Tiumen governorship, the role 
of Petr Latyshev, presidential representative to the regions of the UFD, remains 
unclear. The two main candidates embodied the division between two main 
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groupings of elites in the region brought to a climactic pitch of hostility. Vladimir 
Petrov described the result in these terms: 
Sobianin'S victory is the victory of the okrug governors in the war between 
it north and south " in Tiumen oblast which had dragged on forfive years. 
Sobianin's victory is the victory of "Surgutneftegaz" and "Lukoil" over 
the Tiumen Oil Company. Sobianin's victory is the victory of the 
plenipotentiary presidential representatives and the defeat of that part of 
the presidential administration which is responsiblefor regionalpolicy. 51 
The man the president supported in Tiumen was opposed by elites which were 
more powerful locally, especially in economic terms, and he went down to a 
decisive defeat on the first ballot. Governor Sobianin does not owe his position 
to Putin in any way, quite the contrary. He embodies the reversal of the 
traditional elite and administrative hierarchy of the oblast: instead of the south 
dominating the north, the north now rules through its position in the south. 
Whether his victory will overcome the fragmentation of the elites remains to be 
seen. On the one hand, there are limits to this fragmentation, just as there have 
been limits to decentralisation throughout the Russian Federation. Relations 
between the contending parties remain close, if fraught, and their tracks cnss- 
cross the very boundaries they seem to be fighting about. Figures like Shafranik, 
Roketskii and Ulianov, who are associated primarily with Tiumen, originally 
came from the northern oilfields. Neelov was the deputy governor of Tiumen 
oblast before becoming top man in the IANAO. Valerii Churilov, who has 
played such a key role in the independent evolution of the KhMAO, originally 
came from Tiumen proper. Even Sobianin's attacks on the oblast administration 
in 1996 were relatively mild compared with the ferocity of his simultaneous 
denunciations of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan for "creaming off our oil". 
Sobianin complained at the time that the KhMAO was contributing more than 50 
per cent of its net tax receipts to the federal budget. If that was the case, then it 
must have been particularly galling, since the AOs had been hoping to benefit 
substantially from the removal of the oblast from their fiscal arrangements. It 
also lent credence to Ulianov's contention that despite the wealth of the oblast as 
a whole, its fragmentation meant that "we [i. e., all three parts of it] are obtaining 
51 Petrov, "V Tiumeni vlast' peremenilas 
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in percentage tenns even less than we did prior to 1990". Unsurprisingly, 
Sobianin has made a point of being seen to defend the region's oil and gas 
revenue in front of Putin himself since being installed as governor. On the other 
hand, the oblast-AO divisions now run deep, and there are divisions within those 
divisions. In the KhMAO, for example, the oil and gas fields are concentrated 
around the eastern towns, whose mayors have been unhappy about dividing up 
the proceeds with their western colleagues. 52 
Be that as it may, three points about the history of elite conflict in Tiumen stand 
out. The first is that it was precipitated by regime transition in the early 1990s. 
The second is that it has resulted in the reversal of traditional relations between 
the three territorial elites in the region. And the third is that irrespective of what 
this reversal might mean within the region itself, it was carried out 
independently of the federal political leadership, and to some extent at least in 
defiance of it. A clearer case of unresolved decentralisation might be hard to 
find. 
4.4 Conclusion: pointsfor comparison 
The main points of this study of the Tiumen region can be briefly stated. First, the 
indications of elite continuity are clearly marked, together with some generational 
change during regime transition and significant direct economic/administrative elite 
domination of the new representative institutions. Second, elite division and conflict 
within the region have been based on distinct and competing economic interests. 
Third, developments in elite relations in the region correspond to the distinction 
between uncontrolled and unresolved decentralisation. Fourth, the influence on the 
region of central political elites has sharply declined, while the political significance 
of oligopolistic, vertically integrated corporations has risen. Fifth, elite developments 
have been predicated on the region's overwhelming economic dependence on its two 
natural resources, not on any strategy for diversification. 
52 Petrov, "Tiumenskaia oblast"', p. 946; Sobianin, "Kto snimaet slivki s tiumenskoi nefti? "; Ul'ianov, 
"Dialog: oblast'-avtononmyi okrug"; Zverev, "Strasti po Itigre". 
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The situation in Tiumen is a uniquely complicated one. No other oblast or krai 
encompasses two AOs, let alone two so rich in natural resources as to give them an 
economic basis for real independence from the oblast authorities. It follows that there 
are inherent limitations to a comparison with this particular region. So it is worth 
beginning with some of the differences between it and Omsk, the second case study 
region. Omsk has no natural resources and contains not even one AO. It is far smaller 
in area than Tiumen. Its population is more heavily concentrated in the regional 
capital, the town of Omsk. Although it is, like Tiumen, part of western Siberia, it is 
also a more distinctly southern region, crouching tightly on the Russian border with 
Kazakhstan, whereas Tiumen, from its own, much shorter border, looks to the distant 
north. At the same time, Omsk, without Tiumen's continuing orientation towards the 
Urals, is more definitely Siberian. 
Having noted these preliminary points of difference, we are in a position to formulate 
the main conclusions from the study of Tiumen as questions about Omsk. 
* Is its economy characterised by a narrow product dependency? Has any such 
dependency varied since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and, if so, how? 
0 Is continuity the dominant feature at the elite level? If so, are there associated 
features such as generational change, or the colonisation by administrative and 
economic elites of major representative institutions? 
Have developments inside the region corresponded to a shift from uncontrolled to 
unresolved decentralisation? 
* Have there been any significant elite splits inside the region? If so, how far do 
they relate to differences of economic interest? 
* Has the influence on the region of central political elites declined while the 
political significance of corporate elites has risen? 
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Given the differences between the two regions, it would be logical to expect that not 
all of these questions are likely to be answered in the affirmative. The issue is whether 
enough of them can be to provide the basis for some kind of generalisation. 
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Chapter 5. The Omsk elite's capital problem 
5.1 Introduction 
The combination of continuity and change in the Tiumen elites has been a potent one, 
leading, as we have seen, to a reversal of the old Soviet chain of command. Then, the 
elites at the oblast centre gave the orders to the elites in the north. Now, elites from 
the north, especially from the KhMAO, dominate the administrative centre. The 
continuity of the elites has not been a barrier to this dramatic political change, the 
basis for which was laid by regime transition a decade earlier. On the other hand, the 
change in the regional regime has not affected the pronounced continuity of local 
elites. Chapter 4 has taken us deep into the specifics of Tiumen. It is therefore worth 
briefly restating the more general conclusions about continuity and change of the 
earlier chapters on which the approach to both case studies is based. These chapters 
have already been described as providing contexts, and in terms of whether they 
emphasise elite composition or the political regime. They can also be seen in terms of 
the relationship between continuity and change. 
The first chapter argued for a hypothesis which combined continuity in the 
composition of regional elites with change in the political regime, especially in terms 
of the destruction of traditional chains of command. This offered a way of 
overcoming the limitations of one-sided approaches in existing research. The 
historical survey of centre-region relations in Chapter 2 emphasised how unusual 
periods of regionalism were. Change in this sense had been marginal to the Russian 
tradition. Yet it was to be one of the major characteristics of post-Soviet Russia. The 
abandom-nent by Gorbachev of the leadership's power to appoint regional leaders is 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3 as a key change which ushered in a period of 
spontaneous decentralisation. Chapter 3 charted the power shift from the centre to the 
regions primarily in terms of the regional elites' control over their own territories. The 
settlement embodied in the 1993 constitution recognised this shift in various ways but 
the relative powers of the centre and the regions were not clearly recognised or 
demarcated and remained the focus of conflict. Spontaneous decentralisation gave 
way to unresolved decentralisation. The centre-region balance of power could swing 
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towards the regional elites or away from them as long as it did not seriously threaten 
their independent base inside their own regions. All these changes in the political 
regime could take place without a substantial alteration in elite composition, as 
Chapter 5 indicated with regard to Tiumen. What it also showed, however, was that 
such changes could not take place without seriously disrupting relations between the 
elites themselves. 
It is not necessary to the essential argument advanced here that this process should go 
as far in Omsk as it has in Tiumen, or that it should have exactly the same features. 
However, one would expect to find the same basic elements: clear indications of 
continuity within the elites, significant signs of ffiction between them, especially over 
economic interests. In order to keep the issue of comparability clearly in view, this 
chapter has the same structure as the preceding one. The rest of this introduction will 
therefore deal with the historical development and economic structure of the Omsk 
region. 
The city of Omsk was founded in 1716,130 years after the town of Tiumen, but it 
developed much more quickly and was much more important prior to the discovery of 
oil and gas. Omsk owed this early prominence to its strategic location, both militarily 
and in terms of transport. It became an important destination and point of transit for 
migrants from the European part of the empire, especially in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Leonid Polezhaev, the present-day governor of Omsk, has 
identified the restlessness of the Russian "frontier spirit" as a prime barrier to stability 
and gradual evolution in terms not altogether unlike those used by Stolypin 84 years 
earlier. The population of the area was a rather heady brew of peasants, who were 
better-off and more independent than their counterparts west of the Urals, religious 
dissidents, troublemakers, and political exiles like Dostoevskii. Two other exiles, 
Grigorii Potanin and Nikolai ladrintsev, the founders of Siberian regionalism, 
originally came from Omsk, and were returned to it with long hard labour sentences,. 
In 1839, Omsk became the official seat of the governor of Western Siberia, which 
included what is now Kazakhstan. Despite the city's importance, the banks of the 
rivers Irtysh and the Om, on which it was built, were covered with rubbish and raw 
sewage, epidemics raged and infant mortality in the working-class suburbs remained 
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as high as 30 to 40 per cent until 1939, a hundred years later, when the first sewage 
system began to be built. ' 
In November 1918, Omsk became the capital of Admiral Kolchak, the White military 
dictator, after a coup against his erstwhile Socialist Revolutionary allies. The 
corruption and ruthlessness of his regime gave an exceptional boost to the popularity 
of the Reds among the workers and independent peasants of Siberia, and within a year 
he had been forced to abandon the city to the Bolsheviks. After the civil war, Omsk 
returned to being the administrative and railway centre of an important agricultural 
region, which was incorporated in 1923 into the new Siberian krai. Although Omsk 
itself became one of the centres of the Opposition in Siberia, this was purged in 1927, 
and CPSU organisation in the region as a whole was primarily composed of peasants 
and white-collar workers. The krai leadership had a pro-peasant, anti-industrialisation 
bias, and the entire region became a special target of what turned into the 
collectivisation drive. Formed in 1934, the Omsk oblast originally included the whole 
of what ten years later became the Tiumen region. "Had the idea of forming a new 
Tiumen oblast and of assigning to it the northern okrugs not occurred to the Soviet 
leadership in 1944, " a Russian source points out, "Omsk could have become the oil 
capital of the country. " It might have been easier for the larger and weightier city of 
Omsk with its massive refinery to keep hold of the AOs than it has been for Tiumen. 
On the other hand, such a large and powerful region might also have been a much 
bigger headache for the Kremlin. 2 
1 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples ofSiberia. - Russia's North Asian Colony 1581-1990 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996), pp. 190-191,194,196,200; James Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the crisis of 
the New Economic Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 199 1), pp. 6-8; Neil Melvin, Regional Foreign Policies in 
the Russian Federation (London: RIIA, 1995), pp. 20-21; L. Polezhaev, Vpered, na medlennykh 
tormozakh... (Moscow: Novosti, 1994), pp. 58-59; V. Shuldiakov, "Pogranichnye linii 1 kazaki", 
Omskii vestnik, 25 March 1997; A. Titkov, A. Glubotskii, "Oniskaia oblast"', M. Makfol [McFaul], N. 
Petrov (eds. ), Politicheskii almanax Rossii 1997, Tom 2, Sotsial'no-politicheskieportrety regionov, 
Kniga 2 (Moscow: Mosk. Tsentr Karnegi, 1998), p. 734; N. E. Ul'yanov (ed), Istoriia Omskoi oblasti s 
drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XIX veka (Omsk: Zapadno-Sibirskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, Omskoe 
otdeleme, 1976), pp. 30-31,33,35-36,40-41,43-44,48,58-59; M. P. Zhuravlev, Omsk vchera, 
segodnia, zavtra (Omsk: Omskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993), pp. 20,23-24,69. 
2 James Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the crisis of the New Economic Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 28-29,37-38,137-148,163,169-183; W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory: A 
History of the Russian Civil War (New York NY: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 242-266; A. Titkov, 
A. Glubotskii, "Ornskaia oblast"', M. Makfol [McFaul], N. Petrov (eds. ), Politicheskii almanax Rossii 
1997, Tom 2, Sotsial'no-politicheskieportrety regionov, Kniga 2 (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr 
Karnegi, 1998), p. 732. 
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As Table 5.1 shows, the Second World War brought massive industrial growth to 
Omsk, one of the two main Siberian cities (the other was Novosibirsk) to which 
factories and their workforces were evacuated as the Germans advanced. 3 Although 
food production remained an important sector of the economy, Omsk has been a 
primarily industrial region ever since. By the mid-1990s, 70 per cent of its output 
came from industry and it was among the top 20 industrially-developed regions in 
Russia .4 The wartime boom had given an immense boost to machine-building and 
metal-processing, which had already begun to rival food production by 1937. But 
these pacemakers of industrialisation soon went into a long decline, which began as 
plants moved back to their original locations. Some 60 per cent of regional industry, 
including the oil refinery, was officially part of the military-industrial complex and 
Omsk, which accounts for more than 90 percent of the oblast's industrial output, 
remained a closed city until 1991. Since 1996, four international arms fairs have been 
held in Omsk .5 But the main long-term growth trend in the second half of the 
twentieth century was accounted for by the Omsk Oil Refinery (ONPZ), whose 
production rose from 9 per cent of the regional economy in 1960 to 48.2 per cent in 
1997. 
3 Victor L. Mote, Siberia: Worlds apart (Boutlder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 92-93. 
4" Omsk: Ekonornika", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, <http: //www. nns. ru/regiony/omsk8. html>, 
accessed 20 June 2001 
' John F. Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics in Russia: The Case of Omsk", Theodore H. 
Friedgut, Jeffrey W. Hahn, Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 
pp. 138,157 (fn. 2); "Overview of Trade and linvestment: Opportunities in Omsk Region, Russia", 
BISNIS (Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States, the US Department of 
Commerce's "primary resource center for U. S. companies exploring business opportunities in Russia 
and other Newly Independent States"), 
<http: //www. bisnis-doc. gov/bisnis/country/00051 lomsk. htm>, accessed 28 June 2001; "Istorila 
Omskikh vystavok", Omskii Region: Server Administratsii Omskoi oblasti, 
<http: //region. omskelecom-ru/russian/information/news/vttv/v5. htm>, accessed 24 June 2001. 
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Table 5.1 - The structure of production in Omsk oblast 1937-1998 (%)6 
Industry F1937 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1993 1995 1997 1998 
Oil 
1 
refining - - 9.0 12.6 13.6 15.5 41.9 46.0 48.2 15.6 
Electric 
power 0.2 0.2 4.2 3.5 2.9 4.0 7.1 12.6 13.8 23.7 
Food 40.1 9.9 22.7 19.3 14.2 13.0 11.3 10.8 12.4 21.3 
Petro- 
chemicals 1.7 18.6 10.8 13.8 13.9 12.0 15.4 10.5 6.3 10.3 
Machine- 
building/ 
metal- 36.5 56.5 29.7 28.8 33.1 32.7 12.8 9.4 9.7 12.1 
processing 
Other 21.5 14.8 23.6 22.0 22.3 22.8 1 1 1.5 1 10.7 1 9.6 17.0 
TOTAL loo-o T1 oo. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1_ 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0 100-0 
The relative growth of oil refining in Omsk was particularly marked during the 1990s, 
as other economic sectors went into a much steeper decline. The ONPZ is the largest, 
most modem and most internationally competitive plant of its kind in Russia, and the 
third largest refinery in the world. By the mid-1990s, it was refining about 9 per cent 
of all Russia's oil and accounted for well over 90 per cent of regional exports. Several 
large manufacturers in the region, including Omskshina (Omsk Tyre), 
Omskkhimprom, and Omskkauchuk (Omsk Rubber), depended on ONPZ products as 
inputs. For the people of Omsk, especially for those in its capital, where 1,182,000 (or 
54.2 per cent) of the region's 2,179,700 population live, the refinery was a big, high- 
paying employer. It was also a key source of revenue. Its monthly payments to the 
Omsk city budget alone were between $14 million and $16 million, nearly half the 
city's total revenue. Since the mid-1990s, the main shareholder in the ONPZ has been 
the Siberian Oil Company (Sibneft), based in Omsk and closely linked with the 
"oligarchs" Roman Abramovich and Boris Berezovskii. Sibneft was privatised out of 
the state oil company Rosneft in 1995-1996 in the notorious "loans for shares" 
auctions. Among Sibneft's advantages is the comparatively small distance between its 
refinery and its main extraction arm, Noiabrskneftegaz in the LANAO. Among its 
disadvantages are a position well away from European markets and recurrent financial 
6 Sources, for 1937-1993: Iubileinyi statisticheskii sbornik "Omskaia oblast'v tsiftakh " (Omsk: 
Omskii oblastnoi kormtet gosudarstvennol statistlki, 1994), p. 99; for 1995: "Omskaia oblast': spad 
zamedlilsia, no do pod"ema eshche daleko" (podgotovleno po materialam Omskogo oblastnogo 
komiteta Gosstatistiki), Russkaia Aziia, 14 February 1996; for 1997: V. 1. Galitskil (ed. ), Regiony 
Rossii, Tom 1 (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1998), p. 439; for 1998: V. 1. Galitskii (ed. ), Regiony 
Rossii, Tom 1 (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1999), p. 381. 
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weakness. In 1998 and 1999, the ONPZ itself was in a financial crisis, which may 
help to explain the dramatic change in the figures for 1998 in Table 5.1, and the 
volume of oil it refined in 1999 dropped by over 42 per cent. Sibneft tightened its grip 
on the refinery in response, raising its shareholding to over 50 per cent, increasing its 
representatives on the board to six (out of nine), and changing its name to the Sibneft- 
Omsk Refinery. 7 
Sibneft is also an example of the way in which an increasing proportion of the Omsk 
region is coming under the sway of the big Russian corporations. Sibneft itself has 
taken over a number of the larger finns in the region, including Omskii bekon, 
Russia's - and possibly Europe's - biggest pigbreeder and pigineat producer. There 
too, Sibneft has increased its representation to six out of the seven directors on the 
board. Sibneft is reported to be considering other possible purchases, especially in 
petrochemicals. Gazprom already has the lead in this sector, however, through its 
acquisition in 2000 of the Siberian Urals Petrochemicals Company, usually known as 
the Sibur holding, in which Omskshina is a component firm. 8 This suggests that there 
has been a narrowing of ownership as well as of the productive base of the region. 
7 Ben Aris, "Demystifying the magnificent 7", Russia Review, 3 November 1997; Egor Druzenko [chief 
editor of Neft'i Kapital], "Okhotniki za 'chernym. zolotom"', Obshchaia gazeta, 10-16 July 1997; 
Andrei Egorov, "'Offshor', kak sposob borby gubernatora s merom", Strana. Ru, 9 December 2000, 
<http; Hwww. siberia. strana. ru/print/976370967. htnil>, accessed 10 July 2001; Galitskii, Regiony Rossii 
(1999), pp. 382,385; Jeff Grocott, "Berezovsky Has Inside Track on Sibneft", The Moscow Times, 3 
September 1996; Eugene M. Khartukov, Oil and Gas Journal, 18 August 1997, p. 39; Yulia Latynina, 
"Omsk City, Region Fighting Over Sibneft Tax", The Moscow Times, 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stones/1998/11/03/038. htn-il>, accessed 13 December 2000; Heiko 
Pleines, "The Sibneft-Omsk Refinery", Alexander's Oil and Gas Connections, 
<http: //www. gasandoil. com/goc/company/cnrO I 048. htm>, accessed 20 June 2001; Astrid Wendlandt, 
"Sibneft Buyer May Be Front for Shareholder", The Moscow Times, 25 September 1996; David 
Cameron Wilson, CIS and East European Energy Databook 1995 (Newton Kyrne: Eastern Bloc 
Research Ltd, 1995), p. 25; Kommersant-Daily, No. 6,1996; "Omskaia oblast': spad zamedlilsia, no do 
pod'ema eshche daleko", Russkaia aziia, 14 February 1996; Omskii vestnik, 13 February 1997; 
Omsk: Ekonomika"; "Ornskii neftepererabatyvaiushchii zavod", 
<http: //www. urtiver-omsk. su/omslc/Company/oil/oil. win. htm>; conversation with Aleksandr 
Smolenskii, president of Stolichnii Bank Sberezhnii (SBS), in which he confirmed Polezhaev's 
continued presence on the Sibneft board, 9 February 1998. 
8 Egorov, "'Offshor', kak sposob borby"; Elizabeth Le Bras, "Gazprom, Sibur Get Go-Ahead to 
Merge", The Moscow Times, 240ctober 2000, 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2000/10/24/05 I. htrnl>, accessed 13 December 2000; 
"Aktsionery Omskogo bekona'izbrali v sovet direktorov 6 predstavitelei'Sibnefi... (sic), Product. Ru, 
24 March 2000, <http: //www. product. ru/all/arcmain I 
det. asp-ID=9416. htm>, accessed 28 June 2001; 
"Overview of Trade and Iinvestment: Opportunities in Omsk Region, Russia"; "Reestr oligarkhov: 
posledme izvestlya", Politika, <http: //www. cityline. ru: 8084/politika/raznoe/oligarhi. html>, accessed 
28 June 2001>. 
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The 1998 figure for oil refining in Table 5.1, which represents a fall of 67.6 per cent 
on the previous year, goes sharply against the trend for most of the previous four 
decades. As has already been noted, this may be partly - possibly even wholly - 
explained by the crisis at the refinery. It is, of course, too early to judge if this is a 
"blip" or a long-term change. It may be that there is a problem with the reliability of 
the figures. The Omsk section in the relevant edition of Regiony Rossii records, for 
example, more enterprises in the city of Omsk (34,198) in 1998 than in the oblast as a 
whole (33,487). 9 
Whatever the explanation, the signs are that for most of the post-Soviet period, the 
tendency in Omsk has been for an increasing concentration on one forin of economic 
activity. This concentration is nowhere near as pronounced as in the KhMAO, where 
oil and gas account for over 80 per cent of production, or the LkNAO, where it is over 
90 per cent. On the other hand, the AOs have known no development other than that 
of oil and gas. The lack of diversification may be a problem, as may be the damage to 
the envirom-nent and the destruction of the traditional indigenous way of life. But it is 
not as if there had been some previous significant development which got crushed 
under the weight of the oil and gas projects. Omsk, on the other hand, had developed 
to a point at which a more diversified form of economic development was at least 
possible. The dominance of the refinery has blocked this path. In a sense, Omsk is an 
example of economic regression. It has not literally returned to an earlier stage of 
development, of course, but its economic structure is regressing towards simplicity 
and concentration instead of developing towards complexity and diversity. This 
naturally tends to focus both the economic attention of the inhabitants and the points 
at which the interests of the powerful might conflict. 
5.2 Elite continuity 
Elite continuity in Omsk can be examined in much the same way as in Tiumen, i. e., 
by examining the profiles of key leadership figures and investigating the composition 
of the regional duma. Since Omsk consists of only one regional formation, as against 
Tiumen's three, and since it developed in this mould over a longer period, this is a less 
complicated task. Since 1961, the region has been dominated by two main figures: 
9 Galitskil, Regiony Rossii (1999), pp. 383,385. 
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Sergei losifovich Maniakin, the former first secretary of the Omsk obkom, later a 
local deputy in the State Duma, and Leonid Konstantinovich Polezhaev, who has been 
the regional governor since 1991. Given their comparatively greater weight in 
regional politics, they are discussed at more length than the Tiumen leaders. The basic 
sources for their elite profiles are more or less autobiographical works - two, in 
Polezhaev's case. 10 These have been corroborated wherever possible. Maniakin has 
been included not only as a key formative influence on the regional elite but also 
because his standing enabled him to make a political comeback after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, unlike Bogomiakov, his counterpart in Tiumen. However, 
Polezhaev deserves more attention as the contemporary regional leader, and this 
section focuses on him in such a way as to emphasise the network which formed 
around him. The Omsk regional soviet and its two succeeding dumas are analysed in 
terms of continuity and homogeneity as in Chapter 4. 
Sergei Maniakin was born in November 1923 in Stavropol krai. He grew up and made 
his way in the world during one of the stormiest and most dangerous periods in 
Russian history: the time of collectivisation, industrialisation, the Terror, and the 
Second World War. Even after the war, the prison and prison camp population rose to 
a peak of 5.5 million in 1953. Maniakin himself later claimed a distinguished war 
record, though this was not mentioned in a Soviet-era account. He was admitted to 
membership of the CPSU in 1945, qualified as an agronomist, and began to work his 
way up the ladder of rural promotion, becoming the director of a Machine Tractor 
Station, a key instrument of Soviet control in the countryside, before rising to become 
chairman of a collective fann. He definitively entered the ranks of the regional elite as 
head of the kraikom agricultural department and chain-nan of the krai soviet executive 
committee. He also spent a short time as a CC CPSU inspector before accepting an 
appointment as first secretary of the Omsk obkom in August 1961. Mikhail Suslov, 
the Soviet leader who made him the offer, had been in charge of Stavropol krai during 
the 1940s, and told Maniakin himself that he had good memories of his father from 
that time. Maniakin now belonged to a new generation of officials who replaced half 
of all the Soviet regional leaders within a year as a result of a Krushchev purge. He 
'0 s. 1. Maniakin, Sibir'dalekaia i blizkaia (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985); Leonid Polezhaev, Put'k sebe. - 
vospominaniia (Alma-Ata: Edei'veis, 1993); Leonid Polezhaev, Vpered, na medlennykh tormozakh... 
(Moscow: Novosti, 1994). 
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behaved in a suitably modem fashion in Omsk as a "man of the people", eating in 
public canteens, queuing up in shops, and travelling by public transport, which he 
soon ordered to be improved. Maniakin later boasted that agricultural production had 
nearly tripled and industrial production had risen by 14 times under his stewardship. 
He also claimed the credit for building numerous enterprises, including the refinery 
complex and the huge Luzino pig complex, which became the firm Omskii bekon. 11 
Nevertheless, during his 26 years in office, Maniakin came to symbolise the sclerosis 
of the top regional leadership. This set in soon after his arrival in Omsk. Maniakin 
himself was one of those Krushchev appointees whose positions were guaranteed by 
Brezhnev. "Cadres stabilised" throughout the hierarchy. Including candidate 
members, the Omsk obkom of 1966 retained 24 per cent of its membership from the 
1960 obkom, the 1968 obkom retained 81.6 per cent of its membership from the two 
previous obkoms, and the 1971 obkom retained 69.6 per cent of its membership from 
the three previous obkoms. By 1987, more than half of the region's economic leaders 
had held their positions for longer than five years. A third of them had been in place 
for at least 10-15 years. Three of the region's leading state farm directors who got a 
special mention and photograph in Maniakin's 1985 memoirs - Nikiforov, Khoroshun, 
and Virich - had already been in post when he arrived in Omsk over 25 years earlier. 
Maniakin himself was replaced in March 1987 during the intensified regional purge of 
Gorbachev's final period, though he went on to hold two other Soviet posts 
(Chairman of the People's Control Committee of the USSR, CPSU deputy in the 
Soviet CPD). In 1995, at the age of 72, he was persuaded by the prominent local 
nationalist Sergei Baburin to run for the State Duma, and was elected from a rural 
constituency by a tiny margin against an agro-industrial elite candidate, with a 
regional administration candidate coming in a strong third. 
The elite which came up under Maniakin has survived his passing as a front-rank 
politician. In the 1999 State Duma elections, Maniakin's vacant seat was 
filled by 
11 T. Cliff, Russia. - a marxist analysis (London: International Socialism, 1970), pp. 44,220-22 1; Mike 
Haynes, "Social History and the Russian Revolution", John Rees (ed. ), Essays on Historical 
Materialism (London: Bookmarks Publications, 1998), p. 64; Leonid Ivanov, "Ocherk 1 publitsistika", 
Sibirskie ogni [Organ Soiuza pisatelei RSFSR i Novosibirskoi pisatel'skoi organisatsil], 4,1987, p. 
135; Maniakin, Sibir'dalekaia i blizkaia, P. 14; Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics. - An introduction 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 77; Blok "Vlast' - narodu", undated election leaflet 
(1995) on behalf of Maniakin. 
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Aleksandr Podgurskii, who achieved a convincing win over a KPRF candidate, 
Vladimir Dorokhin, the director of a local printing and publishing company, and 
deputy in the oblast legislative assembly. Podgurskii was the director of Omskii 
Bekon and had been an up-and-coming member of the Maniakin elite. He had 
succeeded A. P. Maiorov, the first director of Omskii Bekon, who had been on the 
CPSU obkom throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Podgurskii himself had been on the 
1990 obkom of the short-lived Communist Party of the RSFSR (along with other 
leading figures such as Leonid Polezhaev and V. V. Savost'ianov, the future director 
of Omskgazifikatsiia and member of the 1998-2002 oblast legislative assembly), and 
has expressed considerable pride in the achievements of the Soviet era. Thus, 
Maniakin's goodbye to regional politics lasted for 12 years and indicated that the elite 
he had led had outlasted even him. 12 
Maniakin's place as the dominant figure in Omsk has been taken by Leonid 
Polezhaev, who has been the governor since November 1991. Polezhaev's 
autobiographical writings seek to project four major personal qualities. The first is 
professionalism. He contrasts this with the machiavellian manoeuvring of 
nomenklatura politicians, from whose ranks he excludes both himself and other 
professionals, such as enterprise directors. The second is ambition, which he depicts 
as a reaction to the oppressiveness of Soviet communism. The third is a certain 
independence of mind suited to a leadership role. This derives from being 
accustomed, as a highly-placed professional, to making on-the-spot decisions on his 
own. The fourth is pride in the development by Russians like himself of the non- 
Russian Soviet republics (accompanied by indignation at their subsequent 
ingratitude). 13 
12 Ivanov, "Ocherk i publitsistika", p. 135; Maniakin, Sibir'dalekaia i blizkaia, pp. 192-193; Omskaia 
pravda, 12 January 1960,11 February 1966,27 January 1968,28 February 1971,16 February 1974,2 
December 1990; Neil J. Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite: The Case of Omsk 1987- 
1995", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4, June 1998, pp. 621,636,638,639; A. Titkov, A. 
Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', M. Makfol [McFaul], N. Petrov (eds. ), Politicheskii almanakh Rossii 
1997, Tom 2, Sotsial'no-politicheskie portrety regionov, Kniga vtoraia, p. 739; "Vlast' - narodu"; 
Interview with Aleksandr Podgurskii, Luzino, 10 December 1996. 
13 Sources for Polezhaev, other than those specified separately: Aleksandr Krotkov, "Omsk Governor 
Polezhayev Views Regions' Assertiveness" (interview), Segodnia, 8 February 1995, translated in 
FBIS-SOV-95-038,27 February 1995, pp. 38-40; Longman Biographical Directory ofDecision- 
Makers in Russia and the Successor States (Harlow: Longman, 1993), pp. 489-490; Leonid Polezhaev, 
Put'k sebe, pp. 206-211,223-226,229-242,243-252,254-262,266-273,275,279; Polezhaev, Vpered, 
na medlennykh tormozakh..., pp. 10-14,37-38; "Polezhaev Leonid Konstantinovich: Glava 
184 
Born in 1940, Polezhaev is a native of Omsk, the son of a well-placed railway 
engineer. Though outraged by the harsh logic of the Soviet system, which reached 
inside his close family, Polezhaev writes that he and his brother were neither cynics 
nor dissidents: they were ambitious. They looked on membership of the CPSU as a 
necessary compromise, for to try to achieve their personal ambitions outside the party 
"would have been more than naive". Having qualified as a hydraulic engineer in 
1965, Polezhaev spent the next 22 years in Kazakhstan, rising from the humble 
position of clerk of the works to head of construction of the Irtysh-Karaganda canal in 
1976-1983. He joined the CPSU in 1969. As the canal neared completion, Polezhaev 
was appointed first deputy chairman of the Karaganda regional soviet executive 
committee, thanks, apparently, to the Kazakh leader Dinmukhamed Kunaev. The 
situation in Kazakhstan deteriorated during the four years that he held this post. He 
refers scathingly to the decision to replace Kunaev, who was fired for corruption and 
nepotism in December 1986, with Gennadii Kolbin, a Russian functionary quite 
unfitted in his view to run an entire country like Kazakhstan in which he had no real 
roots. The change of leader was greeted with the first nationalist riot of the Gorbachev 
period. 14 Polezhaev, who was responsible for a major housing programme, clearly fell 
out with Kolbin. The latter, he argues, made unrealistic decisions for purely political 
reasons, such as committing himself and his subordinates to grandiose projects 
without regard to the lack of funding. Consequently, Polezhaev himself did his best to 
slow down the implementation of Kolbin's directives. This, it seems, was the "conflict 
with local officials" to which John F. Young refers as the cause of his leaving 
Kazakhstan. 15 
administratsii Omskoi oblasti Omskoi oblasti", Arkhiv Zhurnalista: Dos'e: blografii, 
<http: //www. grankin. ru/dosyc/ru - 
biol60. htm>, accessed 28 December 2000; "Polezhaev Leonid 
Konstantinovich", Natsional'naia sluzhba novostei, <http: //www. nns. ru/persons/polezh. html>, 
<http: //www. nns. ru/restricted/persons/Polezh. html>, accessed 5 January 2001; "Polezhaev Leonid 
Konstantinovich", Russian government website, 
<http: //www. gov. ru/sostav/members/deput/d - 
203 64 I. htm>, accessed 4 January 200 1; "Polezhaev 
Leonid Konstantmovich: Glava administratsii Omskoi oblasti", Obshchestvo. ru) 
<http: //www. society. ru/bibl/polros/Omsk/person-om. html>, accessed 29 December 2000. 
14 For an alternative view to Polezhaev's, see Ingvar Svanberg, "Kazakhs", Graham Smith (ed. ), The 
Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London and New York: Longman, 1990), p. 206 et seq. 
15 John F. Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics in Russia: The Case of Omsk", Friedgut, 
Theodore H., and Hahn, Jeffrey W., Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk NY, London: M. 
E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 142. 
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If Polezhaev left Kazakhstan under a cloud, then he could hardly have been more 
favoured when he returned to Omsk in 1988 to take charge of a major irrigation 
project in the south of the region. Evgenii Konovalov, the deputy chairman of the 
regional soviet executive committee, took him under his wing. He was soon presented 
to Anatolii Leont'ev, the chairman of the regional soviet executive committee, and to 
obkorn first secretary Evgenii Pokhitailo, who formed a kind of provisional leadership 
after Maniakin's departure. It was not long before Polezhaev was the head of water 
management for the entire Omsk region. He merged existing organisations into a 
giant new enterprise, Omskvodmelioratsiia. This gave him a power-base and much 
favourable coverage in the regional media. By this time, there was a rising democratic 
movement in Omsk, in which such figures as Aleksei Kazannik, Aleksandr 
Minzhurenko, and Sergei Baburin were coming to the fore. There is little sign that 
Polezhaev had any real sympathy for their politics. On the contrary, he goes out of his 
way to express his sympathy for a political opponent of leading local intelligent 
Kazannik - Ivan Litskevich, director of the Nefteorgsintez plant, later to become the 
head of the Omsk oil refinery: "A vigorous, colourful figure, Litskevich personified 
the image of the clan of the leaders of large enterprises, a steadfast mistrust of whom 
had unfortunately been inculcated in the public mind, and so he was unable to put up 
a serious contest against the candidate of the widest democratic circles". Polezhaev 
himself continued to climb a more traditional ladder. In the autumn of 1989, he was 
appointed head of regional economic planning (its central administration - Glavnoe K- 
Planovo-Ekonomicheskoe Upravlenie - was known as GlavPEU). The vacancy had 
occurred owing to the fortuitous death of his predecessor, who had also been first 
deputy chain-nan of the regional soviet executive committee. Polezhaev seems to have 
inherited this position as well, though he is rather coy about this in his memoirs and 
slips it in nine pages after it has happened. 
Polezhaev claims to have turned GlavPEU into something of a "powerhouse of 
perestroika", reproducing in his relations with his staff the Gorbachevite coalition 
with the intelligentsia, which he says he admired. His closest collaborator, of whom 
he expresses a high opinion and no little fondness, was an economist, Viacheslav 
Malykhin. But there were others, such as the young Aleksandr Saraev, only 36 years 
old in 1989, who went on to become the deputy chairman of the oblispolkom 
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economic committee, and later the chairman of the property committee of the city of 
Omsk. 16 The central thrust of the Malykhin-Polezhaev strategy, according to 
Polezhaev himself, was to promote the spread of small business ventures then known 
as "cooperatives". He later claimed the credit for the idea of regionalisation of 
economic reform. Polezhaev was also taking steps in 1990 to further the more overtly 
political side of his career. He stood for the Russian parliament, only to meet with a 
rebuff which clearly smarted for several years. The victor, Oleg Smolin, who has been 
a parliamentary deputy for Omsk ever since, later described the contest as being 
between himself as a reform communist and Polezhaev, already promoted from 
deputy to acting chainnan of the regional soviet executive committee, as the regional 
establishment figure. It is clear from Polezhaev's own memoirs and from the official 
biographies that Smolin was right about Polezhaev having taken another step up the 
hierarchy, as Leont'ev had by this time moved across to become obkom first 
secre ary. 
17 
Polezhaev did better in the 1990 elections for the regional soviet, in which he won the 
seat for a neglected rural constituency after - by his own admission - persuading his 
opponent not to drop out. The exploitation of rural conservatism to gain or retain 
political office was a common ploy of the less popular members of the nomenklatura 
at the time. 18 But Polezhaev's attempt at the first meeting of the new soviet to get 
himself elected permanent chairman of the executive committee ran into what he 
describes as fierce opposition from a group of ralkom secretaries. He acknowledges 
that this was overcome largely thanks to the Omsk city leadership and singles out 
Vladimir Varnavskii as the man who saved the day for him. Varnavskii had been the 
first secretary of the Omsk gorkom since 1988, and had been elected chairman of the 
gorsovet and deputy in the Russian parliament in March 1990. He was to become 
deputy governor for a few months after the dissolution of the gorsovet in October 
16 Mer i ego komanda, Press-biulleten' No. 1,1992, Omsk, Administratsila goroda; Young, 
"Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics", p. 15 1. 
17 Aleksandr Balamutov, "Perspektiva demokratii problematichna ... Beseda s narodnim. 
deputatom 
Rossii Olegom Smolinym", Oppozitsiia, No. 1,14 May 1993; "Omskii odnomandatnyi izbiratel'nyl 
okrug No. 129", Arkhiv zhurnalista, <http: //www. grankin. ru/elections/okruga/129. htm>, accessed 5 
January 200 1; " Smolin Oleg Nikolaevich", Russian government website, 
<http: //www. duma. gov. ru/deputats/persons/99105719. htm>, accessed 4 January 2001. 
18 See, for example, Philip Hanson, Local Power and Market Reform in the Former Soviet Union 
(Munich: RFE/RL Research Institute, 1993), p. 14. 
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1993, following which he was elected unopposed as chainnan of the new Omsk oblast 
legislative assembly in April 1994, a post which he holds at the time of writing, along 
with his membership of the Federation Council, of which he is a deputy chairman (his 
full term of office runs until March 2001). Polezhaev also acknowledges the support 
of lurii Glebov, a hydraulic engineer by trade like Polezhaev himself, who had been 
the chairman of the Omsk city soviet executive committee for ten years. Glebov went 
on to become Polezhaev's assistant in the regional soviet executive committee before 
succeeding him as second president of the Omsk Trading House, Omskii torgovyi 
dorn (OTD), a conglomerate of big industries in the region which functioned, as 
Young put it, "as a large insiders' club, local trade cartel, and lobby group", or, more 
pithily, as "the nemesis of small business in Omsk". Although the OTD, which was 
founded in April 1991, is not mentioned in Polezhaev's memoirs, the transfer of 
control over trade in the region from the state to a single company is identified as the 
top priority for privatisation. 19 
By 1991, Polezhaev was clearly in the top rank of the regional elite. During the 
August crisis, he played a key role in persuading the rest of the oblast leadership to 
ignore appeals from the organisers of the abortive coup. He seems to have been a 
strong supporter of the Russian government inside the leadership of the regional 
soviet, which generally favoured a wait-and-see attitude. In public, however, he 
simply appealed for calm. In his memoirs, Polezhaev makes great play of the fact that 
Yeltsin issued a decree on 19 August giving him the right to take any action necessary 
to secure agricultural production in the region, an act which in his view presaged and 
began to legitimate his eventual appointment as governor. The moment came in the 
following month, when Aleksandr Minzhurenko, one of the democrats who had been 
elected to parliament in 1990, returned to Omsk as presidential representative and 
recommended Polezhaev for the new post. The local democratic movement had been 
unable to come up with a candidate. Leont'ev was too obviously a creature of the 
discredited CPSU. That left Polezhaev, whom Melvin describes as being at this time 
"the little known head of the apparat". Polezhaev was duly appointed by presidential 
decree on 11 November 199 1. At the time, Minzhurenko justified his decision, about 
19 Titkov, "Omskaia oblast"', p. 735; Young, "Institutions, Elites and Local Politics, % p. 147,153; 
"Varnavskii Vladimir Alekseevich", Russian government website, 
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which he soon had his own doubts, by the need to maintain some basic continuity and 
professionalism. 20 Years later, he volunteered another explanation, one which had 
much more to do with Polezhaev's position in the regional elite, as well as with the 
increased power of the regional elite in relation to Moscow. The president, he 
recounted: 
, appointed the governor from the local elite, someone who would suit the local 
elite. Otherwise the governor could not function. It is a clan, and it is the 
leader of the clan who had to be appointed governor. 21 
The issue which provoked Minzhurenko's second thoughts was Polezhaev's 
administrative team, the eight deputy governors described by Young as "a mix of 
former apparatchiki and supposedly fresh faces (though established administrators)". 
One of the key arguments Minzhurenko, in common with other democrats and 
liberals, had previously put in favour of appointment was that elections were too 
likely to return members of the nomenklatura. Polezhaev described his first deputy 
governor Valentin Tretiakov (who now shares this position, see below) and deputy 
governor Vladimir Sosnin as having "much experience of apparat work". Malykhin 
became deputy governor in charge of economic reform. Another deputy governor was 
Valerii Roshchupkin, who had run the tram and trolleybus network for the city of 
Omsk, and headed the region's housing department. Roshchupkin was to become the 
mayor of Omsk from 1994-2000. Polezhaev's appointment as governor was a triumph 
of transition not just for him but for a powerful, rising element within the regional 
elite. 22 
Such direct evidence of continuity is reinforced by the data presented in Table 5.2 
indicating the level of homogeneity in the Omsk regional legislatures from 1990 to 
2002. The combined weight of the political and economic groupings rose from 58.1 
<http: //www. council. ru/sostav/members/deput/d 20464. htm>, accessed 4 January 200 1. 
20 66 
- 
Melvin, The Consolidation of a New Regional E, lite", p. 622; Young, "Institutions, Elites and Local 
Politics", pp. 142-144. 
21 Interview with Aleksandr Mirizhurenko, Omsk, 10 December 1996. 
22 it Adn-iinistratsiia oblasti: kto est'kto", Omskii vestnik, 20 March 1992; "Roshchupkin Valerii 
Pavlovich, glava administratsiii Ornska", Kommercheskie vesti, No. 5 (113), 2-8 February 1994; Valeril 
Roshchupkin, Osnovnye napravleniia razvitiia g. Omska, n. d. (1995); Young, "Institutions, Elites and 
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per cent in 1990 to 81.0 per cent in 1994, and then to 83.0 per cent in 1998. The 
proportion of political and economic leaders rose from 41.4 per cent in 1990 to 66.7 
per cent in 1994, falling back slightly to 60.0 per cent in 1998. The latter figure 
reflects a drastic fall in the proportion of political leaders together with a dramatic rise 
in that of economic leaders. As with the KhMAO, it seems that the degree of 
integration of economic leaders into an interlocked political elite increased sharply 
around the turn of the century, i. e., well over half a decade after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The rise in the number of deputies clearly identified with a political 
party in 1994 and 1998 is entirely due to the rise of the KPRF. The KPRF's growing 
strength in the assembly represented a break with the non-party pattern highlighted by 
Hughes, who had missed the communist presence in 1994. But this strength was not 
associated with any other differences in the evidence of homogeneity. Nor did it make 
the assembly directly oppositional so far as the regional administration is concerned. 
For one thing, Polezhaev has good relations with the local KPRF, which tends to put 
its main efforts into areas of secondary importance to him. For another, of the twenty 
deputies who are not KPRF, seventeen are reportedly loyal to Polezhaev. As a result, 
Vladimir Dorokhin, the KPRF candidate for chainnan of the assembly, was defeated 
by the incumbent, Vladimir Varnavskii, a vintage ally of Polezhaev's and a political 
leader in Omsk for twenty years. This showed the clear connection between 
23 homogeneity in the assembly and continuity in its leadership . 
Local Politics", P. 143; "Rukovoditeli Administratsil Omskoi oblasti", Administratsda Omskoi oblasti, 
<http: //www. omskelecom. ru/russian/admin/strukt/partl/all. htm>, accessed 26 June 2001. 
23 Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional tlite", pp. 641,643; I'Vybory v mestnye organy 
vlasti izbiratel'nyi protsess - Omskaia oblast"', Obshchestvo. Ru, 
<http: //notes. society. ru/bibl/polros/Onisk/izbir-om. html>, accessed 19 December 2000. 
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36-45 89 43.8 4 19.0 of 11 11 11 
46-55 73 36.0 11 52.4 11 11 11 
>55 16 7.9 6 28.6 
SEX 
Male 192 94.6 21 100.0 26 100.0 27 90.0 
Female 11 5.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 10.0 
_OCCUPATION 
_ 
Political leaders 41 20.2 6 28.6 6 23.1 1 3.3 
_Admin. 
Officials 21 10.3 2 9.5 3 11.5 4 13.3 
_ 
Int. grp. Profs. 3 1.5 1 4.8 0 0.0 2 6.7 
Econ. Leaders 43 21.2 8 38.1 11 42.3 17 56.7 
_ 
Middle mangrs. 13 6.4 1 4.8 2 7.7 3 10.0 
_ 
Emplyees/wkrs. 27 13.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.3 
_ 
Prof Leaders 19 9.4 3 14.3 3 11.5 1 3.3 
_ 
Professionals 36 17.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.3 
Marginals 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.8 0.0 
AFFILIATION 
Vol. Assn. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Vol. assn. nom. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Party cand. 175 86.2 5 23.8 5 19.2 10 33.3 
No affiliation 28 13.8 16 76.2 21 80.8 20 66.7 
Note: The two sources used here for the 1994 figures, Hughes and Glubotskii (see fn. 16 below), differ 
slightly on the composition of the 21 -strong assembly elected in March 1994. Since the turnout in five 
constituences had not reached the minimum threshold, these were filled in elections held on 27 
November 1994, bringing the total up to 26.25 As Hughes does not include a breakdown of the full 
assembly, and keeping in mind the disparities between him and Glubotskii on its initial membership, a 
breakdown of Glubotskii's figures for the full complement of members has been included here. An 
accurate age breakdown could not be given as Glubotskii does not include dates of birth. 
Neil Melvin argued in his study of elections in the region between 1987 and 1995 that 
there had been important changes in the aligm-nent or configuration of elites in Omsk, 
even if the "powerful core grouping, formed from the merger of the local state 
apparatus and leading economic interests, dominated the key positions of power in the 
26 
oblast"' . This argument was 
based on the increase in KPRF representation in the city 
soviet and the regional assembly in 1994, and on the victory of candidates 
24 Sources: for the 1990 and March 1994 assembly (except the 1994 party candidates, for which see 
Melvin below), James Hughes, "Sub-national tlites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A 
Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 6,1997, pp. 1035-1036; 
Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional tlite", p. 628; for the November 1994 assembly, A. 
Glubotskii, 110mskaia oblast"', Ekaterina Mikhailovska (ed. ), Rossiiskii sbornik (Moscow: Panorama, 
1995), pp. 305-307 ; for the 1998 assembly, "Vybory v Zakonodatel'noe Sobranie Omskoi oblasti". 
25 Vladimir lashin, "Omskaia oblast': situatsiia k martu 1995 goda", Institut Gumanitarno- 
politicheskikh issledovanii (monthly regional reports), pp. 
1-2. 
26 Neil J. Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional tlite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995", 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4, June 1998, p. 642. 
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independent from the core elite in the three Omsk single-member constituencies in the 
December 1995 State Duma elections. One of the three was Sergei Baburin, and he 
backed both of the others, Sergei Maniakin and Oleg Smolin. This Baburinite 
dominance disappeared in the December 1999 election. Smolin got back in as a KPRF 
candidate. Baburin, with 12.01 per cent of the vote, was heavily defeated by 
Aleksandr Vereteno, the head of the Osha brewery group and a member of the 
regional assembly, with 29.72 per cent. Maniakin was replaced by Aleksandr 
Podgurskii, the director of Omskii bekon, with 36.08 per cent of the vote, who beat 
the KPRF candidate, Vladimir Dorokhin, the director of a printing firm and, as we 
have seen, a member of the regional assembly, into second place with 31.40 per cent. 
The rise of the KPRF, which accounts for one-third of the 1998-2002 regional 
assembly, is thus no longer associated with that of the Baburinites, who have no 
clearly identifiable representation at all. This has serious consequences for Melvin's 
argument. 27 
It may be that the core of the regional establishment is prepared to get along with a 
range of representatives from outside its ranks. But the elected positions on which 
Melvin focuses suggest a different pattern, albeit one based on his own research and 
periodisation up until 1995. In the first stage (1987-August 1991), the core elite went 
through a crisis of leadership and accepted a minority of democrats (most of whom 
came from an academic background)28 among the overwhelmingly conservative 
deputies from Omsk in the USSR and Russian CPDs. In the second stage (August 
1991 -December 1993), the core elite concentrated on securing the key position of 
governor. Polezhaev made a tactical alliance with the local democratic leaders while 
concentrating power in his own hands. In the third stage (December 1993-December 
1995), the democrats were marginalised by the governor, who trounced the mayor in 
the vote for the Federation Council and then got rid of him, and by the Baburinites 
and the KPRF, who defeated the rest of them electorally. In the following stage 
(December 1995-December 1999), the core elite and the KPRF marginalised the 
27 Sources for 1999 State Duma election results in the single mandate electoral districts Nos. 128 
(Bol'sherechensk), 129 (Omsk), and 130 (Central): Arkhiv zhurnalista, 
<http: //www. grankin. ru/elections/okruga/128. htm>, 
<http: //www. grankin. ru/elections/okruga/129. htm>, 
<http: //www. gTarikin. ru/elections/okruga/130. htm>, accessed 5 January 2001. 
28 A. Titkov, A. Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', p. 736. 
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Baburinite bloc. Thus, elections, rather than introducing a limited element of political 
competition in a way which was not threatening to the existing power-holders, have 
actually functioned to reduce the range of representation step by step in a pattern not 
unlike that of "salami tactics". It is the core elite, whose power derives largely from 
positions outside the electoral process, which has benefited most from it in political 
terms, not the democrats or the Baburinites or even the KPRF, whose fortunes are 
chtically dependent on voting. 
Table 5.3 - Omsk oblast legislative assembly 1998-2002: KPRF representation 29 
Variable No. % 
Political leaders 0 0.0 




Economic leaders 2 20.0 
Middle managers 2 20.0 
Professional leaders 0 0.0 
Professionals 1 10.0 
Employees/workers 1 10.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Other evidence suggests that this core elite has either subordinated or incorporated the 
the KPRF as well as those democrats who remain active in politics. Table 5.3 shows 
that the KPRF group in the 1998-2002 regional assembly is dominated by the same 
political-economic grouping as the assembly as a whole, i. e., administrative officials, 
economic leaders, and middle managers. The difference is that a much lower 
proportion of the KPRF group are leaders and a higher proportion of them come from 
the middle and, to a lesser extent, from the lower occupational categories. Despite 
this, Vladimir Dorokhin, the effective spokesman of the party in the regional 
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assembly and the man the party chose as its candidate for chairman, is one of the 
group's two economic leaders. Krasnyi put', the party's own regional paper, did not 
conceal the fact that, at the height of the 1998 crisis, the entire KPRF challenge at a 
special meeting of the assembly consisted of a demand for the payment of child 
benefit, which Polezhaev refused to discuss, and a proposal to set up a broad-based 
anti-crisis committee, which he had little difficulty in brushing aside. In March 2000, 
M. 1. Mashkarin, another member of the KPRF group in the assembly, joined with six 
other deputies, three of whom were economic leaders (including A. Trippel', the 
director of the big Omskshina tyre plant), to attack the mayor of Omsk, Valerii 
Roschupkin, just as the governor's campaign against him was rising to its climax. 30 
Two important figures from the early democratic movement have made their peace 
with the core elite. Aleksei Kazannik, the man who gave up his seat in the USSR 
Supreme Soviet to Yeltsin in 1989, was a key reformist politician in Omsk during the 
early 1990s. He returned from four months as Procurator General, formed his own 
political organisation, and ended up as a deputy governor. He has now resumed the 
same position he held in the early 1990s, chairman of the regional administration's 
committee on nationality policy, religious affairs, and public organisations, only this 
time not as the representative of a democratic movement. Andrei Golushko, who used 
to help finance opponents of Polezhaev like Kazannik, is one of the two first deputy 
governors (having survived an assassination attempt), the other being the experienced 
apparatchik, Valentin Tretiakov. 31 
Although by-elections have not been included here, they do not seem to have had 
much effect on the overall trend. Thus, Konstantin Potapov, who took over from Ivan 
Litskevich as the head of the ONPZ, also took over his seat in the regional assembly 
in a 1996 by-election. He did so at the same time as Sibneft, of which he became vice- 
29 Source: "Vybory v Zakonodatel'noe Sobranie Omskoi oblasti". 
30 Galina Rosina, Vochemu vzbryndil gubernator", Krasnyi put', 11 September 1998; "Omsk: 
Byvshchii mer - Valerii Pavlovich Roshchupkin", Panorama, 
<http: //www. panorama. ru: 8 10 1 /works/mery/omsk. html>, accessed 27 June 200 1. 
31 Glubotskii, " Omskaia oblast"', p. 301; Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional tlite ", PP 
623,629-630; Simon Saradzhyan, "Governor's Deputy in Omsk Shot by Gunman", The Moscow Times, 
<http: Hwww. themoscowtimes. com/stones/1999/03/23/006. html>, accessed 19 December 2000; 
,, Rukovoditeli Administratsii Oniskoi oblasti". 
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president, began operations. Litskevich, who opposed the creation of Sibneft, has 
been described as "a respected veteran of the industry". His body was recovered from 
the Irtysh river after what was officially described as accidental drowning in August 
1995, around the time that Sibneft was carved out of Rosneft and four months before 
the crucial auction in which Sibneft was privatised. Potapov was defeated in an Omsk 
city constituency in the 1998 regional assembly elections, but was returned in April 
1999 in a rural by-election caused by the surprise resignation of the sitting member to 
take up a job in the regional administration. A regional news agency referred to the 
unexpected vacancy as "a gift of fate or of other forces which answered for it". In 
another by-election in December 1996, Viacheslav Kotel'nikov replaced the deputy 
director of Omskshina. Kotel'nikov was the head of a special technological centre at 
Polet, a major regional aviation and space manufacturer. Like Potapov, Kotel'nikov 
was an advocate of what can be described as "industrial patriotism", especially when 
it came to the enterprises of the old military-industrial complex which so dominated 
Omsk. At the 1998 elections, he was in turn replaced by the general director of 
Omskshina. 32 
Electoral politics in Omsk therefore do not seem to have had much effect on the 
dominance of the core elite, on its continuity, or on its homogeneity. The main 
problem for this elite has been of a different order: control over its own capital city. 
At the time of the studies carried out by Young and Melvin, this seemed to be a matter 
of business as well as political rivalry between Polezhaev and the first mayor, lurii 
Shoikhet, who came from outside the regional establishment. But Shoikhet's 
replacement by Roshchupkin, an insider if ever there was one, did not prevent another 
mayor-governor conflict recurring, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter. 
32 Glubotskii, "Oniskaia oblast"', pp. 306-307; Pavel Khlebnikov, Krestnyi otets Kremlia Boris 
Berezovskii ili Istoriia razgrableniia Rossii (Moscow: Detektiv-Press, 2001), p. 195; Damian Marhefka 
(ed. ), Who's Who in the CIS Oil & Gas Industry (Los Angeles CA: Russian Petroleum Investor, 1996), 
p. 1-3 1; Titkov, Glubotskii, "Ornskaia oblast"', p. 740; "Kandidaty v deputaty zakonodatel'nogo 
sobraniia Omskoi oblasti", Omskii vestnik, II December 1996; "Soobshchenie izbiratel'noi komissii 
Omskoi oblasti", Omskii vestnik, 26 December 1996; "'Sibneft': god nespolkoinol zhiznl" (interview 
with Potapov), Omskii vestnik, 3 April 1997; Yulia Latynina, "Omsk City, Region Fighting Over 
Sibneft Tax", The Moscow Times, 3 November 1998, 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/1998/11/03/038. htnil>, accessed 19 December 2000; 
"KommunizMu predpochli mazut", Agenstvo DO-info, 26 April 1999, 
<http: //w-ww. doinfo. infomsk. ru/vip/pota - 
kn. htm>, accessed 28 June 2001; "Menedzhment Sibnefti", 
Sibneft% <http: //www. sibneft. ru/printjsp? page=23&lang=2>, accessed 28 June 2001. 
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Biographies of the new mayor, Evgenii Belov, his first vice-mayor, Aleksandr 
Sterliagov, and two of his three deputy heads of administration, Anatolii Bushuev and 
Sergei Nos, have been published. 33 According to these biographies, all four have 
backgrounds in the industry of Omsk and can be considered either as members of the 
Soviet-era regional elite or as "coming men". They all attained their highest party 
position in Omsk in the 1980s: Belov as an obkom instructor, Sterliagov as an Omsk 
gorkom instructor, Bushuev as a factory secretary, Nos as secretary in a production 
association. Belov has been the director of the same major enterprise, Omskenergo, 
the regional electricity supplier which employs nearly 13,000 people, 34 since 1987. 
The other three switched from party to soviet careers between 1986 and 1991. 
Bushuev went off into private business after a couple of years as first deputy chairman 
of the Omsk city soviet executive committee, and held a series of company 
directorships before acquiring his present post in an acting capacity in December 
1999. But the careers of Sterliagov and Nos have for the past ten years been 
extraordinarily similar. They were both deputy chairmen of Omsk city district soviet 
executive committees when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. They both became head 
of administration of their respective districts in 1994 and held these positions until 
1997, when they both acquired their present posts under Shoikhet. Sterliagov and 
Belov have shared time together as deputies in the regional assembly. 
Having the right background may not be a sufficient qualification for success in the 
world of the Omsk elite, but it looks increasingly like a necessary one. 
33 it Glava gorodskogo samouprovlenila g. Omska Belov Evgenii Ivanovich", Ofitsial'nyi sait merii 
goroda Omska, <http: //www. omsk. ru/adniinistration/belov/belov. htm>, accessed 3 July 2001; "Pervyi 
vitse-mer Sterliagov Aleksandr Mikhailovich", Ofitsial'nyi sait merii goroda Omska, 
<http: //www. omsk. ru/adniinistration/leadership/cterlyagov. htm>, accessed 3 July 2001; "Bushuev 
Anatolii Mikhailovich Zamestitel' glavy administratsii goroda Oniska, direktor departamenta 
gorodskogo khoziaistva", Ofitsial'nyi sait merii goroda Omska, 
<http: //www. ornsk. ru/adrnirustration/leadership/bushuev. htrn>, accessed 3 July 2001; "Zamestitel' 
glavy administrats1i Sergei Anisimovich Nos", Ofltsial'nyi sait merii goroda Omska, 
<http: //www. omsk. ru/adniinistration/leadership/nos. htm>, accessed 3 July 2001. 
34 to 0 Kompanii", Omskenergo(RAO EES Rossii), < 
http: Hwww. omsk. elektra. ru: 8 l0l/htm/about/aboutO. shtml>, accessed 3 July 2001, 
<http: Hwww. omsk. elektra. ru: 8101/htm/about/about9. shtrnl>, accessed 3 July 2001. 
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5.3 Mayor vs. governor, city vs. region 
The composition of the Omsk regional elite is no less dominated by continuity than 
that of its counterparts in Tiumen. Likewise, power relations in the Omsk region are 
just as conflict-ridden as in Tiumen, though the form of the conflict and its outcome 
are rather different. 
One of the more obvious demographic differences between Omsk and Tiumen 
concerns the nature of urbanisation. This is not a question of the level of urbanisation. 
The real difference is that the population of the Omsk region is much more highly 
concentrated in one place. Well over half of that population live in the city of Omsk, 
as we saw in the introduction to this chapter. By contrast, the urban population in 
Tiumen oblast is far more dispersed thoughout the region. The town of Tiumen, 
which is by far the largest urban centre in the entire oblast, numbers little over half a 
million, less than a third of the population in the region as a whole. Khanty-Mansiisk, 
the capital of the KhMAO, has just over 38,000, Salekhard, the capital of the LANAO, 
under 33,000.35 On top of this, the city of Omsk, again unlike the town of Tiumen, is 
the centre of the region economically as well as in terms of administration, health 
services,, education, culture, and so on. If elites in the Tiumen region have divided 
along boundaries which are to a significant extent economic as well as territorial, and 
if the pressures for such divisions also exist in the Omsk region, albeit not necessarily 
to the same degree as in Tiumen, then one would expect the major fault line to appear 
between the city and the region. Such is indeed the case, although this underlying 
reality was for some time obscured by other differences between the two leaderships. 
The first clash between them strengthened the dominance of the regional elite over the 
oblast before it achieved electoral pre-eminence. 
John F. Young described the political situation in Omsk in the early 1990s as a kind 
of restrained free-for-all between several different economic elites and the institutions 
they dominated. Among the economic interests involved, industry predominated over 
35 V. I. Galitskii (ed. ), Regiony Rossii, Tom 1 (Moscow: Goskornstat, 1999), pp. 381,393,399,405; 
A. Titkov, A. Glubotskil, "Omskaia oblast"', A Makfol [McFaull, N. Petrov (eds. ), Politicheskii 
almanax Rossii 1997, Tom 2, Sotsial'no-politicheskieportrety regionov, Kniga 2 (Moscow: Mosk. 
Tsentr Kamegi, 1998), p. 732; N. Petrov, A. Titkov, A. Glubotskil, "Tiumenskaia oblast"', ibid., p. 
938; A. Titkov, A. Mukhin, "Khanty-Mansuskii avtonorrmyi okrug", ibid., p. 1053; A. Titkov, A. 
Mukhin, "lamalo-Nenetskii avtonomnyi okrug", ibid., p. 108 1. 
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agriculture, and among the representatives of the industrial interest, the foremost was 
Leonid Polezhaev, the top state official in the region. Two points of friction stood out. 
The lesser was between the administration and the regional soviet, which brought 
together tensions not only between industry and agriculture and between executive 
and legislative authority, but also between Polezhaev and Leont'ev, the leader of the 
soviet and a key representative of the older generation in the nomenklatura. In this 
conflict, Polezhaev showed his flexibility and adroitness as an elite politician, 
qualities remarked on by Neil Melvin. Malykhin, by contrast, took a much harder line 
against the agricultural lobby and even denounced a compromise decision on food 
price rises by Polezhaev in September 1992. Polezhaev was receptive both to the 
argument for increasing prices in the interests of the agriculture and for limiting the 
increases, which went down well with everyone else. At the same time, he developed 
his position with the agricultural lobby by defending the big agro-industrial 
enterprises left over from the Soviet era on the grounds that they fitted local 
conditions, although he did not oppose private fanns, of which Omsk had 8,000, or so 
he claimed in 1995.36 
But a more serious. conflict arose between the governor and Iurii lakovlevich 
Shoikhet, the man he himself appointed as the mayor of the city of Omsk. Polezhaev 
seems to have been thrown off-balance, a few days after being appointed governor in 
November 1991, by a scandal which broke over the transfer of municipal buildings 
and funds to OTD. The governor was forced to resign as first president of OTD (in 
favour of lurii Glebov), and the old city leadership was disgraced. Sholkhet, who had 
led the protests and had small business and democratic support (including 
Minzhurenko's), was nominated as mayor in something of a revolt in the inner council 
(the small soviet) of the city soviet. A flustered Polezhaev agreed to appoint him. The 
41 year-old Sholkhet was one of the most prominent small businessmen in Omsk, 
indeed he was just the kind of "entrepreneur-cooperator" Polezhaev claimed to-have 
36 Aleksandr Krotkov, "Omsk Governor Polezhayev Views Regions' Assertiveness" [interview], 
Segodnia, 8 February 1995, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-038,27 February 1995, p. 39; Nell J. Melvin, 
"The Consolidation of a New Regional tlite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995", Europe-Asia Studies, 
Vol. 50, No. 4, June 1998, p. 626; Interview with Aleksandr Podgurskii, director of Oniskil bekon, 
Luzino, 10 December 1996; Leonid Polezhaev, Put'k sebe. Vospominaniia (Alma-Ata: Edel'veis, 
1993), pp. 264-266; John F. Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics in Russia: The Case of 
Omsk", Friedgut, Theodore H., and Hahn, Jeffrey W., Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk 
NY, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 144-147,149-150,153-156. 
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been encouraging. In reality, it made them into key business as well as political rivals. 
Mayor and governor clashed repeatedly during 1992 and 1993, mainly over the 
privatisation of public property to parts of the OTD conglomerate. In January 1993, 
the small soviet of the regional soviet decided, with Polezhaev's support, to stop 
making payments to the federal budget. This led to a sharp exchange between the 
governor and Shoikhet, who accused Polezhaev on the radio of helping to destroy the 
Russian state. But the new mayor remained relatively isolated, even within the city 
soviet, and the local press was generally against him. 37 Shoikhet is the Hebrew word 
for a kosher slaughterer, and there is a view among Jews locally that he was an 
obvious target for anti-semitism. 38 
The decisive confrontation between president and parliament in the autumn of 1993 
gave Polezhaev the opportunity to settle accounts both with the lesser threat embodied 
by Leont'ev and with the greater one represented by Shoikhet. On 22 September, the 
small soviet of the regional soviet declared that Yeltsin's decree No. 1400 dissolving 
the Russian parliament was unconstitutional and had no force in the Omsk region. The 
full soviet demanded Yeltsin's dismissal. The regional administration, headed by 
Polezhaev and backed by the local democrats, stood by the president. On 12 October, 
Polezhaev dissolved all the soviets in the region. There was no resistance. In the 
December 1993 elections, both Shoikhet and Polezhaev stood for the Federation 
Council on the Russia's Choice slate. This was not a direct contest between the two 
men, as the voters were choosing two representatives, but it was clearly a challenge of 
a kind. Another scandal broke out, but this time the target was Sholkhet, whose wife 
was alleged to have used her husband's position to acquire several shops in the city (it 
later transpired that these allegations were without foundation). Polezhaev romped 
home with 65.4 per cent of the vote. Oleg Smolin, who had defeated Polezhaev in 
1990, came second with 33.0 per cent. Shoikhet, his credibility badly damaged, came 
fourth, with 20.1 per cent. The democrats began to criticise him for arrogance and 
authoritarianism, thus increasing his isolation. Having established his democratic 
credentials, Polezhaev arranged to meet Yeltsin in late January 1994 to get his reward. 
37 Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional tlite", p. 629; A. Titkov, A. Glubotskii, "Ornskaia 
oblast"', p. 73 6; Mer i ego komanda, Press-blulleten' No. 1,1992, Omsk, Administrats"a goroda; 
Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local politics in Russia", pp. 147-150. 
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Clearly aware that the blow was about to fall, Shoikhet called a press conference in 
which he defended his record on 26 January, while Polezhaev was in Moscow. Two 
days later, Yeltsin dismissed Shoikhet by presidential decree, ostensibly for 
destabilising the political and economic situation in the city, for acting beyond his 
powers, and for losing the trust of the city's population. That morning an OMON 
(paramilitary police) unit seized the mayor's premises on Polezhaev's orders. 39 
Kommercheskie vesti, an Omsk city business weekly, ran a fairly sympathetic if 
critical front-page analysis of Shoikhet's downfall. It highlighted the "anti-social 
character" of the economic reforins with which the mayor and the democrats in 
general were identified as a major weakness. It also detected beneath the surface 
political storms in Omsk, as in Moscow, the continuing advance of the professional 
managers (khoziaistvenniki) "who had constituted in their time the most intelligent 
and capable part of the nomenklatura". The prime political import of the critical 
events connected with the 1993 crisis in Omsk itself was, as Melvin put it, that they 
"highlighted the degree to which power had shifted in the oblast' to the head of the 
administration, Leonid Polezhaev". This was accompanied by a general 
disenchantment with politics, as evidenced by the low turnout at the March 1994 
regional assembly elections and the lack of reaction to political scandals. Organised 
opposition to Polezhaev at the regional level, never very fierce, disappeared 
completely. He appointed the new mayor of Omsk, Valerii Roshchupkin, who had 
been one of his deputy governors for over two years, prior to which he had been in 
charge of regional housing construction since 1983. Polezhaev decided that 
Roshchupkin would not have to submit himself to an election for nearly two years, 
i. e., until December 1995, at the same time as the first gubernatorial election. 40 
38 1 am indebted to two Omsk Jews, a father and son, for this observation, which was confirmed in 
Yakov Levy (ed. ), The Oxford English-Hebrew, Hebrew-English Dictionary (Jerusalem: Oxford 
Unviversity Press, 1999), p. 285; 1 am also grateful to Ms. Shelly Arad for her linguistic assistance. 
39 Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', pp. 298-299; Vladimir lashin, "Omskaia oblast: situatsila k martu 
1995 goda", Monitoring (Moscow: Institut Gumanitamo-Politicheskikh Issledovanii [IGPI], 1995), p. 
3; Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite", p. 629; S. Tikhonov, "Shoikheta provodili s 
OMONonf ', Oreol, No. 4,3-9 February 1994; Titkov, Glubotskil, "Oniskaia oblast"', p. 736; Young, 
"Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics in Russia", pp. 150-153. 
40 lashin, "Omskaia oblast': situatslia k martu 1995 goda", pp. 2-3; A. Krivoshchekova, "Politika - 
vesh' slishkom ser'eznaia, shtoby eiu mogh zanimat'sia liubiteli", Kommercheskie vesti, No. 5 (113), 
2-8 February 1994; Titkov, Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', p. 736; Melvin, "The Consolidation of a 
New Regional tlite", pp. 623,626. 
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At the same time as preparing for the 1995 elections, Polezhaev was seeing one of his 
pet schemes come to fruition: the creation of a Siberian oil company (Sibneft) based 
in Omsk. He had been one of the prime movers in this on the grounds that, as Neil 
Melvin put it, "60% of the Omsk oblast' budget was based on the activity of the 
refining complex and local control was, therefore, critical to economic stability in the 
region". Sibneft, which was formally set up in the summer of 1995, was one of the 
lesser bargains in the 1995-1996 "loans-for-shares" auctions. The crucial shares were 
bought for $100 million in December 1995 by a finance company associated with 
Boris Berezovskii and by the Stolichnyi Bank Sberezhenii (SBS, later SBS-Agro). 
Sibneft's market value 20 months later was $4,968 million, a much smaller increase 
than that of Lukoil or Surgutneftegaz. Valerii Kriukov and Arild Moe have argued 
that Berezovskii's role was partly as a facilitator for something approaching a covert 
management buy-out. They quote Polezhaev, who was on the Sibneft board, as saying 
that $35 million of the purchase price came from the ONPZ and $65 million from 
Noiabrskneftegaz, Sibneft's extraction arm in the IANAO. The formation of Sibneft 
therefore joined a crucial part of the political leadership of the Omsk region and a 
crucial part of its economic leadership to a vertically-integrated oil company with all 
kinds of political and economic connections, some of them inside the president's inner 
circle. 41 
For the time being, Polezhaev was the head of a subservient administrative hierarchy 
which ran the entire region with the explicit support and participation of industrial, 
agro-industrial, and financial leaders, and of a multi-million dollar oil company in 
which he himself had an important role. "No-one suspected", local journalist 01'ga 
Konovalova wrote six years later, that the replacement of Shoikhet by Roshchupkin 
would lead to "a war lasting many years, in which the losers would turn out to be the 
ordinary people of Omsk. 9,42 Conflicts between governors and mayors of regional 
capitals were endemic in Russia. 
43 Roshchupkin was not a business rival of 
41 Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', p. 306; Pavel Khlebmkov, Krestnyi otets Kremlia Boris Berezovskii 
ili Istoriia razgrableniia Rossii (Moscow: Detektiv-Press, 2001), p. 208; Valerii Kryukov and Arild 
Moe, The Changing Role ofBanks in the Russian Oil Sector (London: RIIA, 1998), pp. 36-39; Titkov, 
Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', p. 740. 
42 01'ga Konovalova, "Prichinoi konflikta stall bol'shie vozmozhnosti mera", Strana. Ru, 
<http: //www. siberia. strana. ru/prmt/974131 11 l. htmI>, accessed 30 April 2001. 
43 See, for example, Pete Glatter, "Regional and Local Power in Russia", slovo, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 
1995, pp. 57,63-64. 
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Polezhaev, nor did he have any political differences with the governor. In the long 
term, however, three factors contributed to a struggle so serious and prolonged that 
the conflict between Polezhaev and Shoikhet paled into insignificance by comparison. 
One of these factors is that Polezhaev does not tolerate independence by other 
officials. Another is that, as part of a "divide- and-rule" approach to governors, central 
elites exploited the existing legislative vagueness about mayor-governor relations by 
giving mayors more power. A third is that the regional elite pursued economic 
interests which increasingly diverged from those of a city leadership with any 
independence at all. 
There is no evidence, certainly not to begin with, that Roshchupkin was anything 
other than what he appeared to be: a professional administrator who was not aligned 
with any political grouping, who made a point of not getting involved in political 
controversy, and who occupied himself exclusively with his municipal 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, there were early warning signs. After all, he was not 
simply an establishment nominee, he was also a coming man, and his growing 
popularity made him look like a potential candidate for governor even before he had 
stood for election as mayor. The pro-Polezhaev press adopted a more critical tone 
towards him. This prompted Roshchupkin to set up his own press and publicity office 
(informatsionnyi otdeý. His popularity grew more quickly. These were minor 
irritations, perhaps. But with Polezhaev's support, and without the opposition of the 
KPRF and the Baburinites, Roshchupkin did even better at the December 1995 
election than his patron, who did most of the campaigning. Polezhaev got about 60 
per cent of the regional vote on a turnout of nearly 69 per cent, while Roshchupkin 
managed well over 80 per cent of the city vote on a 63 per cent turnout. More 
significantly, Roshchupkin's vote of 448,761 could be seen as being within striking 
distance of Polezhaev's 615,257. The mayor had scored nearly 73 per cent of the 
governor's vote although the total number of valid votes cast in the mayoral election 
was only just over half the those cast in the gubernatorial election. Polezhaev scored a 
convincing victory over his opponents, but he could still be seen as more a rural than 
an urban politician. According to a ward-by-ward breakdown, he averaged 68.1 per 
cent of the vote outside the city of Omsk but only 52.4 per cent in the city itself If the 
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election was a boost for Roshchupkin, it must also have heightened Polezhaev's 
awareness that his man was a potential rival. 44 
For the moment, however, this incipient rivalry was overshadowed by crisis and 
division at the regional level. There is something of a parallel here with the way the 
struggle between Polezhaev and Shoikhet was preceded by ffiction between 
Polezhaev and Leont'ev. But this time the economic, budgetary and political problems 
were much worse and much more prolonged. 
Taking the 1990 level as 100, by the end of 1995 Russian GNP had fallen to 62.11 
industrial production had fallen to 49.6, and agricultural production had fallen to 67.2. 
According to these measures, which are not the only ones, of course, but may serve as 
a rough guide, the Russian economy had in these 5 years shrunk by between 32.8 per 
cent and 50.4 per cent. By the mid-1990s, the federal authorities were struggling to 
keep as much revenue as possible flowing in to the centre, and to keep as little as 
possible from flowing out of it, for example, in the form of subsidies to the vast 
majority of regions, which, like Omsk, were "recipients" not "donors". This was done 
to a great extent by transferring obligations like welfare to lower level authorities 
without a corresponding provision of funds. The result was that budgets were pushed 
into the red even in oil- and gas-rich regions like the LANAO and the KhMAO. Local 
and regional elites all over the country faced a major dilernma, which a Russian 
specialist has summed up like this: "Obviously, the territorial authorities are not ready 
to undertake additional expenditure, but, on the other hand, they cannot not do so on 
account of the danger of a rise in social tension in the territory"' . 
45 
In the Omsk region, overall production in 1995 fell by 4.5 per cent compared with 
1994, and was nearly 24 per cent down on 1993. Overall regional investment in 1995 
44 Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', p. 302; lashin, "Omskaia oblast'v aprele 1995 goda", Monitoring 
(Moscow: IGPI, 1995), p. 2; lashin, "Omskaia oblast'v maie 1995 goda", Monitoring (Moscow: IGPI, 
1995), pp. 1-2; Konovalova, "Prichinoi konflikta"; Melvin, "The Consolidation of a New Regional 
Elite", pp. 637-638; E. Mikhailovskaia, lu. Smoliakova, I. Suchkova, Regional'nye sredstva massovoi 
informatsii (Moscow: Panorama, 1999), pp. 123-126; Titkov, Glubotskii, "Omskaia oblast"', pp. 736, 
740; I'Vybory v mestnye organy vlasti, izbiratel'nyi protsess - Omskaia oblast"', Obshchestvo. Ru, 
<http: Hwww. society-ru/bibl/potros/Onisk/izbir-om. htn-fl>, accessed 19 December 2000. 
45 UN, Economic Surveyfor Europe, vol. 51 (1999), No. 3, pp. 128,130; V. Kriukov, A. Sevast'ianova, 
V. Shmat, Neftegazovye territorii: Kak rasporiadit'sia bogatst-vom? (Novosibirsk: Rossilskaia 
akadeniiia naukq sibirskoe otdelenie, 1995), p. 219. 
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was 24 per cent lower than in 1994. Production in the military-industrial complex 
(MIC), which accounted for most of the region's industry, plunged by over 30 per 
cent. A three year-old programme of defence conversion had produced indifferent 
results. When the state stopped paying for MIC production in November 1995, what it 
had not paid for past production made up well over half the total debt owing to the 
MIC in Omsk. This pushed up the level of debt and non-payment throughout the 
regional economy. Inter-enterprise debt in Omsk rose by 230 per cent during 1995. 
According to the tax service, arrears rose to over 9 per cent of revenue during the 
year. In 1995, the main exceptions to the downward trend were certain types of oil 
refining and petrochemical production. But in the first nine months of 1996, chemical 
and petrochemical production fell by up to 30 per cent. Company profits for 1996 in 
the city of Omsk were only half of what they had been in the previous year. 
According to the official figures, industrial production in the region in 1995 was down 
4 per cent on 1994, and in 1996 it was down 9 per cent on 1995.46 
The burgeoning problem of debt led to mounting arrears of welfare benefits and pay, 
especially in the public sector. Although wages in the city of Omsk were six per cent 
above the national average in 1996, average pay arrears in public (biudzhetnyi) 
employment had risen to between three-and-a-half months and over five months by 
the end of the year. In January 1997, a regional daily carried a cartoon in which one 
beggar warned another to keep an eye on his money as the biudzhetniki were on their 
way home. Despite cuts in benefit, large parts of the welfare system seem to have 
been overwhelmed. Delays, long queues, and procedural complications persisted well 
into 1998, despite the introduction of an emergency regime. Payment of current child 
benefit was not resumed until January 1998, and even then the continuing uncertainty 
about arrears going back several years led to a clash between exasperated mothers and 
a benefit office manager in the outlying Kirov district of the city. 47 
46 V. 1. Galitskii (ed. ), Regiony Rossik Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1998), p. 441; G. 
Poliakova, 110 sotsial'no-ekonorriicheskom polozhenii v Omskoi oblasti", Sibirskoe vremia, 22-28 
November 1996; Svetlana Vasil'eva, "Zavtra - aktsila protesta", Omskii vestnik, 26 March 1997; 
IlOmskaia oblast': spad zamedlilsia, no do pod"ema eshche daleko" ("Podgotovleno po materlalam 
Omskogo oblastnogo korniteta Gosstatistiki"), Russkaia Aziia, 14 February 1996; "Omsk v ushedshem 
godu-,, omskii vestnik, I January 1997. 
47omskii vestnik, 23 January 1997, p. 2 [Cartoon]; ... Detskie'nachali platit'... no s dolgarni PO nuin 
iasnosti poka net", Omskii internet, No. 3 (33), 26 January 1998, <http: //www. cocos. ru/news. htm>, 
accessed 14 February 1998; "Ochered'za'detskimi'rassredotochat po okrugu", Omskii internet, No. 4 
(34), 2 February 1998, <http: //www. cocos. ru/news. htrn>, accessed 14 February 1998. 
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The region's political leaders came up with a three-fold response to the crisis. 
First, they put the blame on the national government and on certain enterprise 
directors. Thus, Vladimir Vamavskii, the chairman of the regional assembly, 
campaigned in the Federation Council for the dismissal of prime minister 
Chernomyrdin and his government. Both he and Polezhaev sent a telegram to Egor 
Stroev, its chairman, demanding action on the arrears. The central issue for them was 
their own budget crisis. The attempt to pay off arrears, they claimed, was draining the 
regional budget at the same time as widespread non-payment of taxes and the lack of 
federal finances were reducing its income to a trickle. Polezhaev energetically 
denounced "the directors of a range of enterprises" (only three were named) for failing 
to keep up their tax payments and their contributions to off-budget funds and to the 
national pension fund. He accused another set of unidentified enterprise heads of 
setting up subsidiaries with accounts in out-of-town or foreign banks in order to avoid 
tax liability in Omsk. In a decree of 19 July 1996 on additional taxation measures, the 
governor stated that tax arrears (rather, presumably, than the lack of federal finance) 
were the chief cause of the mounting budgetary problems. Despite some progress, he 
reported that arrears for the first half of the year were equivalent to 55 per cent of all 
48 tax collected over the same period . 
Second, they portrayed themselves as having the people's interests at heart, unlike the 
government and the offending enterprise directors, and identified themselves to some 
extent with anti-government protest, as long as it remained orderly. A trade union day 
of action in defence of jobs, pay and social welfare on 27 March 1997 received 
considerable coverage in the regional administration paper Omskii vestnik, which 
published Polezhaev's major denunciation of enterprise directors on its front page just 
over a week before the event. In the days leading up to the protest, the paper carried a 
48 V. Evdokimov, "Zaiavlenie press-sekxetaria gubernatora, Omskoi oblasti", D. Gutenev, "Vladimir 
Varnavskii", "Tsel'- popolnit'biudzhet", Omskii vestnik, 10 December 1996, "Na chuzhom gorbu" 
(interview with Varnavskii), Omskii vestnik, 29 January 1997; Glava administratsii (gubernator) 
Oniskoi oblasti, PostanovIenie ot 19 iiulia 1996 g. N 364-P, "0 dopolnitel'nykh merakh po 
obespecheniiu polnogo i svoevremennogo postupleniia nalogovykh sborov v oblastnoi biudzhet i 
vnebludzhetnye gosudarstvennye foridy", pravovoi konsul'tant, No. 14,30 July 1996, p. 16; E. 
Maksimov, "Blagodaria Varnavskomu kreslo pod prenferom zashatalos"', Omskaia pravda, II 
December 1996; Leonid Polezhaev, "Dolg pered biudzhetom platezhom ki-asen", Omskii vestnik, 18 
March 1997; "Deputatskii god" (interview with Varnavskii), Omskii vestnik, 21 January 1997. 
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variety of views about about it from local people, and reported that the unions were 
pressing regional authorities to suspend payments to the federal budget until wage 
arrears had been made up. At a meeting between the regional administration and local 
union leaders, vice-governor Valentin Tret'iakov stressed how much the authorities 
were doing to pay off the arrears, and the two sides agreed a joint programme of 
activities on the day itself. Roshchupkin stressed how reasonable he thought the 
protest was at a joint press conference with Vladimir Nikolaev, the chairman of the 
federation of Omsk trade unions, who was to be a successful KPRF candidate for the 
Omsk city soviet in 1998.49 
Third, efforts were made both to bring in more revenue and to support key enterprises. 
In his decree of 19 July 1996 on additional tax measures, Polezhaev reaffirmed that 
getting revenue in was the administration's top priority and laid down additional 
measures aimed at achieving this. These included improving monitoring and 
coordination, stepping up pressure on small businesses, the wider use of arrest, 
confiscation and compulsory sale of property, and restricting the practice of 
concluding mutual settlements (vsaimozachety) with tax debtors. Some modest 
successes were claimed. Polet, a major aviation and space manufacturer, was one of 
them. Polet's workforce had fallen by 8,000 in recent years and production had 
tumbled by 53.2 per cent in 1996 alone. By February 1997, debtors to Polet, which 
included the defence ministry, owed it over 100 million rubles. As a result, it had paid 
very little tax for the previous two years. It was claimed that the regional tax 
authorities had succeeded in restarting the flow of revenue in the autumn of 1996, and 
that the enterprise had paid nearly as much tax in January 1997 as it had in the whole 
of 1996, not that this amounted to very much. Various other mechanisms were put in 
place, including a Regional Emergency Committee for the Strengthening of Tax and 
50 Budgetary Discipline, which began work in January 1997 . 
49Boris Kurkin, "'Za trud, zarabotnuiu platu, sotsial'nye garantii"', Omskii vestnik, 25 March 1997; 
Polezhaev, "Dolg pered biudzhetom"; Svetlana Vasil'eva, "Zavtra - aktsiia protesta", Omskii vestnik, 26 
March 1997; "Vstrecha s profsolUZnymi liderami", Omskii vestnik, 26 March 1997; "Reshit 11 ulitsa 
problemy? ", Omskii vestnik, 27 March 1997; "Nikolaev Vladirnr Nikolaevich", Omskii gorodskoi 
Sovet, <http: //www. omskelecom-ru/parlament/deputat. htm>, accessed 22 July 2001 
50 Tat'iana Bessonova, "'Polet'- na proverku", Omskii vestnik, 26 February 1997; Polezhaev, "Dolg 
pered biudzhetom"; "0 dopolnitel'nykh merakh" 
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The problem was that major sources of tax revenue like Polet often needed support 
themselves. A case in point was Ornskenergo, the regional electricity and heating 
utility headed by Evgenii Belov, the man who was to replace Roshchupkin as mayor 
in March 2001. Three weeks after his tax decree, Polezhaev signed a decree on 
helping Omskenergo to surmount its financial crisis and to prepare for the coming 
autumn and winter. This recognised that the high level of non-payment by consumers 
had destroyed Omskenergo's ability to meet its tax commitments, pay off its bank 
debts, or pay wages for at least the previous four months. The decree envisaged 
various forms of assistance to the utility and its employees, including the general use 
of the mutual settlement of debts between Ornskenergo and the public sector. It 
accepted Sibneft's proposal to provide Ornskenergo with credit for the procurement of 
fuel and for repairs and maintenance and requested further credits from banks in the 
region which would be guaranteed by the regional and city administrations. 51 
The logic of the arguments in favour of paying off arrears, collecting taxes, and 
supporting industry was not necessarily the same, although many people in Omsk no 
doubt subscribed to all three. Putting resources into one could divert them from the 
other two. This was not obvious in the case of Omskenergo, as it was an essential part 
of the social as well as of the industrial infrastructure. But despite all the organised 
protest and spontaneous incidents over arrears, important figures in the regional MIC 
were committed to what was described in the preceding section of this chapter as 
"industrial patriotism". Viacheslav Kotel'nikov, a high-ranking Polet technologist and 
regional assembly member from 1996 to 1998, put the argument like this: 
The rebirth ofRussia is possible only through the rebirth of the industry of the 
fatherland. The defence of the rights of Russian manufacturers, including the 
enterprises of the MIC, is thefundamental task. 52 
Konstantin Potapov, the vice-president of Sibneft, put his case in terms of the inter- 
regional association Siberian Agreement's programme of "import-substitution" 
defence conversion, "SibVPKneftegaz-2000". The idea was that defence plants should 
51 Glava administratsii (gubernator) Omskoi oblasti, PostanovIenie ot 9 avgusta 1996 g. N 395-P, "0 
merakh po preodoleniiu finansovogo krizisa v AK'Omskenergo'l obespecheniiu podgotovki 
energosistemy k rabote v osenne-zimnil period 1996/97 goda", Pravovoi konsul'tant, No. 14,30 July 
1996, pp. 18-19. 
52 "Kandidaty v deputaty zakonodatel'nogo sobraniia Omskoi oblasti", Omskii vestnik, II December 
1996; 
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switch to producing oil equipment. There was an important regional aspect to the 
programme, as the centre "which always forgets about enterprises located beyond the 
Urals" would have to be brought round to supporting it rather than existing production 
located mainly in European Russia. Potapov mentioned that Polezhaev had played "a 
most active part" in furthering this. A visit in February 1997 by representatives of the 
Omsk MIC to Noiabrsk, which just happened to be the site of Sibneft's extraction 
arm, had already resulted in orders. This brought Potapov to a key argument: 
What does additional productive capacity mean? The preservation ofjobs, of 
pay, the expansion of the tax base and the replenishment of the current budget, 
a start (zadel)for the next budget. 53 
The logic of this argument - that what was good for the MIC was good for Omsk - 
was common currency throughout the regional leadership. The implication - that 
what was good for Sibneft was good for the MIC - was perhaps at this stage more 
confined to the governor's administration. 
The depth of the crisis meant that it became extremely difficult to balance between 
conflicting pressures. How much effort should be put into paying off arrears, how 
much into collecting taxes, and how much into supporting regional industry? How 
regionalist should the regional leadership be, especially if this endangered the reduced 
though still vital flow of funds from Moscow, as well as other benefits of a good 
relationship with the federal centre? It was over this second question that cracks in the 
Omsk regional leadership began to appear. A sign of this was that the 1997 regional 
budget was subject to months of delay. 
A draft budget discussed by the assembly in January 1997 had envisaged a projected 
level of expenditure 36.5 per cent above income. The administration and the regional 
assembly were unable to agree a draft for a second reading despite the efforts of a 
conciliation commission, which included other interested parties. Representatives of 
the two sides then hammered out a new version on their own. There were severe cuts. 
Child benefit, for example, effectively became means-tested, so that only large 
53 Rita An, "'Sibneft': god nespokoinoi zhizni" [interview with Potapov], Omskii vestnik, 3 April 1997; 
V. Mel'nikov, "Sfera nashikh interesov", Omskii vestnik, 26 February 1997; Nikolal Shokurov, 
"SibVPKneftegaz:: Mezhregional'naia tselevaia programma", Omskii region: Serve r administratsii 
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families officially classified as poor were eligible for it. But the real novelty of this 
second version was the introduction of a 50 per cent duty on alcohol "imported" into 
the oblast from other regions and a 10 per cent duty on industrial and food "imports". 
The pledge was that these would reduce the budget deficit by 40 per cent. The new 
budget was unenthusiastically adopted by the assembly at a first reading early in 
March. The new duties were not only unpopular, they also contravened federal tax 
legislation and article 74 of the federal constitution on the free flow of goods and 
services, though it was common knowledge that other regions had got away with 
similar violations. It was a stormy session which degenerated into a slanging match 
between the deputies and the regional administration on one side and tax officials and 
the regional procurator, Sergei Kazakov, on the other. Polezhaev accused Kazakov of 
selling out the region's interests in order to keep federal legislation unsullied, and of 
wanting to be "holier than the pope". The anti-Moscow tone got stronger when 
Kotel'nikov reported that the Polet workers were in a state of near-insurrection due to 
the lack of federal funds to make up their pay arrears. 54 
The budget, now with minor amendments, passed its second and final reading a week 
later. Commenting on this, Oleg Shishov, the deputy chairman of the regional 
assembly's committee on finance and budgetary policy, who was close to 
Roshchupkin, 55 told j ournalists: "We are not in crisis, the situation is much worse than 
that". The regional authorities, he said, were doing their best to cope with a situation 
essentially due to drastic cuts in federal funding. They had committed themselves to a 
deficit budget despite the popular unrest this might entail. They had chosen to cut 
certain types of benefit and subsidies to agriculture, but not health or education. 
Shishov was particularly keen to emphasise that they would stand by Polet come what 
may, as the plant was crucial to national defence. The regional assembly was making 
a detennined stand over the import duties and had already chosen him and Andrei 
Golushko to stand up for its interests in court. 
Omskoi oblasti, <http: //region. omskelecom. ru/russian/city/economy/sib-oll. htm>, accessed 15 July 
2001. 
54 Press-tsentr ZS Ornskoi oblasti, "Shag vpered i shag nazad", Omskii vestnik, 25 March 1997; 
Vladimir Radul, "Biudzhet priniat bez pozdravlenii", Omskii vestnik, 6 March 1997; S. A Shakhrai 
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But the budget still had to go to the governor for his signature. Polezhaev promptly 
had second thoughts and referred it back to the assembly with the proposal that the 
import duties be removed. He also proposed a new clause empowering his 
administration to buy shares up to the value of 60 million rubles in enterprises of 
strategic importance to the region, shares which were being acquired at some volume 
by out-of-town interests and might no longer be subject to the influence of the Omsk 
authorities. Shishov did not oppose the acquisition of the shares, but he stood out 
against the abandonment of the duties and forced the issue to a vote. Polezhaev got his 
way. Nevertheless, twelve out the 23 deputies present supported Shishov's motion to 
disregard the governor's veto. It was a sign of how divided an institution otherwise 
marked by continuity and homogeneity could become. At the beginning of the 
following month, it was announced that Omsk had been included as one of the fifteen 
high priority regions for federal transfers. But the sums received - 21 million rubles 
for teachers' and health workers' pay, 20 million for regional defence enterprises - 
seemed small compared with a total regional debt put at over 2 trillion rubles a few 
weeks earlier. 56 
The increasing budgetary weakness of the public authorities strengthened the position 
and influence of Sibneft. Its refinery was the only seriously profitable major 
enterprise in the region, with profits of about $360 million in 1995, of which 
Litskevich had earmarked $250 million for investment in expansion. It had become a 
major lender to Omskenergo and was playing a leading role in defence conversion, 
the region's chief economic hope for the future. It was a big taxpayer, contributing in 
1995 between $14 million and $16 million a month to the city of Omsk alone. 
According to Potapov, it had increased its payments to the regional budget by 9.5 per 
cent in 1996. He claimed to have provided the region with millions of tons of heating 
oil during the "cold season" (otopitePhyi sezon), though he did not say on what ternis. 
He did say that Sibneft was diverting large financial flows which should have gone 
from Noiabrskneftegaz in the LkNAO direct to the federal budget so that they went to 
the Omsk pension fund instead. "So today, " said Potapov in an interview in April 
1997, "perhaps every fourth or fifth pensioner gets a pension which has come from 
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Sibneft's funds. 07 All these apparent benefits to the region made it increasingly 
dependent on the source of the largesse. They could also be useful in their own way to 
Sibneft itself and to its business partners. This may well have been the case, for 
example, with oil equipment for Noiabrskneftegaz supplied from nearby Omsk rather 
than from somewhere west of the Urals. According to Kriukov and Moe, SBS-Agro, 
the bank which had helped Berezovskii acquire Sibneft, carried out all the company's 
currency operations and payments, including those between Noiabrskneftegaz and 
Omsk, which Potapov claimed were so beneficial to the pensioners of Omsk. These 
financial flows seem to have grown during 1997 from the 70 million rubles a month 
claimed by Potapov to a possible 40 billion rubles mentioned by Kriukov and Moe. 
They added: 
This provides crucial liquidity and is an instance of "money-barter" not 
uncommon in a period with payment problems and general slowness of money 
transfers. Liquidity is provided, in this case, Probably in return for regional 
political support. 58 
Meanwhile, Roshchupkin's independence, unlike that of Polezhaev's opponents in the 
regional assembly, had been encouraged from outside the region. As we have seen, 
Omsk was in the first wave of regions to be allowed to elect its governor. As we have 
also seen (in Chapter 3), the centre accompanied this concession with policies 
designed to limit and dissipate any renewed surge of regional assertiveness which 
might be stimulated by the gubernatorial elections. One of these policies was to give 
mayors like Roshchupkin greater economic independence. A federal law of August 
1995 gave local authorities the right to establish and collect their own taxes. Another 
law in 1996 left the respective financial jurisdictions of mayors and governors poorly 
defined. In that year, the Omsk city authorities began the practice of acquiring large 
shareholdings in local companies, beginning with a carbon plant, in order to influence 
decisions about employee welfare and to ensure that such production as was 
considered important for the city as a whole was kept going. In July 1996, 
Roshchupkin and the city soviet refused to implement a clause in the regional budget 
which transferred to them what had previously been the federal responsibility for 
56 B. Chechirskii, "Chto mozhet byt'khuzhe krizisa? ", Omskii vestnik, 12 March 1997; Press-tsentr ZS 
Omskoi oblasti, "Shag vpered i shag nazad"; "Dolg platezhom krasen", Omskii vestnik, 3 April 1997. 
57 An, "'Sibneft': god nespokoinoi zhizni"; Yulia Latynina, "Omsk City, Region Fighting Over Sibneft 
Tax", The Moscow Times, <http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/1998/11/03/138. html>, accessed 
19 December 2000. 
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child benefit. They claimed that the city was owed about a trillion rubles in unpaid 
taxes and that this figure was rising at a time when a considerable amount of child 
benefit was owing for 1995, payment of which was not allowed for in the budget at 
all. Their joint resolution put the blame for the shortfall and its consequences much 
more clearly on the general run of enterprises than did Polezhaev. It also pointed out 
that mutual settlement, the mechanism envisaged by the regional budget to enable 
payment of current child benefit, was not practicable in these circumstances. Three 
months later, Roshchupkin and the soviet introduced duties on vehicles entering the 
city and on heavy goods vehicles passing through it in order to finance road 
59 maintenance and improvement. 
Personal observation in December 1996 suggested that these duties were not being 
imposed with much rigour . 
60 Nevertheless, Roshchupkin is said by Konovalova to 
have used his right to raise taxes to such a degree in that year that he not only filled 
the city's coffers at a time of generally increasing dearth, but also paid his own 
officials and the soviet deputies and their officials much higher salaries than their 
regional counterparts. She added: 
Probably, knowing Leonid Polezhaev's love ofpower, the Omsk mayor should 
have foreseen what kind of pressure awaited him. But Valerii Roshchupkin 
exploited to the full (raskruchival ... na vsiu 
katushku) the opportunities for 
local seýflgovernment without worrying that the governor might not like this. 61 
Be that as it may, the city authorities appeared to be making some difficult if not 
desperate decisions that winter, as first vice-mayor Gennadii Kopeikin explained in 
mid-January 1997. An energy crisis impelled them to divert funds designated to pay 
off arrears, for example, in order to ensure domestic gas supplies. Towards the end of 
January, Roshchupkin and Kopeikin were taking over boilers belonging to local firms, 
58 Kryukov and Moe, The Changing Role ofBanks in the Russian Oil Sector, p. 37. 
59 Ornskii gorodskoi sovet, Glava gorodskogo samoupravlenfia V. P. Roschupkin, reshenie ot 5 lulia 
1996 g., N 210, "0 nevozmozhnosti vypolneniia stat'i 7 zakona Omskoi oblasti'Ob oblastnom 
bjudzhete na 1996 god"', Pravovoi konsul'tant, No. 13,15 July 1996, p. 15; Omskii gorodskoi sovet, 
Glava gorodskogo samoupravlemia V. P. Roschupkin, reshenie ot 2 oktiabna 1996 g., N 241, "0 
vvedenii sbora za v"ezd avtotransportnykh sredstv na territoriiu goroda Omska I sbora za proezd 
bol'shegruznogo avtotransporta po dorogam goroda Ornska", Pravovoi konsul'tant, No. 17,15 October 
1996, pp. 14-15; ; "Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo samoupravlenfia v Rossilskoi 
federatsii", Rossiiskaiafederatsiiafederal'nyi zakon, Stat'la 6 (3); "Omsk v ushedshem godu". 
60 ViSit to Omsk, 5-12 December 1996. 
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including the aviation and space corporation Polet, in order to guarantee domestic A 
heating. The mayor's administration pointed to company directors who were doing 
well out of higher energy prices as the villains of the piece. 62 The mounting pressure 
on public budgets at all levels, Roshchupkin's use of independent tax-raising powers, 
Polezhaev's dislike of such independence, and the governor's alignment with 
economic leaders were coming together in a highly unstable mixture. 
First, however, another kind of payment problem was coming to a head at the Omsk 
oil refinery, the ONPZ, now owned by Sibneft. Towards the end of 1997, ONPZ's tax 
debt to the federal budget was variously estimated at between $79 million and $108 
million at a time when the government was under great pressure to raise revenue and 
owed $1 billion in pay arrears. On 8 December 1997, the Russian government's 
Emergency Commission for Strengthening Tax and Budgetary Discipline, chaired by 
first deputy prime minister Anatolii Chubais, threatened to seize and sell ONPZ assets 
to the value of the debt. Chubais was aligned with another "oligarch", Vladimir 
Potanin, the head of Oneksimbank, and his hostility to Berezovskii was well-known. 
Sibneft claimed that the flow of taxes to regional as well as federal budgets was being 
endangered, and reported that Polezhaev had described the decision as "incendiary for 
the region" in an appeal to president Yeltsin. Prime minister Chemomyrdin intervened 
in a more conciliatory tone. Sibneft then dropped its initial refusal to pay and was 
reported as meeting Chemomyrdin's 25 December deadline, although the ONPZ only 
seemed to have reduced its debt by 23 per cent at the beginning of 1998. The debt was 
paid partly in cash and partly through offsets against debts owed to the refinery by 
government agencies, including the defence ministry, i. e., via vzaimozachet. A 
November presidential decree banned the settlement of debts to the federal budget in 
this way, but luckily for Sibneft it did not come into effect until 1 January 1998, a 
week after the deadline. Non-monetary tax settlements were pervasive throughout the 
regions, and were used, mainly in the late 1990s, to reduce the amount of tax paid to 
the centre. 63 
61 Konovalova, "Prichinoi konflikta"; Latynina, "Omsk City, Region Fighting Over Sibneft Tax"; 
"Regiony Rossii: Gorodskaia zhizn': Ornsk", Panorama, 
<http: //www. panorama. ru: 8 10 1 /works/rnery/ornsk. htrnl>, accessed 27 June 200 1. 
62 Nadezhda Sorokina, "Politika novykh tekhnologii", Omskii vestnik, 16 January 1997; 
"Greet ... meriia", 
Omskii vestnik, 29 January 1997. 
63 it Reiting krupneishchikh neplatel'shikov federal'nogo biudzheta, inielushchikh zadolzhennost' svyshe 
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As the economic and political crises of 1998 began to hit Russia, formal control of 
Sibneft shifted from Berezovskii to his associate Roman Abramovich, who 
commanded 44 per cent of the company's shares by 2001. According to Pavel 
Khlebnikov, Berezovskii and Abramovich had been syphoning off money from 
Sibneft ("the privatisation of profits") by surrounding it with intermediary companies, 
a practice already tried and tested with companies like Avtovaz and Aeroflot. The 
most important intermediary was an Abramovich firm called Runicom, which sold 
Sibneft products but delayed payment to Sibneft itself By the end of 1997, Runicom 
owed Sibneft $30 million; a year later, this had risen to $45 million. In 1998, Sibneft 
made an interest-free loan to Runicom of $124 million. One of Runicom's employees 
was Polezhaev's son Alexei. Indeed, by the end of 2000, when Runicom owned 10 per 
cent of Sibneft's shares, he was vice-president of Runicom. Another intermediary was 
Ekokhims Trading, one of the founders of which was the son of Polezhaev's deputy 
and long-time associate Valentin Tretiakov. By the summer of 1998, a proposed 
merger between Sibneft and Iukos, the second biggest Russian oil company controlled 
by the "oligarch" Mikhail Khodorkovskii, had fallen through, largely due to 
opposition from Abramovich. The latter retained his controlling interest in Sibneft and 
his lucrative contracts, while Berezovskii reduced his holding and his role. Or so it 
seems. For, as Valeria Korchagina has commented, Sibneft may be financially the 
most transparent company in the Russian oil industry, but it is also one of the most 
mysterious when it comes to ownership. 64 
"Premier Delays Seizure of Refineries", The Moscow Times, 19 December 1997, 
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By this time, Potapov's claims about Sibneft's positive contribution to the general 
wellbeing of the Omsk region were beginning to look rather suspect. Once 
incorporated into Sibneft, the ONPZ had switched to a less profitable method of 
operation. Instead of buying oil, refining it, and then selling it again at a mark-up, it 
now charged client companies a fee to refine their oil which did not necessarily reflect 
the full value added. The result was a dramatic fall in the ONPZ's contribution to 
public budgets in Omsk. In the second half of 1998, for example, Sibneft planned to 
pay $715,000 in taxes to the city of Omsk. Even allowing for the devaluation of the 
ruble, this was less than three per cent of the tax paid by the refinery in 1995 prior to 
its expansion. On top of this, the region was now heavily in debt to Sibneft. In 
November 1998, Potapov was quoted as saying that the region owed the company 
$11.8 million. This seemed to be at least partly the result of a series of complicated 
barter deals which favoured Sibneft, typically through the over-pricing of products it 
used in payment. One of these deals in 1997 involved the paying off of tax debts by 
Sibneft to the Omsk* region through the sale of crude oil to Kazakhstan, the proceeds 
of which were used to buy coal for Omsk in lieu of money payment. At this point, the 
coal was overpriced by at least 240 per cent. The deal was administered by 
Ekokhims. 65 
Although there were no complaints about Sibneft from the regional authorities in 
Omsk, its role put them under extra financial pressure in a year of crisis. The 1998 
budget for the region had a deficit which amounted to 47.5 per cent of its revenues, 
part of which was to be made up by borrowing at an annual interest rate of 114 per 
cent. One way of dealing with this was not to honour commitments, pushing arrears of 
public sector pay and welfare benefits, for example, back up to the levels of late 1996- 
early 1997 and beyond. Another way of dealing with it was to reduce expenditure. 
Despite the introduction of local tax powers, most of the revenue still went to the 
regional administration, which then shared out part of it in the form of subsidies to the 
ofigarkhov: poslednie izvestiya", Politika, 
<http: //www. cityline. ru: 8084/politika/raznoe/oligarhi. htnil>, accessed 28 June 2001. 
65 Ibid. 
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local authorities. By far the most important of these, of course, were the Omsk city 
authorities, headed by Polezhaev's chief rival Valerii Roshchupkin. 66 
Roshchupkin had now acquired a national as well as a regional profile. He was a 
member of the president's Council on Local Self-Government and of the government's 
Council of Leaders of Local Organs of Self-Government on the Problems of Socio- 
Economic Reform. In 1998 itself, he was elected president both of the Association of 
Siberian and Far Eastern Cities, and of the Union of Russian Cities. The latter 
position, according to Konovalova, was the last straw for the governor, "who could 
not stand such independence from his protege". Within the region, Roshchupkin 
developed a powerful media presence. According to a 1999 survey, three of the eight 
major newspapers in the region were associated with the mayor, as against six with 
Polezhaev, along with three out of the six television stations (Konovalova indicates a 
slightly different line-up, but the balance is similar). Two of the TV stations - STV-3 
and Antenna-7 - were completely under Roshchupkin's control. According to the 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent in Omsk, Antenna-Ts information 
programmes were considered to be among the best in Siberia. Nevertheless, as the 
tension rose between city and region in 1998, so all the publicly-funded radio and 
television stations spent more of their time blaming the mayor or the governor for the 
region's problems. 67 
Well over half of the region's population lived in the city of Omsk, and it generated 92 
per cent of the region's taxes. In 1998, the regional authorities cut their grant to the 
city by 27 per cent. Roshchupkin responded by using his tax-raising powers in an 
attempt to make up some of the loss of income. In particular, he imposed a two per 
cent turnover tax on business. The main result of this was that big business turned 
decisively against him. It reacted in a way which hurt the city budget even more: key 
enterprises began to move themselves out of the city's tax jurisdiction altogether. By 
the time winter arrived, 30 of the largest businesses had registered "offshore", i. e., 
with tax authorities outside the city limits which were subordinated to the regional 
66 Ibid. 
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administration. They included the ONPZ, whose departure cost the city nearly half its 
income. At the time, Polezhaev and the business leaders involved defended this move 
on the grounds that the city's tax policies had become completely unreasonable. 
Roshchupkin was accused of having "suffocated business with taxes". But many of 
these businesses had ties with the governor, and it later came out that Polezhaev had 
helped instigate the exodus from the city. Key roles were also played by Konstantin 
Potapov of Sibneft and Aleksandr Vereteno, the head of the Osha brewing group and 
a member of the 1998-2002 regional assembly, who was to defeat Sergei Baburin in 
the December 1999 State Duma elections. 68 
If the city was the main victim of the re-registration, the rest of the region did not gain 
since the companies concerned immediately began to pay far less tax. Despite its 
comparatively high level of economic development, within a year it had one of the 
lowest rates of tax collection of all the regions in Russia. Nevertheless, in July 1999, 
two months before he faced his second gubernatorial election, Polezhaev praised 
Sibneft to an audience in Chukotka, where the company was expanding its operations, 
especially for the help he claimed it had given in paying off his administration's $17.4 
million debt to the pensioners of the Omsk region. Roman Abramovich was elected as 
a State Duma deputy in Chukotka in December 1999, and as governor a year later. 69 
By the autumn of 1998, the Omsk budget was in tatters. During the first half of the 
year, i. e., well before the devaluation of the ruble, the city's monthly income never 
amounted to more than 48.9 per cent of budgetary requirements. In January, the worst 
month, it was only 19.1 per cent. The city authorities cut funding for long-term 
programmes by 30 per cent and increased local taxes on oil refining and on fish and 
meat processing. The problem with the tax increases was that, as Roshchupkin pult it 
himself, "My subsidies were cut in line with what I earned. " The notion of taxation as 
a source of municipal independence was shown to be self-defeating, and the regional 
68 Egorov, "'Ofshor', kak sposob bor'by "; Konovalova, "Prichinoi konflikta"; Latynina, "Omsk City, 
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69 Julie A. Corwin, "Russian Oligarchs' Pre-Election Asset Grab", RFEIRL Newsline (End Note), 23 
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November 2000, <http: //www. rferl. org/nca/features/2000/11/02112000201257. asp>, accessed 29 July 
2001; Stepan Pavlovskii, "Cherez skvazhiny k kreslam", Moskovskie novosti, No. 31 (1049), 8-14 
August 2000, <http: //www. mn. ru/2000/31/6l. htn-il>, accessed 12 August 2000; Raff, "Sibneft Doubles 
Net Profit"; "Reestr oligarkhov". 
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leadership had the city in a stranglehold. Unrest among teachers and medical staff 
grew, and divisions appeared inside the city administration. The city's budget forecast 
for 1999 indicated that spending would be over three times higher than income. 70 
Polezhaev repeatedly argued that "tough times mean a tough verticaP - that the 
economic crisis necessitated a ruthless tightening-up of the governmental hierarchy: 
... anyone who knows the structure and logic of the organisation of state power 
will readily see that without a tough vertical of executive power in the country, 
talking about any kind of effective action by the government and generally by 
the authorities which function in the territories is simply not serious. Above 
all, the country needs an increase in the degree of accountability at all levels 
of the country's administrative apparatus, starting from the government and 
ending with the village elder (sel'skim starostoi).... It is completely obvious 
that without a tough executive power and the utmost accountability of the 
individuals who are bringing about the implementation of government 
decisions andjederal laws, we will undoubtedly suffer the same losses which 
we have suffered already. 71 
According to an article in the independent local newspaper Novoe Omskoe slovo, 
however, the "vertical" Polezhaev really meant was not the one which went all the 
way from the Kremlin to the village "but only from himself down". The crisis of 
August 1998 strengthened what Krasnyi put'. the regional KPRF paper, referred to as 
"the governor's idea of centralising power in his hands". Early in September, for 
example, he submitted a draft law to the regional assembly ("On the accountability of 
the organs of local self-government and of public officials for the contravention of 
federal and regional legislation and of municipal charters"), which gave him the 
authority to dismiss inconvenient heads of local self-government. Polezhaev exploited 
his opportunities at this critical time to make people understand that it was not in their 
interests to have Roshchupkin as mayor. Teachers employed by the region got their 
summer holiday pay in 1998, their city colleagues did not. Nor did the city teachers 
get their arrears, as a transfer agreed by the governor in October reached only the 
villages. A regional commission investigating pay arrears in education early in 1999 
concluded that the city could afford to pay its teachers for another nine months 
without any problems. Polezhaev also began to shift the media balance more in his 
70 Ibid. 
71L. K. Polezhaev, "Ne poteriat'stranu", Krestianskoe slovo, 6 October 1998. 
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favour. Thus, the regional administration launched a new TV station, Channel 12, in 
1998 at a reported cost of $1 million. 72 
What effect this propaganda war had on ordinary people is another matter. A shocked 
report in Novoe Omskoe slovo about the long daily queue of quiet, patient people, 
only the first hundred of whom would get the free bread they had come for, pleaded 
with the authorities for some action on hunger, or at least for some reporting on their 
television channels of "this shameful queue": 
Not in order to yet again wound a governor unable to guarantee the payment 
of child benefit, and not in order to show what the mayor has reduced the 
population of Omsk to by his wrecking actions. Simply to help. 73 
Indeed, the signs were that despite all the problems being visited on the city of Omsk, 
Polezhaev was still worried about being challenged by Roshchupkin for the post of 
govemor. 
The mayoral elections were due in September 1999, while the gubernatorial elections 
were not due until December. There was a distinct possibility that Roshchupkin would 
use a convincing win in the mayoral elections as a launch-pad for the gubernatorial 
elections three months later. Evgenii Belov, the director of Omskenergo, stepped in at 
the crucial moment to support the governor. In June, backed up by a torrent of 
accusations in the pro-Polezhaev media about Roshchupkin's overweening ambition, 
Belov persuaded the regional assembly to move the gubernatorial elections to the 
same date as those for mayor. Roshchupkin was thus forced to choose between the 
two contests at a relatively late stage. He decided to stand for re-election as mayor, 
although Aleksandr Kravets, the regional KPRF leader and State Duma deputy, 
initially advised him to take Polezhaev on. The elections on 5 September returned 
both incumbents to power. Polezhaev's share of the vote, at nearly 60 per cent, was 
almost exactly the same as at the previous election, though the turnout of just over 50 
per cent was down nearly 19 per cent on 1995. Roshchupkin got 61 per cent of the 
vote, as opposed to over 80 per cent in 1995, on a turnout of 51 per cent, down 12 per 
72 Latynina, "Omsk City, Region Fighting Over Sibneft Tax"; Vladimir Pogodm, "Vlast'tiazhelo 
i ROs i a, "Pochemu vsbryndll gubernator", bol'na", Novoe Omskoe slovo, I October 1998; Galma in 
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cent on the previous election. Overall, the mayor's result looked rather worse than the 
governor's. Indeed, it was widely thought that his decision not to stand against 
Polezhaev was a strategic mistake. Oleg Shishov, once a close ally, had stood against 
him and the breach between them was not healed after the election. 74 
Polezhaev, on the other hand, had dealt with both of his most serious rivals - 
Roshchupkin, by far the more popular and more dangerous, with whom he had 
succeeded in avoiding a direct encounter, and Kravets, who had stood against him and 
had come second with about 26 per cent of the vote. It is apparent that the govemor 
and his circle clearly took the result as a signal to turn up the pressure on 
Roshchupkin and his supporters. The mayor was soon deserted by five of his team, 
including Kopeikin. Three of them (not including Kopeikin) went over to the regional 
administration. One of them, Vladimir Volkov, a local banker, only gave way when 
placed under imminent threat of a criminal prosecution. An autumn bus crisis in the 
city caused by lack of funds was solved only by agreement with Polezhaev, though 
not before holders of concessionary passes had been infuriated by buses being 
allowed to "pay their way" by charging everyone full fares. In the second half of 
October, Sibneft, which had recently become the monopoly supplier of domestic gas 
in Omsk, cut off 15,000 homes (the city was exceptional at this time in not having a 
natural gas supply). Konstantin Potapov gave out that this was due to "planned repair 
work". However, according to Mikhail Sobolev, the director of Omsgorgaz, the gas 
distribution company in which the city had a shareholding, Sibneft was demanding 
payment exclusively in cash at a time when the government had doubled gas prices. 
Omskgorgaz was crippled by debt: it was owed the equivalent of 15 months' gas by 
local people and by the regional authorities. By the second week in November, an 
emergency had been declared in the city due to the irregular gas supply, which had 
caused an explosion killing five people and which was putting 7,000 homes at risk. 
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Railway troops took over a heating plant after a barracks for 1,500 soldiers and 
buildings housing officers and their families had been repeatedly cut 0 ff . 
75 
At the same time, Potapov, Golushko (who had survived an assassination attempt 
earlier in the year), and Polezhaev lined up to attack Roshchupkin in public. Golushko, 
who was the chairman of the region's Emergency Committee for the Strengthening of 
Tax and Budgetary Discipline, alleged that nearly all the departments of the mayor's 
administration had been avoiding taxes to the tune of 100 million rubles. Potapov 
blamed the city's energy and transport crisis on its administration's inability to agree 
with Sibneft. The company had had to raise its prices before the city leadership had 
decided to give in. As a result, the city got less fuel for its money than it would have 
done had Sibneft's original terms been accepted straight away. In another statement, 
he blamed Roshchupkin for the city's state of unreadiness for the cold season, making 
the point that Sibneft was not a charity and could not always help everyone out. 
Referring to the harm the city leadership was doing to the people who had placed their 
trust in it, he added: "So the question arises: 'Was the right choice made at the 
election?... When Roshchupkin appealed to Polezhaev for a joint television 
appearance in December in order to "put a stop to the present misunderstanding", the 
governor sent him an angry refusal: 
I am sure that the people of Omsk (omichi) do not expect a regular television 
show from us, or a verbal skirmish, or an explanation of the reasons for the 
current problems. They expect from us solutions to these problems. Your 
defective style of conducting city management from television studios and 
newspaper columns was and unfortunately remains one of the reasons for the 
breakdown of the city's services. I am used to working, not to hiding from 
responsibility behind someone else's back, and precisely for this reason I 
cannot adopt this style. 76 
Despite the governor's robust claims, the region's official media allocation for 2000 
was four times higher than that of the city, suggesting that its administration had 
'5 Ibid.; lurli Epanchintsev, "Ornichi greiutsia u porokhovoi bochki", Vek, No. 48,10-16 November 
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adopted the "defective style" with some enthusiasm. On top of this, the mayor lost 
control of his two main television stations, STV-3, which closed down in March 2000 
after its licence was withdrawn, and Antenna-7, which was taken over by the region. 77 
Roshchupkin's efforts to balance the city's budget for 2000 deepened his isolation. He 
initially proposed that city residents should increase their payments for municipal 
services from 20 per cent of cost to 60 per cent, and that the district financial 
administrations should be abolished. This ran into stiff opposition from four of the 
five city district heads of administration, including Viktor Shreider and Sergei Nos, 
who was to become a deputy to Evgenii Belov, when the latter replaced Roshchupkin 
as mayor. A second draft, which scaled down the increase in residents' payments to 40 
per cent, provoked opposition from the KPRF majority in the city soviet (nine 
deputies out of a total of 17) and was rejected early in March 2000. Meanwhile, 
Polezhaev's administration ran a campaign accusing the mayor of trying to rob the 
people of Omsk, although the region's own budget envisaged residents paying for 60 
per cent of the cost of its services. Later that month, an open letter to the people of 
Omsk from seven members of the regional assembly and five deputies in the city 
soviet set off a campaign for a referendum on the issue of no confidence in the 
mayor. 78 
Roshchupkin responded in April with an anti-Sibneft press conference at a congress 
of municipalities in Moscow. He argued that the city's income for 2000 was three 
times lower than in the previous year, and that its welfare system, which three years 
earlier had been one of the best in the country, now corresponded to the needs of a 
town with less than a third of the population of Omsk. The press conference got short 
shrift in Nezavisimaia gazeta, one of Berezovskii's other interests. Two months later, 
a commission set up by the presidential administration to investigate budgetary 
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relations in the region came down heavily against the city leadership's claims about 
underfunding. 79 
Roshchupkin was now assailed from every side. A scandal broke about a contract he 
had signed in 1999 with an organisation called Bona Fide, which was alleged to have 
been organising his campaign for re-election when it was supposed to be researching 
ways of attracting foreign investment. The city procurator proposed that the soviet 
should examine a case against the city administration for the misappropriation of 
1,109,000 rubles from the mayor's reserve fund. Employees of one of the city districts 
protested that they were now seven months behind with their pay. Finally, on 18 July, 
the directors of more than 100 enterprises expressed their extreme disappointment 
with Roshchupkin, and appealed to him to resign voluntarily. They included Evgenii 
Belov of Omskenergo, A. Grezin of Polet, A. Kivich of Omskii bekon, A. Trippel' of 
Omskshina, Aleksandr Vereteno of Osha, and Oleg Shishov of Mostovik. Four of the 
five city district heads of administration were also signatories, including Viktor 
Shreider, who was being mentioned as a potential replacement for Roschupkin, and 
soon began to ignore both the mayor and the city soviet completely. The exception 
was Oleg Men'shov, who later came under heavy pressure from the regional 
administration. A number of businessmen claimed that they had only signed under 
pressure from the regional leadership. 80 
By September, Tret'iakov, the vice-govemor, was openly declaring: "We'll do the 
mayor in November". It did not seem to be a good time for Roshchupkin to embark on 
a struggle over the 2001 budget. But if things were going very much Polezhaev's way 
among the elites, the same was not quite the case among the city's general population. 
Roshchupkin's popularity had declined since his re-election the year before but 
Polezhaev's standing had not risen. There was a widespread feeling that both men 
should resign. It was well-known that the Polezhaev family had a grip on powerful 
positions in Sibneft as well as in the region itself. At the end of 1998, for example, 
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Polezhaev succeeded in getting Yeltsin's approval for the replacement of the regional 
head of internal affairs (UVD), Lieutanant-General Evgenii Storozhenko, a man with 
considerable standing in the region who was sympathetic to Roshchupkin, by his own 
man, Viktor Kamertsel', one of his wife's relatives. It was also known that several 
officials, at least one of them nominally under federal authority, had been dismissed, 
intimidated or imprisoned for showing too much independence of the governor, who 
now controlled the region's "power ministries" - internal affairs, the procurator's 
office, and the federal security service (UFSB), as well as the courts. Whatever impact 
this had on people's behaviour towards the authorities, it did not engage their 
sympathy. The mayor's last-ditch efforts to get the regional subsidy increased by 
nearly 35 per cent could therefore be seen as a genuine defence of the public interest, 
for the time being at any rate. According to Roschupkin, the projected subsidy was 
less than half of what it had been in 1997 - so low that it would do little more than pay 
the city's employees their current wages for the year. 81 
Nevertheless, it was in November that the regional leadership made its move to get rid 
of the troublesome mayor once and for all. At the beginning of the month, it won 
control of Omskgorgaz through the agency of Vladimir Volkov, the former vice- 
mayor whom Polezhaev had pressured to resign a year earlier. Volkov turned out to 
have the controlling packet of shares in the company, and the threat of prosecution 
still hung over him. Two weeks later, on 14 November, the budget easily passed its 
first reading at the regional assembly, where 20 out the 27 members present voted. for 
it. In the debate, Roshchupkin said it meant the destruction of municipal organisation 
in the city. Golushko replied that the city and its administration had long since parted 
company, and denounced the mayor as a bankrupt who had lost people's trust. "If the 
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regional administration had had the legal opportunity to put less resources for 2001 at 
the disposal of the mayor's office, " he said, "we would definitely have taken it. " On 
20 November, Roschchupkin's press centre stated that the budget did indeed mean the 
destruction of the city itself. It concluded: "The administration of the city of Omsk 
declares its determination to fight for the rights of the people of Omsk to a life with 
dignity it . 
82 
What happened next was shrouded in some confusion in both Omsk and Moscow. It 
was variously reported at the beginning of December that Roshchupkin had accepted 
a ministerial post and had already left for the capital, that he had accepted it but was 
not going to leave until he had cleared up his affairs in Omsk, that he had not accepted 
it at all, and that the federal agency concerned knew nothing about it. It was also 
reported that Polezhaev was going to be "taken off' to Moscow as well, raising the 
prospect of impending gubernatorial elections. Andrei Golushko was said to have 
flown out to Chukotka with Potapov not just to support Roman Abramovich's 
campaign for governor there, but to seek the oligarch's blessing as a candidate to 
replace Polezhaev in Omsk. Polezhaev himself was reported to be none too pleased 
about the speed with which Golushko began amassing funds for his campaign. 
Rumours of Polezhaev's impending resignation persisted until well into the new 
year. 83 
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Roshchupkin was offered the post of deputy chairman of the State Committee of the 
Russian Federation for Construction and Housing (Gosstroi) on 28 or 30 November 
2000, possibly in a way that did not easily permit a refusal. The mayor kept silent for 
a week before unexpectedly catching an early flight to Moscow on 6 December, when 
he was due to appear at a session of the city soviet. The issue seems to have remained 
unclear, publicly at any rate, until a special session of the soviet on 15 December 
unanimously accepted his resignation on the grounds of "a transfer to state 
employment from 18 December 2000". As the now ex-mayor left, he agreed to give 
an interview to any of the regional television channels, as long as it was broadcast 
live. No interview took place. Roshchupkin later explained that he felt he had to 
resign as staying on would have condemned the city to a catastrophe. Taking inflation 
into account, he said, the 2001 budget for the city approved by the region was 25 per 
cent lower than in the previous year. The budget for Ekaterinburg, a city of 
comparable size and importance, had been twice as high even in the very worst times. 
In the past three years, Omsk as a provider of welfare support had gone from being in 
the top ten regional capitals to bottom. Unlike other observers, he did not blame this 
on the loss of tax revenue from companies, especially Sibneft, which had registered 
beyond its jurisdiction. Instead, he pointed to the region's "short-sighted economic 
policy" which had kept its income at more or less the same level for the past four 
years while those in the neighbouring regions had been rising. He described this as the 
result of "a non-economic decision - to take from the weak for the benefit of the 
strong". Although he hoped that the city would benefit from his departure, he feared 
nothing much would change so long as the basic problem - the insufficient public 
funds raised in the region - was not tackled. 
84 
Like many others who were involved in the affairs of the Omsk region, officials of the 
new Siberian Federal District (UFD) were careful to keep on the right side of its 
governor, in public at any rate. Despite a carefully-prepared appeal from Roschupkin, 
Leonid Drachevskii, the UFD presidential representative, resolutely refused to take 
sides right up until 10 November 2000, the date of his last visit to Omsk before the 
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mayor's departure. Igor' Spiridonov, Polezhaev's press secretary, commented that 
Drachevskii's neutral stance suited the governor. In an interview four months later, 
Viktor Mironov, the federal inspector for the region, issued what amounted to a 
blanket approval for practically everything Polezhaev had done before, during and 
after Roshchupkin's resignation, which he felt had enabled a significant improvement 
in relations between the city and the regional authorities to take place. He indicated 
that Roshchupkin's post with Gosstroi was a federal solution to a fruitless conflict 
which could not have been resolved within the region. In an evasive answer, Mironov 
admitted that the presidential administration had initially considered getting both men 
out of the region. He said he thought this had now been dropped, but immediately 
added that a Moscow post might well be offered to Polezhaev at some point in the 
future. This lent credence to the scenario outlined by Andrei Egorov, in which 
Drachevskii, having repeatedly failed in his attempts at reconciliation, finally 
delivered some kind of ultimatum to both Polezhaev and Roshchupkin in September 
2000. The repeated and apparently well-founded reports that Polezhaev was going to 
resign as part of a deal with the federal authorities suggest that the governor might 
have been playing Moscow along until Belov's election as mayor on 18 March 2001 
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secured his position on his home ground . 
Roshchupkin's abrupt departure for Moscow on the morning of 6 December 2000 may 
have had something to do with Polezhaev's activities in the preceding days. The 
governor had reacted swiftly to the news of the Gosstroi appointment, initiating an 
effective takeover of the city by the regional executive. This represented the climax of 
a long campaign to detach the lower levels of the city administration from the mayor's 
office. Getting the heads of administration of the city districts to sign the open letter 
calling for Roshchupkin's resignation in July 1999 had been an important step 
forward. In November 2000, Polezhaev had transferred the city's territorial 
committees of social self-administration to the authority of the region. On 5 
January 2001, <http: //siberia. strana. ru/print/979907795. htn-A>, accessed 27 July 2001; "Mer Omska 
Valerii Roshchupkin ushel v otstavku". 
85 "Mer Omska rasskazhet Drachevskomy o svoikh pretenziiakh k gubernatoru", Strana-Ru, 9 
November 2000, <http: //siberia. strana. ru/print/973784556. html>, accessed 29 July 2001; OPga 
Konovalova, "Polpred ne primiril omskogo gubematora i mera", Strana. Ru, 15 November 2000, 
<http: //siberia. strana. nL/print/974191867. htnil>, accessed 30 April 2001; Egorov, "'Ofshor', kak sposob 
bor'by"; Dmitrii Vinogradov, "Federal'nyi inspektor Viktor Mironov: Omsk ustal ot konfliktov", 
Strana. Ru, 21 March 2001, <http: //siberia. strana. ru/print/985190265. htn-ý>, accessed 30 March 2001. 
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December, the day before Roschupkin left, Polezhaev set up a headquarters under 
Golushko's command which was to exercise control over the city. Until then, 
Roshchupkin had, as Egorov observed, been in no hurry to leave. Perhaps it was only 
when he realised how weak and exposed his position had become that an immediate 
and unannounced flight to Moscow suddenly seemed imperative. 86 
Aleksei Men'shov, the head of administration of the Sovetskii district who had refused 
to sign the July 1999 letter against Roshchupkin now began to feel the force of 
Polezhaev's revenge. The worn-out heating system in his district, which had been the 
subject of many appeals to the regional administration, broke down. Golushko's new 
headquarters stood by and did nothing. Ironically, many of the freezing cold flats 
belonged to workers from the oil refinery. Shortly before Christmas, Polezhaev took 
steps to have Men'shov prosecuted for failing in his legal responsibility to make 
proper preparations for the cold season "with catastrophic social and technological 
results". At the same time, Polezhaev signed an agreement with Aleksandr Sterliagov, 
former first deputy to Roshchupkin and now acting mayor, which gave the regional 
administration a direct role in city decision-making. The official regional press release 
suggested that cooperation between the two authorities was the solution to all the 
city's problems. However, the last few announcements posted on the internet by 
Roshchupkin's administration indicated that Sovetskii was not the only district in 
trouble. On 7 December, for example, 11,000 flats in the city were reported to be 
without gas as Sibneft had reduced the supply. On 8 December, a 24-hour telephone 
hotline was opened for Central district residents with heating, gas or water supply 
problems. One of Sterliagov's first announcements, on the other hand, recorded the 40 
per cent rise he had authorised after Christmas for the city's public sector 
employees. 87 
86 Konovalova, "Sviato mesto, pusto ne byvaet"; Egorov, "'Ofshor', kak sposob bor'by". 
87 1 Vse kommunal'nye sluzhby Sovetskogo okruga rabotaiut v avariinom rezhime", OfitsiaNyi sait 
merii goroda Omska, 14 December 2000, 
<http; Hwww2. ornsk. ru/city/ornsknews. nsf/7aI d76d451 ... /243 2 efdcd024 
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Documen>, accessed 17 December 2000; "Omskii gubernator poprosil prokuraturu proverit'ispolnenie 
zakonov neugodnyin emu glavnoi okruga", Strana. Ru, 22 December 2000, 
<http: //siberia. strana. ru/print/977494198. html>, accessed 29 July 2001; "Obladministratsila 1 merila 
Omska namereny zakliuchit'soglashenie o vzaimodeistvii", Strana. Ru, 21 December 2000, 
<http: //sibena. strana. ru/print/977417293. htrril>, accessed 29 July 2001; "Novosti: Vlasti prishli k 
soglasiiu" [includes text of agreement], Omskii region: Server administratsii Omskoi oblasti, 22 
December 2000, <http: //region. omskelecom. ru/russian/information/news/view. asp? id=353>, accessed 
24 July 2001; "Otpusk golubogo topliva ot'Sibnefti'opiat'snizilsia", OfitsiaNyi sait merii goroda 
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Preparations now went ahead to install a new city leadership. Although Polezhaev 
professed not to favour any mayoral candidate, he did let slip that someone who had 
to do with electricity would be useful for the city. The regional administration's 
website publicised an appeal by six big employers' organisations in support of Evgeniii 
Belov, the director of Omskenergo, a week before the election commission fixed the 
date of the ballot. Over the following two months, measures were taken and deals 
struck to ensure that Belov had no serious rivals. Vice-governor Aleksandr Luppov 
and acting mayor Sterliagov decided not to stand without Polezhaev's blessing. 
Aleksandr Korotkov resigned as vice-governor on 8 February in order to stand in the 
election, but was immediately given reason to fear that he might repeat the experience 
of Vladimir Fedorenko, the former chief tax inspector of Omsk, who had spent 18 
months in prison before being released for lack of evidence. Korotkov fled to 
Moscow, where the presidential administration guaranteed his safety in Omsk. While 
he was away, the regional election commission rejected his candidacy, mainly 
because he had not supplied any evidence of no longer being vice-govemor. When he 
returned, the rejection was upheld in court on the grounds that the chairman of the 
election commission had supplied evidence of his being under federal investigation 
for embezzlement. Viktor Shreider, potentially the most serious challenger to Belov, 
was appointed as a vice-governor on 15 March, three days before the election. This 
was widely interpreted to be a reward for not standing. The KPRF, which commanded 
30 to 40 per cent of the electorate, agreed not to put up a candidate but to support 
Belov in exchange for promises of such positions as vice-mayor or speaker of the city 
soviet. Media support for Belov was not far from absolute, especially once Novosti 
Konkretno, the last independent television news provider in the region, was closed 
down. 88 
Omska, 14 December 2000, 
<http; //www2. omsk-ru/city/omsknews. nsf/7ald76d451 ... /6ld7cO87aecf'OeO3c62569b5OOl889bd? Open 
Docurnen>, accessed 17 December 2000; "Kruglosutochnyi avariinyi telefon -51 -00-00", Ofitsial'nyi 
sait merii goroda Omska, 14 December 2000, 
<http; Hwww2. omsk. ru/city/omsknews. nsf/7al d76d45 ... /4935888bad773e49c62569b5OOl8b7aa? Open 
Docurnen>, accessed 17 December 2000; "Zarplata biudzhetnikov pobyshaetsia", Ofitsial'nyi sait merii 
goroda omska, 5 January 2001, 
<http; Hwww2. ornsk. ru/city/omsknews. nsf/newsview/092F6E2EF59269C8462569CB00317F 1 9>, 
accessed 5 January 2001. 
88 11 Novosti: V Omske dosrochno vyberut mera", Omskii region: Server administratsii Omskoi oblasti, 
11 January 2001, <http: //region. oniskelecom. ru/russian/infonnatlon/news/view. asp? id=382>, accessed 
24 July 2001; 01'ga Konovalova, "Vybory mera Omska: pobedit gubernator", Strana-Ru, 17 January 
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Belov came in "the undoubted leader", as the regional administration's website put it, 
with 58.2 per cent of the vote. But he himself confessed to being concerned about the 
fact that over 70 per cent of the electorate had not turned out, and that 23 per cent of 
those who did turn out voted against all candidates. The aftermath of the election was 
in many ways as predictable as had been the result of the vote. Belov soon made it 
clear that he had no intention of depriving Sibneft and the other former big taxpayers 
of the mild regime in their "offshore villages". He merged part of his management 
team from Omskenergo with much of the existing administration. Most city 
employees got a 25 per cent pay rise, a few got 40 per cent. When it came to the city 
budget, which had still not been submitted to the soviet, his views varied considerably 
in the brief period after the election. At first, he insisted on the need for strict 
economy. Just over a fortnight later, he was speculating about the possibility of 
getting the region to increase its subsidy by not far short of the 35 per cent 
Roshchupkin had been advocating six months earlier. The new regime promised to be 
exceptionally business-friendly, initiating an Industry and Enterprise Council in July 
which was headed by Belov himself. The participants looked forward to getting more 
city property made available for rent, and to exploiting more fully the opportunities 
provided by municipal orders. 89 
2001, <http: //siberia. strana. ru/print/979753862. htrril>, accessed 27 July 2001; OPga Konovalova, W 
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Meanwhile, investment in the region appeared to have shrunk from $493 million in 
the first quarter of 2000 to $12.9 million in the first quarter of 2001. Sibneft reported 
that it had more than doubled its net profit from $315,100,000 in 1999 to 
$674,800,000 in 2000, a year in which it was said to have paid proportionately less 
tax than any other oil company in Russia. And at a social event in Omsk where both 
the mayor and the governor were present, a Channel 12 commentator remarked that 
"something was not quite right" between them. It was so similar to the way the 
conflict between Roshchupkin and Polezhaev had emerged into public view that some 
local journalists reported an instant and powerful sensation of dej a vu. 90 
5.4 Conclusion 
There are many differences between Omsk and Tiumen. Some of them were touched 
on at the end of the last chapter - natural resources, territorial structure, size, 
distribution of population, position. The specifics of political development in the two 
regions do not have much in common, apart from the length and intensity of their 
respective conflicts. In the case of Tiumen, the elites in two of the territories of the 
region have reversed their traditional subordination to the elite of the third. In the case 
of Omsk, the regional elite has fought to regain control of its capital for the second 
time in ten years. These are real differences which affect the lives of millions of 
people, and cannot, in that sense, be dismissed as superficial or insubstantial. 
Yet when one looks at the conclusion to the Tiumen case study in Chapter 4, the 
similarities are extremely striking. Indeed, the first paragraph of that conclusion could 
be applied to Omsk almost word for word, apart from the last point about dependence 
on local natural resources. These similarities are summarised below in the form of 
answers to the questions about Omsk which ended the last chapter. 
90 11 Ob"em investitsii v omskuiu ekonornicku za god sokratilsia pochti v 40 raz", Omskaia gazeta, 26 
June 2001, <http: //www. doinfo. infomsk. ru/mews. php3? bid=106202&id=106198>, accessed 29 June 
2001; "Finansovye rezul'taty Sibnefti v 2000-m godu", Sibneft', 
<http: //www. sibneft. ru/printhtmljsp? lang=2&path=content/rus/newsroom/press/&page=260601a. htm> 
. accessed 
28 June 2001; Anna Raff, "Sibneft Doubles Net Profit to $675M", The Moscow Times, 27 
June 2001, <http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2001/06/27/041-print. htnil>, accessed 27 June 
2001; Pavlovskil, "Cherez skvazhiny k kreslam"; Wer Omska Evgenii Belov vper-vye pokritikoval 
gubematorskii telekanal", Omskaia gazeta, 27 June 2001, 
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Is its economy characterised by a narrow product dependency? Has any such 
dependency varied since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and, if so, how? 
Increasing domination by the Omsk refinery is a long-term trend, and has been 
particularly pronounced since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Table 5.1 has 
shown. In addition, Sibneft's ownership of the refinery and its acquisition of other 
economic interests have made it the key economicfactor in the region. Places like 
Kogalym, Surgut, and Nefteiugansk in the Tiumen region can be described as 
company towns. But each town "belongs" to a different company, whereas Omsk can 
with some justification be seen as a company region. Omsk may be more diversified 
economically than Tiumen in terms ofproduction (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2) but not in 
terms of ownership and control. 
Is continuity the dominant feature at the elite level? If so, are there associated features 
such as generational change, or the colonisation by administrative and economic elites 
of major representative institutions? 
The indications of elite continuity are at least as clearly marked in Omsk as in 
Tiumen. Generational change within the elite may have been more gradual and less 
traumatic. Omsk did not experience anything like the Gorbachev purges of the mid- 
1980s in the Tiumen oil industry. Maniakin did not depart with the finality of 
Bogomiakov. Democratic and nationalist "outsiders" have figured more prominently 
in the political life of Omsk than in that of Pumen, but this was only temporary. In 
addition, they were not allowed anywhere near the real centres of regional power. 
Only in the case of Shoikhet did an outsider get into any position ofpolitical power 
inside the region, and again this was temporary. There is a significant level of 
colonisation by administrative and economic elites of the major representative 
institution, the regional assembly. Taken together with the interpenetration of the 
Sibneft network and the regional leadership, this indicates a close association of 
continuity and homogeneity in the regional elite. 
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Have developments inside the region corresponded to a shift from uncontrolled to 
unresolved decentralisation? 
The disposal of the Shoikhet challenge precisely corresponded to this shift. It marked 
the consolidation in the region of the Polezhaev elite, just as the constitution marked 
the consolidation of the power of the AO elites in Tiumen, and of regional elites in 
general. There is a strongly Soviet air about Polezhaev's centralisation of the region 
and his dislike of independence on the part of subordinates. At the same time, what he 
is defending is a great change - the accrual ofpower to the regional elite, something 
very un-Soviet indeed. 
Have there been any significant elite splits inside the region? If so, how far do they 
relate to differences of economic interest? 
Rival economic interests have been central to the recurrent conflict between the 
regional and city leaderships. The point at issue is essentially similar to that in the 
Tiumen region between the oblast and okrug authorities, although the specifics of the 
situation and, of course, the outcome have been very different. The city provides the 
bulk of the tax base but the region controls the revenue. This was clearly the key issue 
in the struggle between Polezhaev and Roshchupkin, which turned out to be much 
more protracted and serious than that between the governor and Shoikhet, although it 
was in formal terms much less political. In both cases, there was just as close an 
association between economic issues and issues of control, as there has been in a 
different way in Tiumen. 
Has the influence oft the region of central political elites declined while the political 
significance of corporate elites has risen? 
Yes. Polezhaev's hostility to Roshchupkin went hand-in-hand with his willingness to 
offer fiscal freedom to Sibneft and other major enterprises in 1998. Both he and 
Golushko have campaignedfor Abramovich in Chukotka, and Golushko considered 
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the oligarch's approval crucial to his plans to stand for governor. By contrast, the 
careful neutrality of the federal authorities at the climax of the Polezhaev- 
Roshchupkin conflict, and their inability to impose an even-handed solution testify to 
the consolidation of the Omsk regional leadership vis-a-vis the centre. In its way, this 
was as significant an indication of the trend as was the victory of Sobianin in the 
Tiumen gubernatorial election. 
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Conclusion 
How well do the conclusions of the case studies fit with the initial hypothesis? 
It will be remembered that in Chapter 1 continuity and change, rather than being 
opposed to each other as they were in most of the literature, were seen as combined 
characteristics of Russian elites in general and of regional elites in particular. This 
held out the possibility of avoiding the polarisations which dominated the literature. 
On the general level, Kryshtanovskaia and White produced a systematic account of 
elite continuity but their picture of change was a muddled structure of bifurcated and 
trifurcated elites. Lane and Ross, on the other hand, squeezed their research results 
through some narrow definitions which favoured the interpretation that change was 
the decisive feature of elites in post-Soviet Russia. When it came to regional elites, 
Hughes came down on the side of continuity and homogeneity and excluded change 
and differentiation altogether. Melvin and Magomedov, by contrast, tended to avoid 
the issue, which made it impossible to gauge the significance of the aspects of change 
on which they preferred to concentrate. All these views were based on the assumption 
that both continuity and change were crucially associated with the composition of 
elites. The specific combination set out in the hypothesis at the end of the chapter was 
that continuity was the main feature of the composition of the regional elites while 
change typified the regime, the power structure through which those elites operated. 
Such an association of continuity and change suggested an evaluation of the past of 
Russian centre-region relations and a treatment of their present "as history". This is 
not a common approach in elite analysis. Gavin Helf s study of the role of regional 
elites in the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet Russia seems almost unique. 
Chapter 2 identified centralism as the dominant theme in the history of the Russian 
regions. At the same time, centrifugal tendencies in the late Soviet period were 
discussed, as was the abandonment by Gorbachev of "the circular flow of power", the 
arrangement which held the elite hierarchy of the CPSU together from the top. This 
last point had a special bearing on the discussion and periodisation of decentralisation 
which occupied the -following chapter. 
In particular, it led to the view that the nature 
of regime change in Russia, the unexpected loss of the "single vertical" which had 
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structured elite relations into a familiar hierarchy for more than six decades, 
predisposed the elites to fragmentation and mutual hostility. The process of transition 
drained power away from the central political elites. Regional elites benefited from 
this devolution of power. But the central authorities were left too weak to impose 
clear new definitions of elite relations within the regions themselves. Hence the 
vagueness and ambiguity of the 1993 constitution and subsequent federal legislation, 
interventions, and pronouncements on relations between okrugs and oblasts, and 
between mayors and governors. Chapter 3 therefore concluded with an elaboration of 
the original hypothesis, namely that the process of regime change had led to a general 
destructuring and disruption of relations between otherwise unchanged elites. This 
explained how the general cleavage between central and regional elites could be 
complemented by particular divisions within the regions themselves. 
Tiumen, which has been the subject of very little research, was a case in point, as 
Chapter 4 established. On the one hand, the elites bore strong signs of continuity. On 
the other, the traditionally subordinate okrug elites had supplanted the traditionally 
dominant oblast elite. Moreover, they had done so in defiance of president Putin, 
whose impotence was the culmination of previous attempts at intervention by the 
centre. Chapter 4 also established five points of comparison for the Omsk case study 
which followed. Despite obvious differences between the two regions, the similarities 
on these points of comparison were, as Chapter 5 concluded, extremely striking. The 
Omsk case study revealed a high degree of elite continuity combined, in this case, 
with the repeated breakdown of relations between the regional elite and the leadership 
of the regional capital. This was an interesting contrast with Melvin's study of the 
Omsk regional elite, which had treated the mayor-governor conflict as marginal 
compared with the importance of elections. As in Tiumen, the shift from spontaneous 
to unresolved decentralisation was clearly marked, and the central political elites 
played a decreasingly effective role, especially when compared with the senior 
management of Sibneft, the main corporate elite in the region. In both cases, the 
breakdown of traditional elite relations provided the opportunity for conflict, while 
rival economic interests supplied the motivation. These economic fault lines still 
exist, as does the legislative vagueness about them. The recent resolution of conflict 
in both regions should therefore be treated with some caution. 
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The completion of the project indicates that the initial hypothesis was flexible enough 
to allow for some elaboration in the first part of the thesis, as well as proving 
productive in terms of the actual results of the research. These indicate that continuity 
is the clearly dominant feature of the composition of the regional elites in the case 
study regions. This is associated with the interlocking of elites noted by Hughes, 
which in the case study regions links local elites to corporate structures. At the same 
time, change in the form of fragmentation and conflict is the key characteristic of the 
regime both in terms of elite relations within the case study regions and in tenns of 
relations between regional elites and the central elites. While the devolution of power 
provides a crucial condition for such conflict, the issue of control over revenue from 
profitable assets supplies the motive. 
This naturally raises the question of how applicable the conclusions arrived at here 
might be to the Russian Federation as a whole. An obvious answer is that 
confirmation would depend on further research in a different part of the country, such 
as European Russia or the Far East. But there are grounds for thinking that 
significance of this project may not be confined to a part of western Siberia. The fact 
is that Tiumen is three regions in one, two of which are resource-rich, like a number 
of the donor regions, one of which is not, like the vast majority of regions in the 
country. It is also a fact that Omsk is not the only case of serious mayor-governor 
conflict, since these have also occurred in regions as diverse and far apart as 
Primorskii krai, Sverdlovsk, and Krasnodar. But there are at least three more general 
reasons for believing that these case studies of Tiumen and Omsk have broader 
implications. 
One reason has to do with the nature of regime change. Had the upper nomenklatura 
been capable of reforming its traditional structures, crucially the CPSU, without 
abolishing the circular flow of power, it might have been able for some time to cope 
with decentralising tendencies in its own ranks inside Russia itself. Had the upper 
nomenklatura been overthrown, then the problem might never have arisen. Ironically, 
the kind of elite fragmentation and conflict which typifies post-Soviet Russia is 
largely the result of a relatively peaceful, relatively gradual process of reform which 
was initiated and led largely from within the political establishment. 
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Another reason concerns the nature of decentralisation. Against the background of 
Soviet centralisation, the decentralisation or devolution of power was barely 
distinguishable from elite fragmentation. This devolution occurred "horizontally", 
outwards, as it were, to large corporations or FIGs (financial-industrial groups), as 
well as "vertically" or downwards to the regions and beyond. These power-shifts plus 
the loss of the CPSU destabilised relationships between the elite groups most 
intimately involved in the business of the new state. Given the hierarchical nature of 
Soviet elites, a military analogy seems appropriate. The elites which emerged from 
the collapse of the USSR were rather like an officer corps which has survived a 
catastrophic reverse of some kind almost intact, but at the cost of a breakdown in the 
chain of command. Their cohesiveness has sharply deteriorated. The lack of clarity 
about who is subordinate to whom and to what degree opens the door to competing 
claims and conflicts. 
The third reason is connected with what was described in the introduction to Chapter 
5 as "economic regression". In the wider context, this means the reduction of much of 
the Russian economy - hence most of the more fortunate regions - to a narrow 
dependency on raw material production and processing. Like many other elite 
conflicts, the ones investigated here have primarily been motivated by control over 
revenue from profitable assets. This kind of elite conflict and economic regression are 
locked together in a vicious circle. The vast majority of Russian regions are unable to 
develop because they lack the necessary resources. The minority of producer regions 
cannot diversify because the income they generate at the moment is in such 
desperately short supply. And it is precisely because it is in such short supply that the 
elites fight over it. 
Change from above, the devolution of power among the elites, and economic 
regression constitute general conditions for elite conflict. The implication is that 
Tiumen and Omsk are variants of a much broader trend. It is only an implication, 
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